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致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
1995年我们的净资产增加了53亿美元，增幅45.0%。每股账面价值增长略低，为43.1%，这是因为我们以股票支付了两项收购，导致流通股增加了1.3%。过去31年（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长至14,426美元，年复合增长率为23.6%。
原文
Our gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or 45.0%. Per-share book value grew by a little less, 43.1%, because we paid stock for two acquisitions, increasing our shares outstanding by 1.3%. Over the last 31 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $14,426, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.
没有理由为1995年的收益手舞足蹈。这一年，任何傻瓜都能在股市中赚得盆满钵满。我们也是如此。套用肯尼迪总统的话来说，水涨船高——只不过涨的全是游艇。
原文
There’s no reason to do handsprings over 1995’s gains. This was a year in which any fool could make a bundle in the stock market. And we did. To paraphrase President Kennedy, a rising tide lifts all yachts.
撇开财务成果不谈，去年伯克希尔好消息也不少：我们谈判达成了三项完全符合我们期望类型的收购。其中两项，赫兹堡钻石商店和R.C.威利家居，已纳入1995年财务报表，而最大的一笔交易——收购GEICO，则是在年底后立即完成的。（稍后报告中我会详细介绍这三项收购。）
原文
Putting aside the financial results, there was plenty of good news at Berkshire last year: We negotiated three acquisitions of exactly the type we desire. Two of these, Helzberg’s Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, are included in our 1995 financial statements, while our largest transaction, the purchase of GEICO, closed immediately after the end of the year. (I’ll tell you more about all three acquisitions later in the report.)
这些新子公司使我们的收入大约翻了一番。即便如此，这些收购并未显著增加我们的流通股或债务。而且，尽管这三项业务雇佣了超过11,000人，我们的总部员工仅从11人增加到12人。（没必要发疯。）
原文
These new subsidiaries roughly double our revenues. Even so, the acquisitions neither materially increased our shares outstanding nor our debt. And, though these three operations employ over 11,000 people, our headquarters staff grew only from 11 to 12. (No sense going crazy.)
查理·芒格，伯克希尔的副董事长兼我的合伙人，以及我本人，希望打造一个由拥有卓越经济特征并由杰出经理人管理的公司组成的集合——无论是全资还是部分持股。我们最喜欢的收购是那种能通过谈判以公平价格购买100%此类业务的交易。但当股市让我们有机会以远低于收购100%股份所需代价的价格，按比例购买一家优秀企业的少数股权时，我们同样感到高兴。这种双管齐下的方法——通过谈判购买整个企业或通过股票市场购买部分权益——使我们相比坚持单一途径的资本配置者拥有重要优势。伍迪·艾伦曾解释为何折衷主义有效：“双性恋的真正优势在于，它让你周六晚上约会的机会翻倍。”
原文
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to build a collection of companies—both wholly- and partly-owned—that have excellent economic characteristics and that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage of an outstanding business at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%. This double-barrelled approach—purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases of part-interests through the stock market—gives us an important advantage over capital-allocators who stick to a single course. Woody Allen once explained why eclecticism works: “The real advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.”
多年来，我们在思考上一直像伍迪那样，力求增加在优秀企业中的有价证券投资，同时尝试整体收购类似的企业。下表展示了我们在两个方面的进展。表中，我们以十年为间隔，列出了伯克希尔每股所拥有的有价证券。第二列列出了我们所有其他活动产生的每股营业收益（税前，经购买价格调整后，但扣除利息和公司管理费用）。换句话说，第二列显示了我们扣除来自投资的股息、利息和已实现资本利得后的收益。购买价格会计调整被忽略，原因我们已在之前的报告中详细解释过，出于仁慈，这里不再重复。（不过，我们很乐意为受虐狂提供之前的解释。）
| 年份 | 每股有价证券 | 每股税前收益（不含所有投资收入） |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | $4 | $4.08 |
| 1975 | $159 | $(6.48) |
| 1985 | $2,443 | $18.86 |
| 1995 | $22,088 | $258.20 |
| 年增长率：1965-95 | 33.4% | 14.7% |
原文
Over the years, we’ve been Woody-like in our thinking, attempting to increase our marketable investments in wonderful businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses in their entirety. The following table illustrates our progress on both fronts. In the tabulation, we show the marketable securities owned per share of Berkshire at ten-year intervals. A second column lists our per-share operating earnings (before taxes and purchase-price adjustments but after interest and corporate overhead) from all other activities. In other words, the second column shows what we earned excluding the dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from investments. Purchase-price accounting adjustments are ignored for reasons we have explained at length in previous reports and which, as an act of mercy, we won’t repeat. (We’ll be glad to send masochists the earlier explanations, however.)
| Year | Marketable Securities Per Share | Pre-tax Earnings Per Share Excluding All Income from Investments |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 | $ 4.08 |
| 1975 | 159 | (6.48) |
| 1985 | 2,443 | 18.86 |
| 1995 | 22,088 | 258.20 |
| Yearly Growth Rate: 1965-95 | 33.4% | 14.7% |
这些成果并非源于1965年我们制定的某个总体规划。从广义上讲，我们当时知道我们希望实现什么，但并不知道具体的机会会是什么。如今我们依然如此非结构化：随着时间的推移，我们期望改善两栏中的数字，但并无路线图告诉我们如何实现。
原文
These results have not sprung from some master plan that we concocted in 1965. In a general way, we knew then what we hoped to accomplish but had no idea what specific opportunities might make it possible. Today we remain similarly unstructured: Over time, we expect to improve the figures in both columns but have no road map to tell us how that will come about.
我们拥有两个优势：首先，我们的运营经理非常出色，并且在大多数情况下，对伯克希尔有异常强烈的归属感。其次，查理和我拥有丰富的资本配置经验，并努力以理性和客观的态度对待这项工作。我们面临的巨大劣势是规模：在早期，我们只需要好主意，但现在我们需要好的大主意。不幸的是，找到这些想法的难度与我们的财务成功成正比，这个问题日益侵蚀着我们的优势。
原文
We proceed with two advantages: First, our operating managers are outstanding and, in most cases, have an unusually strong attachment to Berkshire. Second, Charlie and I have had considerable experience in allocating capital and try to go at that job rationally and objectively. The giant disadvantage we face is size: In the early years, we needed only good ideas, but now we need good big ideas. Unfortunately, the difficulty of finding these grows in direct proportion to our financial success, a problem that increasingly erodes our strengths.
稍后在本报告中，当我讨论我们提议的资本重组时，我还会更多地谈到伯克希尔的前景。
原文
I will have more to say about Berkshire’s prospects later in this report, when I discuss our proposed recapitalization.
收购
鉴于我们经常在这些页面上质疑大多数管理者的收购行为，对我们在一年的三项收购中欢欣鼓舞，这可能看起来很奇怪。请放心，查理和我并没有失去怀疑精神：我们相信大多数交易会损害收购方股东的利益。很多时候，来自《皮纳福号军舰》的歌词适用：“事物很少像它们看起来那样，脱脂牛奶冒充奶油。”具体来说，卖方及其代表总是提供财务预测，其娱乐价值大于教育价值。在描绘美好前景方面，华尔街与华盛顿不相上下。
原文
Acquisitions
It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers. Rest assured, Charlie and I haven’t lost our skepticism: We believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring company. Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: “Things are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream.” Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably present financial projections having more entertainment value than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios, Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.
无论如何，潜在买家为何要看卖方准备的预测，这让我感到困惑。查理和我从不瞥它们一眼，而是记住那个有匹病马的人的故事。他去看兽医，说：“你能帮我吗？有时我的马走得好好的，有时它跛行。”兽医的回答很直接：“没问题——当它走得好时，卖掉它。”在并购的世界里，那匹马会被当作“秘书处”来推销。
原文
In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an ailing horse. Visiting the vet, he said: “Can you help me? Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps.” The vet’s reply was pointed: “No problem—when he’s walking fine, sell him.” In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse would be peddled as Secretariat.
在伯克希尔，我们在感知未来方面，与其他热衷于收购的公司一样面临着所有困难。和他们一样，我们也面临一个固有问题：卖方几乎总是比买方更了解自己的企业，并且会选择出售时机——一个企业很可能“走得好好的”时候。
原文
At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and also picks the time of sale—a time when the business is likely to be walking “just fine.”
即便如此，我们确实有一些优势，也许最大的优势是我们没有战略计划。因此，我们觉得没有必要按照既定的方向前进（这几乎必然会导致愚蠢的购买价格），而是可以简单地决定什么对我们的所有者有意义。在这样做时，我们总是在心理上把我们正在考虑的任何举动，与我们有待实现的数十种其他机会进行比较，包括通过股票市场购买世界上最好的企业的一小部分。我们进行这种比较——收购与被动投资——的做法，是那些只专注于扩张的经理人很少使用的纪律。
原文
Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest being that we don’t have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market. Our practice of making this comparison—acquisitions against passive investments—is a discipline that managers focused simply on expansion seldom use.
几年前，彼得·德鲁克在接受《时代》杂志采访时触及了问题的核心：“我要告诉你一个秘密：做交易比工作强。交易令人兴奋且有趣，而工作是苦差事。经营任何东西主要都是大量乏味的细节工作……做交易是浪漫的、性感的。这就是为什么会有那么多毫无意义的交易。”
原文
Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got to the heart of things: “I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is grubby. Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of grubby detail work … dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That’s why you have deals that make no sense.”
在进行收购时，我们还有一个优势：作为支付方式，我们可以向卖方提供一种由一系列杰出企业支撑的股票。希望处置一家优秀企业，同时又希望无限期推迟个人纳税的个人或家族，很可能会发现伯克希尔的股票是一种特别舒适的持有物。事实上，我相信，这种考量在1995年我们以股票支付的两项收购中发挥了重要作用。
原文
In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions for which we paid shares in 1995.
