伯克希尔·哈撒韦 2009 年股东信

# company:berkshire-hathaway（伯克希尔·哈撒韦） # company:bnsf（伯灵顿北方圣塔菲铁路） # company:clayton-homes（克莱顿房屋） # company:geico（政府雇员保险公司） # company:general-re（通用再保险） # company:marmon（玛蒙集团） # company:midamerican-energy（中美能源） # company:netjets（奈捷航空） # concept:acquisition（收购） # concept:book-value（账面价值） # concept:business-model（商业模式） # concept:capital-allocation（资本配置） # concept:insurance-float（保险浮存金） # concept:intrinsic-value（内在价值） # concept:management（管理层） # concept:owner-orientation（股东导向） # concept:railroad（铁路运输） # concept:underwriting-discipline（承保纪律） # person:charlie-munger（查理·芒格） # person:matt-rose（马特·罗斯） # person:warren-buffett（沃伦·巴菲特）
Jason Tsai
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2009年致股东信

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

我们在2009年期间净增值为218亿美元，这使我们的A类和B类股票每股账面价值增长了19.8%。在过去的45年里（即自现任管理层接管以来），账面价值从19美元增长到84,487美元，年复合增长率为20.3%。*

* 本报告中所使用的每股数据均适用于伯克希尔的A类股票。B类股票的相应数据为A类股票数据的1/1500。

原文

Title: 2009 Letter

Part 1/2

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 2009 was $21.8 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 19.8%. Over the last 45 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

伯克希尔近期对北伯林顿铁路公司（BNSF）的收购，为我们原本约50万人的股东名册上至少增加了6.5万名新股东。对我长期合作的伙伴查理·芒格和我本人而言，重要的是我们所有股东都了解伯克希尔的运营、目标、局限和文化。因此，在每一份年报中，我们都会重申指导我们的经济原则。今年这些原则出现在第89-94页，我敦促你们所有人——尤其是我们的新股东——阅读它们。伯克希尔几十年来一直恪守这些原则，并且在我离世后仍将长期坚持下去。

在这封信中，我们还将回顾我们业务的一些基本原则，希望能为我们的BNSF新股东提供一次新生入学指导，同时也为伯克希尔的资深股东提供一次复习课程。

原文

Berkshire’s recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It’s important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire’s operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you — but particularly our new shareholders — to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I’m gone.

In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.

我们如何衡量自己

我们评估管理绩效的衡量标准显示在对面页面上。从一开始，查理和我就坚信要有一个理性且不变的标准来衡量我们完成了什么——或者没有完成什么。这使我们避免了看到绩效之箭落在何处、然后再围绕它画靶心的诱惑。

选择标普500指数作为我们的基准是一个简单的选择，因为我们的股东几乎不花任何成本就能通过持有指数基金来匹配该指数的表现。如果他们仅仅是为了让我们复制那个结果而付钱给我们，那又是为了什么呢？

对我们来说，一个更困难的决定是如何衡量伯克希尔相对于标普500指数的进展。有充分的理由主张直接使用我们股票价格的变化。事实上，从长期来看，那是最好的检验标准。但每年之间的市场价格可能极其反复无常。即使是以十年为周期的评估，也可能因为评估期开始或结束时愚蠢的高价或低价而严重失真。微软的史蒂夫·鲍尔默和通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特可以告诉你这个问题，他们接手管理权杖时，其股票正以令人头晕目眩的高价交易。

衡量我们年度进展的理想标准应该是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变化。唉，这个价值不可能以任何接近精确的方式计算出来，因此我们用一个粗略的替代指标：每股账面价值。依赖这个衡量标准有其缺点，我们在第92和93页进行了讨论。此外，大多数公司的账面价值都低估了内在价值，伯克希尔的情况当然也是如此。总的来说，我们业务的价值远高于它们在账面上的记录价值。而且，在我们至关重要的保险业务中，这种差异是巨大的。即便如此，查理和我相信，我们的账面价值——尽管被低估——为内在价值的变化提供了最有用的追踪工具。按照这个衡量标准，正如这封信开头所述，自1965财年开始以来，我们的账面价值以每年20.3%的复合增长率增长。

我们应该指出，如果我们选择市场价格作为我们的衡量标准，伯克希尔的业绩看起来会更好，自1965财年开始以来的年复合增长率为22%。令人惊讶的是，年复合增长率的这个微小差异导致整个45年期间市场价值增长了801,516%，而账面价值增长了434,057%（如第2页所示）。我们的市场表现更好是因为1965年伯克希尔的股票以其低盈利纺织资产的账面价值有适当的折价出售，而如今伯克希尔的股票通常以其一流业务的会计价值有溢价出售。

总而言之，第2页的表格传达了三个信息，两个是正面的，一个是极其负面的。首先，从1965-69年开始到2005-09年结束的任何五年期间——共有41个这样的期间——我们的账面价值增长从未落后于标普500指数的增长。其次，尽管在股市为正的某些年份我们落后于标普500指数，但在标普500指数产生负回报的11个年份中，我们始终表现得比标普500指数更好。换句话说，我们的防守比进攻更好，而且这种情况很可能会持续下去。

巨大的负面因素是，随着我们规模的扩大，我们的业绩优势急剧缩小，这是一个必然会持续下去的不愉快趋势。诚然，伯克希尔拥有许多出色的业务和一批真正伟大的管理者，他们在一个不同寻常的企业文化中运作，使其才能得以最大化。查理和我相信，随着时间的推移，这些因素将继续产生高于平均水平的业绩。但是，巨额资金本身就会带来其自身的锚定效应，我们未来的优势，如果有的话，将只是我们历史优势的一小部分。

原文

How We Measure Ourselves

Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have — or have not — accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.

Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?

A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.

The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value — understated though it is — supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.

We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.

Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 — and there have been 41 of these — during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.

The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.

我们不做什么

很久以前，查理就阐述了他最强烈的抱负：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。” 这句智慧之语的灵感来自伟大的普鲁士数学家雅可比，他建议”反转，永远反转”作为解决难题的辅助手段。（我也可以报告说，这种反转方法在较低的层面上也有效：倒着唱一首乡村歌曲，你会很快找回你的汽车、房子和妻子。）

以下是我们如何在伯克希尔应用查理思维的几个例子：

原文

What We Don’t Do

Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)

Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:

  • Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.

    Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.

  • We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.

    When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed — without delay — our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.

    We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.

  • We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly — or not at all — because of a stifling bureaucracy.

    With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.

  • We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.

    To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can’t be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.

    Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: “We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 — and probably well beyond — but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall.” Many news organizations reported — indeed, blared — the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren’t predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.

    Given a few experiences we’ve had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.

