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致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
过去一年，我们的登记股东从约1900人增加到约2900人。这一增长主要源于我们与蓝筹印花公司的合并，但同时，“自然”增长的步伐也有所加快，使我们从几年前1000人的水平提升至此。
原文
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago.
拥有如此多的新股东，有必要总结一下我们在经理人与所有者关系方面所遵循的主要商业原则：
- 尽管我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。查理·芒格和我将我们的股东视为所有者合伙人，并将我们自己视为管理合伙人。（由于我们的持股规模，无论好坏，我们也是控股合伙人。）我们并不将公司本身视为我们业务资产的最终所有者，而是将公司视为股东拥有这些资产的渠道。
原文
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager-owner relationship:
- Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
- 与这种所有者导向一致，我们的董事都是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的主要股东。至少在五位董事中的四位，其家庭净资产的50%以上由伯克希尔的持股构成。我们吃自己做的饭。
原文
- In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
- 我们的长期经济目标（在后文有一些限定条件）是最大化每股内在商业价值的年均增长率。我们不以伯克希尔的规模来衡量其经济意义或表现；我们以每股的进展来衡量。我们确信，未来每股进展的速度将会放缓——大幅扩大的资本基础将导致这一点。但如果我们的比率未能超过美国大型公司平均水平，我们会感到失望。
原文
- Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
- 我们的首选是通过直接拥有一系列多元化的业务来实现这一目标，这些业务能够产生现金并持续获得高于平均水平的资本回报。其次的选择是拥有类似业务的部分股权，主要通过我们的保险子公司购买可流通的普通股来实现。业务的价格和可用性以及保险资本的需求决定了任何给定年份的资本配置。
原文
- Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
- 由于这种双管齐下的业务所有权方法以及传统会计的局限性，合并后的报告收益可能相对较少地揭示我们真实的经济表现。查理和我，作为所有者和经理人，实际上忽略了这些合并数字。然而，我们也将向您报告我们控制的每一项主要业务的收益，我们认为这些数字非常重要。这些数据，连同我们将提供的关于各个业务的其他信息，通常应有助于您对其进行判断。
原文
- Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
- 会计结果不会影响我们的运营或资本配置决策。当收购成本相似时，我们更愿意购买根据标准会计原则无法向我们报告的2美元收益，而不是购买可报告的1美元收益。这正是我们经常面临的抉择，因为整个企业（其收益将完全可报告）的售价通常是其一小部分（其收益将基本不可报告）按比例计算价格的两倍。整体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计这些未报告的收益将通过资本收益完全反映在我们的内在商业价值中。
原文
- Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
- 我们很少使用大量债务，即使使用，我们也试图以长期固定利率的方式构建债务。我们会拒绝有趣的机会，也不愿过度杠杆化我们的资产负债表。考虑到我们对保单持有人、存款人、贷款人以及众多将异常大比例净资产托付给我们照管的股权持有人所承担的受托责任，这种保守主义虽然影响了我们的业绩，但却是唯一让我们感到舒适的行为方式。
原文
- We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.
- 管理层的“愿望清单”不会以股东利益为代价来实现。我们不会通过以控制价格收购整个企业来进行多元化，这种价格忽视了收购对我们的股东造成的长期经济后果。我们只会用您的钱做我们用自己钱会做的事情，充分权衡您通过直接购买股票来实现投资组合多元化所能获得的价值。
原文
- A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
- 我们认为，良好的意图应定期对照结果进行检验。我们通过评估留存收益是否随时间推移为股东每留存1美元带来了至少1美元的市场价值，来检验留存收益的明智性。迄今为止，这一检验已经通过。我们将继续以五年滚动的方式应用这一检验。随着我们净资产的增长，明智地使用留存收益变得更加困难。
原文
- We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
- 只有在收到与我们付出的商业价值相等时，我们才会发行普通股。这一规则适用于所有形式的发行——不仅是合并或公开募股，还包括债转股、股票期权和可转换证券。我们不会以与整个企业价值不一致的方式出售您公司的一小部分——而这正是发行股份的本质。
原文
- We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance—not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company—and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to—on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
- 您应该完全了解查理和我共有的一个态度，这种态度损害了我们的财务表现：无论价格如何，我们对出售伯克希尔拥有的任何优质业务毫无兴趣，并且只要期望次级业务至少能产生一些现金，只要我们对它们的管理层和劳资关系感觉良好，我们就非常不愿意出售它们。我们希望不再重复导致我们陷入这些次级业务的资本配置错误。并且，我们对那种通过大量资本支出就能使我们的差劲业务恢复令人满意的盈利能力的建议持非常谨慎的态度。（预测会是炫目的——倡导者会是真诚的——但最终，在一个糟糕的行业中进行重大额外投资，通常就像在流沙中挣扎一样没有回报。）尽管如此，金罗美式管理行为（每轮都舍弃你最不具前景的业务）不是我们的风格。我们宁愿让整体结果稍微受到惩罚，也不愿参与其中。
原文
- You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling—the advocates will be sincere—but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.
- 我们将在报告中坦诚相待，强调对评估商业价值重要的优点和缺点。我们的准则是：如果我们的位置互换，我们会想知道哪些商业事实，就告诉您哪些。我们至少应该做到这一点。此外，作为一家拥有重要媒体业务的公司，如果我们在报道自己时采用的标准不如我们期望新闻工作者报道他人时所采用的标准那样准确、平衡和深刻，那是不可原谅的。我们也相信坦诚对我们管理者有益：公开误导他人的CEO最终可能会在私下里误导自己。
原文
- We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
- 尽管我们坚持坦诚政策，但我们将只在法律要求的范围内讨论我们在有价证券方面的活动。好的投资想法是稀有的、有价值的，并且与好的产品或业务收购想法一样，会受到竞争性侵占。因此，我们通常不会谈论我们的投资想法。这一禁令甚至延伸至我们已出售的证券（因为我们可能会再次购买），以及我们被错误传闻正在买入的股票。如果我们否认这些报道，但在其他场合说“无可奉告”，那么“无可奉告”就成了确认。
原文
- Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
教条问答到此结束，现在我们可以进入1983年的高潮——收购内布拉斯加家具城的多数股权，以及我们与罗斯·布姆金及其家族的合作。
原文
That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high point of 1983—the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her family.
