• 1995年伯克希尔·哈撒韦年度股东大会
  • 上午场
    • 1. 欢迎致辞
    • 2. 选举董事
    • 3. 关于授权优先股的动议
    • 10. 格雷厄姆的原则适用于高科技股票？
    • 10. Graham’s principles for high-tech stocks?
    • 11. 全美航空：“你不必用失去它的方式把它赚回来”
    • 11. USAir: “You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it”
    • 12. 警惕复杂的时尚和“大祭司”
    • 12. Beware of complicated fads and “high priests”
    • 13. 衍生品：“错误和恶作剧的潜力”
    • 13. Derivatives: “Potential for mistakes and mischief”
    • 14. 所罗门模糊的未来
    • 14. Salomon’s murky future
    • 15. 向共同基金先驱菲尔·卡雷特致敬
    • 15. Honoring mutual fund pioneer Phil Carret
    • 16. 卡片是美国运通未来的关键
    • 16. Cards are key to future of American Express
    • 17. “腐败赢了”：股票期权会计准则
    • 17. “Corruption won” in stock option accounting rule
    • 18. 为什么没有伯克希尔会议的视频
    • 18. Why there’s no video of Berkshire meetings
    • 19. 伯克希尔会议提振波仙珠宝的销售
    • 19. Berkshire meetings boost Borsheims’ sales
    • 20. 一个“傻瓜”也能成功运营伯克希尔
    • 20. An “idiot” could successfully run Berkshire
    • 26. 对堪萨斯城海兹伯格珠宝公司的赞扬
    • 27. 如何评估子公司的价值
    • 28. 所罗门兄弟的文化冲突
    • 29. 本·格雷厄姆《证券分析》的最佳版本
    • 30. 伯克希尔为何不卖出企业
    • 31. 聚焦格雷厄姆的三大原则
    • 32. 不要相信预测
    • 33. 看投资时的第一个问题
  • 下午会议
    • 1. 银行在我们的能力圈内
    • 2. 巴菲特总是计划“六个月后”写书
    • 3. 可口可乐“完全正确地”处理其现金
    • 4. 为什么华尔街的薪酬这么高？
    • 5. 巴菲特谈“真正”富有的好处
    • 6. “持有大量现金从来不是我们的政策”
    • 7. 报业“异常优秀”，但已不如前
    • 8. 巴菲特对伯克希尔的半敌意收购
    • 9. 对比本·格雷厄姆和菲利普·费雪的
    • 10. 芒格出售伯克希尔股票
    • 11. 当公司会计令人困惑时，远离
    • 12. 劳合社近年来的衰落
    • 13. 只要我们能用一美元创造超过一美元的价值，我们就会保留资金
    • 14. “不太可能”我们在美国以外收购一家企业
    • 15. 巴菲特：我日益增长的知名度并非干扰
    • 16. GEICO股本回报率的下降
    • 17. 对健力士投资不予置评
    • 18. 巴菲特的伯克希尔衬衫不对外出售
    • 19. 不给B夫人和Phil Carret做媒
    • 20. “我们对购买任何东西都持开放态度”
    • 21. Helzberg拥有珠宝零售商中异常出色的销售业绩
    • 22. 保险浮存金在估算内在价值时很重要
    • 23. Hagstrom的书对伯克希尔的股价“有些影响”
    • 24. 巴菲特不理解微软，尽管他与盖茨是朋友
    • 25. 商学院应该研究B夫人的成功
    • 26. 现在就做你喜欢的事，而不是以后
    • 31. 与好人共事
    • 32. 为什么只有一家波仙珠宝店
    • 33. 推动报告股本回报率的因素
    • 34. 伯克希尔子公司的资本回报率
    • 35. “高等数学在投资中没有用”
    • 36. 管理层的差异成就了富国银行
    • 37. 正的股东权益没有什么“神奇”之处
    • 38. 在竞争激烈的信用卡行业中寻找赢家
    • 39. 预计未来20年银行业将发生巨大变化
    • 40. 不对太阳信托和PNC的护城河进行评论
    • 41. 芒格希望没说过关于所罗门的“俏皮话”
    • 42. 与GDP相比，国债现在并不可怕
    • 43. 可口可乐作为评估替代方案的“衡量标尺”
    • 44. 买入伯克希尔还是让你的资金经理自由操作？
    • 45. “我们喜欢坦诚的人”

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning. I’m Warren Buffett, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. And on my left is Charlie Munger, the vice chairman and my partner. And we’ll try to get him to say a few words at some point in the proceedings. (Laughter) The format today is going to be just slightly different. We have one item to — normally, we breeze through the meeting pretty fast, and we’ll do that, but we have one item of business on the preferred stock that I could tell caused some confusion with people. So, I’ll discuss that a little bit. And if, before the vote on that, anybody would like to talk about the preferred issue, we’ll have any comments or questions at that time. And then we’ll breeze through the rest of the meeting, and then we’ll open it up. And I’ll have one announcement to make then, too. And then after that, we’ll go for, maybe, close to noon. And feel free, earlier, anybody that would like to leave, you’re free to, obviously, at any time.

Better form to do it while Charlie’s talking, as I’ve mentioned. (Laughter) And you’ll have to be quick. (Laughter) But then we’ll have a break a little before noon for a few minutes, while a more orderly retreat can be conducted. And we’ll have buses outside to take you back to the hotels or to any of the commercial establishments that Berkshire’s involved in. And then because so many of the — we have people here, at least based on the tickets reserved, from 49 of the 50 states. Only Vermont is absent. We have — but we have Alaska, we have a delegation from every place. We have people from Australia, Israel, Sweden, France, the U.K., 40-some from Canada. So, a lot of people have come a long way. So, Charlie and I will stick around. In fact, we’ll eat our lunch right up here. And we will — you don’t want to watch what we eat.

The — but the — well, we’ll stick around until perhaps as late as even 3 o’clock, but if the crowd gets below a couple of hundred, then we’ll feel we can cut it off. But we do want to answer everyone’s questions. You people are part owners of the company. And any question that relates to your ownership of Berkshire, we want to be able to give you a chance to ask. And it’s tough because of the numbers of people here. I don’t know how many are in the other room. But there’re about 3,300, I believe, in this room. And we want to get to you — to all of you. So, that will come after the meeting. Now, we’ve got a little business to take care of.

WARREN BUFFETT: The meeting will come to order. And I’ll first introduce the directors of Berkshire, in addition to myself. They’re right down here. And if you’ll stand up when I give your name. Susan T. Buffett (Applause). Howard Buffett (Applause) These are names we found in the phone book, you can understand — (Laughter) Malcolm Chace, III (Applause) And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause) Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH). They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire. Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. He will certify to the account of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc Hamburg.

Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 998,258 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum, and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that we’ll entertain questions you might have. First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting. WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? (Laughter)

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? We’ll vote on the motion by voice vote. All of those in favor say, “Aye.”

VOICES: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion is carried. (Laughter) Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 7, 1995, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,177,750 shares of Berkshire common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 998,258 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the two items of business provided for in the proxy statement, he or she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that’s present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person on these two items, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish two ballots to you, one for each item. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so we may distribute them? Just raise your hand and you’ll get one. The first item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors. WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? There any discussion? You’re doing fine. (Laughter) The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election for directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Collect those, please. Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections, a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they’ve received? Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready, you may give your report.

ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than 996,892 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase, III, Charles T. Munger and Walter Scott Jr. Have been elected as directors.

WARREN BUFFETT: The second item of business at this meeting is to consider the recommendation of the board of directors to amend the company’s certificate of incorporation. The proposed amendment would add a provision to the certificate of incorporation authorizing the board of directors to issue up to one million shares of preferred stock in one or more series, with such preferences, limitations, and relative rights as the board of directors may determine. Now, we discussed this some in the annual report. But I would say — and we’ll find out the exact number — but I think we probably had 11 or 12 — maybe 12,000 or so shares voted against the proposal. And I think we had a couple thousand shares that abstained. And since there really is no downside to the proposal, that indicated to me that I’d not done a very adequate job of explaining the logic of authorizing the preferred. So, I’d like to discuss that for a minute now. And I’d also like anybody that would like to ask questions about it, they can do so now. We can talk about it later, too. But if you’d like to do it before the vote, that’d be fine.

The authorization is just that. It’s an authorization. It’s not a command to issue shares. It’s not a directive. It simply gives the directors of the company the ability, in a situation where it makes sense for the company to issue preferred shares, to do so. Now, when we acquire businesses — and I’ll tell you about one when we’re through with this in a few minutes — when we acquire businesses, sometimes the seller of the business wants cash. Sometimes they would like common stock. And it’s certainly possible, as one potential seller did last year, that they wanted, in that case, a convertible preferred stock. Now, from our standpoint, as long as the value of the consideration that we give equates, we really don’t care, aside from a question of tax basis we might obtain, but we — In other economic respects, we don’t care what form of consideration we use, because we will equate the value of cash, versus a straight preferred, versus a convertible preferred, versus common stock, whatever it may be.

So, if the worry is that we will do something dumb in issuing the preferred stock, you should — that’s a perfectly valid worry. But you should worry just as much we’ll do something dumb in terms of using cash or common stock. I mean, if we’re going to do something unintelligent, we can do it with a variety of instruments. (Laughter) And we will not get more licentious in our behavior or anything simply because we have the preferred stock. And the preferred stock may offer sellers of a business the chance to do a tax-free exchange with us. And they may not want common stock, because they may have an ownership situation where they don’t want to run the risk of common stock ownership. And that’s why our preferred is flexible as to terms. Because we could give those people a straight preferred with a coupon that made it worth par at the time we issued it. And then they would know what their income would be for the next umpteen years. And that may be of paramount interest to them. We could issue them an adjustable-rate preferred, which as money market conditions change, would also change its coupon.

And then they would be sure of a constant principal value for the rest of their lifetimes. And one or both of those factors could be more important to one seller or another. So that we simply have more forms of currency available to make acquisitions if we have the ability to issue various forms of preferred. Because a preferred stock, if it’s properly structured, allows for the possibility of a tax-free transaction with a seller. And that’s important to many sellers. Now, in the end, many sellers will prefer cash, just as in the past. And probably most of the sellers that don’t want cash will want common stock. But we will have a preferred stock available. We’re only authorizing a million shares because under Delaware law, there’s an annual — I think there’s an annual fee. I know there’s an initial fee. And I think there’s an annual fee that relates to the amount of shares authorized. So, if we authorized a hundred million shares, we would be paying a larger annual fee, which is something Mr. Munger wouldn’t let me do.

(Laughter) So what we will do, if we issue this, we will issue — undoubtedly, we will issue some sub-shares so that the numbers of shares, for taxation purposes, is relatively limited. But that we will issue sub-shares to make it easier to make change, essentially, in the market. We may issue — if the occasion demands — we may issue a convertible preferred. But that convertible preferred would not be worth any more, at the time we issue it, than a straight preferred. We would adjust, in terms of the coupon, and the conversion price, and so on. So we can equate various forms of currency to fit the desires of the seller of the business. And this is simply one more tool to do it. There’s no downside, like I say, unless we do something stupid. And if we do something stupid with this, we would do something stupid with cash or whatever. So it —we probably should’ve done this some time ago, but we never had a case of a seller wanting that form of currency before. And so it just — and we always felt we could get it authorized promptly.

But there’s no reason to lose a couple of months, if a transaction is pending, to call a meeting to get this on the books. So, it’s simply one more tool. And if there are — anybody that has any questions or comments on the preferred, like I say, you can hold them until later, but I’d be glad to have them before we have the vote. Do we have any? Yeah, there’s a question over there. If you’ll wait just a second, we’ll get a microphone to you. When you ask questions, now or later, if you’ll give your name and where you live, I’d appreciate it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Dr. Lawrence Wasser. I’m from New York. My question is this. If you want to buy a business and the people in the business want cash, you have to have cash, cash that — you know, this kind of cash.

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re familiar with it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. (Laughter and applause) But it strikes me that the preferred isn’t really cash, it’s fiat currency. That is, it’s currency that we can create.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s true. It’s like common stock in that respect. It is the — it is a form — it is an alternate form of currency, and — but it is — Just in terms of common stock, for example, assuming we had enough authorized, we have an unlimited ability to create currency. Now, if we created the wrong price, it dilutes the value of the old currency. But go ahead on.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Until we vote in the affirmative, which I’m sure that this group will probably do because of their confidence in you, but until we vote in the affirmative, it doesn’t exist.

WARREN BUFFETT: That is correct. That would be true, incidentally, with common stock. If we had no more authorized common stock out than we had issued, we have, I think, a million and a half authorized. But let’s assume that we’d issued all that we had authorized. Until more was authorized by the shareholders, there would — it would not be available to be issued.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But if more were authorized by the shareholders then isn’t it true that the value of the shareholders’ holding would be diluted?

WARREN BUFFETT: Only if we receive less in value than we give. That’s the key to it. I mean, if we issue $200 million worth of preferred and we receive a business that’s only worth 150 million, there’s no question you’re worse off than before. So are we, incidentally. But we’re all worse off. The — and that’s true if we give cash that’s worth more for a business than the business is worth. If we give 200 million of cash for a business that’s worth a 150 million, we are worse off. We may not have issued a share of stock. But we have diluted the value of your stock if we do that. As long as we get value received, in terms of whether — of cash, common stock, or preferred stock — then you are not diluted in terms of value. It’s an important point. And obviously, a number of companies, as you may have — Charlie and I have commented about in reports and elsewhere — a number of companies, in our opinion, have issued common stock, particularly, which has a value greater than what they receive.

And — when they do that, they are running what I — what John Medlin of the Wachovia called a “chain letter in reverse.” (Laughter) And that’s cost American shareholders a lot of money. I don’t think it’ll cost them any money at Berkshire. But it’s a perfectly valid worry for shareholders to have. Because a management can build an empire just by issuing these little pieces of paper, which they feel don’t cost them anything. I think Charlie had one story about that in the past. You want to comment on that, Charlie? Nonames basis, of course. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: There was a particular bank where one of the officers wanted stock options, pointed out to the management that they could issue all these shares and it didn’t cost anything. Now, imagine hiring a manager who thinks that way and paying them money — (laughter) — to behave like Judas in your very midst.