除此之外，卖方有时关心的是将他们的公司安置在一个既能持久存在，又能为其经理人提供愉快且富有成效的工作条件的企业之家。在这方面，伯克希尔也提供了特别之处。我们的经理人享有非凡的自主权。此外，我们的所有权结构使卖方能够知道，当我说我们买入是为了持有，这个承诺是有分量的。就我们而言，我们喜欢与关心其公司和员工命运的老板打交道。相比于那些仅仅是在拍卖自己企业的卖家，与这类卖家打交道，买家遇到不愉快意外的可能性更小。
原文
Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning off his business.
除了以上是对我们收购风格的说明之外，这当然也是一个不那么微妙的推销。如果您拥有或代表一家税前利润为2500万美元或以上的企业，并且它符合第23页列出的标准，请给我打电话。我们的讨论将是保密的。如果您现在不感兴趣，请将我们的提议记在心里：我们永远不会失去购买具有良好经济和优秀管理的公司的胃口。
原文
In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch. If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more before tax, and it fits the criteria listed on page 23, just give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you aren’t interested now, file our proposition in the back of your mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying companies with good economics and excellent management.
在结束这篇关于收购的小论文时，我忍不住要重复去年一位公司高管给我讲的故事。他成长的企业是一家优秀的企业，在其行业中拥有长期的领导地位。然而，其主要产品却毫无魅力可言。因此，几十年前，公司聘请了一位管理顾问，他——自然——建议进行多元化，这是当时的风尚。（当时“聚焦”还不流行。）不久，公司收购了许多企业，每一次收购都是在咨询公司进行了长期且昂贵的收购研究之后进行的。结果如何？那位高管悲伤地说：“我们开始时，100%的利润来自原来的业务。十年后，我们获得了150%。”
原文
Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can’t resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who—naturally—advised diversification, the then-current fad. (“Focus” was not yet in style.) Before long, the company acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm had gone through a long—and expensive—acquisition study. And the outcome? Said the executive sadly, “When we started, we were getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After ten years, we were getting 150%.”
赫兹堡钻石商店
几年前，管理顾问们推广了一种叫做“走动式管理”的技术。在伯克希尔，我们设立了“走动式收购”。
原文
Helzberg’s Diamond Shops
A few years back, management consultants popularized a technique called “management by walking around” (MBWA). At Berkshire, we’ve instituted ABWA (acquisitions by walking around).
1994年5月，在年度股东大会后大约一周，我在纽约第五大道和第58街路口过马路时，一位女士喊了我的名字。我听着她告诉我她参加了年会，并且很喜欢。几秒钟后，一位听到那位女士叫住我的男士也停了下来。他原来是巴内特·赫兹堡二世，他持有四股伯克希尔股票，也参加了我们的会议。
原文
In May 1994, a week or so after the Annual Meeting, I was crossing the street at 58th and Fifth Avenue in New York, when a woman called out my name. I listened as she told me she’d been to, and had enjoyed, the Annual Meeting. A few seconds later, a man who’d heard the woman stop me did so as well. He turned out to be Barnett Helzberg, Jr., who owned four shares of Berkshire and had also been at our meeting.
在我们简短的交谈中，巴内特说他有一家企业我们可能会感兴趣。当人们这么说时，通常结果是有个柠檬水摊——当然，有潜力很快成长为下一个微软。所以我只是让巴内特把详细资料寄给我。我心想，这事就到此为止了。
原文
In our few minutes of conversation, Barnett said he had a business we might be interested in. When people say that, it usually turns out they have a lemonade stand—with potential, of course, to quickly grow into the next Microsoft. So I simply asked Barnett to send me particulars. That, I thought to myself. will be the end of that.
不久之后，巴内特给我寄来了赫兹堡钻石商店的财务报表。这家公司是由他的祖父在1915年从堪萨斯城的一家店创办的，到我们见面时已发展成为在美国23个州拥有134家门店的集团。销售额从1974年的1000万美元增长到1984年的5300万美元，再到1994年的2.82亿美元。我们说的可不是柠檬水摊。
原文
Not long after, Barnett sent me the financial statements of Helzberg’s Diamond Shops. The company had been started by his grandfather in 1915 from a single store in Kansas City and had developed by the time we met into a group with 134 stores in 23 states. Sales had grown from $10 million in 1974 to $53 million in 1984 and $282 million in 1994. We weren’t talking lemonade stands.
当时60岁的巴内特热爱这项事业，但也希望从中解脱出来。1988年，作为迈向这个目标的一步，他引进了曾任Wanamaker’s总裁的杰夫·康门特来协助他管理公司。聘用杰夫被证明是成功之举，但巴内特仍然发现自己无法摆脱最终责任的束缚。此外，他拥有一项宝贵的资产，受制于一个单一的、竞争激烈的行业的变幻莫测，他认为将其家族持有的资产多元化是明智之举。
原文
Barnett, then 60, loved the business but also wanted to feel free of it. In 1988, as a step in that direction, he had brought in Jeff Comment, formerly President of Wanamaker’s, to help him run things. The hiring of Jeff turned out to be a homerun, but Barnett still found that he couldn’t shake a feeling of ultimate responsibility. Additionally, he owned a valuable asset that was subject to the vagaries of a single, very competitive industry, and he thought it prudent to diversify his family’s holdings.
伯克希尔对他来说简直是量身定做。我们花了一些时间在价格上达成一致，但我心中从未有过疑问：第一，赫兹堡是我们想要拥有的那种企业；第二，杰夫是我们想要的那种经理人。事实上，如果没有杰夫在那里经营，我们根本不会购买这项业务。购买一家没有良好管理的零售商，就像买埃菲尔铁塔却没有电梯。
原文
Berkshire was made to order for him. It took us awhile to get together on price, but there was never any question in my mind that, first, Helzberg’s was the kind of business that we wanted to own and, second, Jeff was our kind of manager. In fact, we would not have bought the business if Jeff had not been there to run it. Buying a retailer without good management is like buying the Eiffel Tower without an elevator.
我们在1995年通过免税股票交换完成了对赫兹堡的收购，这是巴内特唯一感兴趣的交易方式。尽管他绝对没有义务这样做，但巴内特将他出售所得中的很大一部分与他的许多同事分享了。当有人如此慷慨时，你就知道作为买家你会受到公平对待。
原文
We completed the Helzberg purchase in 1995 by means of a tax-free exchange of stock, the only kind of transaction that interested Barnett. Though he was certainly under no obligation to do so, Barnett shared a meaningful part of his proceeds from the sale with a large number of his associates. When someone behaves that generously, you know you are going to be treated right as a buyer.
赫兹堡平均每家门店的年销售额约为200万美元，远高于经营类似规模门店的竞争对手。这种卓越的单店生产力是赫兹堡获得丰厚利润的关键。如果公司继续保持一流的表现——我们相信它会——它可能相当快地增长到目前规模的数倍。
原文
The average Helzberg’s store has annual sales of about $2 million, far more than competitors operating similarly-sized stores achieve. This superior per-store productivity is the key to Helzberg’s excellent profits. If the company continues its first-rate performance—and we believe it will—it could grow rather quickly to several times its present size.
需要补充的是，赫兹堡与我们在奥马哈的珠宝业务波仙珠宝是完全不同类型的经营，这两家公司将独立运营。波仙珠宝在1995年表现出色，销售额增长了11.7%。其36岁的首席执行官苏珊·雅克表现得更为出色，在圣诞购物季开始时生下了她的第二个儿子。苏珊在晋升后的两年里，已证明自己是一位卓越的领导者。
原文
Helzberg’s, it should be added, is an entirely different sort of operation from Borsheim’s, our Omaha jewelry business, and the two companies will operate independently of each other. Borsheim’s had an excellent year in 1995, with sales up 11.7%. Susan Jacques, its 36-year-old CEO, had an even better year, giving birth to her second son at the start of the Christmas season. Susan has proved to be a terrific leader in the two years since her promotion.
R.C.威利家居
在R.C.威利的案例中，是内布拉斯加家具城的艾夫·布卢姆金进行“走动”的。R.C.威利长期以来一直是犹他州领先的家居装饰企业。多年来，艾夫曾告诉我这家公司的优势所在。他还告诉R.C.威利的首席执行官比尔·蔡尔德，布卢姆金家族对其与伯克希尔的关系感到多么满意。因此，在1995年初，比尔向艾夫提到，出于遗产税和多元化的原因，他本人和R.C.威利的其他所有者可能有兴趣出售。
原文
R.C. Willey Home Furnishings
It was Nebraska Furniture Mart’s Irv Blumkin who did the walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons, he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in selling.
从那时起，事情变得再简单不过了。比尔给我发了一些数字，我给他写了一封信，表明了我对价值的看法。我们很快就数字达成了一致，并且发现我们的个人契合度完美无缺。到年中，合并完成了。
原文
From that point forward, things could not have been simpler. Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was completed.
R.C.威利是一个了不起的故事。1954年，比尔从他的岳父手中接管了这家企业，当时销售额约为25万美元。在这个微小的基础上，比尔运用了梅·韦斯特的哲学：“重要的不是你拥有什么——而是你如何运用你所拥有的。”在兄弟谢尔顿的帮助下，比尔将公司发展到1995年2.57亿美元的销售额，目前占据了犹他州家具业务超过50%的份额。与内布拉斯加家具城一样，R.C.威利除了家具外，还销售电器、电子产品、电脑和地毯。两家公司的销售额大致相同，但NFM的所有业务都来自奥马哈的一个综合体，而R.C.威利将在未来几个月内开设其第六家主要门店。
原文
R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about $250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West’s philosophy: “It’s not what you’ve got—it’s what you do with what you’ve got.” Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances, electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture. Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey will open its sixth major store in the next few months.