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让我们来谈谈伯克希尔运营的具体情况。我们有四个主要运营板块，每个板块在资产负债表和损益表特征上都各不相同。因此，像财务报表中标准做法那样将它们合并在一起，会妨碍分析。所以我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是查理和我的看法。

保险

我们的财产-意外险（P/C）业务一直是伯克希尔增长的引擎，并将继续如此。它为我们创造了奇迹。我们将我们的P/C公司在其有形净资产之上以155亿美元的账面价值记录，这笔金额记入了我们的”商誉”账户。然而，这些公司的价值远远高于其账面价值——下面关于P/C行业经济模式的介绍将会告诉你原因。

保险公司先收取保费，日后才赔付。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤赔偿事故，赔付可能延续数十年。这种先收钱后付款的模式使我们持有大量资金——我们称之为”浮存金”——这些钱最终会支付给他人。同时，我们可以为了伯克希尔的利益将这些浮存金进行投资。尽管个别保单和索赔有来有去，但我们持有的浮存金总额相对于保费收入而言保持惊人的稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，我们的浮存金也在增长。

如果保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们就会产生承保利润，这增加了从浮存金中获得的投资收入。这种组合使我们能够享受使用免费资金的好处——而且更好的是，我们持有这些资金还能获得报酬。唉，这种令人愉快的结果的希望吸引了激烈的竞争，在大多数年份里竞争如此激烈，以至于整个P/C行业普遍承受着巨大的承保亏损。这种亏损，实际上就是该行业为其持有浮存金所付出的代价。通常这个成本相当低，但在一些灾害频发的年份，承保亏损的成本会超过使用浮存金所产生的收入。

在我可能带有偏见的眼中，伯克希尔拥有世界上最好的大型保险业务。而且我可以绝对地说，我们拥有最好的管理者。我们的浮存金从1967年我们进入该业务时的1600万美元，增长到了2009年底的620亿美元。此外，我们已经连续七年实现了承保盈利。我相信我们在未来大多数年份——当然不是所有年份——很可能将继续实现盈利的承保。如果我们做到了，那么我们的浮存金将是零成本的，就像有人将620亿美元存入我们这里，我们可以为了自己的利益进行投资而无需支付利息一样。

让我再次强调，零成本的浮存金不是整个P/C行业可以预期的结果：在大多数年份，保费不足以覆盖索赔加上费用。因此，几十年来，该行业的有形净资产整体回报率远低于标普500指数的回报率。伯克希尔之所以能拥有出色的经济状况，只是因为我们拥有一些杰出的管理者来运营一些不同寻常的业务。我们的保险CEO们值得你们感谢，他们为伯克希尔的价值增加了数百亿美元。我很高兴向大家介绍这些全明星阵容。

原文

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Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

Insurance

Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value — and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.

Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.

In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most — though certainly not all — future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.

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让我们从GEICO开始，你们大家都认识它，因为它每年有8亿美元的广告预算（几乎是车险广告中排名第二的广告商的两倍）。GEICO由托尼·奈斯利管理，他18岁就加入了公司。现年66岁的托尼仍然每天步履轻快地跳着舞步去办公室，就像79岁的我一样。我们都觉得能从事自己热爱的工作很幸运。

GEICO的客户对公司也有温暖的感情。证据如下：自伯克希尔于1996年取得GEICO控股权以来，其市场份额已从2.5%增长到8.1%，这一增长反映了净增了700万保单持有人。也许他们联系我们是因为认为我们的壁虎很可爱，但他们向我们购买是为了节省重要的钱。（也许你也可以；请拨打1-800-847-7536或访问www.GEICO.com。）他们留下来是因为他们喜欢我们的服务以及我们的价格。

伯克希尔分两个阶段收购了GEICO。在1976-80年期间，我们以4700万美元购买了该公司约三分之一的股票。多年来，公司大量回购自己的股票，导致我们的持股比例增长到约50%，而我们并未再购买任何股份。然后，在1996年1月2日，我们以23亿美元现金收购了GEICO剩余50%的股份，大约是我们最初购买成本的50倍。

一个古老的华尔街笑话与我们的经历很接近：

客户：谢谢你让我在5美元时买入XYZ股票。我听说它涨到18美元了。
经纪人：是的，这还只是开始。事实上，公司现在做得非常好，在18美元买入甚至比您当初购买时更划算。
客户：该死，我就知道我应该等一等的。

GEICO的增长可能在2010年放缓。由于汽车销售低迷，美国车辆登记数实际上在下降。此外，高失业率导致越来越多的司机没有保险。（这几乎在任何地方都是非法的，但如果你丢了工作还想开车……）然而，我们”低成本生产商”的地位肯定会在未来给我们带来显著的增长。1995年，GEICO是美国第六大汽车保险公司；现在我们排名第三。该公司的浮存金已从27亿美元增长到96亿美元。同样重要的是，在伯克希尔拥有它的14年中，GEICO有13年实现了承保盈利。

早在1951年1月，当我作为一名20岁的学生第一次访问该公司时，我就对GEICO感到兴奋。感谢托尼，我今天更加兴奋。

原文

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Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.

GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.

Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.

An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:

Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.
Broker: Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.

GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive …) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.

I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.

************

伯克希尔历史上一个极其重要的事件发生在1985年的一个星期六。阿吉特·贾恩来到我们奥马哈的办公室——我立刻知道我们找到了一位超级巨星。（他是被迈克·戈德堡发现的，迈克现已升任为”圣迈克”。）

我们立即让阿吉特负责国家赔偿公司规模小且举步维艰的再保险业务。多年来，他将这项业务打造成了保险世界中独一无二的巨头。

如今，阿吉特的部门只有30名员工，却在多个保险领域创下了交易规模的记录。阿吉特签发十亿美元级别的保单——然后保留全部风险，而不是将其分保给其他保险公司。三年前，他接管了劳合社的巨额负债，使其能够清理与27,972名参与者（“名称”）的关系，这些参与者签发了问题缠身的保单，这些保单一度威胁到这家有322年历史的机构的生存。单单一纸合同的保费就高达71亿美元。在2009年期间，他谈判了一项人寿再保险合同，该合同可能在未来50年左右为我们带来500亿美元的保费。

阿吉特的业务与GEICO正好相反。在GEICO，我们有数百万份小保单，大部分年复一年地续保。阿吉特签发的保单相对较少，而且组合每年变化很大。在全世界，当有既庞大又不寻常的保险需求时，他是人们第一个想到要联系的人。

如果查理、我和阿吉特有一天坐在一条正在下沉的船上——而你只能救我们中的一个——请游向阿吉特。

原文

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A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha — and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)

We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.

Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits — and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.

Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.

If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat — and you can only save one of us — swim to Ajit.

************

我们的第三家保险巨头是通用再保险。几年前，这家公司问题重重；现在，它已是我们保险皇冠上的一颗璀璨明珠。

在泰德·蒙特罗斯的领导下，通用再保险在2009年取得了出色的承保业绩，同时就每美元保费收入而言，为我们提供了异常大量的浮存金。除了通用再保险的P/C业务外，泰德和他的同事们还发展了一个日益重要的人寿再保险业务。

去年，通用再保险最终取得了科隆再保险100%的所有权，科隆再保险自1995年以来一直是我们全球业务中的一个关键——尽管只是部分拥有——部分。泰德和我将于9月访问科隆，感谢其经理们对伯克希尔的重要贡献。

最后，我们拥有一组较小的公司，其中大多数专门从事保险世界中某些奇特利基市场。总的来说，它们的业绩一直很稳定，并且如下表所示，它们为我们提供的浮存金是相当可观的。查理和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

以下是我们的财产-意外险和人寿保险业务所有四个板块的记录：

承保利润年末**浮存金
(单位：百万美元)
保险**业务2009年2008年2009年2008年
通用再保险$ 477$ 342$21,014$21,074
BH再保险3491,32426,22324,221
GEICO6499169,6138,454
其他主营保险842105,0614,739
$1,559$2,792$61,911$58,488
原文

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Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.

Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.

Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key — though only partially-owned — part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

Underwriting ProfitYearend**Float
(in millions)
Insurance**Operations2009200820092008
General Re$ 477$ 342$21,014$21,074
BH Reinsurance3491,32426,22324,221
GEICO6499169,6138,454
Other Primary842105,0614,739
$1,559$2,792$61,911$58,488

************

现在，一个痛苦的忏悔：去年，你们的董事长为一桩完全由我个人造成的、代价极其高昂的业务惨败画上了句号。

多年来，我一直在绞尽脑汁思考我们可以向我们数百万忠实的GEICO客户提供的附加产品。不幸的是，我终于成功了，想出了一个”绝妙”的主意，即我们应该推销我们自己的信用卡。我推理道，GEICO的保单持有人很可能是信用良好的客户，假设我们提供一张有吸引力的信用卡，他们很可能会惠顾我们的业务。我们确实获得了业务——但却是错误的那种。

在信用卡业务上，我们税前亏损了大约630万美元，之后我才最终醒悟过来。然后我们以55美分兑1美元的价格出售了我们9800万美元的麻烦应收账款组合，又额外损失了4400万美元。

应该强调的是，GEICO的经理们从未对我的想法充满热情。他们警告我，我们得到的不会是GEICO客户中的精华，而是……嗯，我们称之为非精华。我微妙地暗示他们我年纪更大，更明智。

我只是年纪更大罢了。

原文

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And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.

For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right — but of the wrong type.

Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.

GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the – – – – – well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

I was just older.

受监管公用事业业务

伯克希尔持有中美能源控股公司89.5%的权益，该公司拥有广泛的公用事业业务。其中最大的是：(1) 约克郡电力和北方电力，其380万终端用户使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；(2) 中美能源公司，主要为爱荷华州的72.5万电力客户提供服务；(3) 太平洋电力和落基山电力公司，为六个西部州的约170万电力客户提供服务；以及 (4) 克恩河和北方天然气管道，输送美国消费的约8%的天然气。

中美能源有两位出色的管理者，戴夫·索科尔和格雷格·阿贝尔。此外，我的老朋友沃尔特·斯科特及其家族持有该公司的主要所有权。沃尔特为任何运营都带来了非凡的商业智慧。与戴夫、格雷格和沃尔特合作的十年，强化了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能有更好的合作伙伴了。他们真是一个梦幻团队。

有些不太协调的是，中美能源还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司——HomeServices of America。该公司通过21家本地品牌公司运营，拥有16,000名经纪人。尽管去年对房屋销售来说又是一个糟糕的年份，但HomeServices还是赚取了微薄的利润。它还收购了芝加哥的一家公司，并将在未来以合理价格获得其他优质经纪业务。十年后，HomeServices的规模很可能会大得多。

以下是中美能源业务的一些关键数据：

盈利（单位：百万美元)
2009年2008年
英国公用事业$ 248$ 339
爱荷华州公用事业285425
西部公用事业788703
管道业务457595
HomeServices43(45)
其他（净额）25186
公司利息和税前运营收益1,8462,203
星座能源*—1,092
利息（支付给伯克希尔以外的）(318)(332)
伯克希尔次级债务利息(58)(111)
所得税(313)(1,002)
净利润$ 1,157$ 1,850
归属于伯克希尔的净利润**$ 1,071$ 1,704
欠他人的债务19,57919,145
欠伯克希尔的债务3531,087

我们的受监管电力公司，在大多数情况下提供垄断服务，与其服务区域内的客户以共生方式运作，这些用户依赖我们提供一流的服务并为他们的未来需求进行投资。发电和主要输电设施的许可和建设周期很长，因此我们有责任具备远见。反过来，我们期望我们的公用事业监管机构（代表我们的客户行事）允许我们从为满足未来需求而必须部署的巨额资本中获得合理的回报。如果我们不履行自己的义务，我们就不应指望监管机构履行他们的义务。

戴夫和格雷格确保我们做到这一点。全国性的研究公司一致将我们的爱荷华州和西部公用事业公司评为行业前列。同样，在一家名为Mastio的公司排名的43家美国管道公司中，我们的克恩河和北方天然气管线并列第二。

此外，我们继续将巨额资金投入我们的运营，不仅是为未来做准备，也是为了使其更环保。自十年前我们收购中美能源以来，它从未支付过股息。相反，我们将收益用于改善和扩大我们在所服务的每个地区的资产。一个显著的例子是，在过去三年中，我们的爱荷华州和西部公用事业公司赚取了25亿美元，而同期在风力发电设施上花费了30亿美元。

中美能源一直信守其对社会的承诺，而且，值得称赞的是，社会也给予了回报：除了少数例外，我们的监管机构及时允许我们从不断增加的必要投资中获得公平的回报。展望未来，我们将不惜一切代价，以我们服务区域所期望的方式服务好它们。我们相信，反过来，我们将被允许从我们投入的资金中获得应得的回报。

在早期，查理和我回避像公共事业这样的资本密集型业务。的确，对所有者而言，到目前为止最好的业务仍然是那些资本回报率高且增长所需增量投资少的业务。我们很幸运拥有许多这样的业务，并且我们乐于购买更多。然而，预期伯克希尔将产生越来越多的现金，我们今天非常愿意进入那些定期需要大量资本支出的业务。我们只期望这些业务有合理的预期，能从其投入的增量资金中获得体面的回报。如果我们的期望得到满足——并且我们相信它们会得到满足——伯克希尔不断增长的优秀到伟大的业务集合，应该会在未来几十年产生高于平均水平——尽管肯定不是惊人的——的回报。