内布拉斯加家具城
去年，在讨论那些头脑聪明但肾上腺素充沛的经理人如何争先恐后地进行愚蠢收购时，我引用了帕斯卡的话：“我注意到，人类所有的不幸都源于一个单一的原因，那就是他们不能安静地待在房间里。”
即使是帕斯卡，也会为了布姆金夫人而离开房间。
大约67年前，当时23岁的布姆金夫人说服了一名边境卫兵，让她离开俄罗斯前往美国。她没有受过正规教育，甚至连小学水平都没有，也不懂英语。在美国待了几年后，她的大女儿每天晚上把白天在学校学到的单词教给她，她才学会了这门语言。
1937年，在卖了多年旧衣服后，布姆金夫人攒下了500美元，用来实现她开一家家具店的梦想。看到芝加哥的美国家具城——当时全国家具批发活动的中心——她决定将她的梦想命名为内布拉斯加家具城。
当一家只有500美元资金、没有地点或产品优势的企业与富有且根深蒂固的竞争对手竞争时，她遇到了你能预料到的每一个障碍（以及一些你预料不到的）。在早期的一个阶段，当她微薄的资源耗尽时，“B夫人”（一个个人商标，现在在大奥马哈地区的知名度不亚于可口可乐或三合一咖啡）用了一种商学院不教的方式来应对：她干脆把家里的家具和电器卖掉，以便按承诺向债权人付款。
奥马哈的零售商开始意识到B夫人能为客户提供远比他们以往提供的更好的交易，于是他们向家具和地毯制造商施压，要求他们不要卖给她。但通过多种策略，她获得了商品并大幅削价。接着B夫人被以违反公平贸易法告上法庭。她不仅赢得了所有案件，还获得了无价的名声。在一次案件结束时，她向法庭证明了自己能够以远低于市价的价格盈利销售地毯，然后她卖给了法官价值1400美元的地毯。
如今，内布拉斯加家具城从一个占地20万平方英尺的店面实现年销售额超过1亿美元。美国没有其他家居用品商店的销售量能接近这个数字。光这一个店售出的家具、地毯和电器就超过了奥马哈所有竞争对手的总和。
在评估一项业务时，我总会问自己一个问题：假设我有充足的资本和熟练的人员，我是否愿意与它竞争？我宁愿与灰熊搏斗，也不愿与B夫人和她的后代竞争。他们采购精明，运营费用比率令竞争对手想都不敢想，然后他们将大部分节省下来的钱让利给客户。这是理想的业务——建立在为客户提供卓越价值的基础上，而这又转变为其所有者的卓越经济效益。
B夫人既聪明又智慧，出于远见的家族原因，她去年愿意出售这项业务。几十年来，我一直钦佩这个家族和这项业务，交易很快就达成了。然而，现已90岁的B夫人并不打算回家，用她的话说，以免“失去理智”。她仍然担任董事长，并且每周七天都在销售一线。地毯销售是她的专长。她个人销售的数量，足以让其他地毯零售商的一个部门感到自豪。
我们购买了90%的业务——将10%留给了参与管理的家族成员——并授予某些关键的年轻家族经理人购买10%股份的期权。
他们是多么优秀的经理人啊。遗传学家应该为布姆金家族鼓掌叫好。B夫人的儿子路易·布姆金多年来一直担任内布拉斯加家具城的总裁，被广泛认为是美国最精明的家具和电器采购员。路易说他有一位最好的老师，B夫人说她有一位最好的学生。他们俩说得都对。路易和他的三个儿子都具备布姆金家族的商业能力、职业道德，最重要的是品格。除此之外，他们还是非常好的人。我们很高兴能与他们合作。
原文
Nebraska Furniture Mart
Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.
About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no English. After some years in this country, she learned the language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she had learned in school during the day.
In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs. Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago—then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity—she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.
She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product advantage goes up against rich, long-entrenched competition. At one early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as promised.
Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her. But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet.
Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume. That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.
One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business—one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.
Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk, as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good departmental total for other carpet retailers.
We purchased 90% of the business—leaving 10% with members of the family who are involved in management—and have optioned 10% to certain key young family managers.
And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she had the best student. They’re both right. Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership with them.
公司业绩
1983年，我们的每股账面价值从737.43美元增加到975.83美元，增长了32%。我们从不把这个一年的数字看得太重。毕竟，为什么行星绕太阳公转所需的时间要与商业行动产生回报所需的时间精确同步呢？相反，我们建议至少使用五年的测试作为经济表现的粗略衡量标准。如果五年平均年收益远低于同期美国工业整体的股本回报率，红灯就应该开始闪烁。（如果发生这种情况，请注意我们的解释，正如歌德所观察到的，“当思想枯竭时，言语就变得非常方便。”）
在现有管理层执掌的19年间，每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到975.83美元，年复合增长率为22.6%。考虑到我们目前的规模，这种回报率是无法持续的。那些相信相反观点的人应该从事销售职业，但应避免从事数学工作。
我们以账面价值来报告我们的进展，因为在我们的案例中（尽管并非在所有情况下），它是内在商业价值增长的保守但相当合适的替代指标——*这才是真正重要的衡量标准。*账面价值作为记分衡量标准的优点是易于计算，并且不涉及计算内在商业价值时所使用的主观（但重要）判断。然而，重要的是要理解，这两个术语——账面价值和内在商业价值——具有非常不同的含义。
账面价值是一个会计概念，记录了来自投入资本和留存收益的累积财务投入。内在商业价值是一个经济概念，估计未来现金产出折现到现在的价值。账面价值告诉你已经投入了什么；内在商业价值估计可以取出什么。
一个类比可以说明这种差异。假设你花费相同的金额供两个孩子上大学。每个孩子教育的账面价值（以财务投入衡量）将是相同的。但未来回报的现值（内在商业价值）可能差异巨大——从零到教育成本的许多倍。同样，具有相同财务投入的企业最终也会产生巨大的价值差异。
在伯克希尔，在现有管理层接手的1965财年伊始，每股19.46美元的账面价值大大高估了内在商业价值。所有这些账面价值都由纺织资产组成，这些资产平均而言无法赚取任何接近合理回报率的东西。用我们的类比来说，对纺织资产的投资类似于对基本上浪费的教育投资。
然而，现在我们的内在商业价值已大大超过账面价值。有两个主要原因：
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标准会计原则要求我们保险子公司持有的普通股在账簿上按市值列报，但我们拥有的其他股票则按总成本与市价孰低法列报。1983年底，后一组股票的市值超过账面价值7000万美元（税前），约5000万美元（税后）。这部分超额应属于我们的内在商业价值，但不包含在账面价值的计算中；
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更重要的是，我们拥有几项业务，它们拥有远远超过资产负债表上列报并反映在账面价值中的会计商誉的经济商誉（应恰当地计入内在商业价值）。
商誉，无论是经济商誉还是会计商誉，都是一个深奥的主题，需要的解释比此处更合适。这封信后面的附录——“商誉及其摊销：规则与现实”——解释了经济商誉和会计商誉为何可能且通常存在巨大差异。
你可以一生都不去想商誉及其摊销，仍然过得充实而有价值。但投资和管理的学生应该理解这个主题的细微差别。我自己的思考与35年前相比已发生巨大变化，那时我被教导要偏好有形资产，回避价值主要依赖于经济商誉的业务。这种偏见导致我犯了许多重要的商业不作为错误，尽管作为错误相对较少。
凯恩斯指出了我的问题：“困难不在于新观念，而在于摆脱旧观念。”我的摆脱被大大延迟，部分原因是同一位老师教导我的大部分内容（并且继续）如此非凡地有价值。最终，直接和间接的商业经验使我形成了目前的强烈偏好，即偏好拥有大量持久商誉且使用最少有形资产的企业。
我向那些熟悉会计术语并对理解商誉的商业层面感兴趣的人推荐附录。无论你是否愿意阅读附录，你都应该知道，查理和我相信伯克希尔拥有远高于账面价值所反映的非常重要的经济商誉价值。
原文
Corporate Performance
During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate. (Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed, “When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)
During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.