WARREN BUFFETT: We have had conversations with managers — (laughter) — where they tell us how fortunate they feel because the stock is down and they can issue options cheaper. Now, if they were issuing those to the third parties, you know, I’m not sure whether they’d have exactly the same attitude. But we have no feeling that we’re getting richer when we issue shares. We have a feeling we’re getting richer when we get at least as much value in a business as the shares are worth that we issue. And we don’t intend to issue them under any other circumstances. But it’s a perfectly valid worry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second part of the question is that, obviously, with preferred issue, you have a situation where the common shareholder is — moves to the back of the line, as it were. Why should the common shareholder in this room want to step to the back of the line if he’s at the front of the line now?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it — but it’s also true if we buy a business for cash, and we — let’s say we borrow the money, the bank that we borrow the money from will come ahead of the common shareholder. There’s no question. Any time you move — you engage in transactions that involve the capital structure, you are changing the potential for each part of the capital structure. If you issue a lot of common and you’ve got some debt outstanding, you’ve generally improved the position of the debt. And the question really becomes whether you think that the position of the common shareholder is improved by issuing either preferred stock, or perhaps borrowing a lot of money, to make an acquisition. I mean, a couple of times in the history of Berkshire, we’ve borrowed money to buy something, to buy a business. And when we do that, we are placing a bank, or an insurance company, or whomever, ahead of the position of the common shareholder. We did that when we issued some debt a few years back. And there’s a question of weighing whether the common shareholders are going to be better off by borrowing money.

But borrowing money is not necessarily at all harmful to shareholders — although certainly, if it’s carried to excess, it is. And the preferred is a form of quasi-borrowed money that does rank ahead of the common shareholder. But then, at the same time, we’re adding a business which we think is going to benefit the shareholder, if we issue that. So that’s the tradeoff. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Matt Zuckerman (PH). I’m from Miami, Florida. My question is, it seems to me that there’s some requirement for shareholder votes if convertible stock — preferred stock — is issued beyond a certain limit. What are those limits?

WARREN BUFFETT: There are no limits on the conversion term that we might do. But for example, if we were going to issue a convertible preferred — now we have no plans to do it, but it could happen. In fact, it might well happen this year. The — we would — and the alternative, we’ll say, was giving somebody a hundred million dollars in cash for a business. If we were to issue a straight preferred, we would figure out what a hundred million dollars’ worth of a straight preferred would sell for, what coupon would be necessary. And that would depend on call provisions and a few things. But for a triple-A credit like Berkshire, you know, it would be somewhere in the area of 7 percent or thereabouts. And then they would have no participation in the upside of the common. If they wanted something that was sure to maintain its principal value, then you have to issue an adjustable-rate preferred that will keep its value around par. That preferred might have an initial coupon of, say, 5 percent or something of the sort, because it has the ability to go up or down based on interest rates. But it would always be worth about par.

If we were to issue a convertible preferred, it might have a conversion price of, just to pick a figure, 28,000 or something of the sort, and a coupon well below the coupon on a straight preferred. And so, whatever we did, they would equate out in our mind as to the value we were giving. We’re not going to give 120 percent of X if we’re only willing to pay a hundred percent of X, just because the form of a deal changes. But you may well see us issue, at some point — you may see us issue a convertible preferred. You may see us issue a straight preferred. You may see us issue an adjustable-rate preferred. I hope we do something because I’d like, you know —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. Based on —

WARREN BUFFETT: If we do it, we’ll think we’re better off.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, based on your past performance, I’m sure you’ll get more value than you give.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: But in any case, it was my understanding that if the amount of shares issued for a conversion of a convertible issue were greater than 20 percent of the total amount of shares outstanding, then it would require a vote of the stockholders, under Delaware law. I may be wrong.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think it’s a stock exchange rule, isn’t it, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: You’re right about the rule, but —

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s a New York Stock Exchange rule.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a New York Stock Exchange rule. That would be $5 billion-plus of deal. And, you know, we would love to make a $5 billion deal, but I don’t think we’re going to do it. So I would say that the chances of any acquisition being large enough so that it requires a shareholder vote is probably slim. But it isn’t because we wouldn’t be interested. (Laughter) And you know, if we have one, we’ll be coming back to you — (laughter) — with the votes already in hand. (Laughter and applause) Are there any other questions on the preferred? We can talk more about it later, too. I just want to — oh, here we are. Sure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett.

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Raina Di Costiloy (PH) from Chicago. I’m very proud to be here. And I’ve seen you grow so, that pretty soon we’re going to be out in a football field. (Laughter) I think your explanation was very helpful. Because as I read this, and I’m sure many of the other lay folk, I didn’t understand what you —

WARREN BUFFETT: (Inaudible)

RAYNA DI COSTILOY: — what you were doing. And you mentioned the preferred stock. But in the prospectus, it’s not clear whether it would be the convertible preferred, the straight preferred. And you cleared that, answering a few other questions, but some of the people felt it would dilute their stock.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I should’ve made that clear in the annual report. And I’m glad I’ve had this chance to do it today. Anything else on the preferred? OK.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You don’t have to come back to the shareholders for a vote, after these shares are authorized, for the terms of it. And you’ve discussed this in terms of buying companies. My question is, you yourself, through Berkshire Hathaway, own the preferred shares of several companies: Salomon, USAir, American Express. Do those shareholders have to vote on the terms of the preferred shares that you bought for those companies? Or is that left at the board of directors’ decision level.

WARREN BUFFETT: Those —

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you clarify that point?

WARREN BUFFETT: Go — excuse me, go ahead.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you clarify that point, please?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We bought a — I think we’ve probably bought six issues of preferred directly from companies. And since none of those triggered that New York Stock Exchange rule that we discussed earlier — and they could’ve if they’d been somewhat larger, but they didn’t — none of those deals had to be approved by the shareholders. I think the only deal we’ve had with a company that had to be approved by the shareholders was when we bought the Cap Cities/ABC stock. Well, we bought early in 1986. I think it was approved by their shareholders in 1985. But the only situations where it would’ve had to have been approved is if it triggered the New York Stock Exchange rule. And our purchases were not that large that they did that. Any other questions? Yeah, there’s one more.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dale Vocawitz (PH). I’m from Champagne, Illinois. A recent issue of Barron’s indicated that it may be possible to issue a best of all possible worlds preferred, that being one where the dividend looks like interest to the issuer and is taxdeductible. And to the purchaser, it would qualify for the dividends received deduction. Do you think that structure might be possible with these shares?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we haven’t thought about that. I know what you’re talking about on that, but I don’t think it would be possible. For one thing, I don’t think you probably have a tax-free deal that way. Charlie, do you?

CHARLIE MUNGER: We probably wouldn’t try and be that cute. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ve got several quips in mind, but I think I’ll keep them to myself. (Laughter) My guess is that that form does not work for a long time. I know what you’re talking about on it, but my guess is it doesn’t. Some companies — then we’ll get on with this — but some companies care about the consideration they give in a deal, whether it’s cash, or preferred, or so on, because they care about the accounting treatment that they get. They want — they usually want pooling treatment rather than purchase accounting treatment. I won’t get into that here. I know it’s going to disappoint you, but I won’t get into that here. Although I may in the next annual report. And that is of absolutely no consequence to us. We care not a wit about the accounting treatment that we receive. We feel that we have a shareholder body that’s intelligent enough to understand the economic reality of a transaction.

And that by playing various games, in terms of how we try to structure it, and maybe flow part of the purchase price back through the income statement or anything of the sort, which is done — that’s not something that we care about at all. We would rather do whatever makes the most sense for us and for the seller, and then explain to you whatever accounting peculiarities may arise out of the transaction. And that probably differentiates us from most companies. And it probably helps us make a deal, occasionally. Anything else?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — really

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, now I can hear you fine.

DALE VOCAWITZ: OK. And I was wondering, will there be any opportunity for shareholders who may find the preferred issue preferable, for any number of reasons, to participate in that?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we issued a preferred and it became actively traded — let’s say it was a company with many shareholders instead of a few. Obviously, that would be something that any new or present shareholder could make a decision on whether they preferred that issue than others. We could, but have no plans of doing it and I don’t see it happening, we could offer to exchange preferred for present common. And it’s conceivable a few people would have an interest, but the — most people have selfselected in terms of the kind of security they want to own in terms of owning Berkshire common. So it’s unlikely they would want to switch into a preferred, because they would — we wouldn’t have a premium of value, it would just be an alternative security. We could do that, though. I mean, and it would probably be a tax-free deal. We have no plans of doing that, but it’s something that if we ever thought that enough people might want, we could offer it. But no one would be obliged to take it. It’s a good question. OK? We’ll move on.

Is there a motion to adopt the board of directors’ recommendation? WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move the adoption of the amendment to the fourth article of the certificate of corporation as set forth in exhibit A of the company’s proxy statement for this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion’s been made and seconded to adopt the proposed amendment to certificate of incorporation. Any further discussion? We are ready to act upon the motion. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballot on the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Collecting a few there. Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the proposed amendment voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received? We’ll wait just a second here. Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready you may give your report.

ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast lot — not less than 928,889 in favor of the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of all shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. The amendment to the certificate of incorporation as set forth in exhibit A to the proxy statement for this meeting is approved. After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the businesses of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting. Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting. WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move this meeting be adjourned.

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Any discussion? If not, all in favor say, “Aye.”

AUDIENCE: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “No.” The meeting is adjourned. (Laughter)

The only thing that may restrict that is that if the buyer is sophisticated enough to question the viability of that company under really extreme conditions, which is the only conditions that count when you’re buying catastrophe insurance, that may restrict it. The second thing is, of course, none of the people that have started up can offer anywhere near the amount of coverage that Berkshire has. Berkshire is really one of a kind in terms of its capital strength in the business. I’m — I don’t think any money in Bermuda that I can remember — I don’t think Ajit’s out there. But I don’t think anybody has a billion of net worth. And you know, we have — at present, we probably have close to 13 billion of net worth and considerably more of value. So we can sustain shocks, and we will sustain shocks, I should add, that others can’t. And we try to get paid appropriately for that. But when we say we can take a billion-dollar loss, we can take a billion-dollar loss. And we will have a billion-dollar loss at some point. And anyone buying it knows we can take it, or something greater.

And they should know that very few other — very few of our competitors can. So, there’s competition. We do an unusual proportion of our business with the eight or ten largest insurance — reinsurance companies and insurance companies in the world. So, we really have established with the people who understand the real risks of the business. They come to Berkshire and — a lot more often than they stop in Bermuda, because they know that we’ll pay. And they’ve been around long enough to know that, in the end, that’s what really counts with an insurance company. If the rates — if there were enough capacity at really ridiculous rates, I mean, in the end, we wouldn’t be writing that business at that time. But I don’t think that will happen. It certainly hasn’t happened so far. And if it happens, you know, so be it. We’ll all play golf until the loss occurs. Charlie? (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

10. Graham’s principles for high-tech stocks?

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6? Or did we do — yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chairmen, most company Berkshire invest at this time are not high in — are not in high-technology sector. What we have seen in the last few years, that there seems to be a significant growth, both in sales and earnings of the high-technology area. And also, what invest — what U.S. shareholder believe that the times are changing from a brand name to high-technology. My question is, can someone apply your investment principle, business philosophy, and your discipline in life to build a portfolio of, say, five or six high-technology company? Let’s call it Berkshire Hathaway Technology Fund? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it would sell. (Laughter) The question about — Charlie and I won’t be able to do it. We — Charlie probably understands high-tech. But you can see how hard it is to get any information out of him. So — (laughter) — he hasn’t told me yet. We try not to get into things we — that we don’t understand. And if we’re going to lose your money, we want to be able to come before you, you know, next year and tell you we lost your money because we thought this and it turned out to be that. We don’t want to say, you know, somebody wrote us a report saying if, you know, “This is what’s going to happen,” in some field that we don’t understand and that, therefore, we lost your money by following someone else’s advice. So, we won’t do it ourselves. At — I think that the principles — I think Ben Graham’s principles — are perfectly valid when applied to high-tech companies.

It’s that we don’t know how to do it, but that doesn’t mean somebody else doesn’t know how to do it. My guess is that if Bill Gates were thinking about some company in an arena that he understood and that I didn’t understand, he would apply much the same way of thinking about the investment decision that I would. He would just understand the business. I might think I understand Coca-Cola or Gillette. And he may have a — he may have the ability to understand a lot of other businesses that seems as clear to him as Coke or Gillette would seem to me. I think once he identified those, he would apply pretty much the same yardsticks in deciding how to act. I think he would act — I think he would have a margin of safety principle that might be a little different because there’s essentially more risk in a high-tech company. But he would still have the margin of safety principle on a — sort of adjusted for the mathematical risk of loss in his mind. He would have — he would look at it as a business, not as a stock. You know, he would not buy it on borrowed money.

I mean, it — a bunch of principles would be carried through. But our circle of things we understand is really unlikely to enlarge, maybe a tiny bit here or there. But if the capital doesn’t get too large, the circle’s OK. And — but we will not —if we have trouble finding things within our circle, we will not enlarge the circle. You know, we’ll wait. That’s our approach.

11. USAir: “You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it”

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, how are we set up for Zone 7? Can we do it out — yeah, here we are.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are you there? Hi, I’m Susie Taylor (PH) from Lincoln, Nebraska. By way of explaining — we wrote down the value of USAir, reflecting our investment’s current market value. You had a good explanation in your report as to why the economics of the business are unattractive. And I presume, given the choice, we wouldn’t do it over again.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s a fair assumption. (Laughter) I should mention, anybody wanted to ask about USAir, we put them in the other room, just so you’ll know why. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And then the second part is better.

WARREN BUFFETT: But I’m watching you. I can see you on the monitor. (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And quoting from your profound statement, “You don’t have to make it back the way you lost it.”

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Wouldn’t it be a good idea to put that 89 million in something you are really behind as opposed to USAir?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very good question. Because it is true that a very important principle in investing is you don’t have to make it back the way you lost it. And in fact, it’s usually a mistake to make — try and make it back the way that you lost it. And we have — when we write our — an investment down, as we did with USAir at 89 million, we probably think it’s worth something more than that. But we tend to want to be on the conservative side. But it’s worth a whole lot less than we paid. And the nature of that preferred, as well as other private issues we’ve bought, usually makes it quite difficult to sell. That’s one of the things we know going in. When we bought preferred, some people thought that we were getting unusually favorable terms. I haven’t heard from them lately on USAir, but — (Laughter) But one of the considerations in that is that, if you buy a hundred shares of a preferred that’s being offered through a securities firm, from the same issuer, you can sell it tomorrow.