零售业是一个艰难的行业。在我的投资生涯中，我目睹了大量零售商在一段时间内享受惊人的增长和极好的股本回报率，然后突然暴跌，常常一路跌至破产。这种流星现象在零售业远比在制造业或服务业更为常见。部分原因是，零售商必须日复一日地保持精明。你的竞争对手总是在复制并超越你所做的一切。与此同时，购物者被各种可以想象的方式吸引去尝试源源不断的新商家。在零售业，安于现状就意味着失败。
原文
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
与这种必须每天保持精明的业务形成对比的是，我称之为只需精明一次的业务。例如，如果你足够精明，在游戏早期就买下了一家电视网，那么你可以安排一个懒散又迟钝的侄子来经营，这家企业仍然可以蓬勃发展几十年。当然，如果你任用汤姆·墨菲，你会做得更好，但没有他，你也能安稳地保持盈利。而对于零售商来说，雇佣那个侄子就是一张通往破产的特快车票。
原文
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business, there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for decades. You’d do far better, of course, if you put in Tom Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him. For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to bankruptcy.
我们今年收购的两家零售企业都拥有出色的管理者，他们热爱竞争，并且几十年来一直成功竞争。和我们其他运营单位的CEO一样，他们将自主运营：我们希望他们觉得他们管理的企业是他们的。这意味着查理和我不会事后批评。我们避免那种校友对足球教练说的态度：“我100%支持你——无论输赢还是平局。”作为所有者，我们的基本目标是，以我们希望我们的所有者对待我们的方式来对待我们的经理人。
原文
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the alumnus whose message to the football coach is “I’m 100% with you—win or tie.” Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
随着我们增加更多的业务，有时我会被问及我能处理多少人向我汇报。我的回答很简单：如果有一个向我汇报的人是废物，那这一个就太多了；而如果我有像我们现在这样的经理人，那么人数几乎是无限的。我们非常高兴比尔和谢尔顿加入我们，并希望我们能够收购其他企业，这些企业也带来类似水平的经理人。
原文
As we add more operations, I’m sometimes asked how many people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon, that’s one too many, and if I have managers like those we now have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar caliber.
GEICO公司
就在年底之后，我们完成了对GEICO的100%收购，GEICO是美国第七大汽车保险公司，承保约370万辆汽车。我与GEICO已有45年的交往，虽然这个故事以前讲过，但这里值得简短回顾一下。
原文
GEICO Corporation
Right after yearend, we completed the purchase of 100% of GEICO, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States, with about 3.7 million cars insured. I’ve had a 45-year association with GEICO, and though the story has been told before, it’s worth a short recap here.
1950-51年，我在哥伦比亚大学商学院学习，不是因为我关心它提供的学位，而是因为我想师从当时在那里任教的本·格雷厄姆。在本的课堂上度过的时光是我个人的高光时刻，并迅速促使我尽可能多地了解我的偶像。我首先查阅了《美国名人录》，在那里发现，除其他事项外，本还是政府雇员保险公司的董事长——对我来说，这是一家位于陌生行业的未知公司。
原文
I attended Columbia University’s business school in 1950-51, not because I cared about the degree it offered, but because I wanted to study under Ben Graham, then teaching there. The time I spent in Ben’s classes was a personal high, and quickly induced me to learn all I could about my hero. I turned first to Who’s Who in America, finding there, among other things, that Ben was Chairman of Government Employees Insurance Company, to me an unknown company in an unfamiliar industry.
接着，一位图书管理员给我推荐了Best’s火灾和意外保险手册，我从中得知GEICO总部位于华盛顿特区。于是，在1951年1月的一个星期六，我乘火车去了华盛顿，前往GEICO的市中心总部。令我沮丧的是，大楼关门了，但我使劲敲门，直到一个门卫出现。我问这个困惑的家伙办公室里是否有人可以谈谈，他说他看到六楼有一个人在办公。
原文
A librarian next referred me to Best’s Fire and Casualty insurance manual, where I learned that GEICO was based in Washington, DC. So on a Saturday in January, 1951, I took the train to Washington and headed for GEICO’s downtown headquarters. To my dismay, the building was closed, but I pounded on the door until a custodian appeared. I asked this puzzled fellow if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he said he’d seen one man working on the sixth floor.
于是我遇到了洛里默·戴维森，总裁助理，后来成为了CEO。虽然我唯一的凭证是格雷厄姆的学生，“戴维”还是慷慨地花了大约四个小时，既友善又充满教诲地对待我。没有人比我更幸运地享受过关于保险业如何运作以及哪些因素能使一家公司脱颖而出这样一个半天的课程。正如戴维所阐明的，GEICO的销售方式——直接营销——使其相对于通过代理人销售的竞争对手拥有巨大的成本优势，而这种分销形式在那些保险公司中根深蒂固，以至于他们无法放弃。在与戴维会面后，我从未对任何股票比GEICO更兴奋。
原文
And thus I met Lorimer Davidson, Assistant to the President, who was later to become CEO. Though my only credentials were that I was a student of Graham’s, “Davy” graciously spent four hours or so showering me with both kindness and instruction. No one has ever received a better half-day course in how the insurance industry functions nor in the factors that enable one company to excel over others. As Davy made clear, GEICO’s method of selling—direct marketing—gave it an enormous cost advantage over competitors that sold through agents, a form of distribution so ingrained in the business of these insurers that it was impossible for them to give it up. After my session with Davy, I was more excited about GEICO than I have ever been about a stock.
几个月后，当我从哥伦比亚大学毕业后回到奥马哈销售证券时，我自然几乎只专注于GEICO。我的第一次销售电话——打给我的爱丽丝姨妈，她总是100%支持我——成功了。但那时我是一个瘦削、不成熟的20岁年轻人，看起来大约17岁，我的推销通常以失败告终。尽管如此，我在1951年底为《商业与金融纪事报》（当时一家领先的金融出版物）的“我最喜欢的证券”专栏写了一篇关于GEICO的简短报告。更重要的是，我用自己的账户购买了股票。
原文
When I finished at Columbia some months later and returned to Omaha to sell securities, I naturally focused almost exclusively on GEICO. My first sales call—on my Aunt Alice, who always supported me 100%—was successful. But I was then a skinny, unpolished 20-year-old who looked about 17, and my pitch usually failed. Undaunted, I wrote a short report late in 1951 about GEICO for “The Security I Like Best” column in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a leading financial publication of the time. More important, I bought stock for my own account.
你可能觉得奇怪，但我保留了我提交的每一份纳税申报单的副本，从1944年的申报单开始。核查后，我发现我在1951年分四次购买了GEICO股票，最后一次购买是在9月26日。这种坚持的模式让我觉得，我自我陶醉的倾向很早就形成了。我可能在那个9月的一天，在未能成功向某个潜在客户推销后回来，决定——尽管我已经将超过50%的净资产投入GEICO——进一步加仓。无论如何，那一年我累计购买了350股GEICO股票，成本为10,282美元。年底，这些持股价值13,125美元，超过了我净资产的65%。
原文
You may think this odd, but I have kept copies of every tax return I filed, starting with the return for 1944. Checking back, I find that I purchased GEICO shares on four occasions during 1951, the last purchase being made on September 26. This pattern of persistence suggests to me that my tendency toward self-intoxication was developed early. I probably came back on that September day from unsuccessfully trying to sell some prospect and decided—despite my already having more than 50% of my net worth in GEICO—to load up further. In any event, I accumulated 350 shares of GEICO during the year, at a cost of $10,282. At yearend, this holding was worth $13,125, more than 65% of my net worth.
你可以理解为什么GEICO是我的初恋业务。此外，为了完成这次怀旧之旅，我还应该补充一点，我购买GEICO股票所用的资金，大部分是通过投递《华盛顿邮报》赚来的，而这家公司的主要产品后来使伯克希尔有可能将1000万美元变成5亿美元。
原文
You can see why GEICO was my first business love. Furthermore, just to complete this stroll down memory lane, I should add that I earned most of the funds I used to buy GEICO shares by delivering The Washington Post, the chief product of a company that much later made it possible for Berkshire to turn $10 million into $500 million.
唉，我在1952年以15,259美元的价格卖出了我所有的GEICO头寸，主要是为了换入Western Insurance Securities。这种不忠行为可以部分地被这样一个事实所原谅：Western的售价仅略高于其当期收益的一倍，这个市盈率不知何故引起了我的注意。但在接下来的20年里，我卖出的GEICO股票价值增长到了大约130万美元，这让我学到了一个教训：出售一家明确是优秀公司的股权是多么不明智。
原文
Alas, I sold my entire GEICO position in 1952 for $15,259, primarily to switch into Western Insurance Securities. This act of infidelity can partially be excused by the fact that Western was selling for slightly more than one times its current earnings, a p/e ratio that for some reason caught my eye. But in the next 20 years, the GEICO stock I sold grew in value to about $1.3 million, which taught me a lesson about the inadvisability of selling a stake in an identifiably-wonderful company.
在1970年代初期，戴维退休后，管理GEICO的高管们在估算理赔成本方面犯了一些严重错误，这个错误导致公司为其保单定价过低——并且几乎因此破产。公司之所以能够幸存，只是因为杰克·伯恩在1976年出任CEO并采取了严厉的补救措施。
原文
In the early 1970’s, after Davy retired, the executives running GEICO made some serious errors in estimating their claims costs, a mistake that led the company to underprice its policies—and that almost caused it to go bankrupt. The company was saved only because Jack Byrne came in as CEO in 1976 and took drastic remedial measures.
因为我既相信杰克，也相信GEICO的根本竞争优势，伯克希尔在1976年下半年购买了该公司的大量股权，后来又进行了较小的购买。到1980年底，我们已向GEICO投入了4570万美元，持有其33.3%的股份。在接下来的15年里，我们没有再进行购买。尽管如此，我们在该公司的持股比例增长到了约50%，因为它是自身股票的大额回购者。
原文
Because I believed both in Jack and in GEICO’s fundamental competitive strength, Berkshire purchased a large interest in the company during the second half of 1976, and also made smaller purchases later. By yearend 1980, we had put $45.7 million into GEICO and owned 33.3% of its shares. During the next 15 years, we did not make further purchases. Our interest in the company, nonetheless, grew to about 50% because it was a big repurchaser of its own shares.
