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2025年年度股东大会

上午会议

1. 开幕致辞

沃伦·巴菲特:请大家就座。这是我第60次年度股东大会,也是规模最大的一次,我相信这将是最好的。在开始之前,我想先给大家提供一些昨天的情况,因为我们创造了各种纪录。

昨天下午中午到5点之间有19,700人加入我们,高于前一年16,200人的前纪录。在各个方面我们都创造了纪录。喜诗糖果卖出了31.7万美元,而前一年是28.3万美元,其中大部分受限于产能。全天都排着长队。布鲁克斯跑鞋卖出了31万美元——创下了他们有史以来最高的单日销售额。我想他们周日有近3,000名跑者参加活动,人数很多。之前我们有2,200或2,400人,但现在是3,000人——这还不算我,而且我也不算在内。

我可以一路列举下去。爵士乐商品卖出了大约25万美元,是前几年的两倍。他们卖得越快越好。大多数地方都有人在收银台前排队,有时等待时间比我们希望的要长。但我们最终会学会如何运作。每家公司都创下了纪录。

我们无法知道今天现场有多少人。世界各地都有人在收听,但我认为我们可能会在多种不同的方面创下纪录。

我想首先介绍我们的董事。我是沃伦·巴菲特,我在这里奥马哈出生和长大。我们有格雷格·阿贝尔——他在加拿大出生和长大,还有阿吉特·贾因,他在印度出生和长大。所以我们是一个非常多元化的群体。

我将按照字母顺序介绍我们的董事,当我介绍时请他们起立——请大家在最后一起鼓掌,这样我们可以完成名单:

霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、肯·陈纳德、克里斯·戴维斯、苏·戴克——她是我们的首席独立董事

夏洛特·盖曼、小汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森——我稍后会再提到他,沃利·斯科特、梅丽尔·威特默。

就这样,你们看到了我们的全明星阵容。罗恩,如果你不介意站起来,我想指出,罗恩在伯克希尔已经达到了董事年龄上限。我想不久前我们还有五位超过90岁的董事,但苏检查过的是,我们的年龄上限是任何公司中最高的。罗恩已经在董事会任职28年,在此之前他在芒格·托尔斯律师事务所与查理·芒格共事了多年。在伯克希尔经历各种危机、欢乐、失望和惊喜的时刻,他一直在我们身边,为我们提供了无价的帮助。所以我想特别向罗恩·奥尔森致谢。

我想做一件在年度股东大会上通常不会做的事。周四下午我听了苹果公司的季度电话会议——这是我唯一听的个股季度电话会议。我知道蒂姆·库克在这里,从我这可能很难看到他,但他就在那里。我有点不好意思地说,蒂姆·库克为伯克希尔赚的钱比我为伯克希尔哈撒韦赚的钱多得多。

我短暂地认识史蒂夫·乔布斯,当然,史蒂夫做了其他任何人都无法做到的事情来发展苹果。史蒂夫选中了蒂姆来接替他,他确实做出了正确的决定。如你所知,史蒂夫英年早逝,除了史蒂夫,没有人能创造苹果,但除了蒂姆,也没有人能像他那样发展苹果。所以,我代表伯克希尔全体,感谢蒂姆。

还有几个人我想感谢。我在演出或伯克希尔的其他事务上不做什么工作,但你们今天看到的是伯克希尔许多人的成果。伯克希尔的员工每年都组织这场演出——我们的首席财务官和每个人都参与其中。从这方面来说,这是一个了不起的组织。但今年以及过去几年,这个活动是由梅丽莎·夏皮罗领导的,她让这一切得以顺利进行。

我们还有一个想法……大概65年前,我遇到了凯莉的祖父和他的妻子。他们有九个孩子,我和苏茜加入了一个剧场小组。我不像那种会加入剧场小组的人,但结果证明这在很多方面都是一个很好的举动。我喜欢那些戏剧,但除此之外,我不仅认识了凯莉的祖父——他在奥马哈经营一家保险公司,比尔·凯泽——我还认识了基威特兄弟的父母,路易斯和弗朗西斯。

关于凯莉,她的父亲经营一家名为中央各州的公司,后来我们收购了那家公司,她的父亲继续经营。她的妹妹几年前开始在伯克希尔工作,后来离开去组建家庭,有了四个孩子。凯莉随即接手,表现出惊人的才能。大约10或11年前,我请凯莉为伯克希尔制作一本50周年纪念册,让她发挥想象力。她从未编辑过书,从未出版过书,从未与印刷商打过交道,但她完成了这本50周年纪念册。

后来凯莉结婚并有了三个孩子,所以她不得不离开我们。我们每年去看一次棒球赛,邀请一些像凯莉这样杰出的老同事加入我们。尽管她在抚养三个孩子,但她自愿创作了一本60周年纪念册。她一边照顾孩子一边继续工作,我时不时问问进展如何。她在会议前大约一周完成了,因为我给她布置任务很晚。