应该指出的是，我们的BNSF业务具有某些重要的经济特征，与我们的电力公用事业类似。在两种情况下，我们都提供基础服务，这些服务现在和将来都是我们的客户、我们所服务的社区乃至国家经济福祉所必需的。两者在未来几十年都需要远超折旧准备的巨额投资。两者还必须进行长远规划，以满足预计将超过过去需求的需求。最后，两者都需要明智的监管机构，它们能提供关于允许回报的确定性，以便我们能满怀信心地进行维持、更换和扩建工厂所需的巨额投资。

我们看到公众与我们的铁路业务之间存在着一种”社会契约”，就像我们的公用事业一样。如果任何一方逃避其义务，双方都将不可避免地遭受损失。因此，契约的双方都应该——并且我们相信将会——理解以鼓励对方良好行为的方式行事的好处。如果我们的国家没有一流的电力和铁路系统，那么它要实现其全部经济潜力是不可思议的。我们将尽自己的一份力量来确保它们的存在。

未来，BNSF的业绩将包含在这个”受监管公用事业”部分中。除了这两项业务具有相似的基本经济特征外，它们都是大量债务的逻辑使用者，这些债务不由伯克希尔担保。两者都将保留其大部分收益。无论是繁荣还是萧条时期，两者都将赚取和投资巨额资金，尽管铁路将表现出更大的周期性。总体而言，我们预计这个受监管的板块将随着时间的推移带来显著增长的收益，尽管代价是我们需要投入数百亿——是的，数百亿——美元的增量股权资本。

原文

Regulated Utility Business

Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners. They are truly a dream team.

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:

Earnings (in millions)
20092008
U.K. utilities$ 248$ 339
Iowa utility285425
Western utilities788703
Pipelines457595
HomeServices43(45)
Other (net)25186
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes1,8462,203
Constellation Energy *—1,092
Interest, other than to Berkshire(318)(332)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt(58)(111)
Income tax(313)(1,002)
Net earnings$ 1,157$ 1,850
Earnings applicable to Berkshire **$ 1,071$ 1,704
Debt owed to others19,57919,145
Debt owed to Berkshire3531,087

Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities’ regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.

Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.

Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned $2.5 billion, while in this same period spending $3 billion on wind generation facilities.

MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society’s credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the ever-increasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.

In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met — and we believe that they will be — Berkshire’s ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.

Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.

We see a “social compact” existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should — and we believe will — understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.

In the future, BNSF results will be included in this “regulated utility” section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens — yes, tens — of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.

制造、服务及零售业务

我们在伯克希尔这一部分的活动范围涵盖了方方面面。不过，让我们看看整个集团的资产负债表和损益表摘要。

资产负债表 2009年12月31日 (单位：百万美元)
资产负债**与权益
现金及现金等价物$ 3,018应付票据$ 1,842
应收账款及应收票据5,066其他流动负债7,414
存货6,147流动负债合计9,256
其他流动资产625
流动资产合计14,856
商誉及其他无形资产16,499递延税款2,834
固定资产15,374长期债务及其他负债6,240
其他资产2,070权益30,469
$48,799$48,799
损益表 (单位：百万美元)
2009年2008年2007年
收入$61,665$66,099$59,100
营业费用（包括折旧：2009年14.22亿美元，2008年12.80亿美元，2007年9.55亿美元）59,50961,93755,026
利息费用98139127
税前利润2,058*4,023*3,947*
所得税及少数股东权益9451,7401,594
净利润$ 1,113$ 2,283$ 2,353
*不包括购买会计调整。

这个板块中众多且极为多元化的业务几乎都不同程度地受到了2009年严重经济衰退的影响。主要的例外是麦克莱恩公司，它是我们向数千家零售店（其中最大的是沃尔玛）分销食品杂货、糖果和非食品商品的经销商。

格雷迪·罗西尔领导麦克莱恩创造了3.44亿美元的税前利润记录，即便如此，这也仅相当于其312亿美元巨额销售额的略高于1美分每美元。麦克莱恩拥有大量的有形资产——几乎全部自有——包括3,242辆拖车、2,309辆牵引车和55个总占地1,520万平方英尺的分销中心。然而，麦克莱恩的首要资产是格雷迪。

我们有一些公司在销售额萎缩的情况下利润却有所改善，这始终是一项非凡的管理成就。以下是实现这一目标的CEO们：

公司CEO
本杰明·摩尔（涂料）丹尼斯·艾布拉姆斯
博希姆（珠宝零售）苏珊·雅克
H.H. Brown（鞋类制造与零售）吉姆·伊斯勒
CTB（农业设备）维克·曼奇内利
冰雪皇后约翰·盖纳
内布拉斯加家具城（家具零售）罗恩和欧文·布鲁姆金
Pampered Chef（厨房用品直销）玛拉·戈特沙尔克
喜诗糖果（糖果制造与零售）布拉德·金斯特勒
星家具（家具零售）比尔·金布雷尔

在我们拥有的、对萧条工业领域有较大敞口的企业中，马蒙和伊斯卡都交出了相对强劲的业绩。弗兰克·普塔克领导下的马蒙实现了13.5%的税前利润率，创历史新高。尽管公司销售额下降了27%，但弗兰克注重成本的管理使得利润下降幅度得到了缓冲。

总部位于以色列的伊斯卡没有任何事情能阻挡它——无论是战争、经济衰退还是竞争对手。世界上另外两家领先的小型刀具供应商都经历了非常艰难的一年，在一年中的大部分时间里都处于亏损状态。尽管伊斯卡的业绩较2008年大幅下滑，但该公司持续报告盈利，即便是在整合和优化我们去年告诉过你们的日本大型收购对象Tungaloy期间。当制造业复苏时，伊斯卡将创下新纪录。其令人难以置信的管理团队——埃坦·韦特海默、雅各布·哈帕兹和丹尼·戈尔曼——将确保这一点。

我们拥有的每一家与住宅和商业建筑相关的业务在2009年都遭受了严重打击。Shaw、Johns Manville、Acme Brick和MiTek的合并税前利润为2.27亿美元，比2006年建筑活动繁荣时期的12.95亿美元下降了82.5%。这些业务仍在谷底挣扎，尽管它们的竞争地位依然稳固。