And we are restricted, in some ways legally, and in other ways simply by the way that markets work, from disposing of holdings like that. And we know that there’s an extra cost involved to us if we should try to sell, or it may be impossible. And that’s not of great importance with us because we don’t buy things to sell, but it’s of some importance. And we are not in the same position owning our Series A preferred of USAir as we would be if we bought a thousand shares or 5,000 shares of the Series B preferred, I believe it is, that trades on the New York Stock Exchange. That would be very saleable. And our preferred could well even be saleable at a price modestly above what we carry it for, but it would require — it would not be very easy to do. It might — if it were do — if we went about to do it, we could probably — assuming we could do it at all — we could probably get a little more money for it. But it would not be easy to do, partly because of legal restrictions. Charlie and I are on the board. That complicates things.

We always know something that, just by being on the board, that the public doesn’t know. So, that complicates things. And in the end, we usually find that dealing with anything where we’ve got fiduciary obligations is, maybe, not practical at all. And if it is, it’s probably more trouble than it’s worth. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s certainly been an interesting experience, the USAir experience. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Is that it, Charlie? OK. No, he —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d like to repeat that business about not having to get it back the way you lost it. You know, that’s the reason so many people are ruined by gambling. They get behind and then they feel they have to get it back the way they lost it. It’s a deep part of the human nature. And it’s very smart just to lick it by will, and little phrases like that are very useful.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, one of the important things in stocks is that the stock does not know that you own it. You know, you have all these feelings about it. You know, and — (laughter) — you remember what you paid, you know? (Laughter) You remember who told you about it. All these little things, you know? And it — you know, it doesn’t give a damn, you know? (Laughter) It just sits there. And it — you know, a stock at 50, somebody’s paid a hundred, they feel terrible. Somebody else paid 10, they feel wonderful. All these feelings, and it has no impact whatsoever. And so, it’s — as Charlie says, gambling is the classic example. Someone builds a business over years. You know, that, they know how to do. And then they go out some place and get into a mathematically disadvantageous game. Start losing it and they think they’ve got to make it back, not only the way they lost it, but that night. And — (laughter) it’s a great mistake.

12. Beware of complicated fads and “high priests”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Donald Stone. I’m from Riverside, Connecticut. I’m — this is my second shareholders meeting, ever, at age 61. So, I’m really very privileged to be here. My first was Coca-Cola a week and a half ago. And there were only 200 people there. I’m trying to figure this out. (Laughter) I think the rule is that the number of people present is in direct proportion to the price of the shares.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case, we won’t split. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Prefatory comment to my question: the November 24th, 1994 issue of Fortune Magazine had an article, a featured article, entitled “America’s Greatest Wealth Builders,” dealing with the concepts of market value added and economic value added. It was with great glee that I noticed that Coca-Cola was number two on that list, second only to General Electric, and that Coca-Cola had done twice as well as Pepsi-Cola, number nine on the list, with one-third as much capitalization. My question is this: whether the concept of market value added and economic value added, as such, or any of its variants, is a concept that’s applicable and useful to Berkshire Hathaway as a whole, or in analyzing its line of business segments? I’d really like to hear from Charlie Munger on this first. (Laughter) Because I’ve heard —

WARREN BUFFETT: So would I. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve heard —

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’ve heard that he’s thought a lot about this particular subject.

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: If Warren is using economic value added exactly the way they’re now teaching it in the business schools, he hasn’t told me. Obviously, the concept has some merit in it. But the exact formal methods, I don’t believe we use. Warren, are you using this stuff secretly?

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — (laughter) — in a sense, they’re trying to get at the same thing we do. Or we’re trying to get at the same thing they do. But I think it’s — A, I think it has some flaws in it. Although I think it generally comes out with the right answers, it sort of forces itself to come out with the right answers. But I really don’t think you need that sort of thing. I mean, I do not think it’s that complicated to figure out, you know, where it makes sense to put money. You can make mistakes doing it. But in terms of the mental manipulations you go through, I don’t think it’s a very complicated subject. And I don’t think that — I think that the people marketing one or another fad in management tend to make them a little more complicated than needed so that you have to call in the high priest. And, you know, it — if all that really counts is the Ten Commandments, you know, it’s very tough on religious counselors and everything.

(Laughs) It doesn’t take — it just doesn’t make it complicated enough. And I think there’s some of that in — quite a bit of that — in management consulting and in the books that you see and all of that, that come out.

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s way less silly than the capital assets pricing model. So that, at least academia’s improving. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Really, yeah. The capital asset pricing model, which is — I don’t know how much it’s used now. Certainly — you know, they had these great waves of popularity. You get that in management. You get it in investing. I mean, real estate, you know, may have been popular, or international. I — you can read Pensions & Investment magazine, which is a pretty good magazine. But you can just see these fads sort of going through. And then they have seminars on them and everything. And, you know, the investment bankers create product to satisfy the demand. And there’re these fads in management — I mean, obviously, listening to your customer and things like that, I mean, that is — nothing makes more sense. But it’s hard to write a 300-page book that just says, “Listen to your customer.” (Laughter) And, you know, that’s one of the things I liked about Graham’s book. I mean, you know, he wrote — everything he wrote sort of made sense.

He didn’t sort of get into all the frills and try and make it more complicated than it really, truly is. You know, I really didn’t need to read the November issue — 1994 issue of Fortune — to know that Coca-Cola had added a lot of value. (Laughter) We added about 4 billion-some of value to Berkshire. That’s good enough for me. (Laughter)

13. Derivatives: “Potential for mistakes and mischief”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Maurus Spence (PH) from Omaha, Nebraska. I have a two-part question on derivatives. Does Berkshire Hathaway currently, or had they in the past, engaged in strategies involving derivatives? If so, do you as CEO, fully understand these financial instruments? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Whoever suggested that crazy notion? (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Finally, would Charlie care — you or Charlie — care to comment on the use of these by other financial institutions?

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about derivatives — the reason I inject that remark — in a Fortune article that all of you should read if you haven’t, I suggested that the use of derivatives would be dramatically reduced if the CEO had to say in the report whether he understood them or not, and — (Laughter) The answer to your question, though, is we have two types, I guess it would be, of derivative transactions, of very modest size. But that doesn’t mean we wouldn’t — if the conditions were right, we either wouldn’t have them on a much greater scale now, or we wouldn’t have done it in the past. We have two types of transactions, and I do understand them. And there are times when there are things that we would want to do — not often — but there would be times when they could be best accomplished by a transaction involving a derivative security. And we wouldn’t hesitate to do so. We would obviously care very much about the counterparty, because that transaction is just a little piece of paper between two people.

And it’s going to cause one of the two to have to do something painful at the end of the period, usually, which is to write a check to the other person. And therefore, you want to be sure that that person will be both willing and able to write the check. And so, we’re probably more concerned about counterparty risk than most people might be. Last year and the year before, I think I said that derivatives often combine borrowed money with ignorance, and that that is a rather dangerous combination. And I think that we’ve seen some of that in the last year. When you can engage in, sort of, non-physical transactions that involve hundreds of millions, or billions, or tens of billions of dollars, as long as you can get some party on the other side to accept your signature, that really has — that has the potential for a lot of mistakes and mischief. And if you’ve looked at the formulas involved in some, particularly I guess, interest rate-type derivative instruments, it is really hard to conceive of how any business purpose could be solved by the creation of those instruments. I mean, they essentially had a huge, really, gambling element to them.

And I use that in the terms of engaging in a risk that doesn’t even need to be created, as opposed to speculative aspects. They involved a creation of risk, not the transfer of risk, you know, not the moderation of risk, but the creation of risk on a huge scale. And it may be fortunate that in the last year, half a dozen or so cases of people that have gotten into trouble on them have come out because it — that may tend to moderate the troubles of the future. The potential is huge. I mean, you can do things in the derivative markets — Well, I’ve used this example before, but in borrowing money on securities, the Federal Reserve of the U.S. Government decided many decades ago that society had an interest in limiting the degree to which people could use borrowed money in buying securities. They had the example of the 1920s, with what was 10 percent margin. That was regarded as contributing to the Great Crash. So, the government, through the Fed, established margin requirements and said, “I don’t care if you’re John D.

Rockefeller,” you know, “You’re going to have to put up 50 percent of the cost of buying your General Motors stock,” or whatever it may be. And they said that maybe Mr. Rockefeller doesn’t need that, but society needs that. They don’t — we don’t want a bunch of people on thin margins gambling, you know, essentially, in shares, where the ripple effects can cause all kinds of problems for society. And that’s still a law. But it means nothing anymore because various derivative instruments have made 10 percent margins of the 1920s, you know, look like what a small-town banker in Nebraska would regard as conservative, compared to what goes on. So, it’s been an interesting history. You know, like I say, perhaps the experiences of the last year — they’ve got everybody focused on derivatives. Nobody knows exactly what to do about them. Berkshire Hathaway will — if we think something makes sense and Charlie and I understand it — we may find ways to use them to what we think will be our advantage. Charlie, you want to add anything on that?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I disapprove even more than you do, which is hard. If I were running the world, we wouldn’t have options exchanges. The derivative transactions would be about 5 percent of what they are. And the complexity of the contracts would go way down. The clearing systems would be tougher. I think the world has gone a little bonkers. And I’m very happy that I’m not so located in life that I have to be an apologist for it. You know, a lot of these people, I feel sorry for them. You know, they had great banks. And they have to go before people, sometimes even including their children and friends, and argue that these things are wonderful.

14. Salomon’s murky future

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m John Nugier (PH) from Kingsburg, California. And my question relates to Salomon. And where — I’m just asking if you could take us out the next two or three years in your vision. It started out as a good investment. You got a good return on it, or your interest. And it’s clearly had some problems. And we have gotten in deeper and deeper as those problems have continued. And it doesn’t look like it’s superbright. So, it — you must understand where it’s going. But could you just give us where you see it going in the next two or three years?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, no, I think it’s very difficult to forecast where Salomon or, really, almost any major investment bank, slash, trading house will do over actually the next two or three months, let alone the next two or three years. The nature of that business is obviously far more volatile than the blade and razor business. Now the — and the tough part is assessing over a longer period of time whether — because of volatility, it’s much harder to assess whether — what the average returns might be from a business. And the answer is, Charlie and I, probably, if we were to try and write the forecast for the next two or three years, we would not have a high — a feeling that we had a high probability of being able to predict what that company, or other companies in that industry either, would earn three years out or would probably have in the way of average earnings. Our own commitment is to a $700 million preferred issue, which has five redemption dates starting in October 31st of this year and then every year thereafter. On those dates, we can either take cash or stock. And that’s an advantage, obviously, to have an option.

Any time you have an option in this world, it’s to an advantage — it’s to your advantage. It may be a very small advantage, but it’s — giving options is generally a mistake, and accepting options is usually a good idea, if it doesn’t cost you anything. And we will — the other thing about options is you don’t make a decision on them until you have to make a decision. But — so, we, in addition to that $700 million of preferred, which in our view is a hundred percent money-good — I mean, we’d like to own more of that. But we also have about 6 million-odd shares of common, which we paid perhaps $48 a share for, or something in that area. In any event, considerably more than the present market of 35 or ’6. So, we have a loss of probably 80 or $90 million, or some number like that, at market in the common. The preferred has actually treated us fine. We’ve received $63 million a year.

Incidentally, by owning the amount of common we own, this probably isn’t generally known, but — or recognized — if you own 20 percent of the voting power of a company, you have a somewhat different dividends-received credit. You have somewhat different tax treatment than if you own less than 20 percent. So, until we own that common, we paid somewhat more tax on our preferred dividend than we now pay. It’s not a huge item, but it’s not immaterial, either. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I certainly agree, it’s hard to forecast what’s going to happen in the big investment banking, dash — slash, trading houses. I would like to say that Berkshire Hathaway was a large customer of Salomon long before we bought the preferred, and that we’ve had marvelous service over the years. I think Salomon’s going to be around for a long time, rendering very good service to various clients.

WARREN BUFFETT: We sold —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Satisfied clients.

WARREN BUFFETT: We sold our first debt issue of Berkshire, I think, in 1973, through Salomon. So, we’ve had an investing banking relationship for 21 or 22 years there. And actually, we’d done business with them before that in various other ways. So, it’s a long-term relationship. But there’s no question about Salomon being around. The question — and that’s why our preferred is absolutely money-good. But the question is what the average return on capital will be. And we knew that was difficult to predict when we went in. And we found out it’s even more difficult to predict than we thought.

15. Honoring mutual fund pioneer Phil Carret

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for the opportunity. Dick Jensen (PH) from Omaha, a fellow Nebraska University supporter. A rather convoluted question: very interested in your recent purchase and your future intention of American Express. And as I understand the company, I know it’s a rather involved and complicated and rather expansive company, insofar as it has its interest in many areas. I know one of which, of course, is the credit card. But there’s also the major part of the organization of IDS and others that I don’t even know about. And I wondered, what your hopes are for that investment. And I also, just recently, as perhaps you have, became curious to know if you are personally acquainted with Mr. Phil Carret, I believe, his name is. And how about the purchase of his firm in your future? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Dick, I think Phil Carret is here today. Phil?

CHARLIE MUNGER: He’s right back there.

WARREN BUFFETT: Phil, would you stand up? There he is. (Applause) Give him a hand. Phil is 98. I first met him in 1952, 43 years ago. He attends every eclipse around the world. And you can run into him in some very strange places. Wrote his first book on securities, I believe, in 1924. I — am I right on that, Phil? Yeah. And wrote an autobiography here, recently. Probably the greatest long-term investment record in this country’s history. And — but I think — I, you know, my impression is that Phil sold part, or a good bit, of Pioneer some years ago, which he managed for decades, many decades. In fact, I first learned about Phil when I was leafing through Moody’s Banks and Financial Manual 40-odd years ago, and I saw this company with this great record and with some securities that looked terribly interesting. So, we got in touch. And he was out in Omaha and we got acquainted. It — so, anybody that can get Phil to talk to them, listen carefully. I advise that.

16. Cards are key to future of American Express

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about American Express: we own just under 10 percent of American Express. And obviously, even though you mentioned they’re in a number of businesses, the — by far, the key, the most important factor in American Express’s future for a good many years to come — a great many years to come — will be the credit card. And that is a business that has become, and will forever, probably, become ever more competitive. I mean, I followed it since — I think I met Ralph Schneider at the Diners’ Club in the late 1950s. And American Express entered into the credit card business out of fear. I mean, they were worried about what the credit card was going to do to their traveler’s check business. Traveler’s check business had been originated back in 1890-something, I believe. And that was, in turn, building off of the old express business where, I think, it was Henry Wells and William Fargo, they would chain themselves to the express boxes as they delivered them through the — to the West.