We report our progress in terms of book value because in our case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in intrinsic business value—the measurement that really counts. Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important) judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value. It is important to understand, however, that the two terms—book value and intrinsic business value—have very different meanings.
Book value is an accounting concept, recording the accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic business value estimates what can be taken out.
An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend identical amounts putting each of two children through college. The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s education would be the same. But the present value of the future payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously—from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do businesses having equal financial input end up with wide variations in value.
At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled investment in a largely-wasted education.
Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:
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Standard accounting principles require that common stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on our books at market value, but that other stocks we own be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market. At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax, or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in our intrinsic business value, but is not included in the calculation of book value;
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More important, we own several businesses that possess economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in intrinsic business value) far larger than the accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance sheet and reflected in book value.
Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The appendix that follows this letter—“Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities”—explains why economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ enormously.
You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although relatively few of commission.
Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience, direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.
I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.
报告收益来源
下表显示了伯克希尔报告收益的来源。1982年，伯克希尔拥有蓝筹印花公司约60%的股份，而在1983年，我们在前六个月拥有60%的股份，此后为100%。相应地，伯克希尔在韦斯科的净权益在1982年和1983年前六个月为48%，1983年剩余时间为80%。由于这些所有权百分比的变动，表格的前两列提供了衡量基础业务表现的最佳指标。
任何业务实体因异常资产出售而产生的所有重大损益，均与证券交易合并计入表格底部附近的“出售证券和异常资产出售”一行，不包含在营业收益中。（我们认为任何一年的已实现资本利得或损失数字毫无意义，但我们认为多年期间的已实现和未实现资本利得总合非常重要。）此外，商誉摊销不计入特定业务，而是根据附录中概述的理由作为单独项目列示。
| 税前收益 | 税后净收益 | ||||||||||
| 总额 | 伯克希尔份额 | 伯克希尔份额 | |||||||||
| 1983 | 1982 | 1983 | 1982 | 1983 | 1982 | ||||||
| (千美元省略) | |||||||||||
| 营业收益： | |||||||||||
| 保险集团： | |||||||||||
| 承保 | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(18,400) | $(11,345) | |||||
| 净投资收入 | 43,810 | 41,620 | 43,810 | 41,620 | 39,114 | 35,270 | |||||
| 伯克希尔-旺贝科纺织 | (100) | (1,545) | (100) | (1,545) | (63) | (862) | |||||
| 联合零售商店 | 697 | 914 | 697 | 914 | 355 | 446 | |||||
| 内布拉斯加家具城(1) | 3,812 | — | 3,049 | — | 1,521 | — | |||||
| 喜诗糖果 | 27,411 | 23,884 | 24,526 | 14,235 | 12,212 | 6,914 | |||||
| 布法罗晚报 | 19,352 | (1,215) | 16,547 | (724) | 8,832 | (226) | |||||
| 蓝筹印花公司(2) | (1,422) | 4,182 | (1,876) | 2,492 | (353) | 2,472 | |||||
| 韦斯科金融——母公司 | 7,493 | 6,156 | 4,844 | 2,937 | 3,448 | 2,210 | |||||
| 互助储蓄与贷款 | (798) | (6) | (467) | (2) | 1,917 | 1,524 | |||||
| 精密钢铁 | 3,241 | 1,035 | 2,102 | 493 | 1,136 | 265 | |||||
| 债务利息 | (15,104) | (14,996) | (13,844) | (12,977) | (7,346) | (6,951) | |||||
| 政府雇员保险公司特别分配 | 21,000 | — | 21,000 | — | 19,551 | — | |||||
| 股东指定捐款 | (3,066) | (891) | (3,066) | (891) | (1,656) | (481) | |||||
| 商誉摊销 | (532) | 151 | (563) | 90 | (563) | 90 | |||||
| 其他 | 10,121 | 3,371 | 9,623 | 2,658 | 8,490 | 2,171 | |||||
| 营业收益 | 82,043 | 41,102 | 72,410 | 27,742 | 68,195 | 31,497 | |||||
| 出售证券和异常资产出售 | 67,260 | 36,651 | 65,089 | 21,875 | 45,298 | 14,877 | |||||
| 总收益 | $149,303 | $ 77,753 | $137,499 | $ 49,617 | $113,493 | $ 46,374 |
(1) 10月至12月 (2) 1982年和1983年不可比；合并中转让了主要资产。
关于韦斯科所拥有业务的讨论，请阅读查理·芒格在第46-51页的报告。1983年底，在健康问题迫使77岁的路易·文森蒂退休时，查理接替他担任韦斯科董事长。在某些情况下，“健康”是一种委婉说法，但就路易而言，除了健康，没有其他原因会让我们考虑他的退休。路易是一个了不起的人，也是一个了不起的经理。
表中列报的政府雇员保险公司特别分配，源于该公司对其部分股份进行要约收购，从我们和其他股东处同时买入。应政府雇员保险公司的要求，我们回购了一定数量的股份，使交易后我们的持股比例与交易前保持一致。我们的销售按比例进行，使我们能够将所得款项视为股息。与个人不同，当收益来自股息而非资本利得时，公司获得的净收益要多得多，因为股息的有效联邦所得税率为6.9%，而资本利得税率为28%。
即使加上这个特殊项目，1983年我们从政府雇员保险公司获得的总股息仍远低于我们应占的政府雇员保险公司收益。因此，无论从会计还是经济角度来看，将赎回收益计入我们报告的收益都是完全合适的。正是因为这个项目金额巨大且不寻常，我们才提请您注意。
显示我们收益来源的表格包括我们拥有的非控制公司的股息，这些公司的有价证券由我们持有。但该表格不包括这些公司保留的、适用于我们所有权的收益。总体而言，随着时间的推移，我们预计这些未分配收益将反映在市场价格中，并一美元一美元地增加我们的内在商业价值，就好像这些收益受我们控制并作为我们利润的一部分报告一样。这并不意味着我们期望所有持股都表现一致；有些会让我们失望，其他的则会带来令人愉快的惊喜。迄今为止，我们的经验比我们最初预期的要好。总体上，我们为每一美元留存收益获得了远超过一美元的市场价值增长。
下表显示了我们1983年底在市场权益证券中的净持有量。所有数字代表伯克希尔持股的100%和韦斯科持股的80%。韦斯科少数股东应占的部分已被排除。
| 股数 | 成本 | 市值 | |||
| (千美元省略) | |||||
| 690,975 | 联合出版公司 | $ 3,516 | $ 26,603 | ||
| 4,451,544 | 通用食品公司(a) | 163,786 | 228,698 | ||
| 6,850,000 | 政府雇员保险公司 | 47,138 | 398,156 | ||
| 2,379,000 | 汉迪与哈曼公司 | 27,318 | 42,231 | ||
| 636,310 | 埃培智集团公司 | 4,056 | 33,088 | ||
| 197,200 | 通用媒体公司 | 3,191 | 11,191 | ||
| 250,400 | 奥美国际集团 | 2,580 | 12,833 | ||
| 5,618,661 | 雷诺兹工业公司(a) | 268,918 | 314,334 | ||
| 901,788 | 时代公司 | 27,732 | 56,860 | ||
| 1,868,600 | 华盛顿邮报公司 | 10,628 | 136,875 | ||
| $558,863 | $1,287,869 | ||||
| 所有其他普通股持股 | 7,485 | 18,044 | |||
| 普通股总计 | $566,348 | $1,305,913 |
(a) 韦斯科持有这些公司的股份。
基于目前的持股和目前的股息率——排除任何特殊项目，例如去年的政府雇员保险公司按比例赎回——我们预计该组公司1984年报告的股息约为3900万美元。我们还可以非常粗略地估计该组公司保留的、归属于我们所有权的收益：全年可能总计约6500万美元。这些留存收益可能不会对证券市场价格产生直接影响。然而，随着时间的推移，我们觉得它们将具有实际意义。
除了已提供的数字外，关于我们控制的业务的信息出现在管理层讨论部分（第40-44页）。其中最重要的是《布法罗晚报》、喜诗糖果和保险集团，我们将在这里特别关注它们。
原文
Sources of Reported Earnings
The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and 80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.