去年伯克希尔的主要问题是NetJets，一家提供飞机分时所有权服务的航空运营公司。多年来，它已极其成功地确立了自己在其行业中的首要公司地位，其机队价值远超其主要竞争对手总和。总体而言，我们在该领域的主导地位仍然无可挑战。

然而，NetJets的业务运营则是另一回事。在我们拥有该公司的11年里，它累计录得1.57亿美元的税前亏损。此外，该公司的债务从收购时的1.02亿美元飙升至去年4月的19亿美元。如果没有伯克希尔对这些债务的担保，NetJets可能已经倒闭了。很明显，我让你们失望了，竟然让NetJets陷入这种境地。但幸运的是，我得到了解救。

中美能源极具才华的建设者和运营者戴夫·索科尔在8月成为NetJets的CEO。他的领导力带来了变革：债务已减少到14亿美元，并且在2009年遭受了高达7.11亿美元的惊人亏损之后，该公司现在已稳固盈利。

最重要的是，戴夫所实施的变革丝毫没有削弱NetJets前任CEO、分时所有权行业之父里奇·桑图利所坚持的最高标准的安全和服务。戴夫和我在维持这些标准方面有着最强烈的个人利益，因为我们和我们的家人几乎所有的飞行都使用NetJets，我们的许多董事和经理也是如此。我们没有指定专门的飞机或机组人员。我们得到的待遇与其他任何所有者完全相同，这意味着当我们使用个人合同时，我们支付与其他人相同的价格。简而言之，我们自产自销。在航空业，没有比这更有力的证明了。

原文

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

Balance Sheet 12/31/09 (in millions)
AssetsLiabilities**and Equity
Cash and equivalents$ 3,018Notes payable$ 1,842
Accounts and notes receivable5,066Other current liabilities7,414
Inventory6,147Total current liabilities9,256
Other current assets625
Total current assets14,856
Goodwill and other intangibles16,499Deferred taxes2,834
Fixed assets15,374Term debt and other liabilities6,240
Other assets2,070Equity30,469
$48,799$48,799
EarningsStatement(in millions)
200920082007
Revenues$61,665$66,099$59,100
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,422 in 2009, $1,280 in 2008 and $955 in 2007)59,50961,93755,026
Interest expense98139127
Pre-tax earnings2,058*4,023*3,947*
Income taxes and minority interests9451,7401,594
Net income$ 1,113$ 2,283 $2,353
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009’s severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.

Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of $344 million, which even so amounted to only slightly more than one cent per dollar on its huge sales of $31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets — practically all of which it owns — including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane’s prime asset, however, is Grady.

We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:

COMPANYCEO
Benjamin Moore (paint)Dennis Abrams
Borsheims (jewelry retailing)Susan Jacques
H. H. Brown (manufacturing and retailing of shoes)Jim Issler
CTB (agricultural equipment)Vic Mancinelli
Dairy QueenJohn Gainor
Nebraska Furniture Mart (furniture retailing)Ron and Irv Blumkin
Pampered Chef (direct sales of kitchen tools)Marla Gottschalk
See’s (manufacturing and retailing of candy)Brad Kinstler
Star Furniture (furniture retailing)Bill Kimbrell

Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak’s Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.

Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar — not wars, recessions or competitors. The world’s two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar’s results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.

Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.

The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.

NetJets’ business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million. Moreover, the company’s debt has soared from $102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire’s guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It’s clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.

Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to $1.4 billion, and, after suffering a staggering loss of $711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable.

Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more.

金融与金融产品业务

我们在这个板块中最大的业务是克莱顿家园，该国领先的模块化和制造住宅生产商。克莱顿并非一直排名第一：十年前，三大制造商是Fleetwood、Champion和Oakwood，它们合计占行业产出的44%。此后，所有这些公司都已破产。与此同时，行业总产出从1999年的38.2万套下降到2009年的6万套。

该行业陷入困境有两个原因，如果美国经济要复苏，第一个原因必须被接受。这个原因与美国住房开工量（包括公寓单元）有关。2009年，开工量为55.4万套，这是我们拥有数据的50年来的最低数字。矛盾的是，这是好消息。

几年前，当住房开工量——供应面——每年约为200万套时，人们认为这是好消息。但家庭组建——需求面——每年只有约120万套。经过几年这样的失衡，该国最终拥有过多的房屋也就不足为奇了。

有三种方法可以解决这个过剩问题：（1）炸毁大量房屋，类似于”旧车换现金”计划中对汽车的销毁；（2）通过鼓励青少年同居来加速家庭组建，这个计划可能不乏志愿者；或者（3）将新屋开工量降至远低于家庭组建率的水平。

我们的国家明智地选择了第三种选择，这意味着在一两年内，住宅住房问题应该基本成为过去，例外情况仅限于高价值房屋和那些过度建设特别严重的特定地区。当然，价格将远低于”泡沫”水平，但对于每一个因此受到伤害的卖方（或贷款人）来说，都会有一个买方从中受益。事实上，许多在几年前还买不起合适住房的家庭，现在发现这完全在他们的能力范围之内，因为泡沫破裂了。

制造住宅陷入困境的第二个原因是该行业特有的：工厂建造房屋和现场建造房屋之间的抵押贷款利率存在惩罚性差异。在你们进一步阅读之前，让我强调一个显而易见的事实：伯克希尔在这场争论中是有利害关系的，因此你们应该特别谨慎地评估下面的评论。在发出这个警告之后，让我解释一下为什么利率差异会给大量低收入美国人和克莱顿带来问题。

住宅抵押贷款市场由FHA、房地美和房利美表达的政府规则所塑造。它们的贷款标准是极其强大的，因为它们保险的抵押贷款通常可以被证券化，并实际上变成美国政府的义务。目前，符合这些担保条件的传统现场建造房屋的购买者可以获得利率约为5¼%的30年期贷款。此外，这些抵押贷款近期已被美联储大量购买，这一行动也帮助将利率维持在极低的水平。

相比之下，很少有工厂建造的房屋符合机构保险抵押贷款的资格。因此，一个有资格的工厂建造房屋购买者必须为其贷款支付约9%的利息。对于全现金买家来说，克莱顿的房屋提供了极好的价值。然而，如果买家需要抵押贷款融资——当然，大多数买家都需要——融资成本的差异往往抵消了工厂建造房屋的吸引人价格。

去年我告诉过你们为什么我们的买家——通常是低收入人群——作为信用风险表现如此出色。他们的态度至关重要：他们签约是为了住在房子里，而不是为了转售或再融资。因此，我们的买家通常以与其验证过的收入相匹配的还款额获得贷款（我们没有发放”谎言贷款”），并期待着能烧掉抵押贷款的那一天。如果他们失业、有健康问题或离婚，我们当然可以预期违约。但他们很少仅仅因为房价下跌就选择放弃。即使在今天，尽管失业问题加剧，克莱顿的逾期和违约率仍然合理，不会给我们造成重大问题。