And they decided that maybe issuing traveler’s checks would a little easier — (laughter) — than carrying all this stuff around. So, that — the traveler’s check was the — evolved out of the express business. And the credit card business with American Express arose out of fear of what — particularly Diners’ Club at the time. They were all terrified of Diners’ Club, which got this — got the jump on everybody. And they became enormously successful with it. And the American Express card, as you know, had a terribly strong position in what they called the “travel and entertainment” part of the card business. And of course, the banks entered in on a big scale. And Visa’s been enormously successful. So, the card has a strong franchise in certain areas, like the corporate card. Although people like First Bank System are very aggressive in going after them there. The card — but the card has a significant franchise, but it does not have the breadth of franchise that it had many years ago. For a while, it was “the” card. And now it’s “the” card in certain areas, but nothing like as broad an area as before.

It has certain, very important, advantages and economic strengths and it has some weaknesses. And you have to suss those, in deciding where it’ll be in the year 2000 or 2005. And we think that the management of American Express thinks well about the question of how to — how you keep the card special in certain situations. And they’ve reacted to the merchant backlash for higher discount fees, I think, in an intelligent way. So, we’ll see how it all plays out. But the key — IDS, which has now been renamed, but is a very big part of American Express — it accounts for close to a third of their earnings — but the real key will be how the card does over time. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

17. “Corruption won” in stock option accounting rule

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Philip King (PH) from San Francisco. And my question has to do with how the FASB has caved in on the stock option proposal. And the people opposed to the proposal argue that it would hurt capital formation for companies and that the cost of stock options is already reflected in shares outstanding, in fully diluted calculations. And I was curious, what is your feelings about what’s happened?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as those of you have followed this issue — FASB did cave, and they were — they hated it. I mean, they knew they were right. Matter of fact, most of the, what are now, I guess, the big six auditing firms, many years ago, sided with the position. But in my opinion, the auditing firms caved to their clients, in that respect. In terms of capital formation, I would argue that the most intelligent form of capital formation follows from the most accurate form of accounting. I mean, it — if all the companies with — whose names began with A through M didn’t have to count depreciation and all the ones with N through Z did, or something, you know, that might help in capital formation for companies that were — had names with A thru M. And incidentally, they probably all change their names. But I don’t think that bad accounting is an aid to capital formation. In fact, I think probably over time, it distorts capital formation.

Because if we were to pay all of the shareholders with — I mean, all of the people who worked for Berkshire Hathaway — in stock, and therefore record no wage expense, you know, we might be able to sucker in a bunch of people who thought the earnings were real. But that would not be a great step forward for capital formation, in my view. I really think that — you know, I’ve talked privately to a number of managers about this. And they understand it. But they, you know, they prefer the present situation. And they used a lot of muscle in Washington many years ago. And I think I have this authenticated now. This fellow — mathematics professor — sent me some material after I’d written this. I try to get a little proof after the fact when I can. I believe it was in the Indiana legislature, where a legislator introduced a bill to change the value of pi, the mathematical symbol pi, to three. Because he said that it was too difficult for the schoolchildren to work with this — (laughter) — complicated 3.14159. And he was right. I mean, it was difficult.

And I — and Congress, in connection with the stock option question, received all kinds of pressure to, in turn, pressure FASB and the SEC to not count stock option costs as part of compensation. I’ve never met anybody that wanted to be compensated that felt that, if he received his present salary plus an option, he was not getting compensated more than if he just received a salary. So, he thought it was compensation. And I will tell you that if we’d been issuing options over a period of time at Berkshire for things unrelated to the performance of the entire business, that we would’ve had a cost, perhaps measuring in the billions of dollars, whether it was recorded or not. So, it goes back to Bishop Berkeley’s question of whether a tree that falls in the forest and doesn’t make a sound, you know, when — et cetera.

But it — I think it is — I really think that it makes you a bit of a cynic about American business when you see the extent to which a group has pressured — even to the extent of talking about financial — withdrawing financial support from the Financial Accounting Standards Board — the degree to which they’ve pressured people to make sure the value of pi stays at three instead of 3.14, simply because it was their own ox that was being gored a bit. In any event, it’s — it looks like it’s all over now for some time. In fact, now they’re pressuring them to even weaken further the standards that have been set. So, self-interest is alive and well in corporate America. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think dishonor won. And I think that — I think it is quite important for a civilization to have sound engineering and good accounting. And it is a very regrettable episode, leading politicians — leading venture capitalists. I think to some extent, it’s an indictment of the educational system, that this thing could be so widely looked at, and so wrongly.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s bad enough people want to cheat on their accounting. And they do cheat on their accounting. But to want it to be endorsed as the system —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

WARREN BUFFETT: — is really kind of disgusting.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, corruption won.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, put us down on undecided on that and we’ll move on to zone 6. (Laughter)

18. Why there’s no video of Berkshire meetings

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, Mike Lee-Chin from Hamilton, Ontario. Could you consider availing a videotape of this meeting to us, the shareholders?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I didn’t quite get that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Would you consider availing this videotape of the shareholder — this particular shareholder meeting to us, the shareholders?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Distributing a videotape?

WARREN BUFFETT: A transcript or a videotape?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve had that suggested a number of times. It’s a good suggestion, and we’ve considered it. The thing we’re worried about, in connection with that, is discouraging attendance. I mean, it — (laughter) — we’d hate to have two people here asking questions and then send it out to tens of thousands. So — (laughter) — in the end —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Particularly if it might make sales go down at the jewelry store.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter and applause) Since we were just attacking hypocrisy in American business, Charlie felt like he should add that to my comments. (Laughter) But we — it’s a close call on that because we would like everybody — Of course, we try to cover a great many subjects in the annual report. But we like the idea of the meeting — answering a lot of shareholders questions. We don’t want to discourage attendance. And it’s fun to have everybody come in and ask questions. And the chances are, if we had far fewer people, we would have, you know, far more — far fewer — good questions. So that the quality of the meeting is enhanced, I think, by having a lot of people come. But you’ve come a long way, so I can understand why you might be interested in a transcript. (Laughs) I apprentice that. Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — or no. Is that a yes or a no?

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a no.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a no.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Most everything we say is a no. But we have various ways of getting there. (Laughter)

19. Berkshire meetings boost Borsheims’ sales

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 7 from the other room, I can see you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I was wondering if you could tell us what the sales at Borsheims were yesterday and how it compared to a year ago?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can tell you how it compared to a year ago. They were 15 percent above a year ago. And a year ago it was 40-odd percent above the year before. And I forget how much that was before. So, we keep setting records. But we haven’t announced any numbers. But it’s a pretty good size number. You’re a sporty crowd.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. (Laughter)

20. An “idiot” could successfully run Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Patrick Terhune from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. And first of all, I see, per your request, there are a lot of people who wore red in honor of the Cornhuskers. (Applause)

1995年年度股东大会

第三部分（共六部分）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们——是的，我们努力——我是说，我们努力遵循本（格雷厄姆）的原则，无论是在投资态度还是收购企业方面。但你能做的最重要的事——你知道，我们试图做的是寻找一家拥有宽阔且持久的护城河的企业，围绕——保护一个由诚实领主掌管的经济城堡。本质上，这就是商业的全部。我的意思是，你自己想成为城堡的领主。既然如此，你就不用担心最后一个因素。但你试图——我们试图寻找的是这样一家企业，出于某种原因——它可以是因为在某些领域是低成本生产商，也可以是因为拥有基于表面能力的自然特许经营权，还可能是因为它在消费者心智中的位置，或者是因为技术优势，或任何其他原因——它拥有这条护城河。

然后我们——接着我们必须决定的是——在资本主义体系中，所有护城河都会受到攻击，所以每个人都试图——如果你在那里有个大城堡，人们就会试图找到进入的方法。而我们必须决定——在资本主义中，大多数护城河都不值一提。我是说，这就是其本质。而且这是一件建设性的事情。但我们在试图弄清楚是什么在维持——为什么那个城堡仍然屹立？以及什么会使它在五年、十年、二十年后依然屹立或倒塌？关键因素是什么？它们有多持久？它们在多大程度上依赖于城堡中领主的天才？然后如果我们对护城河感觉良好，我们就试图弄清楚，你知道，领主是否试图把一切据为己有，他是否可能用收益做蠢事，等等。但这就是我们看待企业的方式。

查理，你想补充什么吗？

查理·芒格：嗯，我想他想把它翻译成经济学的一般术语。诚实的领主意味着低代理成本。这就是经济学中的说法。而微观经济商业优势，总的来说，是规模优势——市场主导地位的规模，这可以是一个零售商，在更便宜的采购和更高的每平方英尺销售额方面拥有巨大优势。所以，你——总的来说，你在谈论规模经济。你也可以有智力上的规模。换句话说，你可以有一个拥有足够额外智力的领主，使他拥有巨大优势。所以，你——总的来说，你在谈论规模优势和低代理成本。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，在某种程度上，查理和我会试图区分两种企业：一种是你只需要聪明一次的企业，另一种是你必须一直保持聪明的企业。我是说，零售业就是一个你需要一直保持聪明的典型例子。但你——你一直受到攻击。人们会进入你的商店。如果你做得成功，他们第二天就会进入你的商店，试图弄清楚你成功的秘诀是什么，他们可以移植什么，也许还能在他们自己的情况下添加一点东西。所以，在零售业你不能放松。还有一些企业，你只需要聪明一次，至少可以持续很长时间。曾经有一位南方出版商，他的报纸做得非常好。有人问他成功的秘诀。他说是垄断和裙带关系。（笑声）我是说，他并不傻。我是说，他对自己没有任何幻想。如果你在30年前拥有一个大型电视附属台网络，那么好的管理和差的管理之间仍然存在巨大差异。我是说，巨大的差异。

但你可以是一个糟糕的管理者，却仍然能发财，基本上是这样。因为拥有网络电视附属台这一决策，几乎可以克服此后存在的任何缺陷。但如果你是在零售业或类似领域第一个提出某种概念的人，那就不会是这样了。我是说，你必须每天出去捍卫它。理想情况下，你知道，你希望在一个优秀的企业中拥有出色的管理。这就是我们寻找的。但正如我们过去指出的，如果两者之间只能选一个，那就选一个出色的企业。查理，还有什么吗？

查理·芒格：没有了。

26. 对堪萨斯城海兹伯格珠宝公司的赞扬

沃伦·巴菲特：让我们看看，下一个是第7区，对吧？

声音：第7区没有问题。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第1区呢？

观众：我是来自堪萨斯城的保罗·米勒。首先，我想评论一下您对总部位于堪萨斯城的海兹伯格珠宝公司的收购。您提到了巴尼特·海兹伯格和他——他在零售业方面的成就。对于我们堪萨斯城的人来说，您也获得了巴尼特和雪莉·海兹伯格，他们是堪萨斯城慈善事业的第一家族。对于这个房间里的股东来说，海兹伯格一家是了不起的人。把他们加入这个公司集团，充分说明了沃伦·巴菲特以及他们根据管理层和人员来选择公司的做法。所以，祝贺伯克希尔·哈撒韦收购海兹伯格，并感谢海兹伯格一家为堪萨斯城所做的一切。现在，我的——（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

27. 如何评估子公司的价值

观众：我的问题与价值有关。我们可以在年报中看到，例如，以1000万美元收购的《华盛顿邮报》，如今的价值为4.2亿美元。但要辨别其他非公开交易的企业集团的价值，比如内布拉斯加家具城、波仙珠宝等——它们历年来的收购价格与当前价值相比，我们如何理解这些价值？这些价值在年报中又是如何体现的呢？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们试图——这是个好问题。我们试图在年报中提供我们自己回答这个问题所需的信息。部分信息，我们在那些注明“非GAAP会计准则”的页面上提供。但里面有很多有用的信息。我们不会——我们没有给每家公司标一个数字。但我们试图提供足够的信息，关于资本运用、利润率等等，针对较大的业务，这样你就可以做出可能和我们差不多准确的估算。

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我需要的用来对控股企业进行合理估值的信息，不会比报告中已有的更多。我们并没有隐瞒任何我们认为对评估这些企业真正重要的信息。但你说得对，评估有价证券比评估全资拥有的企业更容易——至少从当前数字来看是这样。全资拥有的企业，总的来说，其中一些的价值远远高于它们在账面上的记录。我们对它们，基本上，都感觉很好。但它们——我认为可以说，多年来，它们的结果都非常出色。我猜测它们会继续保持良好运转。在座的有我们许多这类企业的经理。我不打算一一介绍他们，因为我们太多了，介绍起来会花很长时间。但你提到了《华盛顿邮报》。

在前排，靠近前排的位置，我们有唐·基奥，来自可口可乐，请站起来一下？（掌声）我们有凯·格雷厄姆，来自《华盛顿邮报》。（掌声）还有汤姆·墨菲，来自大都会/ABC。（掌声）

查理·芒格：保罗·哈森也在这里吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：我会试着——嗯，还有很多人。我不想——但我想说——这三位坐在一起，我想到一个事实：如果——这三家加起来，我们到目前为止已经获得了大约65亿美元的利润。（笑声）所以，我想说那是——（掌声）——那是三家非常出色的企业。就像——我强调“到目前为止”，因为我们希望将来能说出更大的数字。但我们拥有一批管理者，无论是在控股企业还是部分持股的企业，他们为伯克希尔创造了难以置信的价值。我是说，查理和我每天只是坐着看报纸、看很多杂志、看OJ·辛普森案或者别的什么。（笑声）而这些人却在为我们创造大量价值。所以，我们不会改变。那——

28. 所罗门兄弟的文化冲突

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，让我们看看。我想，现在是第2区吗？还是——是的。

观众：你好。我是来自科罗拉多州狄龙的蒂姆·帕尔默。我有一个关于所罗门公司的问题。在过去的一周里，《纽约时报》、《华尔街日报》和《商业周刊》都有文章，对那里的管理层和您的选择进行了相当不客气的报道。似乎存在某种——文化冲突。我不知道这是否是事实。但我想知道，第一，您如何让自己在坏消息成为新闻之前就保持开放态度？第二，所罗门那里到底发生了什么，薪酬计划等等？您认为从文化上讲，事情会如何发展？

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我总是——我们总是对坏消息比好消息更感兴趣。我们认为好消息会自己处理。而且我们——当人们为我们工作时，我们只给他们几条指示。其中一条是像所有者一样思考。第二条是立即告诉我们坏消息，因为好消息会自己处理。我们能承受坏消息，但我们不喜欢迟到的坏消息。所以，我想说，关于所罗门公司，那里存在并且一直存在一些文化冲突。而且在一个存在如此多紧张关系的企业中，几乎总是会有文化冲突。无论是娱乐业、投资银行业还是体育业，当涉及员工薪酬和所有者回报之间的分配时，都会存在一定程度的紧张关系。我认为这种紧张关系从我第一天到所罗门公司就存在，而且远在此之前。我是说，这并不令人意外。这是可以理解的。