All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix, is set forth as a separate item.
| Earnings Before Income Taxes | Net Earnings After Tax | ||||||||||
| Total | Berkshire Share | Berkshire Share | |||||||||
| 1983 | 1982 | 1983 | 1982 | 1983 | 1982 | ||||||
| (000s omitted) | |||||||||||
| Operating Earnings: | |||||||||||
| Insurance Group: | |||||||||||
| Underwriting | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(33,872) | $(21,558) | $(18,400) | $(11,345) | |||||
| Net Investment Income | 43,810 | 41,620 | 43,810 | 41,620 | 39,114 | 35,270 | |||||
| Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles | (100) | (1,545) | (100) | (1,545) | (63) | (862) | |||||
| Associated Retail Stores | 697 | 914 | 697 | 914 | 355 | 446 | |||||
| Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) | 3,812 | — | 3,049 | — | 1,521 | — | |||||
| See’s Candies | 27,411 | 23,884 | 24,526 | 14,235 | 12,212 | 6,914 | |||||
| Buffalo Evening News | 19,352 | (1,215) | 16,547 | (724) | 8,832 | (226) | |||||
| Blue Chip Stamps(2) | (1,422) | 4,182 | (1,876) | 2,492 | (353) | 2,472 | |||||
| Wesco Financial — Parent | 7,493 | 6,156 | 4,844 | 2,937 | 3,448 | 2,210 | |||||
| Mutual Savings and Loan | (798) | (6) | (467) | (2) | 1,917 | 1,524 | |||||
| Precision Steel | 3,241 | 1,035 | 2,102 | 493 | 1,136 | 265 | |||||
| Interest on Debt | (15,104) | (14,996) | (13,844) | (12,977) | (7,346) | (6,951) | |||||
| Special GEICO Distribution | 21,000 | — | 21,000 | — | 19,551 | — | |||||
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (3,066) | (891) | (3,066) | (891) | (1,656) | (481) | |||||
| Amortization of Goodwill | (532) | 151 | (563) | 90 | (563) | 90 | |||||
| Other | 10,121 | 3,371 | 9,623 | 2,658 | 8,490 | 2,171 | |||||
| Operating Earnings | 82,043 | 41,102 | 72,410 | 27,742 | 68,195 | 31,497 | |||||
| Sales of securities and unusual sales of assets | 67,260 | 36,651 | 65,089 | 21,875 | 45,298 | 14,877 | |||||
| Total Earnings | $149,303 | $ 77,753 | $137,499 | $ 49,617 | $113,493 | $ 46,374 |
(1) October through December
(2) 1982 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were transferred in the merger.
For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, “health” is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man and has been a marvelous manager.
The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock, buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request, we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership percentage the same after the transaction as before. The proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.
Even with this special item added in, our total dividends from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is large and unusual that we call your attention to it.
The table showing you our sources of earnings includes dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable equity securities we own. But the table does not include earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us, others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for every dollar of earnings retained.
The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.
| No. of Shares | Cost | Market | |||
| (000s omitted) | |||||
| 690,975 | Affiliated Publications, Inc. | $ 3,516 | $ 26,603 | ||
| 4,451,544 | General Foods Corporation(a) | 163,786 | 228,698 | ||
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation | 47,138 | 398,156 | ||
| 2,379,000 | Handy & Harman | 27,318 | 42,231 | ||
| 636,310 | Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. | 4,056 | 33,088 | ||
| 197,200 | Media General | 3,191 | 11,191 | ||
| 250,400 | Ogilvy & Mather International | 2,580 | 12,833 | ||
| 5,618,661 | R. J. Reynolds Industries(a) | 268,918 | 314,334 | ||
| 901,788 | Time, Inc. | 27,732 | 56,860 | ||
| 1,868,600 | The Washington Post Company | 10,628 | 136,875 | ||
| $558,863 | $1,287,869 | ||||
| All Other Common Stockholdings | 7,485 | 18,044 | |||
| Total Common Stocks | $566,348 | $1,305,913 |
(a) WESCO owns shares in these companies.
Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates—excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional redemption last year—we would expect reported dividends from this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about $65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities. Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.
In addition to the figures already supplied, information regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.