我们曾试图让更多客户的贷款获得类似于现场建造产品可用的待遇。到目前为止，我们只取得了象征性的成功。因此，许多收入不高但责任心强的家庭不得不放弃拥有住房，仅仅因为与工厂建造产品相关的融资差异使得月供过于昂贵。如果资格标准不扩大，以便为所有满足首付和收入标准的人开放低成本融资，那么制造住宅行业似乎注定要挣扎和萎缩。

即使在这些条件下，我相信克莱顿在未来几年仍将盈利运营，尽管远低于其潜力。我们不可能有比CEO凯文·克莱顿更好的管理者了，他对待伯克希尔的利益就像对待自己的利益一样。我们的产品是一流的、价格低廉且不断改进的。此外，我们将继续利用伯克希尔的信用来支持克莱顿的抵押贷款计划，因为我们坚信其稳健性。即便如此，伯克希尔的借款利率也无法接近政府机构可用的利率。这一不利因素将限制销售，既损害克莱顿，也伤害众多渴望拥有低成本住房的有价值家庭。

在下表中，克莱顿的收益已扣除了该公司因使用伯克希尔信用而向伯克希尔支付的费用。这笔费用被等额计入伯克希尔金融业务的收入中，并包含在”其他收入”中。2009年的费用和收入金额为1.16亿美元，2008年为9200万美元。

该表还显示了我们的家具租赁（CORT）和拖车租赁（XTRA）业务受经济衰退打击的严重程度。尽管它们的竞争地位一如既往地强劲，但我们尚未看到这些业务有任何反弹。

税前**利润
(单位：百万美元)
2009年2008年
净投资收益$278$330
人寿与年金业务11623
租赁业务1487
制造住宅融资（克莱顿）187206
其他收入*186141
扣除投资及衍生品损益前的收入$781$787
原文

Finance and Financial Products

Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and

标题：2009年致股东信

第二部分/共两部分

然而，那些失败公司的CEO和董事们大多毫发无损。他们或许因自己所掌管的灾难而财富缩水，但依然过着奢华的生活。正是这些CEO和董事们的行为需要改变：如果他们的鲁莽行为损害了公司和国家，他们就应该付出沉重的代价——这笔代价既不能由他们损害的公司报销，也不能由保险赔付。CEO们，以及在许多情况下的董事们，长期以来一直受益于过大的财务”胡萝卜”；现在，他们的雇佣图景中也必须包含一些有意义的”大棒”。

原文

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price — one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.

一个不便的真相（董事会的过热）

去年，我们的子公司进行了一些小规模的”补强型”收购，但我们对北伯林顿铁路公司（BNSF）的重磅交易要求我们发行约95,000股伯克希尔股票，这相当于此前已发行股份的6.1%。查理和我对发行伯克希尔股票的热情，大概和我们准备做结肠镜检查差不多。

我们厌恶它的原因很简单。如果我们根本不会考虑以当前市场价格整体出售伯克希尔，那我们凭什么要通过在并购中发行股票，以同样不合理的价格”出售”公司的一大部分？

在评估换股收购要约时，目标公司的股东很自然地会关注他们将获得的收购方股票的市场价格。但他们同样期望交易能提供他们自己股票——也就是他们交出的股票——的内在价值。如果潜在收购方的股票售价低于其内在价值，那么该买家就不可能通过全股票交易做成一笔明智的买卖。你根本无法在不损害股东利益的情况下，用一只被低估的股票去交换一只价值充足的股票。

想象一下，假如公司A和公司B规模相同，且两者业务的内在价值均为每股100美元。但它们的股票都只卖80美元。A公司的CEO自信满满但缺乏智慧，他提出用1.25股A公司股票交换1股B公司股票，并正确地告诉他的董事们B公司价值每股100美元。但他不会解释，他给出的东西将让他的股东付出125美元的内在价值。如果董事们数学也不太好，交易就这样达成了，那么B公司的股东最终将拥有A和B合并资产的55.6%，而A公司的股东将拥有44.4%。值得注意的是，在这场毫无意义的交易中，并非A公司的每个人都是输家。这位CEO现在管理的公司规模是他原来的两倍，而在这个世界里，规模往往与声望和薪酬成正比。

如果收购方的股票被高估，那就是另一回事了：用它作为货币会对收购方有利。这就是为什么股票市场各个领域的泡沫总会导致狡猾的发起人连续发行股票。凭借他们股票的市场价值，他们有能力支付过高的价格，因为他们实际上是在使用伪钞。周期性发生的”空气换资产”式收购屡见不鲜，20世纪60年代末是这种欺诈行为尤为猖獗的时期。事实上，一些大公司就是这样建立起来的。（当然，没有哪个参与者会公开承认正在发生的事情的真相，尽管私下里有很多窃笑。）

在我们的北伯林顿铁路公司收购中，出售股票的股东正确地评估了我们的报价为每股100美元。然而，我们的成本要稍高一些，因为100美元中的40%是以我们股票的形式支付的，而查理和我认为这些股票的价值高于其市场价格。幸运的是，我们长期持有了大量用现金在市场上购买的北伯林顿铁路公司股票。因此，总的来说，我们总成本中只有大约30%是用伯克希尔股票支付的。

最终，查理和我认为，用股票支付30%价格的劣势，被这次收购给予我们的机会所抵消，即我们可以将220亿美元现金部署到一个我们理解并长期喜爱的业务中。它还有一个额外的优点，即由我们信任和钦佩的马特·罗斯（Matt Rose）管理。我们也喜欢未来几年以合理回报率再投资数十亿美元的前景。但最终的决定是艰难的。如果我们需要发行更多股票来完成收购，那实际上就毫无意义了。那样我们将付出的比得到的更多。

原文

An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)

Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.

The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?

In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares — the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.

Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 1¼ shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.

If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)

In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.

In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.

我曾参加过数十次董事会会议，会上商议过收购事宜，通常董事们会听取高价聘请的投资银行家（还有其他类型的吗？）的意见。银行家们无一例外地会向董事会提供一份对所收购公司价值的详细评估，并强调其价值远高于其市场价格。然而，在我超过50年的董事会生涯中，我从未听到投资银行家（或管理层！）讨论所给予的东西的真实价值。当交易涉及发行收购方股票时，他们只是用市场价值来衡量成本。他们这样做，尽管他们本会争辩说，如果收购方本身成为收购目标，那么其股票价格是严重不足的——完全不能反映其真实价值。

当考虑在收购中使用股票作为货币，并且董事们在听取顾问意见时，在我看来，只有一种方法能获得理性且平衡的讨论。董事们应该聘请第二位顾问来提出反对拟议收购的理由，其费用取决于交易未能达成。如果没有这种激进的补救措施，我们关于使用顾问的建议仍然是：“别问理发师你是否需要理发。”

原文

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I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully inadequate — absolutely no indicator of its real value — had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.