实际上，你在航空业也看到了员工与资本之间的紧张关系。这在航空业产生了糟糕的结果。那里的员工能够——我不是特指全美航空，尽管它是一个例子。但这超出了那个范围。他们拥有的合同，正如我在报告中指出的，是在一个更早的时代签订的，这些合同在很多时候，基本上不允许资本获得任何回报。这产生了大量的紧张关系。在投资银行业或华尔街，通常没有这样的合同。但存在同样类型的紧张关系。而改变一种文化，首先需要时间，其次可能需要一些人员变动。我是说，如果你期望做到这一点，我认为这并不令人意外。我认为——你找不到比鲍勃·德纳姆和德里克·莫恩更好的人了。他们聪明、素质高、愿意努力工作。

会有人认同他们想要建立的安排。也会有人不认同。离开的人中，远非所有人都是自愿离开的，但大多数是。但有些不是。我是说，所罗门去年亏损了很多钱。许多离开的人并不对这些损失负责，但有些人是的。所以，这不是那种会在报纸上公布名字的事情。但有些人离开是因为他们可以在别处赚更多钱。而有些人离开，也许是因为我们认为没有他们我们能赚更多钱。（笑声）查理？

查理·芒格：是的，我不认为所罗门内部被评论的紧张关系有多么不寻常。我认为它们在华尔街几乎无处不在，甚至在那些试图模仿华尔街的银行里也是如此。我只是觉得这是这个行业本身的特点。

沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道今年高盛有多少合伙人离开了，但当他们遭遇糟糕的一年时，显然会产生紧张关系。而且他们时不时会遇到糟糕的一年。每个人都会遇到糟糕的一年。但高盛的普通合伙人在截至1994年11月30日的财年里做得并不好。他们可能什么也没赚到。而他们在之前的年份赚了很多钱。他们很可能在随后的年份也会赚很多钱。但在他们没赚钱的那一年，人员流动率很高。也许这些流动中，有些也并非你所读到的那些离开的普通合伙人自愿的。我不知道那件事的实情。但在华尔街，任何情况下都存在一定程度的紧张关系。当你不赚钱时，紧张关系就会加剧。

29. 本·格雷厄姆《证券分析》的最佳版本

沃伦·巴菲特：第3区？

观众：是的。我叫迈克尔·约翰逊。我是奥马哈本地人，不过我和家人是居住在海外的美国人，现在在沙特阿拉伯的达兰。我的问题与内在价值以及本·格雷厄姆的《证券分析》有关。今年早些时候我读了珍妮特·洛的一本书，她说您更倾向于《证券分析》的第一或第二版，而不是第四版。然而，第四版似乎更倾向于将成长和价值视为密不可分，就像您在最近几年的年报中所说的那样。所以，如果我是一个像您一样一直在研究证券分析的人——我想我在这方面花的时间很多——您认为我需要去弄那些第一版吗？还是说第四版更符合您现在的想法，基于您那些“价值与成长密不可分”的评论？

沃伦·巴菲特：珍妮特·洛今天也在这里，顺便提一下。她写了一本关于本·格雷厄姆的很棒的书。我建议大家如果还没读过，就去买一本。至于——我仍然更喜欢——我认为第二版比第一版便宜很多。而且我认为它们基本上是同一本书。所以，那是我会推荐的版本。我——不是因为价值与成长的区别。我只是认为第二版的推理更好，而且全书更一致，那实际上是本完全负责（当然戴夫·多德以各种方式帮助他）写作的最后一个版本。所以，我认为这本书在很大程度上已经偏离了格雷厄姆的思考方式和他的表达方式。所以，我真的——但我完全不反对任何人想读后来的版本。我确实认为，如果你是真正的证券分析学生，如果你阅读并理解了第二版，那么——你应该会做得很好。

就——在垃圾债券、会计处理等等方面犯下的许多错误，在1934年的第一版以及随后的1940年第二版中都有涉及。里面有很多实质内容。后来，你知道——我必须承认，我没有像仔细阅读早期版本那样仔细阅读最后一个版本。但它给我的印象是——它所说的内容不那么重要，而且表达得也没那么好。而且它还更贵。（笑声）查理，你有什么想法吗？

查理·芒格：没有了。

30. 伯克希尔为何不卖出企业

沃伦·巴菲特：第4区？

观众：是的，来自纽约市的杰夫·佩斯金。我有一个关于年报的问题，您在年报中说，显然，由于伯克希尔的规模，未来的回报可能无法与过去相提并论。然后您又说，阻碍这一点的一个因素可能是您不喜欢出售您拥有的公司。我想知道其中的原因是什么，如果您有一家公司或一项投资，您认为它未来的表现不如您可以将资金投入的其他地方，那么坚持持有而不重新部署资金的理由到底是什么？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我稍微纠正你一下。第一，我没有说我们可能比过去做得更差。我说过我们一定比过去做得更差。我是说，我们不可能复制过去的百分比数字。那——你知道，在不太长的时间内，我们——假设我们不支出任何东西——我们就会吞掉整个GDP，这是我们偶尔会考虑的事情，但——（笑声）——我们并不真的期望实现。但——第二点，与规模有关。这与我们不愿出售企业无关，因为这种不愿已经存在了几十年。但规模直到最近几十年才存在。规模是——你知道，将120亿左右翻倍比将10-20亿翻倍更难，而后者又比将1.2亿翻倍更难。我是说，这是毫无疑问的。所以，最终——好吧，它已经对业绩构成了拖累。这并不意味着业绩会很糟糕，但这确实意味着23%是一个历史数字。

它没有预测价值。不愿出售企业，就像我说的，由来已久。这不是——如果这损害了业绩，那也是微不足道的。这只是一个事实——是查理和我心态的体现：如果我们想过自己的生活，我们发现，找到我们想要合作的企业中的人是罕见的。当我们找到时，我们很享受。我们看不出有什么理由为了每年多赚半个点或一个点——别拿更高的数字来考验我们——而去结束我们与人们建立的友谊、联系或关系。这在我们看来毫无意义。我们不想卷入那种活动。我们知道，如果我们是一家私人公司，我们不会这样做。现在，在伯克希尔，我们觉得我们已经阐明了这个立场。我们希望让每一个可能加入我们的人明白这一点，因为我们不希望他们期望我们这样做。

我们希望他们期望我们努力工作以获得体面的结果，并确保股东获得和我们一样的结果，等等。但我们不想与我们的股东达成任何隐含的契约，导致我们不得不以我们并不真正想要的方式行事。如果那是赚更多钱的代价，那我们不想付这个代价。我们还放弃了其他东西，但这一点是人们可能不同意我们的地方。所以，我们希望确保每个人从一开始就明白这一点。这是你在这里买到的一部分。它可能——我认为无论如何它不会对业绩造成太大损害。但就算有，这也是你得到我们时需要接受的限制。查理？（掌声）

查理·芒格：我认为没有办法精确衡量。但我猜测，如果你能评估一种可以称为“伯克希尔旗下运营企业负责人品格”的东西——其中许多人是这些企业的创始者，并且是其社区的领袖人物，比如海兹伯格一家——我认为美国没有其他公司能像我们这样，在人员素质方面做得这么好。现在，你可以说我们收集了高素质的人，因为我们肯定创造不出来。但无论如何，这是一个非凡的系统。我们为什么要去改动它呢？

沃伦·巴菲特：如果你想——（掌声）——吸引高素质的人，你可能自己也要表现得很好。我是说，而且，做别的事情也不会有什么乐趣。我是说，我在60年代管理合伙公司时，就有点处于那种位置。我真的——你知道，人们加入我的合伙公司。我的工作是尽可能获得最好的回报。我发现如果我进入一个企业，它会带来一些我不喜欢的选项。所以，伯克希尔在这方面要令人满意得多。

31. 聚焦格雷厄姆的三大原则

沃伦·巴菲特：第5区？

观众：约翰·兰金，来自科罗拉多州科林斯堡。感谢您接待我们。在《沃伦·巴菲特之道》一书中，作者描述了您用来评估普通股购买内在价值的资本增长模型。我的问题是，您是否仍然使用本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》中描述的那种公式，该公式涉及评估预期增长，但也涉及账面价值？在我看来，使用格雷厄姆先生的公式得出的公允价值，总是比《沃伦·巴菲特之道》中以及您在年报中提及的现金流折现回现值的方法要略高一些。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们已经在年报中比较详细地介绍了我们处理证券的方法。账面价值不是一个考虑因素——实际上，根本不予考虑。而最好的企业，根据定义，将是那些随着时间的推移，在投入资本上能赚取非常高的回报率的企业。所以，本质上，如果我们想拥有好企业，我们将拥有那些相对于我们的收购价格而言投入资本相对较少的资产。这不会是本·格雷厄姆的方法。但本·格雷厄姆——本当时处理的资金规模并不大。他不会反对这种方法，他只是会说他的方法更简单。当资金规模较小时，它可能确实更简单。我的朋友沃尔特·施洛斯更倾向于本会选择的那种证券。但他管理的资金规模较小。他的业绩绝对惊人。我对此一点也不感到惊讶。我是说，当沃尔特离开格雷厄姆-纽曼公司时，我就预料到他会做得很好。

但从我们的角度来看，我并不认为格雷厄姆的主要信息在于任何与公式相关的东西。换句话说，其中有三个重要方面。你知道，第一是看待股票市场的态度。这在《聪明的投资者》第八章中有论述。我是说，如果你有了那种对待市场的态度，你就领先于市场上99%的人。所以，你拥有巨大的优势。第二个原则是安全边际，这同样给了你巨大的优势，实际上它的适用性远不止投资领域。第三个原则就是把股票看作企业，这让你与市场上大多数人有完全不同的视角。有了这三个哲学基准，你使用的具体估值技术其实并不那么重要。因为你不会偏离轨道太远，无论你使用沃尔特的方法——沃尔特·施洛斯的方法——还是我的方法，或者其他什么方法。菲尔·卡雷特的方法略有不同。

但他也拥有这三个基石，我保证。相信我，他做得非常好。查理？

32. 不要相信预测

查理·芒格：是的。就估算未来现金流的方法需要预测而言，我想说，预测虽然在逻辑上是情境所需的，但平均而言，在美国带来的弊大于利。大多数预测都是由对特定结果有利害关系的人编制的。在这个过程中产生的潜意识偏见及其表面上的精确性，使得它——嗯，它是愚蠢的、不光彩的、或愚蠢的，或别的什么。马克·吐温曾说过，矿坑是一个由骗子拥有的地洞。而在美国，由任何拿佣金的人或试图为特定行动方案辩护的高管编制的预测，常常会是谎言。在大多数情况下，这不是蓄意的谎言。这个人自己已经相信了。那是最糟糕的一种。所以，我认为我们不应该——预测需要非常谨慎地对待，特别是当有人有误导你的利益时。

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我，可以公平地说，我们从未看过与我们购买的任何证券或企业相关的预测。我们曾被大量提供这些预测。事实上，当人们试图把它们强加给我们时，我们主动拒绝它们——我是说，这些预测是由出售企业的人或向董事会做陈述的高管等人精心准备的，仅此一点——你知道，我的意思是，要么是我们错了，要么是他们错了。在所有情况下，大约有九成是管理者为了证明他们一开始就想做的事而走过场。我从未，你知道，我从未遇到过一个想买东西的高管说，“嗯，我不得不拒绝，因为预测不成立。”我是说，就是——这从未发生过。

总会有人拿出预测，来满足那个给他发薪水的人，或者签署那份提供佣金的交易。然后他们会把这些预测传给其他需要的人，比如银行家或董事会，以获得批准。这完全是胡扯。我最近参与了一些——在某种情况下，预测是陈述的一部分。我要求那些做预测的人过去的预测记录也同时呈上。（笑声）这是一个非常无礼的行为。（笑声）

查理·芒格：被认为是一种背叛。

沃伦·巴菲特：它——但相信我，它证明了这一点。我是说，那简直是个笑话。所以，我们就谈到这里吧。

33. 看投资时的第一个问题

沃伦·巴菲特：我们再来一个——也许再来一个问题。然后我们休息一下。查理和我会在这里吃饭。想留下来的人可以留下来。另一个房间的人，无疑这里会有座位空出来。所以，我们大约十到十五分钟后重新集合。然后我们会继续，直到这个群体结束。所以，从第6区再来一个问题。然后我们休息。

观众：你好，我叫彼得·贝弗林，来自瑞典。当您看一个潜在的投资时，您问自己的第一个问题是什么？您和芒格先生问自己的第一个问题一样吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我想——我不会问自己查理是否会喜欢它，因为——（笑声）——那会是个很难的问题。不，第一个问题是，我能理解它吗？除非它是我认为自己能够理解的业务，否则看它就没有意义。自欺欺人地认为我能理解某家软件公司、生物技术公司或类似的东西是没有意义的。我到底对它知道什么？我是说，你知道，我可以——所以那是第一个门槛问题。然后第二个问题是，你知道，它看起来是否有良好的经济前景？它是否在资本上获得了高回报？你知道，它是否给我一种感觉，它有可能继续这样做？然后我就从那里开始。你呢，查理？

查理·芒格：是的。我们倾向于根据过去的记录来判断。总的来说，如果某样东西过去记录很糟糕，而未来很光明，我们很可能会错过这个机会。（笑声和掌声）

下午会议

1. 银行在我们的能力圈内

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们准备从这里开始，第1区有个问题，请就座。我们得——

观众：巴菲特先生，我是来自佛罗里达州克利尔沃特的布莱恩·墨菲。我想问您一个问题，关于您目前收购银行（如PNC和太阳信托银行）背后的想法，特别是考虑到1990年银行股卖得那么便宜，而现在许多已经涨了三倍。从最近的出版物和金融文献来看，相对于1990年的估值，您似乎对处于这些更高价位的银行更感兴趣了。您能解释一下您的想法吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们真的没有不同——我们对银行的标准与其他企业没有任何区别。有几家出版物可能有点夸大其词了，因为我怀疑差异只有几个百分点——而且，顺便说一句，我们不那样看待问题。我们没有任何行业配置理论，完全没有。所以，我们在看银行时，简单地应用与其他任何企业相同的标准——顺便说一句，有时候，你应该知道，媒体报道中关于我们活动的，可能有一半，甚至更多，是错误的。当然，有些也是准确的。然后，当然，有些早已过时。我是说，我们向美国证券交易委员会提交的持股报告是保密的，所以它们在我们提交后一年多才公布。