布法罗晚报
首先，澄清一点：我们的公司名称是布法罗晚报公司，但自一年多前我们开始发行早间版以来，报纸的名称是《布法罗新闻》。
1983年，《布法罗新闻》略微超过了其10%的税后目标利润率。有两个因素造成这一结果：(1) 州所得税成本低于正常水平，原因是有一笔现已完全使用的大额亏损结转；(2) 新闻纸每吨成本大幅下降（这是一个意料之外的特例情况，将在1984年逆转）。
尽管我们1983年的利润率大约与《布法罗新闻》这类报纸的平均水平相当，但考虑到布法罗的经济和零售环境，该报的表现仍然是一项显著的成就。
布法罗集中了重工业，这部分经济在最近的衰退中受到特别严重的打击，并且复苏滞后。随着布法罗消费者遭受痛苦，该报的零售客户也在受苦。过去几年中，它们的数量有所减少，许多幸存下来的客户也削减了广告版面。
在这种环境下，《布法罗新闻》有一个非凡的优势：其公众接受度，这通过报纸的“渗透率”（社区内每天购买报纸的家庭百分比）来衡量。我们的比率非常出色：在截至1983年9月30日的六个月中，《布法罗新闻》在美国100家最大报纸中工作日渗透率排名第一（该排名基于审计媒体联盟编制的“城市区域”数据）。
在解读排名时，重要的是要注意许多大城市有两家报纸，在这种情况下，任何一家报纸的渗透率必然低于像布法罗这样只有一家报纸的城市。尽管如此，前100家最大报纸的名单中包括许多在该城市是唯一报纸的报纸。在这些报纸中，《布法罗新闻》在全国排名第一，远远领先于许多全国最知名的日报。
在同组大报的周日版中，《布法罗新闻》的渗透率排名第三——比许多知名报纸高出十到二十个百分点。布法罗的情况并非一直如此。下面我们展示1977年之前几年布法罗的周日发行量与当前时期的对比。在较早的时期，周日版是《信使快报》（当时《布法罗新闻》不出版周日版）。当然，现在周日版是《布法罗新闻》。
| 平均周日发行量 | ||
| 年份 | 发行量 | |
| 1970 | 314,000 | |
| 1971 | 306,000 | |
| 1972 | 302,000 | |
| 1973 | 290,000 | |
| 1974 | 278,000 | |
| 1975 | 269,000 | |
| 1976 | 270,000 | |
| 1984 (当前) | 376,000 |
我们相信，报纸的渗透率是衡量其特许经营权实力的最佳指标。在对大型本地零售商具有主要兴趣的地理区域内拥有异常高渗透率，且在其他地方发行量相对较少的报纸，对这些零售商来说是异常高效的购买选择。低渗透率的报纸向广告商传达的信息要弱得多。
我们认为，有三个因素在很大程度上解释了《布法罗新闻》在社区中不寻常的接受度。其中，第2点和第3点也可能解释了《星期日布法罗新闻》相比其作为唯一周日版时的《星期日信使快报》更受欢迎的原因：
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第一点与《布法罗新闻》的优点无关。布法罗的移民和外来移民都相对较低。一个稳定的人口比一个流动的人口对社区活动更感兴趣、参与度更高——因此，对本地日报的内容也更感兴趣。增加城市的进出流动，渗透率就会下降。
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《布法罗新闻》以其编辑质量和诚信享有盛誉，这一声誉由我们长期担任编辑、传奇般的阿尔弗雷德·基尔希霍夫塑造，并由默里·莱特保持和发扬。这一声誉对于我们在与根深蒂固的竞争对手竞争时成功创办周日版至关重要。而没有周日版，《布法罗新闻》长期将无法生存。
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《布法罗新闻》名副其实——它提供了非常大量的新闻。1983年，我们的“新闻版面”（编辑材料——非广告）占报纸内容的50%（不包括预印插页）。在那些主导其市场且规模相当或更大的报纸中，我们只知道一家的新闻版面百分比超过《布法罗新闻》。没有全面的数据，但抽样调查显示平均百分比在30%以上。换句话说，逐页比较，我们的组合为读者提供的新闻比典型报纸多出25%以上。这种新闻丰富的组合是故意的。一些出版商为了追求更高的利润率，在过去十年中削减了新闻版面。我们保持了我们的新闻版面，并将继续这样做。只要编写和编辑得当，丰富的新闻内容使我们的报纸对读者更有价值，并有助于我们实现不寻常的渗透率。
尽管《布法罗新闻》的特许经营权实力雄厚，但ROP广告版面（印刷在报纸页面内的广告，与预印插页相对）的增长将非常难以实现。1983年，我们的预印插页获得了巨大增长：行数从930万增加到1640万，收入从360万美元增加到810万美元。这些增长与全国趋势一致，但在我们的情况下，因《信使快报》停刊而获得的业务而被放大。
总的来说，从ROP广告转向预印插页对我们有负面的经济影响。预印插页的盈利能力较低，且该业务更容易受到替代递送方式的竞争。此外，ROP广告版面的减少意味着分配给新闻的绝对空间减少（因为新闻版面百分比保持不变），从而降低了报纸对读者的实用性。
斯坦·利普西在年中接替退休的亨利·厄本成为《布法罗新闻》的发行人。在我们推出周日版后的诉讼和亏损的黑暗日子里，亨利从未退缩——当时推出周日版的明智性受到许多报业人士质疑，包括我们大楼内的一些人。亨利受到布法罗商界的钦佩，受到所有为他工作的人的钦佩，也受到查理和我的钦佩。斯坦与亨利合作了几年，并自1969年以来一直为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作。他个人参与了报纸业务从编辑到发行的所有具体方面。我们无法做得更好。
原文
Buffalo Evening News
First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.
In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be reversed in 1984).
Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance, nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.
Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers. Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of those surviving have cut their linage.
Within this environment the News has one exceptional strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the paper’s “penetration ratio”—the percentage of households within the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone” numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).
In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.
Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News ranks number three in penetration—ten to twenty percentage points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it is the News.
| Average Sunday Circulation | ||
| Year | Circulation | |
| 1970 | 314,000 | |
| 1971 | 306,000 | |
| 1972 | 302,000 | |
| 1973 | 290,000 | |
| 1974 | 278,000 | |
| 1975 | 269,000 | |
| 1976 | 270,000 | |
| 1984 (Current) | 376,000 |
We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling message to present to advertisers.
In our opinion, three factors largely account for the unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these, points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the sole Sunday paper:
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The first point has nothing to do with merits of the News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested and involved in the activities of its community than is a shifting population—and, as a result, is more interested in the content of the local daily paper. Increase the movement in and out of a city and penetration ratios will fall.
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The News has a reputation for editorial quality and integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was enormously important to our success in establishing a Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the long run.
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The News lives up to its name—it delivers a very unusual amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole” (editorial material—not ads) amounted to 50% of the newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts). Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent. Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have cut their news holes during the past decade. We have maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly written and edited, a full serving of news makes our paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our unusual penetration ratio.
Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983: lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6 million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we picked up when the Courier-Express closed.
On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less and the business is more subject to competition from alternative means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the paper to the reader.
Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction of the Sunday paper—an introduction whose wisdom was questioned by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community, he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do better.