然后，在1995年，我们同意支付23亿美元购买我们尚未拥有的公司一半的股份。这是一个高昂的价格。但它让我们完全拥有了一家成长型企业，其业务之所以如此卓越，正是出于1951年时同样的原因。此外，GEICO拥有两位杰出的管理者：托尼·奈斯利，负责运营的保险业务，以及卢·辛普森，负责投资。
原文
Then, in 1995, we agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the half of the company we didn’t own. That is a steep price. But it gives us full ownership of a growing enterprise whose business remains exceptional for precisely the same reasons that prevailed in 1951. In addition, GEICO has two extraordinary managers: Tony Nicely, who runs the insurance side of the operation, and Lou Simpson, who runs investments.
托尼，52岁，已在GEICO工作了34年。没有比他我更希望管理GEICO保险业务的人了。他拥有智慧、精力、诚信和专注。如果我们运气好，他会再待34年。
原文
Tony, 52, has been with GEICO for 34 years. There’s no one I would rather have managing GEICO’s insurance operation. He has brains, energy, integrity and focus. If we’re lucky, he’ll stay another 34 years.
卢同样出色地管理着投资。从1980年到1995年，卢管理的股票年均回报率为22.8%，而标准普尔500指数为15.7%。卢采取与我们伯克希尔相同的保守、集中的投资方法，有他在我们身边是一个巨大的加分项。有一点超出了卢在GEICO的工作范围：他在场保证，如果查理和我发生了什么意外，伯克希尔能立即有一位杰出的专业人士来处理其投资。
原文
Lou runs investments just as ably. Between 1980 and 1995, the equities under Lou’s management returned an average of 22.8% annually vs. 15.7% for the S&P. Lou takes the same conservative, concentrated approach to investments that we do at Berkshire, and it is an enormous plus for us to have him on board. One point that goes beyond Lou’s GEICO work: His presence on the scene assures us that Berkshire would have an extraordinary professional immediately available to handle its investments if something were to happen to Charlie and me.
当然，GEICO必须继续吸引好的投保人并让他们满意。它还必须正确地进行准备金提取和定价。但公司成功的最终关键在于其极低的运营成本，这几乎没有竞争对手能够匹敌。此外，在1995年，托尼和他的管理团队将承保和理赔调整费用进一步降低到保费的23.6%，比1994年的比例低了近一个百分点。在商业中，我寻找由不可攻破的“护城河”保护的城堡。感谢托尼和他的管理团队，GEICO的护城河在1995年变宽了。
原文
GEICO, of course, must continue both to attract good policyholders and keep them happy. It must also reserve and price properly. But the ultimate key to the company’s success is its rock-bottom operating costs, which virtually no competitor can match. In 1995, moreover, Tony and his management team pushed underwriting and loss adjustment expenses down further to 23.6% of premiums, nearly one percentage point below 1994’s ratio. In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable “moats.” Thanks to Tony and his management team, GEICO’s moat widened in 1995.
最后，让我向您介绍戴维的最新情况。他现在93岁，仍然是我的朋友和老师。他持续密切关注着GEICO，并始终在公司CEO们——杰克·伯恩、比尔·斯奈德和托尼——需要他时提供帮助。我们收购100%的GEICO导致戴维承担了巨额税款。一贯地，他仍然热情支持这项交易。
原文
Finally, let me bring you up to date on Davy. He’s now 93 and remains my friend and teacher. He continues to pay close attention to GEICO and has always been there when the company’s CEOs—Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder and Tony—have needed him. Our acquisition of 100% of GEICO caused Davy to incur a large tax. Characteristically, he still warmly supported the transaction.
在我认识戴维的45年里，他一直是我心目中的英雄，从未让我失望。你应该明白，如果1951年那个寒冷的星期六，戴维没有如此慷慨地付出他的时间，伯克希尔就不会有今天的成就。我曾私下多次感谢他，但借此报告代表伯克希尔的股东感谢他是合适的。
原文
Davy has been one of my heroes for the 45 years I’ve known him, and he’s never let me down. You should understand that Berkshire would not be where it is today if Davy had not been so generous with his time on a cold Saturday in 1951. I’ve often thanked him privately, but it is fitting that I use this report to thank him on behalf of Berkshire’s shareholders.
保险业务
除了收购GEICO，我们在1995年的保险业务中还有其他利好发展。
原文
Insurance Operations
In addition to acquiring GEICO, we enjoyed other favorable developments in insurance during 1995.
正如我们在过去的报告中解释过的，我们保险业务的关键是：第一，我们产生的“浮存金”金额；第二，它的成本。浮存金是我们持有但不拥有的资金。在保险业务中，浮存金产生的原因是大多数保单要求预付保费，更重要的是，因为保险公司通常需要时间来了解和处理理赔。
原文
As we’ve explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of “float” we generate and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don’t own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
通常，保险公司收取的保费无法覆盖其必须支付的损失和费用。这导致其出现“承保损失”——而这个损失就是浮存金的成本。如果浮存金的成本低于公司为获得资金而必须支付的市场利率，那么保险业务从长远来看就是盈利的。但是，如果浮存金的成本高于市场利率，那么该业务就具有负面价值。
原文
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss”—and that loss is the cost of float. An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.
如下表所示，伯克希尔的保险业务一直是一个巨大的赢家。在表中，我们通过将损失准备金、损失理算准备金、根据承担的再保险持有的资金和未赚保费准备金相加，然后减去代理人余额、预付购置成本、预付税款和适用于承担的再保险的递延费用，来计算我们的浮存金——相对于我们的保费规模，我们产生的浮存金数量异常庞大。我们的浮存金成本由我们的承保损失或利润决定。在那些我们有承保利润的年份，比如过去三年，我们的浮存金成本是负的，这意味着我们通过将承保利润加到浮存金收入中来计算我们的保险收益。
原文
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire’s insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float— which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume—by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents’ balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last three, our cost of float has been negative, which means we have calculated our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
| 年份 | (1) 承保损失 | (2) 平均浮存金 | 近似资金成本 | 年底长期政府债券收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (百万美元) | (1与2之比率) | |||
| 1967 | 盈利 | $17.3 | 低于零 | 5.50% |
| 1968 | 盈利 | 19.9 | 低于零 | 5.90% |
| 1969 | 盈利 | 23.4 | 低于零 | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | 盈利 | 52.5 | 低于零 | 5.81% |
| 1972 | 盈利 | 69.5 | 低于零 | 5.82% |
| 1973 | 盈利 | 73.3 | 低于零 | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | 盈利 | 102.6 | 低于零 | 7.30% |
| 1977 | 盈利 | 139.0 | 低于零 | 7.97% |
| 1978 | 盈利 | 190.4 | 低于零 | 8.93% |
| 1979 | 盈利 | 227.3 | 低于零 | 10.08% |
| 1980 | 盈利 | 237.0 | 低于零 | 11.94% |
| 1981 | 盈利 | 228.4 | 低于零 | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | 盈利 | 2,624.7 | 低于零 | 6.35% |
| 1994 | 盈利 | 3,056.6 | 低于零 | 7.88% |
| 1995 | 盈利 | 3,607.2 | 低于零 | 5.95% |
原文
| (1) Underwriting Loss | (2) Average Float | Approximate Cost of Funds | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds | |
| (In $ Millions) | (Ratio of 1 to 2) | |||
| 1967 | profit | $17.3 | less than zero | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | 19.9 | less than zero | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | 23.4 | less than zero | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $ 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | 52.5 | less than zero | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | 69.5 | less than zero | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | 73.3 | less than zero | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | 102.6 | less than zero | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | 139.0 | less than zero | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | 190.4 | less than zero | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | 227.3 | less than zero | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | 237.0 | less than zero | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | 228.4 | less than zero | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | profit | 2,624.7 | less than zero | 6.35% |
| 1994 | profit | 3,056.6 | less than zero | 7.88% |
| 1995 | profit | 3,607.2 | less than zero | 5.95% |
自1967年我们进入保险业务以来，我们的浮存金以20.7%的年复合增长率增长。在大多数年份里，我们的资金成本低于零。这种获得“免费”资金的途径极大地提升了伯克希尔的业绩。
原文
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to “free” money has boosted Berkshire’s performance in a major way.
任何公司的盈利水平都由三个因素决定：(1) 其资产赚取的收益；(2) 其负债的成本；(3) 其对“杠杆”的利用——即其资产由负债而非股权提供资金的程度。多年来，我们在第1点上做得很好，资产产生了高回报。但我们也从第2点中获益匪浅——其程度通常未被充分理解——因为我们的负债成本非常低。这种低成本的一个重要原因是，我们以非常有利的条件获得了浮存金。许多其他财产意外险公司则不能这么说，它们可能产生大量浮存金，但成本超过了这些资金对它们的价值。在这种情况下，杠杆就变成了劣势。
原文
Any company’s level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of “leverage”—that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity. Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly—to a degree that is not generally well-understood—because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms. The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances, leverage becomes a disadvantage.
由于多年来我们的浮存金几乎不花成本，它实际上起到了权益资本的作用。当然，它与真正的权益资本不同，因为它不属于我们。尽管如此，让我们假设，我们没有在1994年底拥有34亿美元的浮存金，而是用34亿美元的权益资本替代了它。在这种情况下，我们在1995年拥有的资产不会比实际更多。然而，我们的盈利会略低，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的。也就是说，我们的浮存金产生了利润。而且，当然，为了获得替代的权益资本，我们需要发行大量伯克希尔新股。最终结果——更多的股份，相同的资产，更低的盈利——会大大降低我们股票的价值。所以你可以理解为什么浮存金对企业如此有益——如果它以低成本获得的话。
原文
Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years, it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true equity in that it doesn’t belong to us. Nevertheless, let’s assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result—more shares, equal assets and lower earnings—would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business—if it is obtained at a low cost.