因此，在过去一两个月里，有几篇关于我们买了什么东西的报道。当然，如果你仔细看报道，我们可能是一年半前买的。我们可能已经卖掉了，也可能买了更多，各种情况都有。所以，总的来说，对媒体报道要小心。我们——实际上——我们在1969年为伯克希尔买了一家银行，伊利诺伊州罗克福德的伊利诺伊国民银行与信托公司。我们对银行业一直有兴趣。我们觉得这是我们能力圈内可以评估的东西。这并不意味着我们每次都对，但我们——我们认为理解银行业并不超出我们的能力范围。所以，我们——我们会关注那个领域的企业。查理？

查理·芒格：没什么要补充的。

2. 巴菲特总是计划“六个月后”写书

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。有第2区吗？

观众：来自奥马哈的拉里·迈尔斯。沃伦，两个简单的问题，第一个非常简短。关于您写一本关于您职业生涯和哲学的书，您有时间表吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我的时间表总是从现在起六个月后。（笑声）对这个问题的回答是，我考虑过几次写书，也一直在想。对我来说，似乎总是有比已经发生的更令人感兴趣的事情将要发生，我不想——我知道我不会写第二本，所以我一直推迟。这是我的理由。

3. 可口可乐“完全正确地”处理其现金

观众：谢谢。第二个问题关于股息。上周五晚上，巧合的是，在路易斯·鲁凯泽的每周电视节目上，特邀嘉宾是菲利普·卡雷特。卡雷特先生说，他最喜欢的美国股票是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。他给出的一个主要原因就是，“我们都知道，伯克希尔从未支付过股息，”因此，您对多余现金有更优越的利用方式。现在，如果你把这个推理延伸下去，如果可口可乐和吉列停止支付股息，并以其他方式利用现金，这是否也是一个有利的政策？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这取决于他们能用现金做什么——他们如何利用现金，以及能用它做什么。相对于伯克希尔，至少在产品方面，这些是更加专注的企业。而且他们——我认为——我赞赏那些拥有优秀业务的管理层，他们将现金用于这些优秀的业务，或者用于他们理解且同样具有优秀经济前景的业务，并将剩余的资金返还给股东。所以，可口可乐，在我看来，在现金处理上完全正确，当它，第一，尽可能有效地将所有现金用于业务，以拓展新市场等等。但除此之外，它还会支付股息，将现金分配给股东，然后大规模回购股票，这以选择性的方式将现金返还给股东，但以一种使所有股东都受益的方式。所以，你——只要我们能利用——我们保留的每一美元——随着时间的推移创造出超过一美元的价值和市场价值，你就会从我们不支付股息中受益。

我们是否能继续这样做，你知道，我们能继续这样做多久，我不能向你保证，但那是——那是做出决定的衡量标准。我认为，这也是可口可乐做出决定的衡量标准。我认为他们值得高度赞扬，因为他们当——在用现金方面——当他们用完了能有效利用现金的机会时，能够约束自己停止使用，然后进一步通过回购股票来有利地部署它。我认为我钦佩我的朋友比尔·盖茨的一点是，他在微软有45亿美元的现金，而很少有管理层能在拥有45亿美元现金时不做出不明智的事情。到目前为止，保留我们所有的收益对我们来说是有意义的，我认为还会再有意义一段时间，但可能不会无限期地有意义。查理？

查理·芒格：我希望它能持续很长时间。（笑声）

4. 为什么华尔街的薪酬这么高？

沃伦·巴菲特：第3区？

观众：我叫丹·奥尼尔，来自新墨西哥州圣达菲。我想问您一个关于所罗门兄弟公司的更具体的问题，那就是，为什么我们要付给那里的员工那么多钱？

沃伦·巴菲特：付什么？

观众：为什么我们要付给那里的员工那么多钱？传统理论似乎是，华尔街的薪酬标准与世界其他地方不同。其基础是认为交易员更聪明——有些交易员比其他人更聪明，并且以某种超自然的方式，能够接收到未来发回给现在的信号。我们怎么知道那不是一个都市传说，就像纽约市下水道里的鳄鱼一样？另一个理论是，大量的股东资本允许交易员捕捉市场中的低效率，就像拉斯维加斯的赌场一样。我的意思是，如果我们拥有一家赌场，雇佣阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦还是阿甘来管二十一点台子都不会有区别，我们会付给他们同样的钱。我想知道您认为哪个理论更接近真相。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你说得很好。（笑声和掌声）最终，当然，你最终会以你认为的——至少是市场价格——来支付报酬。在某种程度上，市场会通过你是否会因为有人出价更高而导致员工离职来检验你。但对此的限制应该是，只要你获得了资本的市价回报率，你就按市价支付给他们报酬。但在短期内衡量资本的市价回报率，比衡量薪酬的市价回报率要困难。所以，许多离开的人——但远非全部——离开是因为他们觉得他们会在别处获得——大概是这样——更高的薪酬。市场就是这样运作的，就像它在娱乐业和体育界一样。当它这样运作时，它是否为资本留下了足够的回报，这是一个悬而未决的问题。我是说，我没有看过所有棒球队的数据，但我看过一些。

当然，在一些较小的市场中，我是说，账目不是假的。我的意思是，在堪萨斯城这样的地方，按市价支付棒球运动员薪水，同时还要经营一支球队赚钱，是非常困难的，因为与大城市相比，你的电视市场更小等等。所以，最终你必须按市价支付薪酬来留住人才，但部分也取决于他们衡量自己——他们将得到什么——的期限。我的意思是，如果你看看去年的高盛，他们什么也没得到。这是否意味着每个人都会离开，因为他们在别处能得到一些报酬？不是，因为80%或90%的合伙人有着更长的时间视野。他们在比较与其他地方提供的薪酬时，心中有一个预期的收入数字。如果你遇到一种情况，市价超过了企业的盈利能力，那么在某些时候，资本将会从该企业流出。

在航空业，我把它作为一个例子，市价——大多数——嗯，就较大的航空公司而言，人们并不是按市价获得报酬，他们是按合同规定的费率获得报酬。你不能因此责怪任何人。如果你有一份合同，规定你应该得到X，而当前市场价格只有一半X，你会非常积极地抓住这份合同。就像我说的，你不能因此责怪任何人，只是如果你最终陷入这种状况，你会遇到真正的问题。而如果你遇到的问题是，市场价格高于你企业能够承受的水平——或者类似的问题——你也会遇到同样的问题。我的猜测是，实际上，所罗门已经建立了一个更接近高盛式的系统，因为它本质上在某种程度上创建了一个内部合伙关系。

要让这个运转起来，首先，随着时间的推移，合伙人必须赚到好钱，否则它就行不通，但其次，你必须拥有具备合伙人心态的人。如果你从一种文化转变到另一种文化，你不可能让百分之百的人接受任何新系统。查理？

查理·芒格：是的，在实行新薪酬制度之后紧接着遭遇一个非常糟糕的年份，这确实有点不走运。从本质上讲，人们会下意识地责怪薪酬制度。其次，我认为华尔街普遍存在比其他地方更强烈的嫉妒-羡慕效应。

5. 巴菲特谈“真正”富有的好处

查理·芒格：我有一个朋友，他的祖母过去常说，她不明白人们为什么会陷入嫉妒-羡慕之中，因为那是唯一一种你永远无法从中获得任何乐趣的罪孽。——（笑声）但总的来说，我认为在华尔街，很多人拥有错误类型的祖母。（笑声和掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不时地评论——他叫什么名字？罗宾·利奇在《富人和名人的生活方式》节目中完全搞错了，因为他展示了所有如果你变富就会发生的美妙事情。但它们真的没那么美妙，那些豪华的房子、游船等等。正如我向人们解释的，富有的真正好处是它能让你如此有效地去恨。如果你非常富有，你知道，而你兄弟或其他人，表亲或某人，在世界上得到了一点更多的关注之类的事情，你可以以一种非常大规模的方式去恨。你可以雇佣会计师和律师给他制造各种各样的麻烦。如果你很穷，你只能在感恩节冷落他，不露面或者类似的事情。（笑声）但我注意到，这些富人，特别是当他们继承大笔财富时，迟早他们会——经常——开始对兄弟姐妹、表亲或其他人产生强烈的敌意。

而且他们真的可以——他们可以以我们这些普通人真的无法企及的方式来恨——或者变得嫉妒。所以，这是最近没有出现在罗宾·利奇节目中的好处，但我——但你可以在体育界和娱乐界看到一点，也许甚至在华尔街也是，一年赚一百万美元看起来很棒，直到坐在你旁边的那个家伙，他不可能比你聪明，却赚了一百二十万。然后整个世界就变成了一个非常不公平的地方。（笑声）

6. “持有大量现金从来不是我们的政策”

沃伦·巴菲特：第4区？

观众：下午好。我的问题很简单，是关于今年资产负债表上显示的现金及现金等价物与去年的比较。在我看来，现金等价物总是好东西，以备市场大幅下跌时能够进行机会性买入，正如我所知，您曾提到“市场先生”有时会变得躁郁。这里是不是有什么不太明显的地方我没看到？还是说如果市场出现那种情况，我们现在没有这个头寸呢？

沃伦·巴菲特：伯克希尔的现金是一个剩余项。我是说，我们希望在所有的时刻都没有现金。同时，我们也不希望在任何一个时刻欠很多钱。但是——如果我们周围有现金，那仅仅是因为我们没有找到任何我们喜欢做的事情，而且我们希望——总是希望——尽快部署它。我们从不考虑市场是否会下跌或类似的事情，也不考虑我们是否可能买到更便宜的东西。如果我们喜欢某样东西，我们就会买。当你看到我们资产负债表上有任何规模的现金时，那是查理和我在承认，我们在那个时间点没有找到任何有吸引力的东西，至少是大规模的有吸引力的东西。持有大量现金从来不是我们的政策。

7. 报业“异常优秀”，但已不如前

沃伦·巴菲特：第5区？

观众：大卫·温特斯，来自新泽西州山湖。我站起来说。大卫·温特斯，新泽西州山湖。几年前，您说过您热爱报业，然后随着时间的推移，我猜，它——您说热爱程度下降了一点。我有点想知道您现在感觉如何，以及您能否为我们做一些预测？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我以前从两个方面热爱它。我热爱它的经济状况，也热爱这个活动本身，两者都热爱。活动本身——对活动的热爱并未减少。其经济状况，与世界上的任何行业相比，仍然异常优秀。但它们不如15年前那么好了。所以，它们——我几年前写过这个，曾经似乎是最无懈可击的特许经营权，现在仍然是一个非常优秀的业务，但它不像是10年或20年前可能的那样无懈可击了。我仍然认为它是我所处的世界里最有趣的行业之一。但如果你谈纯粹的经济学，我——我想不出几个其他的行业，如果我一生中只拥有一项资产，我会更愿意拥有一份独家报纸城市的报纸。但我不会有像10或15年前那样的绝对确定感了。查理？

查理·芒格：是的，我认为很明显，报业老板们第一次感到有点偏执狂了。我是说，他们担心电子革命，他们担心年轻人不读书。去参加报业大会不再像以前那样有趣了。

沃伦·巴菲特：他们仍然在赚取巨额的利润。我是说，这是有趣的事情。

查理·芒格：啊，但是他们——我听你说过十几次，“人们似乎不关心他们在哪一层，只关心电梯是在上升还是下降。”

沃伦·巴菲特：没错，确实如此。（笑声）当人们在一楼刚刚上来的电梯二楼时，感觉比在从一百楼下来的九十九楼要好，这是毫无疑问的。他们有这种投射。当然，尤其是当他们身处一个利润自动生成的行业时，因为他们开始思考，你知道，问题来了：如果没有这种有利的地位，他们是否真的有能力赚很多钱？这是他们以前从不需要思考的问题。所以，这会让他们感到不舒服。他们都在叫嚷着新闻纸价格。我们可能也会稍微叫嚷一下。我是说，如果你将身处新闻纸行业与身处报业进行比较，那是很可笑的。

新闻纸价格，如果你——你可以从任何时间点绘制图表，你知道，15或20年前，或10年前，报纸的价格，广告价格涨得更多。我是说，听到他们喊不公平是很有趣的，因为它们在过去的12个月里涨了很多，而且在接下来的6个月里还会再涨一些。但相信我，身处报业仍比身处新闻纸行业要好。

8. 巴菲特对伯克希尔的半敌意收购

沃伦·巴菲特：第6区？

观众：巴菲特先生，我叫莉兹·普鲁斯，来自纽约市。我想知道，关于您的收购标准——我知道其中一部分是伯克希尔·哈撒韦不会参与恶意收购。我想知道这种理念在多大程度上适用于或可能不适用于您作为其他几家上市公司董事会成员的角色。

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个有趣的问题。我还没有在任何公司的董事会遇到过CEO把恶意收购的问题提交给董事会的情况。你能想到我忘记的任何情况吗？没有，但是——没有规定说这不会发生。所以，我不完全确定如果遇到这种情况我会怎么做。这是个很好的问题。我以前——我以前对此有完全不同的态度。我是说，实际上——如果我们回顾40年，我们实际上收购了公司的控股权。以伯克希尔为例，董事长马尔科姆·蔡斯完全支持我们购买伯克希尔的股票。但总裁西伯里·斯坦顿就不会支持，而且西伯里当时在管理公司。所以，那不算是敌意的，但西伯里不会支持。而马尔科姆会支持。

所以，我不知道今天如果有人走进吉列、大都会/ABC或类似的地方，情况会怎样。我不认为这会发生，但我目前对此没有任何政策。查理，你觉得我们会怎么做？

查理·芒格：我不认为我们的行为是完全可预测的。（笑声和掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：他说得对。（笑声）

9. 对比本·格雷厄姆和菲利普·费雪的

沃伦·巴菲特：第1区？

观众：是的，尼尔·麦克马洪，纽约市，也是红杉基金的股东。本·格雷厄姆的投资鼓励换手。看看伯克希尔的持股，集中且长期，您仍然还是15%的菲利普·费雪和85%的格雷厄姆吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：我不知道百分比是多少。在刚才我提到的三点上，我是100%的本·格雷厄姆，那些确实很重要。我非常——我在大约1960年左右第一次读到菲利普·费雪的两本书时，深受其影响。我认为它们是很棒的书，而且我认为费雪是个很棒的家伙。所以，我想我可能给出了那个百分比——我想我第一次在《福布斯》杂志上使用它，当时吉姆·迈克尔斯采访我。我想，你知道，那是那种情况之一。我只是随口说了一个数字。但我想我更愿意把自己看作，在他们不矛盾的地方——而且他们确实不矛盾——是100%的本·格雷厄姆和100%的菲利普·费雪。只是他们的侧重点截然不同。本不会反对这样的命题：如果你能找到一家资本回报率很高并且能够持续使用更多资本的企业，那它就是世界上最好的企业。