When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”

我忍不住要告诉你一个很久以前的真实故事。我们拥有一家大型且经营良好的银行股票，该银行数十年间受法规限制无法进行收购。最终，法律修改了，我们的银行立即开始寻找可能的收购目标。其管理层——都是好人且能干的银行家——不出所料地开始表现得像刚刚发现女孩的十几岁男孩。

他们很快聚焦于一家规模小得多的银行，这家银行也经营良好，并且在股本回报率、息差、贷款质量等方面拥有相似的财务特征。我们拥有的这家银行股价低廉（这就是我们买入的原因），徘徊在账面价值附近，市盈率非常低。与此同时，这家小银行的所有者正受到州内其他大银行的追捧，坚持要价接近三倍账面价值。而且，他想要股票，而不是现金。

自然，我们的人屈服了，同意了这笔价值毁灭的交易。“我们需要表明我们也在参与竞争。而且，这只是一笔小交易，“他们说，仿佛只有对股东造成重大损害才应该是阻止交易的合理理由。查理当时的反应是：“难道我们应该因为弄脏我们草坪的狗是吉娃娃而不是圣伯纳犬就拍手叫好？”

这家小银行的卖家——并非傻瓜——随后在谈判中提出了最后一个要求。“合并之后，“他实际上说，也许措辞比这更委婉，“我将是你银行的大股东，这代表了我净资产的很大一部分。因此，你必须向我保证，你再也不会做这么愚蠢的交易了。”

是的，合并完成了。小银行的所有者变得更富有了，我们则变得更穷了，而大银行的管理层——规模更大了一——从此过上了幸福生活。

原文

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I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers — fine people and able bankers — not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.

They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.

Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”

The seller of the smaller bank — no fool — then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. “After the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, “I’m going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”

Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank — newly bigger — lived happily ever after.

年度股东大会

我们最好的估计是，去年有35,000人参加了年会（相比之下，1981年是12人——没有省略零）。随着我们的股东数量大幅增加，我们预计今年会更多。因此，我们不得不在常规流程中做一些改变。但是，我们欢迎你们参加的热情不会改变。查理和我喜欢与你们见面，回答你们的问题，最重要的是——让你们从我们的企业购买大量商品。

今年的会议将于5月1日星期六举行。和往常一样，门将在早上7点在奎斯特中心（Qwest Center）打开，新的伯克希尔电影将在8:30放映。9:30我们将直接进入问答环节，该环节（在奎斯特的摊位午休后）将持续到3:30。短暂休息后，查理和我在3:45召开年度会议。如果你决定在当天的提问环节离开，请在查理讲话时离开。（动作要快；他可能很简短。）

当然，离开的最佳理由是去购物。我们将通过填满与会议区毗邻的194,300平方英尺的大厅，里面摆满了数十家伯克希尔子公司的产品来帮助你们做到这一点。去年，你们做得很好，大多数摊位都创下了销售记录。但你们可以做得更好。（友情提醒：如果我发现销售滞后，我会变得暴躁并锁上出口。）

GEICO将设有一个展位，由来自全国各地的多位顶级顾问组成，他们都准备为你们提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO能够给你们提供股东折扣（通常为8%）。我们运营的51个司法管辖区中有44个允许此特别优惠。（一个补充点：如果你有资格获得其他折扣，例如给予某些群体的折扣，则此折扣不叠加。）请带上你们现有保险的详细信息，并检查我们能否为你们省钱。我相信，对于你们中至少50%的人来说，我们可以。

一定要参观Bookworm。它提供的30多种书籍和DVD中，包括我两个儿子的新书：霍华德的《脆弱的》（Fragile），一本包含照片和关于全球奋斗生活评论的书；以及彼得的《生活由你创造》（Life Is What You Make It）。完成这个家庭三部曲的是我姐姐多丽丝（Doris）传记的首发，一个聚焦于她非凡慈善活动的故事。还可以买到*《穷查理宝典》*（Poor Charlie’s Almanack），关于我的合伙人的故事。这本书堪称出版界的奇迹——从未做过广告，却年复一年通过其网站销售了数千册。（如果你需要寄送所购书籍，附近将提供送货服务。）

如果你是一个大手笔的消费者——或者，就此而言，仅仅是一个看客——请在星期六中午到下午5点之间参观奥马哈机场东侧的Elliott Aviation。那里我们将有一支NetJets飞机机队，保证让你心跳加速。

随本报告附上的代理材料附件，解释了如何获得参加会议和其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与运通（American Express，800-799-6634）签约，为你们提供特别协助。负责这些事务的卡罗尔·佩德森（Carol Pedersen）每年都为我们做得非常出色，我对此表示感谢。酒店房间可能很难找，但和卡罗尔合作，你一定能订到房间。

在内布拉斯加家具城（Nebraska Furniture Mart），位于道奇街（Dodge）和太平洋街（Pacific）之间的第72街77英亩地块上，我们将再次提供”伯克希尔周末”折扣价格。要获得伯克希尔折扣，你必须在4月29日星期四至5月3日星期一（含首尾两日）期间购物，并出示你的会议凭证。此期间的特别定价甚至适用于几家知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有反对折扣的严格规定，但本着我们股东周末的精神，它们为你们破了例。我们感谢它们的合作。NFM的营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日上午10点至下午6点。今年星期六下午5:30至晚上8:00，NFM将举办Berkyville烧烤活动，邀请大家参加。

在博希姆（Borsheims），我们将再次举办两个仅限股东参加的活动。第一个活动是4月30日星期五下午6点至10点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二个活动，主要庆典，将于5月2日星期日上午9点至下午4点举行。星期六我们将营业至下午6点。

整个周末博希姆都将有大量人群。为了方便你们，股东价格将从4月26日星期一持续到5月8日星期六。在此期间，请出示你的会议凭证或显示你是伯克希尔持有者的经纪对账单以表明你的股东身份。带着水钻进来，带着钻石离开。我女儿告诉我，你买得越多，省得越多（孩子们真是什么都说得出来）。

星期天，在博希姆外的商场里，两次美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫（Patrick Wolff）将蒙住眼睛，与所有挑战者——他们则睁大眼睛——进行六人一组的对弈。附近，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克（Norman Beck）将让旁观者眼花缭乱。