收购GEICO将立即增加我们近30亿美元的浮存金，并且几乎肯定会进一步增长。我们也期望GEICO在大多数年份能实现可观的承保利润，这一事实将增加我们总浮存金成本为零的可能性。当然，我们为GEICO的浮存金支付了非常高昂的代价，而表中显示的浮存金增长几乎全部是内部产生的。
原文
Our acquisition of GEICO will immediately increase our float by nearly $3 billion, with additional growth almost certain. We also expect GEICO to operate at a decent underwriting profit in most years, a fact that will increase the probability that our total float will cost us nothing. Of course, we paid a very substantial price for the GEICO float, whereas virtually all of the gains in float depicted in the table were developed internally.
对1995年保险业绩的兴奋必须再次有所保留，因为我们在超级巨灾业务上连续第三年交了好运。在这一业务中，我们销售保单给保险和再保险公司，以保护它们免受特大灾难的影响。由于真正的特大灾难并不频繁发生，我们的超级巨灾业务在大多数年份应该会显示巨额利润，但偶尔也会录得巨额亏损。换句话说，我们超级巨灾业务的吸引力需要很多年才能衡量出来。我们知道，像过去三年这样的年份的结果，至少会部分地被未来某个真正糟糕的年份所抵消。我们只希望“部分地”最终是恰当的副词。
原文
Our enthusiasm over 1995’s insurance results must be tempered once again because we had our third straight year of good fortune in the super-cat business. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take many years to measure. We know that the results of years like the past three will be at least partially offset by some truly terrible year in the future. We just hope that “partially” turns out to be the proper adverb.
去年发生了大量灾难，但没有保险类的超级巨灾。当风速为150英里/小时的风暴奥珀尔在佛罗里达州附近徘徊时，东南部险些遇险。然而，风暴在登陆前减弱了，因此躲过了第二个安德鲁。对于保险公司来说，神户地震是另一个侥幸脱险：经济损失巨大——可能创纪录——但其中只有一小部分投保了。保险业不会总是那么幸运。
原文
There were plenty of catastrophes last year, but no super-cats of the insured variety. The Southeast had a close call when Opal, sporting winds of 150 miles per hour, hovered off Florida. However, the storm abated before hitting land, and so a second Andrew was dodged. For insurers, the Kobe earthquake was another close call: The economic damage was huge—perhaps even a record—but only a tiny portion of it was insured. The insurance industry won’t always be that lucky.
阿吉特·杰恩是我们超级巨灾业务的指导天才，他也承保重要的非巨灾业务。在保险业中，“巨灾”一词适用于导致大量保险损失的事件，如飓风或地震。阿吉特参与的其他交易通常只覆盖单个巨额损失。去年三项交易的简化描述将说明我的意思以及阿吉特的多才多艺。我们承保了：(1) 迈克·泰森的生命，初始保额巨大，然后随着一场场比赛，在未来几年内逐渐降至零；(2) 劳合社针对其超过225名“成员”在年内死亡的风险；(3) 两颗中国卫星的发射及一年的轨道运行。幸运的是，两颗卫星都在轨道上运行，劳合社的人们避免了异常的死亡率，而如果迈克·泰森看起来更健康，没人敢和他进拳击台。
原文
Ajit Jain is the guiding genius of our super-cat business and writes important non-cat business as well. In insurance, the term “catastrophe” is applied to an event, such as a hurricane or earthquake, that causes a great many insured losses. The other deals Ajit enters into usually cover only a single large loss. A simplified description of three transactions from last year will illustrate both what I mean and Ajit’s versatility. We insured: (1) The life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that, fight-by-fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years; (2) Lloyd’s against more than 225 of its “names” dying during the year; (3) The launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd’s folk avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier, no one would get in the ring with him.
伯克希尔之所以被寻求承保多种保险，包括超级巨灾和大型单一风险，是因为：(1) 我们的财务实力无与伦比，被保险人知道我们在最不利的情况下能够并且将会支付赔款；(2) 我们能比业内任何人都更快地提供报价；(3) 我们会签发比任何其他人都愿意承保的限额更高的保单。我们的大多数竞争对手都拥有广泛的再保险合约，并分保掉大部分业务。虽然这有助于他们避免冲击损失，但也损害了他们的灵活性和反应时间。如你所知，伯克希尔在抓住投资和收购机会时行动迅速；在保险领域，我们以同样非凡的速度回应。另一个重要方面是，大额保险不会吓倒我们，反而会增强我们的兴趣。我们曾提供过一份保单，我们可能因此损失10亿美元；客户接受的最大保险金额是4亿美元。
原文
Berkshire is sought out for many kinds of insurance, both super-cat and large single-risk, because: (1) our financial strength is unmatched, and insureds know we can and will pay our losses under the most adverse of circumstances; (2) we can supply a quote faster than anyone in the business; and (3) we will issue policies with limits larger than anyone else is prepared to write. Most of our competitors have extensive reinsurance treaties and lay off much of their business. While this helps them avoid shock losses, it also hurts their flexibility and reaction time. As you know, Berkshire moves quickly to seize investment and acquisition opportunities; in insurance we respond with the same exceptional speed. In another important point, large coverages don’t frighten us but, on the contrary, intensify our interest. We have offered a policy under which we could have lost $1 billion; the largest coverage that a client accepted was $400 million.
我们时不时会受到重大损失的打击。然而，查理和我非常愿意接受相对波动的结果，以换取比我们本来可能获得的更好的长期收益。换句话说，我们更喜欢不稳定的15%，而不是平稳的12%。由于大多数管理者选择平稳，我们便拥有了一种我们努力最大化的竞争优势。不过，我们确实监控着我们的总风险敞口，以使我们的“最坏情况”保持在我们感到舒适的水平。
原文
We will get hit from time to time with large losses. Charlie and I, however, are quite willing to accept relatively volatile results in exchange for better long-term earnings than we would otherwise have had. In other words, we prefer a lumpy 15% to a smooth 12%. Since most managers opt for smoothness, we are left with a competitive advantage that we try to maximize. We do, though, monitor our aggregate exposure in order to keep our “worst case” at a level that leaves us comfortable.
实际上，我们来自“百年一遇”超级巨灾的“最坏情况”——相对于净资产而言——远轻于许多承保大量财产险保单的知名直接保险公司所面临的风险。这些保险公司不像我们那样签发单个巨额限额保单，但它们的小额保单，总的来说，可能产生惊人的风险。“大灾”将直接穿透其中一些保险公司的再保险覆盖，使它们面临可能威胁其生存的无上限损失。在我们的情况下，损失会很大，但被限制在我们能够轻松应付的水平。
原文
Indeed, our worst case from a “once-in-a-century” super-cat is far less severe—relative to net worth—than that faced by many well-known primary companies writing great numbers of property policies. These insurers don’t issue single huge-limit policies as we do, but their small policies, in aggregate, can create a risk of staggering size. The “big one” would blow right through the reinsurance covers of some of these insurers, exposing them to uncapped losses that could threaten their survival. In our case, losses would be large, but capped at levels we could easily handle.
超级巨灾领域的价格正在走软。考虑到几年前再保险业的资本涌入以及持有这些资本的人自然希望加以利用，这是可以理解的。无论其他人做什么，我们不会明知故犯地以不足的费率承保业务。我们在1970年代初期无意中这样做过，20多年后，我们仍然经常收到源于那个时代错误的大额账单。我猜20年后，我们仍然会从那项业务中得到意外。糟糕的再保险合同就像地狱：容易进入，无法退出。
原文
Prices are weakening in the super-cat field. That is understandable considering the influx of capital into the reinsurance business a few years ago and the natural desire of those holding the capital to employ it. No matter what others may do, we will not knowingly write business at inadequate rates. We unwittingly did this in the early 1970’s and, after more than 20 years, regularly receive significant bills stemming from the mistakes of that era. My guess is that we will still be getting surprises from that business 20 years from now. A bad reinsurance contract is like hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.
我积极参与了那些早期的再保险决策，伯克希尔为我在这项业务中接受教育支付了高昂的学费。不幸的是，再保险学生不能靠奖学金上学。顺便提一下，GEICO在1980年代初期也经历了类似的不幸经历，当时它热情地投入到再保险和大风险的承保中。GEICO的愚蠢行为时间虽短，但它将花费至少十年时间来清理这些烂摊子。劳合社广为人知的问题进一步说明了再保险的危险，并强调承保保险业务的人员的利益——在下跌和上涨时——必须与提供资本的人员的利益保持一致，这一点至关重要。当这种对称性缺失时，保险公司几乎总是会陷入困境，尽管其存在可能在一段时间内仍隐藏不露。
原文
I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions, and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can’t attend school on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar, disastrous experience in the early 1980’s, when it plunged enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks. GEICO’s folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd’s further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore how vital it is that the interests of the people who write insurance business be aligned—on the downside as well as the upside—with those of the people putting up the capital. When that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.