当然，他大部分钱是从GEICO赚来的，而那正是那种企业。所以，他认识到这一点，只是他觉得，另一种系统——买入统计上非常便宜的东西，并且买入大量这样的东西——是一种更容易应用的政策，也更容易教授。他会觉得菲利普·费雪的方法不如他的方法容易教授，但他的方法价值更有限，因为它不适用于真正大规模的资金。在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司——格雷厄姆-纽曼公司是一个封闭式基金——哦，技术上是开放式基金，但它有600万美元的净资产。而与之相关的纽曼和格雷厄姆合伙公司也有600万。所以，你总共有1200万的资金池。嗯，你可以到处买小型机床公司——机床公司的股票，不管是什么，都是统计上便宜的。那是一个非常好的群体操作。而且他有——如果你拥有一家糟糕的企业，你必须在某个时候卖掉它。

我是说，如果你拥有一堆糟糕的企业，你最好希望其中一些被收购或者发生点什么。你需要换手。如果你拥有一家优秀的企业，你知道，你基本上不想换手。查理？

10. 芒格出售伯克希尔股票

查理·芒格：对我而言，菲尔·费舍尔关注的生意里有趣的一点是，其中许多并非长久的好生意。他投资过的一家公司是“产权保险与信托公司”，它主导了加州市场。它拥有最大的产权档案库，靠人工维护，并且有着出色的财务稳健性和正直声誉等等。它几乎垄断了一个利润丰厚的行业。但随着计算机的出现，你只需花几百万美元就能打造一个产权档案库，而且无需大量文员就能维护。很快，市场上就有了20家不同的产权公司。它们会去找大客户，比如大型贷款机构和大型房地产经纪人，按照旧时的标准支付高得离谱的佣金，并竞相拉走大笔业务。最终，在加州，所有产权保险公司合计的总收益跌到了零以下——而这一切始于一个近乎垄断的局面。

沃伦·巴菲特：从一个看似垄断的局面开始。

查理·芒格：所以，很少有公司能安全到让你可以高枕无忧地展望未来20年。技术有时是你的朋友，有时则是你的死敌。如果产权保险与信托公司足够聪明，它们本应把计算机——它们曾视为降低成本工具的计算机——视为降临人间的最可怕诅咒之一。

沃伦·巴菲特：在某种程度上，运用菲尔·费舍尔的方法可能需要更多的商业经验和洞察力，而格雷厄姆的方法则不然。如果你严格应用格雷厄姆的方法，唯一的问题是你可能很长一段时间都找不到可做的事，而且用大笔资金操作也会很困难。但如果你严格应用他的营运资本测试于证券，它确实有效。只是可能规模无法很大，而且会有无所事事的阶段。本实际上更像是一位老师——我的意思是，他没有强烈的赚钱欲望。那对他没有吸引力。所以他想要的是某种他认为可教授的、作为其哲学和方法基石的东西。他觉得你可以坐在奥马哈这里读他的书，然后应用——买入那些统计上便宜的股票，而不需要对商业或消费者行为有任何特殊的洞察力。

我不认为这有什么问题，但我也认为你无法用这种方法管理大笔资金。

11. 当公司会计令人困惑时，远离

沃伦·巴菲特：区域3？查理将他净资产的很大一部分投在伯克希尔，我也是。请说。抱歉，请说。我想它没太正常工作——

参会者：你好？

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

参会者：你好，我是来自纽约的Gorem Pulich。我有两个问题，第一个很短。我认为很多人因为市场上一些复杂的会计手法而难以评估企业价值。你有什么建议吗，比如一些书或读物，可以帮助理解这些会计故事？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。Abe Briloff过去经常在《巴伦周刊》上撰写关于各种会计操作的文章，《巴伦》也延续了这一点。但你说得对，有些公司会试图用会计来描绘与经济现实相去甚远的画面。有时会计规则本身也会导致这种情况。我要说的是，当会计让你感到困惑时，我倾向于直接放弃考虑这家公司。我的意思是，这很可能是故意的，无论如何，你都不该靠近它。我们从未从那些会计可疑的公司中获得过好的投资结果。我想不出一个例子。你能吗，查理？

查理·芒格：没有。

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常不好的信号。

查理·芒格：我曾经做过一次卖空，结果不错——（笑声）——就是这种情况。

沃伦·巴菲特：会计真的可以让你深入了解管理层的品格。我要说的是，你会遇到不少糟糕的会计。我过去称之为“创造性会计”。如果被允许，你可能会遇到更多。但有些公司能够将审计师推得很远，我会对任何看起来可疑的东西持非常怀疑的态度。我认为有一些文章写过这方面，但我记不清它们出现在哪里了，它们讨论了那些问题。显然，如果预付费用、递延资产账户开始异常高企，存货与销售额的比率趋势看起来不正常，你就需要多留意这些公司。在人寿保险领域，我们也经常看到薄弱的会计。

当你面对的产品无法在短期内将收入与费用近似匹配现金时，人们就有机会玩数字游戏。有些人已经学会了如何玩得很好，他们有时会策划长期股票操纵或推销计划，以牺牲公众利益为代价中饱私囊。如果你对会计产生怀疑，直接转到下一家公司。

12. 劳合社近年来的衰落

沃伦·巴菲特：区域4？

参会者：是的。我是来自芝加哥的Wasserman女士。为了更好地理解再保险业务，您能解释一下您与伦敦劳合社在市场中的关系吗？您认为它可能是这个领域的领导者？你们多久直接竞争一次？或者你们是否曾为它们做再保险业务，因为它们近年来有亏损？您如何看待随着它们经济状况变化而变化的行业格局？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，劳合社，正如你所知，它不是一个保险公司，而是一个——最初它是一个咖啡馆，但人们认为它是一个许多辛迪加在特定物理地点运营和聚集的场所。它历史上承保更大、更奇特的保险风险。在过去10年左右，劳合社的相对地位已经大幅下降，部分原因是——很大程度上是因为糟糕的业绩，这导致了资本撤出，支持辛迪加的人也变得不满。所以，劳合社在再保险业务和某些特殊类型的直接保险中仍然是一个重要的竞争因素。它是一个非常重要的因素。但它不再是10或15年前的那个因素了。我不确定伯克希尔的资本与劳合社所有辛迪加的资本相比如何，但它在过去5到10年中的相对重要性肯定已经改变了。

而且劳合社在面临问题后吸引资本的能力已经减弱，尽管他们正在努力解决这个问题。但我们把劳合社视为竞争对手，就像我们看待许多再保险公司一样。但我们也会与劳合社的许多辛迪加做生意，未来10年我们很可能与各种辛迪加做大量业务。查理？

查理·芒格：是的，劳合社是一个非常有趣的机构，因为它有着诚信的声誉，他们在旧金山大火等事件中支付了赔款，等等。但我要说的是，10或15年前，大量马虎和愚蠢的行为进入了劳合社，特别是在某些辛迪加中。当同样的风险在系统中循环时，大量的佣金从顶层抽取。定制过度，三个小时的午餐配上好酒。那是不对的，他们陷入了大麻烦。

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，在伯克希尔的历史上，我们遇到的最重大的保险问题与劳合社有关——或者说与劳合社的某些辛迪加有关——那几乎是20年前的事了。正如查理所说，他们有着几个世纪以来极好的声誉——行为声誉。我认为他们有一段时间是靠这个名声吃老本。我们曾在一个场景中遇到了行为问题。那对我们来说代价非常高昂。所以，我们可能早期就预见到了将要发生的事情。劳合社有很多不同的辛迪加，由不同的人管理，他们在某种程度上有着不同的行为标准。那些以为与劳合社打交道就不会有任何问题的人，发现事实并非如此。但他们将继续成为保险业的一支主要力量，他们会克服目前的困难，并且很可能会以比之前更好的结构走出来。

13. 只要我们能用一美元创造超过一美元的价值，我们就会保留资金

沃伦·巴菲特：我们刚刚是到了区域5吗？

参会者：我是来自亚利桑那州斯科茨代尔的Christopher Jones。我有几个问题想请教你们。你们今天多次提到，在美国寻找能够收购或部分收购的有能力公司时的困难和挫折。我知道，当我们持有可口可乐和吉列时，我们已经是全球环境的一部分。但令我惊讶的是，竟然没有引起你们中任何一位兴趣的全球性特许经营权或全球性管理层。我知道过去我们曾拥有过一些。所以我的问题是，鉴于伯克希尔现在的规模，我们是否会看到投资组合更倾向于全球性？第二个问题，你们也谈到，你们寻找的管理层应当聪明地使用现金。现在许多管理层都在回购自己的股票，因为他们在市场上找不到更便宜或更好的东西。你们目前不回购自己股票的理念，是否意味着你们认为伯克希尔在当前价格下被高估了？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们从未回购过股票。我——实际上我们在60年代回购过一些——但基本上我们从未回购过股票，尽管有很多次我们都觉得这样做相当有吸引力。但我们也一直认为，如果我们通过保留一美元能够创造出超过一美元的市场价值——也许远超过一美元——那么从长远来看，这样做总体效果会更好。只要我们能够找到使用现金的方法，并且整体上我们觉得这些方法能将一美元变成大于一美元的东西，我们就会继续保留资金。我们不会以本周或本月能否找到东西来衡量，但我们肯定会以未来几年能否找到东西来衡量。我们有过沉寂期。实际上，现在的情况比往常稍微活跃一些。但在20多年的时间里，我们有过很多次沉寂期。正如我所说，我曾在一次沉寂期结束了合伙公司。

所以，这——它部分取决于现在的情况，部分取决于预期。我认为，无论我们的股票现在是卖在X价格还是四分之三X价格，都不会有太大区别。但如果我们认为无法在外部找到使用这笔钱的事情，那就会产生影响。

14. “不太可能”我们在美国以外收购一家企业

沃伦·巴菲特：关于非本土业务的问题，正如你提到的，我们在可口可乐和吉列上合计投资了近80亿美元，可口可乐80%以上的收益来自美国以外，吉列大概有三分之二左右。所以你可以说，仅在这两项投资中，伯克希尔近40%的净资产——35%到40%——是在美国境外运作的。就整体收购一家企业而言，我们不排除收购非美国注册的企业。但这不太可能发生。我们很想这样做，特别是如果它规模很大并且我们理解它的话。但我们是否像在美国找到Helzberg那样容易在欧洲找到一家类似的呢？我对此表示怀疑。我只是不确定我们能否对它们运营的环境、管理层以及所有一切建立起足够的信心。但我们可能会。

它必须是一个非常简单的业务，并且必须是那种我们确信长期了解其护城河的业务。它还必须是我们能够与管理层建立融洽关系的业务，尽管背景可能有所不同。这不是不可能，但我要说的是，可能性不大。查理？

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。

15. 巴菲特：我日益增长的知名度并非干扰

沃伦·巴菲特：区域6？

参会者：你好。我是来自西弗吉尼亚州摩根敦的Lee Debroff。自从所罗门事件以来，你似乎吸引了越来越多的媒体关注。在这方面，出现了许多似乎会分散你实际投资业务注意力的事情。比如，我们看到你参加了比尔·盖茨在夏威夷的婚礼，买了一台个人电脑，现在又戴着引人注目的设计师领带。（笑声）而且昨天——

沃伦·巴菲特：即使我没有在所罗门公司，比尔也会邀请我去参加婚礼。（笑声）

参会者：昨天，我们在雨中得到了那些小旗。一个非常严肃的问题，既然你现在成了媒体的宠儿，你如何向我们保证你依然专注于那个“球”？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我的确收到了比以前更多的邮件，所以我们在那方面建立了一个稍好的系统。但我只做我喜欢做的事。就拿演讲来说，现在邀请我演讲的次数大概是10年前的20倍，但我做的演讲数量是一样的。你知道，我对自己做的事情有自己的选择标准。同样，我被邀请参加，你知道，我不知道有多少晚宴致敬活动等等。基本上，我不会改变我做事的方式，因为我不想改变——如果我想做别的事——如果在我建设伯克希尔的过程中，那些事情是为了让我最终到达另一个位置，我现在早就到了。这什么都不会改变。它确实改变了邮件量，但我已经处理好了，那不会造成大的干扰。

抱歉？

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我会留在奥马哈。是的，毫无疑问。我的意思是，如果我不想待在奥马哈，我早就想出办法改变了，几十年前就很容易改变。我认为——我们这里有很多人不是来自奥马哈，但那是他们的问题。我的意思是——（笑声）

查理·芒格：我观察沃伦很久了，那些担心他会改变的人，是在大量地自寻不必要的烦恼。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我会改变的可能性，和查理会改变的可能性差不多。（笑声）邮件这件事，你知道，你希望有一种更简单的方式来处理它。但你基本上无法回复所有收到的信件，就这么简单。一旦你接受了这一点，用一封格式信来处理，事情就解决了。

16. GEICO股本回报率的下降

沃伦·巴菲特：区域1？

参会者：是的。我是来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的Samuel Park。我的问题是关于GEICO的。我注意到，在过去五年中，它们的股本回报率每年都在下降。这是否意味着业务发生了变化，还是只是暂时现象？

沃伦·巴菲特：问题是关于GEICO的股本回报率吗？

参会者：是的。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，确实在一定程度上下降了。GEICO的增长或多或少取决于一些基本因素——我是说，那里有一个自然的增长率。资本的增长速度超过了保费收入和投资资产的增长速度，所以，如果要实现同样的承保成功和投资成功，除非它们回购股票，否则就会产生更低的资本回报率，而它们确实已经相当大幅度地回购了。但这也会受到可用性的限制。这是一个非常好的业务。但这不是一个你只要将资本翻倍就能轻松将收益翻倍的业务。查理？

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。

17. 对健力士投资不予置评

沃伦·巴菲特：区域2？

参会者：我是来自斯科茨代尔的Mark Hake。我想你关于外国股票投资的问题那位先生已经基本回答了。但我注意到你过去曾投资过健力士。你能评论一下吗？你现在还持有吗？如果没有，为什么？

沃伦·巴菲特：我们不对证券的买卖或所有权发表评论，除非法律要求我们这样做，或者它们达到我们年度报告的阈值水平。随着我们资产的增长，我们提高了阈值水平。我们不是按照资产百分比来提高的。所以今年我们使用的截止点是，我认为，市值达到3亿美元才进行报告。现在，如果我们持有等量的健力士——我不是说我们持有过——但如果我们1994年12月31日持有等量的健力士，它不会达到我们1993年12月31日的阈值。它不会达到那个阈值。我们真的不想参与任何谈论我们买卖了什么的事情。关于这方面有很多猜测，但谈论买卖对伯克希尔没有好处。