今年为股东准备的特别款待是邀请我的朋友艾莉尔·邢（Ariel Hsing），美国青少年乒乓球排名第一的选手（并且很有希望在某天赢得奥运会）。现年14岁的艾莉尔四年前来参加年会，击败了所有挑战者，包括我在内。（你可以在YouTube上见证我可耻的失败；只需输入Ariel Hsing Berkshire。）

自然，我一直在策划卷土重来，并将在星期日下午1点在博希姆外与她交手。这将是一场三分制的比赛，在我先消耗她的体力之后，所有股东都被邀请参加类似的3分制比赛来试试运气。获胜者将获得一盒喜诗糖果。我们将提供设备，但如果你认为有用，可以自带球拍。（其实没用的。）

Gorat’s牛排馆将于5月2日星期日下午1点至10点再次专门为伯克希尔股东开放。然而，去年它被巨大的需求所淹没。由于预计今年用餐者会多得多，我已请我的朋友唐娜·希恩（Donna Sheehan）在比科洛（Piccolo’s）——我的另一家最爱餐厅——也在周日为股东提供服务。（比科洛的巨大根汁汽水漂浮冰淇淋是高级餐饮爱好者的必点之选。）我计划两家都吃：周末的所有活动让我真的很饿，而且每家餐厅都有我最喜欢的菜。记住：在Gorat’s预订请于4月1日（但不要早于）致电402-551-3733，在Piccolo’s请致电402-342-9038。

遗憾的是，我们今年将无法为国际访客举办招待会。去年我们的人数增长到约800人，我仅为每人签一件物品就花了大约2.5小时。由于预计今年会有更多国际访客，查理和我决定必须取消这个活动。但请放心，我们欢迎每一位到来的国际访客。

去年，我们改变了确定会议上提问问题的方式，并收到了许多封称赞新安排的来信。因此，我们将再次邀请同三位财经记者主持问答环节，向查理和我提问股东通过电子邮件提交给他们的问题。

这三位记者及其电子邮件地址是：来自《财富》杂志的卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis），可发送邮件至cloomis@fortunemail.com；来自CNBC的贝基·奎克（Becky Quick），可发送至BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及来自《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金（Andrew Ross Sorkin），可发送至arsorkin@nytimes.com。从提交的问题中，每位记者将选择他或她认为最有趣、最重要的十几个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你保持问题简洁，并且在你发送给他们的任何邮件中不超过两个问题，你的问题被选中的机会最大。（在你的电子邮件中，如果你希望在被选中时提及你的名字，请告知记者。）

查理和我都不会得到关于将被提问问题的任何线索。我们知道记者们会挑选一些棘手的问题，这正是我们喜欢的。

我们将在星期六上午8:15再次在13个麦克风处进行抽奖，供那些希望自己提问的股东参与。在会上，我将轮流提问来自记者的问题和来自获胜股东的问题。我们已经将提问时间增加了30分钟，并且很可能有时间从每组中提问大约30个问题。

原文

The Annual Meeting

Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year (up from 12 — no zeros omitted — in 1981). With our shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year. Therefore, we will have to make a few changes in the usual routine. There will be no change, however, in our enthusiasm for having you attend. Charlie and I like to meet you, answer your questions and — best of all — have you buy lots of goods from our businesses.

The meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 1st. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I get testy and lock the exits.)

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. Among the more than 30 books and DVDs it will offer are two new books by my sons: Howard’s Fragile, a volume filled with photos and commentary about lives of struggle around the globe and Peter’s Life Is What You Make It. Completing the family trilogy will be the debut of my sister Doris’s biography, a story focusing on her remarkable philanthropic activities. Also available will be Poor *Charlie’\s Almanack, the story of my partner. This book is something of a publishing miracle — never advertised, yet year after year selling many thousands of copies from its Internet site. (Should you need to ship your book purchases, a nearby shipping service will be available.)

If you are a big spender — or, for that matter, merely a gawker — visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing.

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday, May 3rd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Berkyville BBQ to which you are all invited.

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 2nd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 26th through Saturday, May 8th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder. Enter with rhinestones; leave with diamonds. My daughter tells me that the more you buy, the more you save (kids say the darnedest things).

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.

Our special treat for shareholders this year will be the return of my friend, Ariel Hsing, the country’s top-ranked junior table tennis player (and a good bet to win at the Olympics some day). Now 14, Ariel came to the annual meeting four years ago and demolished all comers, including me. (You can witness my humiliating defeat on YouTube; just type in Ariel Hsing Berkshire.)

Naturally, I’ve been plotting a comeback and will take her on outside of Borsheims at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. It will be a three-point match, and after I soften her up, all shareholders are invited to try their luck at similar three-point contests. Winners will be given a box of See’s candy. We will have equipment available, but bring your own paddle if you think it will help. (It won’t.)

Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year, though, it was overwhelmed by demand. With many more diners expected this year, I’ve asked my friend, Donna Sheehan, at Piccolo’s — another favorite restaurant of mine — to serve shareholders on Sunday as well. (Piccolo’s giant root beer float is mandatory for any fan of fine dining.) I plan to eat at both restaurants: All of the weekend action makes me really hungry, and I have favorite dishes at each spot. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.

Regrettably, we will not be able to have a reception for international visitors this year. Our count grew to about 800 last year, and my simply signing one item per person took about 2½ hours. Since we expect even more international visitors this year, Charlie and I decided we must drop this function. But be assured, we welcome every international visitor who comes.

Last year we changed our method of determining what questions would be asked at the meeting and received many dozens of letters applauding the new arrangement. We will therefore again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.

The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We’ve added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group.

在86岁和79岁的年纪，查理和我的幸运程度仍然超出了我们的梦想。我们出生在美国；拥有出色的父母，他们确保我们接受了良好的教育；享受着美好的家庭和健康的身体；并且天生带有一种”商业”基因，使我们能够以远远超过许多为社会福祉做出同等或更多贡献的人的经历的方式取得成功。此外，我们长久以来都热爱我们的工作，在这方面，我们得到了无数才华横溢、乐观向上的同事的无数帮助。确实，多年来，我们的工作变得越来越迷人；难怪我们是跳着踢踏舞去上班的。如果非要说，我们很乐意支付一大笔钱来做我们的工作（但别告诉薪酬委员会）。

然而，对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔年会上与我们的股东合伙人相聚更有趣了。所以，5月1日在奎斯特加入我们的年度资本家的伍德斯托克盛会吧。我们到时候见。

2010年2月26日

沃伦·E·巴菲特

附言：乘火车来吧。

原文

***********

At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).

Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.

February 26, 2010

Warren E. Buffett

P.S. Come by rail.

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