一个小故事，讲的是有位分析师拜访一位保险公司的CEO，从中可以看出这个行业的很多特点。对于分析师关于其业务的问题，CEO只有悲观的回答：费率低得离谱；他资产负债表上的准备金不足以应对普通索赔，更不用说可能由石棉和环境问题引起的索赔；他的大多数再保险公司早已破产，让他独自承担损失。但随后CEO眼前一亮：“不过，情况可能更糟，”他说，“这些钱可能是我自己的。”在伯克希尔，这些钱是我们的。
原文
A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the analyst’s questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his balance sheet weren’t adequate for ordinary claims, much less those likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the sack. But then the CEO brightened: “Still, things could be a lot worse,” he said. “It
但我当时自作聪明，没有这么做。结果，在不到两年的时间里，我们额外获得了一些股息收入（优先股收益率与普通股之间的差额），随后该公司——完全合理地——赎回了该优先股，并尽可能快地完成了此事。如果我当初谈判的是普通股而非优先股，那么到1995年底，我们的状况会更好，多出6.25亿美元，减去约7000万美元的“超额”股息。
原文
But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference between the preferred’s yield and that of the common), at which point the company—quite properly—called the issue, moving to do that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend 1995 by $625 million, minus the “excess” dividends of about $70 million.
在Champion的案例中，该公司有权以成本价的115%赎回我们的优先股，这使得我们在去年八月被迫退出，而我们本希望推迟这一行动。在这种情况下，我们在赎回前夕转换了股份，并以小幅折扣将股票卖回给公司。
查理和我对造纸业从未有过坚定的信念——实际上，在我54年的投资生涯中，我不记得曾持有过任何一家造纸商的普通股——所以我们八月份的选择是要么在市场上出售，要么卖给公司。Champion的管理层与我们打交道时一直坦诚且值得尊敬，他们希望回购普通股，因此我们将股票卖给了公司。我们在Champion上的资本收益适中——从六年期的投资来看，税后收益约为19%——但在我们持有期间，优先股为我们提供了良好的税后股息收益率。（尽管如此，许多媒体报道夸大了财产意外险公司从收到的股息中获得的税后收益率。媒体没有考虑到的是，1987年生效的税法变更大幅减少了适用于保险公司的股息抵免额。详情请参阅我们1986年的年报。）
原文
In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the company at a modest discount.
Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper industry—actually, I can’t remember ever owning the common stock of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing—so our choice in August was whether to sell in the market or to the company. Champion’s management had always been candid and honorable in dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was moderate—about 19% after tax from a six-year investment—but the preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986 Annual Report.)
我们的First Empire优先股将于1996年3月31日被赎回，这是允许的最早日期。我们乐意持有经营良好银行的股票，因此我们将转换并保留First Empire的普通股。该公司首席执行官Bob Wilmers是一位杰出的银行家，我们很高兴能与他合作。
我们的另外两只优先股则令人失望，尽管Salomon优先股的表现略优于它所替代的固定收益证券。然而，查理和我花在这项持仓上的管理时间，远远超出了它对伯克希尔的经济重要性。我绝对没有想到，在60岁时，我会因为之前购买了一只固定收益证券而接受一份新工作——即担任Salomon的临时董事长。
在1987年我们购买Salomon优先股后不久，我写道：“我对投资银行业的方向或未来盈利能力没有特别的见解。”即使是最善意的评论家也会得出结论，我后来证明了自己的观点。
到目前为止，我们转换为Salomon普通股的选择权并未显示出价值。此外，自我承诺购买该优先股以来，道琼斯工业平均指数已经翻了一番，而经纪类股的表现也同样出色。这意味着我当初因为看到转换选择权的价值而选择Salomon的决定，评级必须是非常糟糕的。即便如此，该优先股在一些艰难的时期仍继续作为固定收益证券发挥作用，9%的股息目前相当有吸引力。
除非该优先股被转换，否则其条款要求每年10月31日赎回20%的发行量，从1995年到1999年，我们最初7亿美元中的1.4亿美元已于去年按期赎回。（一些媒体报道称之为出售，但到期的高级证券并非被“出售”。）尽管我们没有选择转换去年到期的优先股，但我们还有四次转换机会，我相信我们很可能仍能从转换权中发现价值。
原文
Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996, the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding banker, and we love being associated with him.
Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire. Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60—Salomon interim chairman, that is—because of an earlier purchase of a fixed-income security.
Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I wrote that I had “no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking.” Even the most charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my point.
To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive.
Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99, and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior security that matures is not “sold.”) Though we did not elect to convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that we will yet find value in our right to convert.
我在去年的报告中详细讨论了USAir的投资。该公司1995年的业绩有所改善，但仍面临重大问题。对我们有利的一点是，我们的优先股结构设计得很好：例如，尽管自1994年6月以来我们未收到股息，但欠我们的金额正以高于最优惠利率5%的利率复利计算。不利的一面是，我们面对的是一个信用状况疲弱的对手。
我们对自己在USAir的优先股的感觉比一年前好多了，但对其最终价值的判断，你和我的猜测一样好。（事实上，考虑到我在这项投资上的记录，公平地说，你的猜测可能比我的更好。）在年底，我们按面值的60%对这笔优先股（没有公开市场）进行估值，尽管USAir还有一只未偿还的次级优先股，除了转换价格外，在所有方面都明显劣于我们的优先股，而当时它的交易价格是面值的82%。在我写这封信时，这只次级证券已升至面值的97%。希望市场是对的。
总的来说，我们的优先股表现良好，但这仅仅是因为有一个巨大的赢家：吉列。撇开吉列不谈，我们的优先股作为一个整体，为我们提供的税后回报并不高于我们所取代的中期固定收益证券所能带来的回报。
原文
I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year’s report. The company’s results improved in 1995, but it still faces significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.
We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it’s fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at 60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let’s hope the market is right.
Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette, our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term fixed-income issues that they replaced.
一项拟议的资本重组
在年度股东大会上，您将被要求批准伯克希尔的资本重组，创建两类股票。如果该计划获得通过，我们现有的普通股将被指定为A类普通股，并将授权设立新的B类普通股。
每股“B”股将拥有A股1/30的权利，但有以下例外：第一，B股拥有A股1/200的投票权（而非1/30）。第二，B股没有资格参与伯克希尔的股东指定慈善捐款计划。
资本重组完成后，每股A股将可按持有人的选择，随时转换为30股B股。此转换权不适用于相反方向。也就是说，B股持有人不能将其转换为A股。
我们预计将B股在纽约证券交易所上市，与A股一同交易。为了建立上市所需的股东基础——并确保B股市场的流动性——伯克希尔预计将通过公开发行至少1亿美元的新B股来筹集现金。此次发行将仅通过招股说明书进行。
市场最终将决定B股的价格。不过，其价格应接近A股价格的1/30。
希望赠送礼物的A类股东可能会发现，将一股或两股股票转换为B类股份会很方便。此外，如果对B股的需求强劲，足以将其价格推高至略高于A股价格的1/30，则可能会出现套利相关的转换。
然而，由于A类股票将赋予其持有人完整的投票权和参与伯克希尔捐款计划的权利，这些股票将优于B类股票，我们预计大多数股东将继续持有A类股票——这正是巴菲特和芒格家族计划要做的，除非我们本人为了便于赠送礼物而转换少量股份。大多数股东将坚持持有A股的前景表明，其市场流动性将比B股略好一些。
这次资本重组对伯克希尔而言有利有弊。但这并非源于发行所得——我们会为这些资金找到建设性的用途——也绝不源于我们出售B股的价格。在我写这封信时——伯克希尔股价为36,000美元——查理和我不认为它被低估了。因此，我们提议的发行不会降低我们现有股票的内在价值。让我更直白地阐述我们对估值的看法：伯克希尔的售价是查理和我不会考虑购买的价格。
伯克希尔为发行B股将承担一些额外成本，包括处理更多股东相关事务的成本。另一方面，这只股票将为希望赠送礼物的人提供便利。而那些希望分股的股东，现在有了一种自行实现分股的方法。
然而，我们采取这一举措是出于其他原因——与那些成本高昂、声称是伯克希尔低价“克隆品”且必将被大力推销的单位信托基金的出现有关。这些工具背后的想法并不新鲜：近年来，许多人告诉我，他们希望创建一只“全伯克希尔”的投资基金，以低价出售。但直到最近，这些投资的发起人在听取了我的反对意见后都退缩了。
我劝阻这些人，并非因为我偏爱大投资者。如果可能的话，查理和我会很乐意将1,000美元变成3,000美元，造福那些认为这笔收益是解决他们眼前问题的重要答案的众多人们。
然而，要迅速将小额投资翻三倍，我们就必须同样迅速地将我们目前430亿美元的市场资本总额变成1,290亿美元（大致相当于美国市值最高的公司通用电气的市值）。我们几乎不可能做到这一点。 我们最大的希望是——平均而言——每五年将伯克希尔的每股内在价值翻一番，而且我们很可能远低于这一目标。
最终，查理和我不在乎我们的股东是大量还是少量持有伯克希尔股份。我们所期望的是任何规模的股东，他们了解我们的运营，认同我们的目标和长期视角，并意识到我们的局限，尤其是我们庞大资本基础所带来的限制。
最近出现的单位信托基金与这些目标背道而驰。它们将由收取高额佣金的经纪人销售，会给其股东带来其他沉重的成本，并且会向不成熟的买家进行大规模营销，这些人很容易被我们过去的记录所诱惑，并被近些年伯克希尔和我本人获得的宣传所迷惑。必然的结果是：众多投资者注定会失望。
通过创建B股——一种远优于纯伯克希尔信托的低面值产品——我们希望使这些克隆产品难以销售。
原文
A Proposed Recapitalization
At the Annual Meeting you will be asked to approve a recapitalization of Berkshire, creating two classes of stock. If the plan is adopted, our existing common stock will be designated as Class A Common Stock and a new Class B Common Stock will be authorized.
Each share of the “B” will have the rights of 1/30th of an “A” share with these exceptions: First, a B share will have 1/200th of the vote of an A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Second, the B will not be eligible to participate in Berkshire’s shareholder-designated charitable contributions program.
When the recapitalization is complete, each share of A will become convertible, at the holder’s option and at any time, into 30 shares of B. This conversion privilege will not extend in the opposite direction. That is, holders of B shares will not be able to convert them into A shares.