如果我们正在收购市中心的一块土地，并且只买了我们计划中的四分之一，例如，我们不会觉得报纸头版报道我们在收购土地对我们有好处。我们基本上不从事提供投资建议的业务。我们会谈论我们的原则。所以，关于健力士或者任何其他没有出现在我们年终清单上的东西，你唯一能得出的结论是，我们在那个时间点没有持有市值3亿美元或以上的该股票。

18. 巴菲特的伯克希尔衬衫不对外出售

沃伦·巴菲特：区域3？

参会者：是的，巴菲特先生。我是来自马萨诸塞州波士顿的Don Bresca。最近我注意到你穿着一件IZOD衬衫，中间印有伯克希尔·哈撒韦字样——还有一只握着现金的拳头。这是新的标志吗？第二个问题是，这件衬衫股东们能买到吗？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：这件衬衫不对外出售。那是别人送的礼物，股东们买不到。但你可以自己揣摩其中的含义。（笑声）

19. 不给B夫人和Phil Carret做媒

沃伦·巴菲特：区域4？

参会者：是的。我是来自爱荷华州密苏里谷的Lyle McIntosh，大约在公路25英里处。沃伦，考虑到这里是玉米产区，我务农，还有几位农民股东，这次会议正好赶上了玉米种植的中期。你能把它往后推三周吗？（笑声）另外，我注意到[共同基金先驱]Phil Carret周五晚上出现在“华尔街一周”节目中。抱歉我不知道他的婚姻状况，但如果他单身，你有没有想过把他介绍给B夫人[内布拉斯加家具城创始人Rose Blumkin]？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，顺便说一句，B夫人昨天还在工作。我大约4点钟过去探望了她，她状态很好。她今年晚些时候就要102岁了，我猜她在102岁生日那天也会工作。不过，我会让Phil和B夫人自己处理这方面的事情。（笑声）

查理·芒格：对她来说，他可能太年轻了一点。（笑声）

20. “我们对购买任何东西都持开放态度”

沃伦·巴菲特：区域5？

参会者：嗯，我是来自辛辛那提的投资者Ken Donovant。您谈到了您对收购整个外国公司的看法。我想知道您是否愿意谈谈，或者伯克希尔是否在寻找机会购买那些可以被称作“近似特许经营权”的公司，可能是在海外——购买股票权益或部分权益？另外，您如何看待海外公司的固定债务投资？

沃伦·巴菲特：债务投资，是吗？

参会者：是的。嗯，第一部分是购买股票投资，而不是整个公司。

沃伦·巴菲特：第二部分是债务投资。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我们对购买任何东西都持开放态度。当你说我们是否在关注它们时，我从来都不太确定我们是如何关注事物的。我的意思是，它们似乎只是通过阅读之类的方式突然冒出来。但我们——我们最终做成的可能性较低，原因我之前提到过一些。但我们确实购买过总部在美国以外的公司的股票——除了健力士。我们也有可能购买债务工具。我们本来就不怎么买债务工具，所以这非常不可能。但我们会在伯克希尔做任何我们认为合理的事情，只要符合我们想要的运营方式。当然，我们不关心公司注册地在哪里——那并不重要。查理？

21. Helzberg拥有珠宝零售商中异常出色的销售业绩

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，区域5，是吗？

参会者：我是来自纽约的Scott Spilcovich。我的问题是关于收购Helzberg的。您能谈谈收购价格、销售和利润预期，以及收购时公司的债务情况吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：你指的是哪次收购？

参会者：Helzberg。

查理·芒格：Helzberg。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们没有公布Helzberg的数据，将来也不会。但我们评估过——截至2月底的年度销售额已公布约为2.8亿美元，本年度会更多。但我们没有公布具体数字。我可以告诉你的是，显然，我们认为，就我们投入的股票和/或现金而言——随着时间的推移，这将是一笔非常不错的收购。这与我们在其他业务中应用的逻辑相同。零售业，正如我之前提到的，是一种你必须在整个过程中保持精明的业务，而我们有一位出色的经理人，名叫Jeff Comment，他将负责运营。他的记录非常好，我打赌这个记录会继续保持下去。它的投入资本回报率很高，否则我们不会收购它。我们总是寻找高资本回报率。珠宝行业的很多公司并没有获得高资本回报率。

我的意思是，这个行业并不是大多数参与者都能繁荣的行业。要想成功，你需要有比竞争对手更高的每平方英尺销售额，而我们在Borsheims有一家做得非常好的业务，在Helzberg也有另一种不同类型的业务。典型的珠宝店经营并不是一个非常好的生意，但我们认为我们有两个好生意。查理？

查理·芒格：是的，我们经常发现，整个企业的所有者都有一种矛盾心理。他们想以略高于其价值的价格卖掉自己的企业，接受股票，这样就不用交税。同时他们希望股票属于那种只会做一次愚蠢收购的公司——即收购他们自己的公司——之后就会像黄金一样守护着股票，不再做任何愚蠢的收购。（笑声）不用说，世界没那么简单。我认为随着时间的推移，我们做了一些对双方都公平的收购，平均来看，它们对伯克希尔来说效果不错。我认为，一家如此行事的公司，能为想要出售企业的私人所有者提供最好的长期价值。你不会想把你的企业卖给一家喜欢发行股票的公司而换取它们的股票。

22. 保险浮存金在估算内在价值时很重要

沃伦·巴菲特：区域6？

声音：那是六。

沃伦·巴菲特：麦克风在哪？哦，那里。我想它没开。

参会者：现在能听到我说话吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，可以。

参会者：我是来自田纳西州诺克斯维尔的Jack Glanding。我有一个问题，可能不适合伯克希尔的高管回答，但我还是想问。您在年报中提到了内在价值，并建议通过查看后面的灰色页面，人们可能能够估算出伯克希尔的内在价值。我尝试了一下，我得出的市盈率大约在21倍左右，这似乎有点高估了。我想问巴菲特先生，您是否愿意透露您认为伯克希尔的内在价值是多少？如果您不愿意，您认为伯克希尔在当前价格水平下是公平的吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：我——每年我都会被问到这个问题，以这样或那样的形式，我总是说我不想破坏那些自己估算内在价值的人的乐趣。你拥有我们拥有的所有关键数字。我要说的是，除了市盈率之外，还有一些重要的因素。我之前提到过，例如，我认为描述浮存金的那一页可能是年报中最重要的页面之一。然后问题是，随着时间推移，你如何运用资本？显然，这也会影响内在价值。但总的来说，我要说的是——这几乎在所有时候都是如此——我认为伯克希尔的内在价值与其——实际上，我反过来讲。我认为伯克希尔的价格相对于其内在价值，可能提供了与我所见到的大多数股票同等或更多的价值。但我不想说得更深入了。查理？

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。不过，你那个关于自己推算其乐趣的故事，让我想起一位著名的英国校长，他曾经对每一届毕业班说：“你们中有5%的人会成为罪犯，而且我知道你们是谁。但我不打算告诉你们，因为我不想剥夺你们生活中的兴奋感。”（轻微的笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们稍后再解释。（零散的笑声和掌声）内在价值远不止——正如我们之前讨论过的——仅仅是把你认为在任何给定时间可以出售的各个部分加总，因为它是一个前瞻性数字。它是未来现金流折现到当下的值。资本配置是其中很重要的一部分。例如，你期望浮存金在未来如何表现，会导致可能的数值相对于价值产生巨大波动。我的意思是，如果——当我们在1967年收购国民保险公司时，它当时有，假设是1500万或2000万的浮存金，我们当时并没有预见到。但如果我们当时能够预见到浮存金随时间推移的最终发展，那么国民保险公司的内在价值可能是当时大多数人认为——也可能是我们当时认为的——的许多倍。

23. Hagstrom的书对伯克希尔的股价“有些影响”

沃伦·巴菲特：区域1。

参会者：我是来自佛罗里达州墨尔本的Richard Ducheck。我有两个问题，第一个关于股票。我们都知道，今年第一个月股价上涨了大约25%，然后回撤了大约20%。我想知道您的看法，是否特别将其归因于某些书，或者机构买盘，或者您有什么解释？

沃伦·巴菲特：我要说——我先回答第一个。我认为[Robert] Hagstrom的书[《沃伦·巴菲特之路》]无疑对此产生了一些影响。这难以衡量，但那本书卖了很多册。我猜它产生了一些影响。

参会者：好的。比机构买盘的影响更大吗？因为我听到一些传闻，比如富达之类的在买入——

沃伦·巴菲特：我无法——我只是不知道——我不知道如何区分这些变量，但我要说的是，那本书在当时肯定是一个因素，假设它没有影响是不合理的。

查理·芒格：嗯，很多买盘是以零股形式出现的，所以——

沃伦·巴菲特：很多零股交易，是的。

查理·芒格：看起来肯定是书的购买者。（笑声）

24. 巴菲特不理解微软，尽管他与盖茨是朋友

参会者：第二个问题，我本人是电子工程师。所以科技行业是我最感兴趣的，我想我们都同意，至少在过去6到8个月里，科技行业的表现非常惊人。我也注意到您与盖茨先生交好，请他到家里做客等等。未来是否有某种可能，您会购买微软或收购它？或者你们俩能不能一起做点什么？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我见过比尔的第一天就买了一百股，然后就没有然后了。我只是想确保从那时起能收到他的报告。这是个人行为，不是伯克希尔的。我们不可能投资那些我们不理解的生意，而我也不会理解微软。

参会者：不，您说得很清楚了。我只是想也许会有例外，因为显然——

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果要破例，他确实是一个值得破例的好人选——非常好的人选。但我想我不会破例。

25. 商学院应该研究B夫人的成功

沃伦·巴菲特：区域2？

参会者：我叫（听不清），来自德克萨斯州阿灵顿。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，你们俩有如此伟大的头脑，有没有可能利用它们长期造福于社会，比如在伯克希尔设立学徒制，或者开办一所学校？

查理·芒格：我没听清。沃伦，你来回答。

沃伦·巴菲特：问题是关于什么——？

参会者：有没有可能利用你们两位伟大的头脑来教育新一代，作为对这个国家的长期投资，比如在伯克希尔为年轻人提供学徒机会，或者开办一所商学院？

查理·芒格：嗯，让我来试试回答这个问题，因为我在不履行承诺方面有显著记录。（笑声）我让我的孩子们了解我所知道的东西非常困难。（笑声）沃伦，也许你做得没那么失败。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我的孩子们在很多方面都比我聪明得多。所以，我的经历不同，查理。（笑）不，我认为你可以——你知道，我主要是通过自己阅读学习的，所以我不认为我有什么原创的想法——我当然有很多——我的意思是，我提到过阅读格雷厄姆、费舍尔，我自己从阅读中获得了许多想法。就我个人而言，说到父母的影响力，你知道，我的父母对我影响巨大。所以，我认为你可以从别人那里学到很多东西。事实上，我认为，如果你能很好地从别人那里学习，你甚至不需要自己创造新想法或做太多事情。你只需要应用你看到的最好的东西。

查理·芒格：总的来说，我认为我们总是在筛选数百万人之后才能得到一群聪明人。但我不认为有人发明了一种方法可以让每个人都变得聪明。有些人抗拒学习的程度令人难以置信。（笑声和掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，令人震惊的是，当学习符合他们自身利益时，他们却如此抗拒。我的意思是，我总是惊讶于人们对格雷厄姆的关注——我是说，40年前他被公认为证券分析师之父——但他所传授的原则却很少有人关注。这不是因为人们反驳这些原则，也不是因为人们没有自身利益去学习健全的投资原则。只是对思考或改变有着令人难以置信的抵触。我的意思是，我曾引用过伯特兰·罗素的话，他说：“大多数男人宁愿死也不愿思考。很多人确实死了。”（笑声）在财务意义上，这非常正确。投资并不复杂。我的意思是，人际关系通常也不那么复杂，但——当然，培养良好的人际交往习惯符合人们的自身利益，但令人惊讶的是，似乎有太多人以这样或那样的方式把事情搞砸了。

查理·芒格：伯克希尔·哈撒韦被模仿了多少？无论是在投资界还是企业界？我不是说我们一定值得被模仿。但人们不想改变他们目前的做法。

沃伦·巴菲特：你可能会说B夫人[内布拉斯加家具城创始人Rose Blumkin]，她于1937年用500美元起步，你可以看到这个周末的成就，她没有上过一天学，却把企业建成了伟大的事业。你可能会说，“嗯，这值得研究。”我的意思是，难道是因为她移民过来时不会说英语吗？也许我们可以向人们解释——我是说，看着有人在竞争激烈的行业里取得如此不可思议的成功，我们能学到什么？她并没有发明世界从未见过的东西。她没有垄断某块地产来保护自己免受竞争。你知道，所有这些——然而，她取得了几乎无人能及的成就。那么，为什么商学院不研究她呢？你知道，为什么他们谈论EVA，经济增加值，就像我们之前提到的那样？我的意思是，这里有一个成功的典范。有些东西造就了她的成功。

你知道，是因为她有220的智商吗？不是。她是一个非常聪明的女人，但她的习惯和思维方式并非不可复制。但谁在研究她呢？我的意思是，他们把她当成一个奇闻轶事。但如果你去任何一所前20的商学院，你知道，没有一页纸是让学生研究这个令人难以置信的成功案例的。我觉得这非常有趣——在某种程度上，你知道，我在投资界也看到了这一点。首先，你知道，对于一位已经获得博士学位的顶级商学院管理学教授来说，想到他必须来家具城闲逛——（笑声）——研究一个开高尔夫球车的女人——（笑声）——这可能会有点令人沮丧。但他们如果真这么做，会受益匪浅。

26. 现在就做你喜欢的事，而不是以后

沃伦·巴菲特：我们刚才到哪儿了？现在是哪个区域，四吗？不管了。也许是区域3，嗯？

参会者：是的，谢谢。我是来自亚利桑那州凤凰城的Jim Ludke。我大约有10年没参加你们的年会了。上一次是在水边的Red Lion Inn。我祝贺你的人气。

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

参会者：我希望那时买了更多股票。（笑声）但就像查理一样，我也一直在把我的股票捐给慈善。所以，你的有益影响已经回馈并在整个经济中扩散。我祝贺你。

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我祝贺你。

参会者：你认为有什么改变了——嗯，一件事是，本·格雷厄姆——评论你刚才说的话——我是本·格雷厄姆的学生，他说，他一直惊讶于自己被广泛阅读却又极少被遵循。但你在过去10年里改变了吗？改变得多吗？还是根本没变？或者——？