喜诗糖果店
喜诗的财务业绩依然卓越。该业务拥有宝贵而牢固的消费特许经营权，以及同样宝贵和坚实的管理者。
近年来，喜诗遇到了两个重要问题，其中至少有一个正在顺利解决中。那个问题涉及成本，不包括原材料成本。近年来，我们在原材料成本方面享受了优惠，当然，我们的竞争对手也是如此。总有一天，我们会在相反的方向上遇到一个令人不快的意外。实际上，原材料成本在很大程度上超出我们的控制，因为作为惯例，我们会购买我们能买到的最优质的原料，无论其价格水平如何变化。我们将产品质量视为神圣不可侵犯。
但其他类型的成本更可控，正是在这方面我们遇到了问题。按每磅计算，近几年我们的成本（不包括原材料成本）的增长速度显著高于一般价格水平的增长。扭转这一趋势对我们的竞争地位和盈利潜力至关重要。
近几个月，成本控制已得到显著改善，我们确信1984年这些成本的增长速度将低于通胀率。这种信心源于我们与查克·哈金斯管理才能的长期合作经验。我们收购当天就由查克负责，他的业绩简直非凡，如下表所示：
| 约12月31日结束的52-53周财年 | 销售收入 | 税后营业利润 | 售出糖果磅数 | 年末营业店铺数 | ||||
| 1983 (53周) | $133,531,000 | $13,699,000 | 24,651,000 | 207 | ||||
| 1982 | 123,662,000 | 11,875,000 | 24,216,000 | 202 | ||||
| 1981 | 112,578,000 | 10,779,000 | 24,052,000 | 199 | ||||
| 1980 | 97,715,000 | 7,547,000 | 24,065,000 | 191 | ||||
| 1979 | 87,314,000 | 6,330,000 | 23,985,000 | 188 | ||||
| 1978 | 73,653,000 | 6,178,000 | 22,407,000 | 182 | ||||
| 1977 | 62,886,000 | 6,154,000 | 20,921,000 | 179 | ||||
| 1976 (53周) | 56,333,000 | 5,569,000 | 20,553,000 | 173 | ||||
| 1975 | 50,492,000 | 5,132,000 | 19,134,000 | 172 | ||||
| 1974 | 41,248,000 | 3,021,000 | 17,883,000 | 170 | ||||
| 1973 | 35,050,000 | 1,940,000 | 17,813,000 | 169 | ||||
| 1972 | 31,337,000 | 2,083,000 | 16,954,000 | 167 |
如表所示，我们面临的另一个问题是近期在实现销售磅数的有意义增长方面缺乏能力。整个行业也面临同样的问题。但多年来我们在这方面一直优于行业，而现在我们不再如此。
尽管店铺数量每年略有增加（分销费用也随之增加），但我们零售店近四年的磅数销量几乎每年都无变化。当然，由于我们大幅提价，美元销售额有所增长。但我们认为零售趋势最重要的衡量标准是每家店铺的单位销量，而非美元销售额。在同店基础上（仅统计全年开业的店铺），所有数据均调整为52周年度，1983年磅数下降了0.8%。这一小幅下降是我们自1979年以来最好的同店表现；自那时起的累计下降约为8%。占我们总量约25%的大宗订单量，在1970年代经历巨大增长后，近年已趋于平稳。
我们不确定这种销量持平——无论是在零售店领域还是大宗订单领域——在多大程度上是由于我们的定价策略，又在多大程度上是由于行业销量停滞、经济衰退以及我们在主要销售区域已经拥有的非凡市场份额所致。我们1984年的提价幅度远低于过去几年，希望明年能向您报告更好的销量数据。但我们没有依据来预测这一点。
尽管存在销量问题，喜诗的优势众多且重要。在我们的主要销售区域西部，我们的糖果比任何竞争对手都更受消费者欢迎。事实上，我们相信大多数巧克力爱好者更喜欢它，甚至胜过价格是其两到三倍的糖果。（在糖果和股票中，价格和价值可能不同；价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。）我们店铺的客户服务质量——全国范围内由我们而非特许经营商运营——与产品质量一样好。愉快、乐于助人的员工与盒子上的标志一样，都是喜诗的标志。在一个需要雇佣约2000名季节性工人的业务中，这绝非易事。据我们所知，没有哪个规模相当的组织能比查克·哈金斯及其同事提供的客户服务质量更好。
由于我们在1984年提价幅度非常温和，我们预计喜诗今年的利润将与1983年大致相同。
原文
See’s Candy Shops
The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional. The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise and a manager equally valuable and solid.
In recent years See’s has encountered two important problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price levels. We regard product quality as sacred.
But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the increase in the general price level. It is vital to our competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this trend.
In recent months much better control over costs has been attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by the following table:
| 52-53 Week Year Ended About December 31 | Sales Revenues | Operating Profits After Taxes | Number of Pounds of Candy Sold | Number of Stores Open at Year End | ||||
| 1983 (53 weeks) | $133,531,000 | $13,699,000 | 24,651,000 | 207 | ||||
| 1982 | 123,662,000 | 11,875,000 | 24,216,000 | 202 | ||||
| 1981 | 112,578,000 | 10,779,000 | 24,052,000 | 199 | ||||
| 1980 | 97,715,000 | 7,547,000 | 24,065,000 | 191 | ||||
| 1979 | 87,314,000 | 6,330,000 | 23,985,000 | 188 | ||||
| 1978 | 73,653,000 | 6,178,000 | 22,407,000 | 182 | ||||
| 1977 | 62,886,000 | 6,154,000 | 20,921,000 | 179 | ||||
| 1976 (53 weeks) | 56,333,000 | 5,569,000 | 20,553,000 | 173 | ||||
| 1975 | 50,492,000 | 5,132,000 | 19,134,000 | 172 | ||||
| 1974 | 41,248,000 | 3,021,000 | 17,883,000 | 170 | ||||
| 1973 | 35,050,000 | 1,940,000 | 17,813,000 | 169 | ||||
| 1972 | 31,337,000 | 2,083,000 | 16,954,000 | 167 |
The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The industry has the same problem. But for many years we outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.