We expect to list the B shares on the New York Stock Exchange, where they will trade alongside the A stock. To create the shareholder base necessary for a listing—and to ensure a liquid market in the B stock—Berkshire expects to make a public offering for cash of at least $100 million of new B shares. The offering will be made only by means of a prospectus.
The market will ultimately determine the price of the B shares. Their price, though, should be in the neighborhood of 1/30th of the price of the A shares.
Class A shareholders who wish to give gifts may find it convenient to convert a share or two of their stock into Class B shares. Additionally, arbitrage-related conversions will occur if demand for the B is strong enough to push its price to slightly above 1/30th of the price of A.
However, because the Class A stock will entitle its holders to full voting rights and access to Berkshire’s contributions program, these shares will be superior to the Class B shares and we would expect most shareholders to remain holders of the Class A—which is precisely what the Buffett and Munger families plan to do, except in those instances when we ourselves might convert a few shares to facilitate gifts. The prospect that most shareholders will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat more liquid market than the B.
There are tradeoffs for Berkshire in this recapitalization. But they do not arise from the proceeds of the offering—we will find constructive uses for the money—nor in any degree from the price at which we will sell the B shares. As I write this—with Berkshire stock at $36,000—Charlie and I do not believe it undervalued. Therefore, the offering we propose will not diminish the per-share intrinsic value of our existing stock. Let me also put our thoughts about valuation more baldly: Berkshire is selling at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it.
What Berkshire will incur by way of the B stock are certain added costs, including those involving the mechanics of handling a larger number of shareholders. On the other hand, the stock should be a convenience for people wishing to make gifts. And those of you who have hoped for a split have gained a do-it-yourself method of bringing one about.
We are making this move, though, for other reasons—having to do with the appearance of expense-laden unit trusts purporting to be low-priced “clones” of Berkshire and sure to be aggressively marketed. The idea behind these vehicles is not new: In recent years, a number of people have told me about their wish to create an “all-Berkshire” investment fund to be sold at a low dollar price. But until recently, the promoters of these investments heard out my objections and backed off.
I did not discourage these people because I prefer large investors over small. Were it possible, Charlie and I would love to turn $1,000 into $3,000 for multitudes of people who would find that gain an important answer to their immediate problems.
In order to quickly triple small stakes, however, we would have to just as quickly turn our present market capitalization of $43 billion into $129 billion (roughly the market cap of General Electric, America’s most highly valued company). We can’t come close to doing that. The very best we hope for is—on average—to double Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value every five years, and we may well fall far short of that goal.
In the end, Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders own Berkshire in large or small amounts. What we wish for are shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our operations, share our objectives and long-term perspective, and are aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our large capital base.
The unit trusts that have recently surfaced fly in the face of these goals. They would be sold by brokers working for big commissions, would impose other burdensome costs on their shareholders, and would be marketed en masse to unsophisticated buyers, apt to be seduced by our past record and beguiled by the publicity Berkshire and I have received in recent years. The sure outcome: a multitude of investors destined to be disappointed.
Through our creation of the B stock—a low-denomination product far superior to Berkshire-only trusts—we hope to make the clones unmerchandisable.
但现有和潜在的伯克希尔股东应特别关注一点：尽管我们股票的每股内在价值在过去五年中以极好的速度增长，但其市场价格增长得更快。换句话说，股票的表现超过了企业的表现。
这种市场超常表现不可能无限期持续下去，无论是伯克希尔还是任何其他股票。不可避免地，也会出现表现不佳的时期。 由此产生的价格波动，虽然是公开市场的固有特征，但并非我们所愿。我们更希望伯克希尔的市场价格能精确地跟踪其内在价值。如果股票能做到这一点，那么每位股东在持有期间获得的收益将与他们持有期间伯克希尔自身的进展完全成比例。
显然，伯克希尔股票的市场行为永远不会符合这一理想。但是，如果我们现在的和潜在的股东都是知情、以业务为导向的，并且在做出投资决策时没有受到高佣金推销的影响，那么我们将比不这样做更接近这个目标。为此，如果我们能够削弱单位信托基金的推销努力，对我们更有利——这就是我们创建B股的原因。
我们期待在年度股东大会上回答您关于资本重组的提问。
原文
But both present and prospective Berkshire shareholders should pay special attention to one point: Though the per-share intrinsic value of our stock has grown at an excellent rate during the past five years, its market price has grown still faster. The stock, in other words, has outperformed the business.
That kind of market overperformance cannot persist indefinitely, neither for Berkshire nor any other stock. Inevitably, there will be periods of underperformance as well. The price volatility that results, though endemic to public markets, is not to our liking. What we would prefer instead is to have the market price of Berkshire precisely track its intrinsic value. Were the stock to do that, every shareholder would benefit during his period of ownership in exact proportion to the progress Berkshire itself made in the period.
Obviously, the market behavior of Berkshire’s stock will never conform to this ideal. But we will come closer to this goal than we would otherwise if our present and prospective shareholders are informed, business-oriented and not exposed to high-commission salesmanship when making their investment decisions. To that end, we are better off if we can blunt the merchandising efforts of the unit trusts—and that is the reason we are creating the B stock.
We look forward to answering your questions about the recapitalization at the Annual Meeting.
杂项
伯克希尔并非唯一一家采用新颖、令人兴奋的ABWA策略的美国公司。1995年7月14日下午1点15分左右，华特迪士尼公司首席执行官迈克尔·艾斯纳正走在太阳谷的野花巷上。与此同时，我刚离开赫伯特·艾伦在那条街上的家中的午餐会，准备与Cap Cities/ABC的首席执行官汤姆·墨菲会合打高尔夫球。
当天上午，迈克尔在艾伦投资银行组织的高管和资金经理人群面前，就迪士尼公司做了精彩的演讲，看到他后，我向他表示祝贺。我们简短地聊了聊——期间提到了迪士尼与Cap Cities可能合并的话题。这并非首次讨论合并事宜，但此前从未取得进展，部分原因是迪士尼希望用现金收购，而Cap Cities希望获得股票。
迈克尔和我等了几分钟，等墨菲到来。在随后的简短谈话中，迈克尔和墨菲都表示他们可能在股票/现金问题上做出让步。几周之内，他们确实都做出了让步，随后在非常忙碌的三天里敲定了合同。
迪士尼/Cap Cities的交易如此合理，我确信即使没有那次在太阳谷的偶遇，最终也会发生。但那天我在野花巷遇到迈克尔时，他正要去赶飞机，所以如果没有那次偶然相遇，这笔交易肯定不会在当时那个时间框架内发生。我相信，迪士尼和Cap Cities都会因我们那天偶然相遇而受益。
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在这里，我有必要对墨菲说几句。简而言之，在我漫长的商业生涯中，他是我见过的最优秀的管理者。同样重要的是，他的人格品质完全等同于他的管理才能。他是一位非凡的朋友、父亲、丈夫和公民。在那些墨菲的个人利益与股东利益相左的罕见情况下，他始终如一地支持所有者。当我说我喜欢与那些我希望他们成为我的兄弟姐妹、姻亲或遗嘱受托人的经理人合作时，墨菲就是我所指的典范。
如果墨菲选择经营另一家企业，不必费心研究其价值——直接买入股票就行了。之后，不要再像我两年前那样愚蠢，当时我卖出了我们持有的Cap Cities三分之一股份，获得了6.35亿美元（而同样的股票在迪士尼合并中将价值12.7亿美元）。
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大约96.3%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1995年的股东指定捐款计划。捐款总额为1,160万美元，共资助了3,600家慈善机构。股东指定捐款计划的完整描述见第54-55页。
每年都有少数股东错过该计划，原因是在规定的登记日，他们的股票没有以自己的名义登记，或者未能在允许的60天期限内将指定表格寄回给我们。第二个问题今年尤其让我痛心，因为两位持有大量股份的好朋友错过了截止日期。我们不得不拒绝他们参与的要求，因为我们不能为一些股东破例，却拒绝为其他股东这样做。
要参与未来的计划，您必须拥有以实际所有人名义登记的A类股票，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记的股票。在1996年8月31日未如此登记的股票将没有资格参与1996年的计划。收到表格后，请及时寄回，以免搁置或遗忘。
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说到我们的年度股东大会，查理和我是管理层的异类：我们非常享受这个活动。所以，请来加入我们，时间是5月6日星期一。在伯克希尔，我们没有投资者关系部门，也不使用金融分析师作为传播信息、盈余“指引”等的渠道。相反，我们更喜欢直接的管理层对所有者沟通，并相信年度股东大会是进行这种思想交流的理想场所。在那里与你们交谈对我们来说很高效，也很民主，因为所有在场的人都能同时听到我们要说的话。
去年，我们首次在Holiday会议中心举行年度股东大会，后勤工作似乎运转顺利。主宴会厅容纳了大约3,200人，我们通过视频信号传输到另一个能容纳800人的房间。主会场的座位有点挤，所以今年我们可能会将其布置成容纳3,000人。今年我们还会准备两个房间来容纳超额的人数。
总而言之，我们将能容纳5,000名股东。会议将在上午9:30开始，但请注意，去年主宴会厅在早上8点后就坐满了。
来自49个州的股东参加了我们1995年的会议——佛蒙特州，你们在哪？——还有来自澳大利亚、瑞典和德国等一些国家的代表。与往年一样，会议吸引了那些对伯克希尔业务感兴趣的股东——而不是那些主要关心自己的股东——而且所有提问都很好。查理和我在台上吃了午饭，并回答了大约五个小时的问题。
我们认为，如果股东来自世界各地，我们应该努力确保他们有机会提问。大多数股东在中午左右离开，但大约有一千名左右的铁杆股东通常会留下来，看我们是否会倒下。查理和我正在训练，以争取今年再次坚持至少五个小时。
我们将在会议上展示我们一贯的伯克希尔产品，今年还将增加一位GEICO的销售代表。在1995年的会议上，我们卖出了747磅糖果、759双鞋，以及价值超过17,500美元的World Book及相关出版物。去年，我们还添加了来自我们Quikut子公司的刀具，卖出了400套，如果我们的股票疲软，这一举动可能很危险。（不过，我们对软水果划定了界限。）所有这些商品今年将再次供应。我们认为，除非掺杂点生意，否则文化活动就不算完整。
由于我们预计会议会有很多人，建议您尽早预订机票和酒店。那些喜欢住在市中心（距离会议中心约6英里）的人，可以选择Radisson Redick Tower（一家小巧但不错的酒店，有88间客房），或者几个街区外规模大得多的Red Lion Hotel。会议中心附近有Holiday Inn（403间客房）、Homewood Suites（118间客房）和Hampton Inn（136间客房）。另一个推荐地点是Marriott，其奥马哈西部的分店距离Borsheim’s约100码，距离会议中心十分钟车程。Marriott将有巴士在上午7:30、8:00和8:30出发前往会议，并在会议结束后返回。
我们委托书材料中的附件说明了如何获取参加会议所需的入场卡。会议中心有充足的停车位，而住在Holiday Inn、Homewood Suites和Hampton Inn的人可以步行前往会议。像往常一样，我们会在会后安排巴士送您前往内布拉斯加家具城和Borsheim’s，之后再将您送到酒店或机场。
NFM的主店位于会议中心以北约两英里处，占地64英亩，营业时间为工作日早上10点至晚上9点，周六早上10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。罗斯·布卢姆金——“B夫人”——现在102岁，但仍会在B夫人仓库辛勤工作。去年11月，她因拯救了“The Rose”剧院而受到表彰，这座始建于20年代的经典市中心剧院经过华丽修复，若非她出手，早已被拆除。不妨请她讲讲这个故事。
Borsheim’s通常周日不营业，但将于5月5日（星期日）上午10点至下午6点专门为股东及嘉宾营业。此外，我们将在5月4日（星期六）下午6点至晚上9点为股东安排一次特别开放时间。去年，在股东日，我们在营业的六小时内开了1,733张票——相当于每13秒成交一笔。但请记住，纪录就是用来被打破的。