The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume, about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following very large poundage gains throughout the
这些公司在1982年底的净资产总和为750亿美元，占《财富》500强企业净资产和净利润总额的12%以上。按照我们的假设，投资者总体上每年为了满足他们“财务折腾”的偏好，而放弃了这个惊人资本规模所产生的全部收益。此外，每年超过20亿美元的投资管理费——这些钱是用来购买换椅子建议的——相当于投资者放弃了美国最大五家银行机构（花旗银行、美国银行、大通曼哈顿银行、汉华银行和摩根大通）的全部收益。这些昂贵的活动可能决定了谁来分这块蛋糕，但它们并没有把蛋糕做大。
（我们注意到，有一种“做大蛋糕”的说法，认为这类活动提高了资本配置过程的合理性。我们认为这种论点似是而非，而且总的来说，过度活跃的股票市场会破坏合理的资本配置，并成为蛋糕的缩水者。亚当·斯密认为，自由市场中所有非共谋行为都受到一只无形之手的引导，使经济实现最大进步；而我们的观点是，赌场式的市场和一触即发的投资管理则像一只无形的脚，绊倒并拖慢了向前发展的经济。）
将这种过度活跃的股票与伯克希尔对比一下。目前我们股票上的买卖价差大约是30个点，略高于2%。根据交易规模的不同，伯克希尔卖方收到的款项与买方支付的成本之间的差异，范围可以从低至4%（仅涉及少量股票的交易）到大约1.5%（在大额交易中，通过协商可以降低做市商的价差和经纪商的佣金）。由于大部分伯克希尔股票是以相当大的交易量进行交易的，因此所有交易中的价差平均可能不超过2%。
与此同时，伯克希尔股票的真实换手率（不包括交易商之间交易、赠与和遗赠）每年大概为3%。因此，我们的股东总体上每年可能支付伯克希尔市值的万分之六作为转让特权费用。根据这个非常粗略的估算，大约是90万美元——这不是一个小数目，但远低于平均水平。拆股会增加这项成本，降低我们股东群体的素质，并鼓励市场价格与内在商业价值的关联度降低。我们没有看到任何抵消性的优势。
杂项
去年在这个部分，我发了一则小广告以鼓励收购候选对象。在我们的传播业务中，我们告诉广告客户，重复是取得成果的关键（事实确实如此），因此我们将再次重复我们的收购标准。
我们偏好：（1）大额收购（至少500万美元的税后利润），（2）已证明的持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们没什么兴趣，扭亏为盈的情况也一样），（3）在很少或没有负债的情况下获得良好净资产收益率的企业，（4）有现成的管理层（我们无法提供），（5）简单的业务（如果包含大量技术，我们无法理解），（6）有报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步地谈论交易，浪费我们或卖方的时间）。
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内——告知我们是否感兴趣。我们更倾向于用现金购买，但也会考虑发行股票，前提是我们收到的内在商业价值与我们付出的相当。我们欢迎潜在的卖家通过联系我们过去合作过的对象来了解我们。对于合适的企业——以及合适的人——我们可以提供一个好的归宿。
大约96.4%的合格股份参与了我们1983年的股东指定捐赠计划。根据该计划进行的总捐赠——在1984年初拨付，但全部在1983年列支——为3,066,501美元，共有1353家慈善机构受益。尽管从参与股份的百分比来看，响应程度异常地好，但从参与股东的百分比来看，响应程度却不那么理想。原因很可能是通过合并获得的大量新股东对该计划不熟悉。我们敦促新股东阅读第52-53页关于该计划的描述。
如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股票是以实际所有者的名义登记的，而不是以“券商”或代名人名义登记。未在1984年9月28日之前以这种方式登记的股份将没有资格参与任何1984年的计划。
蓝筹/伯克希尔的合并进行得非常顺利。每家公司的反对合并的股份都不到总量的千分之一，也没有人提出评估请求。1983年，我们从合并中获得了一些税收效率，并预计未来会获得更多。
合并带来一个有趣的侧面影响：伯克希尔现在有1,146,909股流通股，而1965财年初（现任管理层接手时）是1,137,778股。如果您当时拥有公司1%的股份，现在您将拥有0.99%。因此，今天所有的资产——《新闻报》、喜诗糖果、内布拉斯加家具城、保险集团、价值13亿美元的可流通股票等——都是在几乎完全没有稀释原始股东权益的情况下，添加到最初的纺织资产之上的。
我们很高兴前蓝筹股东加入我们。为了帮助您理解伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们乐意寄给您《1977-1981年年报致股东信汇编》和/或《1982年年报》。请寄信至公司地址：内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基维特广场1440号，邮编68131。
1984年3月14日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事长
附录
商誉及其摊销：规则与现实
本附录只讨论经济和会计上的商誉，而非日常所指的善意。例如，一个企业可能被大多数客户喜爱甚至热爱，但却没有经济商誉。（AT&T在分拆前普遍被认为不错，但连一分钱的经济商誉都没有。）而且，遗憾的是，一个企业可能被客户讨厌，却拥有巨大且不断增长的经济商誉。所以，暂时放下情感，只关注经济学和会计学。
当一家企业被收购时，会计准则要求购买价格首先要分配到所收购的可辨认资产的公允价值上。通常，分配给资产的公允价值之和（扣除负债后）会低于企业的总购买价格。在这种情况下，差额被归入一个名为“成本超过所获净资产权益的金额”的资产账户。为了避免不断重复这个冗长的说法，我们将用“商誉”来代替。
1970年11月之前收购的企业所产生的会计商誉具有特殊地位。除非在极少数情况下，只要收购的企业被保留，它就可以作为资产负债表上的资产保留。这意味着不需要通过每年从收益中扣除摊销费用来逐渐冲销这项资产。
然而，对于1970年11月之后的收购，情况就不同了。当这些收购产生商誉时，必须在不超过40年的时间内，通过每年从收益账户中扣除等额的费用来摊销。由于40年是允许的最长期限，因此管理层（包括我们）通常选择40年。这项每年从收益中扣除的费用不允许用作税收抵扣，因此，它对税后收入的影响大约是大多数其他费用的两倍。
这就是会计商誉的运作方式。要了解它如何与经济现实不同，让我们看一个身边的例子。为了便于理解，我们将四舍五入一些数字，并大大简化。我们还会提到一些对投资者和管理者的启示。
蓝筹印花在1972年初以2500万美元收购了喜诗糖果，当时喜诗约有800万美元的有形净资产。（在整篇讨论中，应收账款将被归类为有形资产，这个定义适合商业分析。）这个水平的有形资产足以在没有债务的情况下经营业务，除了季节性的短期需求。当时喜诗每年的税后利润约为200万美元，而且这个盈利数字似乎保守地代表了以1972年不变美元计算的未来盈利能力。
因此，我们的第一堂课是：当一企业可以预期在其有形资产上持续获得远高于市场回报率的收益时，其价值逻辑上远超其有形净资产。这种超额收益的资本化价值就是经济商誉。
在1972年（以及现在），很少有企业能像喜诗那样，持续获得25%的有形净资产税后回报率——而且是在采用保守会计且无财务杠杆的情况下实现的。产生这种超额回报率的并非存货、应收账款或固定资产的公允市场价值。而是一系列无形资产的组合，尤其是基于消费者对产品和人员无数次愉快体验所建立起来的、广泛而良好的声誉。
这种声誉创造了消费者特许经营权，使得产品对购买者的价值，而非其生产成本，成为销售价格的主要决定因素。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的主要来源。其他来源包括不受利润监管的政府特许经营权，例如电视台，以及在一个行业中作为低成本生产商的持久地位。
让我们回到喜诗案例的会计处理。蓝筹购买喜诗支付了超过有形净资产1700万美元的价格，这要求在蓝筹的账簿上建立一个同等金额的商誉资产账户，并在40年内每年从收益中扣除42.5万美元来摊销该资产。到1983年，经过11年的摊销，这1700万美元已减少到约1250万美元。与此同时，伯克希尔拥有60%的蓝筹股份，因此也间接拥有60%的喜诗资产。这意味着伯克希尔的资产负债表反映了60%的喜诗商誉，约750万美元。
1983年，伯克希尔通过合并收购了蓝筹的剩余股份，这次合并采用了购买法会计处理，而非一些合并允许的“权益结合法”。在购买法下，我们给予蓝筹股东的股份的“公允价值”必须分摊到从蓝筹收购的净资产上。这个“公允价值”是通过放弃股份的市场价值来衡量的，上市公司在收购中使用自己股份时几乎总是如此。
“购买”的资产包括蓝筹拥有的全部资产的40%（如前所述，伯克希尔已经拥有另外60%）。伯克希尔“支付”的价格超过我们获得的可辨认净资产5170万美元，这部分被分配到两项商誉上：喜诗的2840万美元和《布法罗晚报》的2330万美元。
因此，合并后，伯克希尔为喜诗留下了具有两个组成部分的商誉资产：1971年购买剩余的750万美元，以及1983年“购买”40%股份新产生的2840万美元。我们现在的摊销费用在未来28年每年约为100万美元，在随后的12年（2002年至2013年）每年约为70万美元。
换句话说，不同的购买日期和价格使得我们对同一资产的两个部分获得了截然不同的资产价值和摊销费用。（我们重复我们惯常的免责声明：我们没有更好的会计制度可以建议。需要处理的问题令人难以置信，需要武断的规则。）
但经济现实是什么？一个现实是，自收购喜诗以来每年从收益表中作为成本扣除的摊销费用并非真正的经济成本。我们知道这一点，因为喜诗去年在上缴税后利润1300万美元时，仅使用了约2000万美元的有形净资产——这一表现表明其经济商誉远大于我们会计商誉的全部原始成本。换句话说，当会计商誉自购买之时起定期减少时，经济商誉却以不规则但非常显著的方式在增长。
另一个现实是，未来的年度摊销费用将与经济成本不符。当然，喜诗的经济商誉有可能消失。但它不会以均匀递减或任何类似的方式消失。更有可能的是，由于通货膨胀，商誉会以现价美元（即使不是以不变美元）增加。
这种可能性之所以存在，是因为真正的经济商誉的 nominal value 往往会随通货膨胀按比例上升。为了说明这一点，让我们将喜诗这类企业与一个更普通的企业进行对比。回想一下，我们在1972年购买喜诗时，它以800万美元的有形净资产生成了约200万美元的利润。现在假设我们假设的那个普通企业也产生了200万美元的利润，但正常运营需要1800万美元的有形净资产。如果只提供所需有形资产11%的回报率，那么这家普通企业可能几乎没有或根本没有经济商誉。
因此，这样一家企业的售价可能就只有其有形净资产的价值，即1800万美元。相比之下，我们为喜诗支付了2500万美元，尽管它的盈利能力相同，而“真金白银”的资产却不到一半。正如我们的购买价格所暗示的那样，更少的东西真的可以意味着更多吗？答案是“是的”——即使预计两个企业的单位销量都持平——只要您像我们在1972年那样，预期一个持续通货膨胀的世界。
为了理解原因，设想一下价格水平翻倍随后对这两个企业的影响。两者都需要将名义利润翻倍至400万美元，才能保持与通胀同步。这似乎并不太难：只需以两倍于以前的价格销售相同数量的产品，并且假设利润率保持不变，那么利润也必然翻倍。
但是，至关重要的是，要实现这一点，两个企业都可能需要将其有形净资产的名义投资翻倍，因为通货膨胀通常会对企业（无论好坏）施加这种经济要求。销售额的翻倍意味着相应地需要立即投入更多资金用于应收账款和存货。投入固定资产的资金对通胀的反应会慢一些，但可能同样确定。所有这些由通胀要求的投资都不会带来回报率的提高。这种投资的动机是为了企业的生存，而不是所有者的繁荣。
但是请记住，喜诗只有800万美元的有形净资产。因此，它只需要额外投入800万美元来满足通货膨胀带来的资本需求。与此同时，那个普通企业负担的资本需求要大两倍以上——需要追加1800万美元的资本。
尘埃落定后，年赚400万美元的普通企业可能仍值其有形资产的价值，即3600万美元。这意味着其所有者每投入一美元新资本，仅获得一美元的名义价值增长。（这与他们如果向储蓄账户追加资金所获得的逐元对等结果是一样的。）
然而，同样年赚400万美元的喜诗，如果按照我们购买时相同的逻辑进行估值，其价值可能达到5000万美元。因此，当所有者仅投入800万美元的追加资本时，它将获得2500万美元的名义价值增长——每投入1美元，获得超过3美元的名义价值增长。
但请记住，即便如此，喜诗这类企业的所有者也不得不因通货膨胀而投入800万美元的额外资本，仅仅是为了保持实际利润不变。任何需要一些有形净资产才能运营的无杠杆企业（几乎所有企业都是如此）都会受到通胀的伤害。那些只需要很少有形资产的企业，只不过受伤最轻而已。
当然，这个事实对很多人来说难以理解。多年来，传统智慧——历史悠久但智慧不足——认为通胀保护最好由拥有大量自然资源、厂房和机器或其他有形资产的企业提供（“我们信任有形资产”）。但事实并非如此。资产密集型企业的回报率通常很低——这些回报率往往仅够为现有企业的通胀需求提供资金，而没有任何剩余用于实际增长、分配给所有者或收购新企业。
相比之下，在通胀年代积累起来的伟大企业财富中，有不成比例的一部分来自于拥有那些结合了持久无形资产和相对较低有形资产需求的业务。在这些情况下，利润以名义美元大幅增长，而这些美元很大一部分可用于收购额外的企业。这种现象在通信业务中尤其明显。该业务几乎不需要有形投资——但其特许经营权却经久不衰。在通胀期间，商誉是一份不断给予的礼物。
当然，这个说法只适用于真正的经济商誉。虚假的会计商誉——市面上有不少——则是另一回事。当一个兴奋过度的管理层以愚蠢的价格收购一家企业时，也会遵循前面描述的相同会计惯例。由于无处可去，这种愚蠢行为最终被记入商誉账户。考虑到创造这个账户的管理层缺乏纪律，在这种情况下，也许更应该把它称为“无意商誉”。不管叫什么名字，40年的例行程序通常被遵守，并且被资本化的肾上腺素就像收购是明智的一样，作为“资产”留在账面上。
如果您仍然相信商誉的会计处理是衡量经济现实的最佳方法，我建议您思考最后一点。
假设一家公司每股净资产为20美元，全部是有形资产。进一步假设该公司内部已经开发出了一些极好的消费者特许经营权，或者幸运地通过最初的FCC许可获得了一些重要的电视台。因此，它在有形资产上赚了很多钱，比如说每股5美元，即25%的回报率。
基于这样的经济状况，它的股价可能卖到每股100美元甚至更高，而且通过协商出售整个企业也可能得到这个价格。
假设一位投资者以每股100美元买入该股票，实际上是为每股商誉支付了80美元（就像购买整个公司的公司买家一样）。这位投资者是否应该为计算“真实”每股收益而每年计提每股2美元的摊销费用（80美元除以40年）？如果是这样，新的“真实”每股收益为3美元，是否应该让他重新考虑他的购买价格？
我们认为管理者和投资者都应该从两个角度来看待无形资产：
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在分析经营成果时——也就是说，在评估一个业务单元的基本经济状况时——摊销费用应该被忽略。一个企业在无杠杆的有形净资产上能够期望赚取的收益（不包括任何因商誉摊销而从收益中扣除的费用）是判断该业务经济吸引力的最佳指南。它也是判断该业务经济商誉当前价值的最佳指南。
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在评估收购企业的明智性时，摊销费用也应该被忽略。它们既不应从收益中扣除，也不应从企业成本中扣除。这意味着要永远以购买商誉的全部成本（在任何摊销之前）来看待它。此外，成本应定义为所给予的所有对价（无论合并时相关证券的市场价格如何，也无论是否允许采用权益结合法处理）的全部内在商业价值，而不仅仅是记录的会计价值。例如，在蓝筹合并中，我们为喜诗和《新闻报》40%的商誉真正支付的成本，远多于我们账簿上记录的5170万美元。这种差异之所以存在，是因为在合并中放弃的伯克希尔股票的市场价值低于其内在商业价值，而内在商业价值才定义了我们的真实成本。
从视角（1）来看表现不错的业务，从视角（2）来看可能会黯然失色。好的企业并不总是好的购买对象——尽管它是寻找好企业的地方。
我们将努力收购那些在（1）衡量下具有卓越经营经济性，并且在（2）衡量下提供合理回报的企业。会计后果将被完全忽略。
在1983年底，我们会计账簿上的商誉净额总计6200万美元，包括您在我们资产负债表资产方看到的7900万美元，以及抵消我们持有Mutual Savings and Loan权益账面价值的1700万美元负商誉。
我们相信经济商誉净额远远超过6200万美元的会计数字。