在Borsheim’s，我们还将展出世界上最大的多面切割钻石。这颗不起眼的小玩意儿经过两年切割，重达545克拉。请仔细端详这颗宝石，让它指导您为心爱的人选择合适大小的宝石。
5月4日星期六晚上，罗森布拉特体育场将举行一场棒球赛，由奥马哈皇家队对阵路易斯维尔红鸟队。我预计会投出开幕球——拥有球队四分之一的股份保证我每年有一次首发机会——但我们的经理迈克·杰舍尔很可能会犯他的老毛病，在此之后立刻把我换下。去年约有1,700名股东观看了比赛。不幸的是，那天下雨比赛取消了，这让看台上的众多球探非常失望。但聪明人今年会再来的，我计划向他们展示我的最佳状态。
我们的委托书声明将包含获取比赛门票的信息。今年我们还将提供一个信息包，列出周日晚上营业的餐厅，并描述周末在奥马哈可以做的各种事情。
多年来，我一直试图让我小学同学“帕尔”戈拉特在股东大会前的周日晚上开放他的牛排馆营业，但都未能成功。但今年他同意了。戈拉特是一家经营了52年的家族企业，如果你喜欢牛排，你会爱上这个地方。我告诉帕尔，他会迎来一大群顾客，所以请致电戈拉特饭店（402-551-3733）预订。你会在那里找到我——我会是那个吃着带血T骨牛排，外加双份土豆饼的人。
原文
Miscellaneous
Berkshire isn’t the only American corporation utilizing the new, exciting ABWA strategy. At about 1:15 p.m. on July 14, 1995, Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney Company, was walking up Wildflower Lane in Sun Valley. At the same time, I was leaving a lunch at Herbert Allen’s home on that street to meet Tom Murphy, CEO of Cap Cities/ABC, for a golf game.
That morning, speaking to a large group of executives and money managers assembled by Allen’s investment bank, Michael had made a brilliant presentation about Disney, and upon seeing him, I offered my congratulations. We chatted briefly—and the subject of a possible combination of Disney and Cap Cities came up. This wasn’t the first time a merger had been discussed, but progress had never before been made, in part because Disney wanted to buy with cash and Cap Cities desired stock.
Michael and I waited a few minutes for Murph to arrive, and in the short conversation that ensued, both Michael and Murph indicated they might bend on the stock/cash question. Within a few weeks, they both did, at which point a contract was put together in three very busy days.
The Disney/Cap Cities deal makes so much sense that I’m sure it would have occurred without that chance encounter in Sun Valley. But when I ran into Michael that day on Wildflower Lane, he was heading for his plane, so without that accidental meeting the deal certainly wouldn’t have happened in the time frame it did. I believe both Disney and Cap Cities will benefit from the fact that we all serendipitously met that day.
It’s appropriate that I say a few words here about Murph. To put it simply, he is as fine an executive as I have ever seen in my long exposure to business. Equally important, he possesses human qualities every bit the equal of his managerial qualities. He’s an extraordinary friend, parent, husband and citizen. In those rare instances in which Murph’s personal interests diverged from those of shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners. When I say that I like to be associated with managers whom I would love to have as a sibling, in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the exemplar of what I mean.
If Murph should elect to run another business, don’t bother to study its value—just buy the stock. And don’t later be as dumb as I was two years ago when I sold one-third of our holdings in Cap Cities for $635 million (versus the $1.27 billion those shares would bring in the Disney merger).
About 96.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1995 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $11.6 million and 3,600 charities were recipients. A full description of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears on pages 54-55.
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because they don’t have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get their designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. That second problem pained me especially this year because two good friends with substantial holdings missed the deadline. We had to deny their requests to be included because we can’t make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1996, will be ineligible for the 1996 program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
When it comes to our Annual Meetings, Charlie and I are managerial oddballs: We thoroughly enjoy the event. So come join us on Monday, May 6. At Berkshire, we have no investor relations department and don’t use financial analysts as a channel for disseminating information, earnings “guidance,” or the like. Instead, we prefer direct manager-to-owner communication and believe that the Annual Meeting is the ideal place for this interchange of ideas. Talking to you there is efficient for us and also democratic in that all present simultaneously hear what we have to say.
Last year, for the first time, we had the Annual Meeting at the Holiday Convention Centre and the logistics seemed to work. The ballroom there was filled with about 3,200 people, and we had a video feed into a second room holding another 800 people. Seating in the main room was a little tight, so this year we will probably configure it to hold 3,000. This year we will also have two rooms for the overflow.
All in all, we will be able to handle 5,000 shareholders. The meeting will start at 9:30 a.m., but be warned that last year the main ballroom was filled shortly after 8:00 a.m.
Shareholders from 49 states attended our 1995 meeting—where were you, Vermont?—and a number of foreign countries, including Australia, Sweden and Germany, were represented. As always, the meeting attracted shareholders who were interested in Berkshire’s business—as contrasted to shareholders who are primarily interested in themselves—and the questions were all good. Charlie and I ate lunch on stage and answered questions for about five hours.
We feel that if owners come from all over the world, we should try to make sure they have an opportunity to ask their questions. Most shareholders leave about noon, but a thousand or so hardcore types usually stay to see whether we will drop. Charlie and I are in training to last at least five hours again this year.
We will have our usual array of Berkshire products at the meeting and this year will add a sales representative from GEICO. At the 1995 meeting, we sold 747 pounds of candy, 759 pairs of shoes, and over $17,500 of World Books and related publications. In a move that might have been dangerous had our stock been weak, we added knives last year from our Quikut subsidiary and sold 400 sets of these. (We draw the line at soft fruit, however.) All of these goods will again be available this year. We don’t consider a cultural event complete unless a little business is mixed in.
Because we expect a large crowd for the meeting, we recommend that you promptly get both plane and hotel reservations. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel, or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from Borsheim’s and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at 7:30, 8:00 and 8:30 for the meeting and return after it ends.
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting. As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later.
NFM’s main store, on its 64-acre site about two miles north of the Centre, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Rose Blumkin—”Mrs. B”—is now 102, but will be hard at work in Mrs. B’s Warehouse. She was honored in November at the opening of The Rose, a classic downtown theater of the 20’s that has been magnificently restored, but that would have been demolished had she not saved it. Ask her to tell you the story.
Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 5th. Additionally, we will have a special opening for shareholders on Saturday, the 4th, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. Last year, on Shareholders Day, we wrote 1,733 tickets in the six hours we were open—which is a sale every 13 seconds. Remember, though, that records are made to be broken.
At Borsheim’s, we will also have the world’s largest faceted diamond on display. Two years in the cutting, this inconspicuous bauble is 545 carats in size. Please inspect this stone and let it guide you in determining what size gem is appropriate for the one you love.
On Saturday evening, May 4, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Louisville Redbirds. I expect to make the opening pitch—owning a quarter of the team assures me of one start per year—but our manager, Mike Jirschele, will probably make his usual mistake and yank me immediately after. About 1,700 shareholders attended last year’s game. Unfortunately, we had a rain-out, which greatly disappointed the many scouts in the stands. But the smart ones will be back this year, and I plan to show them my best stuff.
Our proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also offer an information packet this year listing restaurants that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you can do in Omaha on the weekend.
For years, I’ve unsuccessfully tried to get my grade school classmate, “Pal” Gorat, to open his steakhouse for business on the Sunday evening preceding the meeting. But this year he’s relented. Gorat’s is a family-owned enterprise that has thrived for 52 years, and if you like steaks, you’ll love this place. I’ve told Pal he will get a good crowd, so call Gorat’s at 402-551-3733 for a reservation. You’ll spot me there—I’ll be the one eating the rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.
1996年3月1日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席