昨天我们卖出了大约4,400本书。我们印了8,000本——我们原本打算印5,000本——所以今天大概还剩3,600本。这本书有点异想天开但很准确,她推出了正是我希望她写的书。凯莉一分钱都不肯收,但我让她指定了她最喜欢的慈善机构——斯蒂芬中心,它照顾无家可归的人,还做许多其他事情。它位于这里以南大约五六英里处,一直在做很棒的工作。她的祖父帮助成立了这个中心,她的丈夫现在已经加入了董事会。

我们正在销售20本特别版的书。在会议前我们卖了10本,筹集了几十万美元——我想我们有一本卖了10万美元。这些书与25美元版本之间的唯一区别是凯莉和我签了名。昨天我们卖出的六本带来了148,000美元,大约是每本25,000美元。我们留了四本,今天下午1点散会后,我们身后的书店区域将卖出最后四本。等全部完成后,我会匹配从这20本书中筹集的所有金额,我们将从财务和知名度两方面给予斯蒂芬中心支持。

当你看着这本书时,真的是凯莉完成了全部工作。里面有大量信息,她全部挖掘整理出来。她来过几次核实一些事实,但她从芒格家族那里获取了资料——她做得太棒了。我没法让她收一分钱,所以我打算将来请她做许多其他的事。

有了这些,我想我们已经涵盖了所有事务。我们将进入提问环节,交替由贝基提问来自全国各地的提问,以及来自我们按区域组织的现场观众的提问。

原文

Title: 2025 Annual Meeting

Part 1/4

2025 Annual Meeting

Morning Session

1. Opening Remarks

WARREN BUFFETT: If everyone will please take their seats. This is my 60th annual meeting, and it’s the biggest and I think it’ll be the best yet. Before I start, I’d like to give you a few figures from yesterday because we set all kinds of records.

Yesterday we had 19,700 people join us in the afternoon between noon and 5:00, up from 16,200 which was the previous record the year before. In every aspect we set records. See’s Candy did $317,000 against $283,000 the year before, and most of these were limited by capacity. There were lines throughout the entire day. Brooks did $310,000 – an all-time record sales day for them. I think they have close to 3,000 runners lined up for Sunday, which is a lot of people. We’ve had 2,200 or 2,400 before, but 3,000 – and that doesn’t count me, and it won’t count me.

I could go up and down the line. Jazz wares did around $250,000, double the previous years. They just sell as fast as they can sell. Most every place had people lined up at the cash register, sometimes for a longer wait than we’d wish. But we’ll learn the game eventually. Every company set records.

There’s no way of knowing how many people we have here today. We have people listening in around the world, but I think we’ll probably set records in a great variety of ways.

I would like to first introduce our directors. I’m Warren Buffett, and I was born and raised here in Omaha. We have Greg Abel – he was born and raised in Canada, and we have Ajit Jain who was born and raised in India. So we have a very diverse group.

I will introduce our directors alphabetically, and if they’ll stand as I introduce them – withhold your applause till the end so we can get through the list:

Howard Buffett, Susan Buffett, Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Chris Davis, Sue Decker, who’s our lead director

Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy Jr., Ron Olson – and I’ll have a few more things to say about him, Wally Scott, Meryl Witmer.

And with that, you’ve got our all-star cast. Ron, if you don’t mind standing, I would like to point out that Ron has reached our director age limit at Berkshire. I think we had five directors over 90 not so long ago, but we have the highest age limit of any company Sue has checked. Ron has been on the board for 28 years and has been associated with Charlie Munger at Munger Tolles for many years beyond that. He has been around at various times of crisis, joy, disappointments, and surprises at Berkshire and has been of invaluable help to us. So I’d like to give a special hand to Ron Olson.

I think I’ll do something else that isn’t usually done at annual meetings. I listened to Apple’s quarterly call on Thursday afternoon – it’s the only investment quarterly call that I listen to. I understand Tim Cook is here, and it’ll be tough for me to see him from up here, but there he is. I’m somewhat embarrassed to say that Tim Cook has made Berkshire a lot more money than I’ve ever made Berkshire Hathaway.

I knew Steve Jobs briefly, and Steve of course did things that nobody else could have done in developing Apple. Steve picked Tim to succeed him, and he really made the right decision. Steve died young as you know, and nobody but Steve could have created Apple, but nobody but Tim could have developed it as he has. So on behalf of all of Berkshire, thank you Tim.

There are a couple other people I’d like to thank. I don’t do any work in terms of the show or anything else around Berkshire, but what you see today is the product of a lot of people at Berkshire. The people of Berkshire put on this show every year – our chief financial officer and just everybody pitches in. It’s a remarkable organization that way. But it’s led this year and in the last few years by Melissa Shapiro, and she’s made this whole thing work.

We also had an idea a while back… maybe 65 years ago, I met Carrie Sa’s grandfather and his wife. They had nine children, and Susie and I joined a playhouse group. I don’t look like the kind of guy that would join a playhouse group, but it turned out to be a great move in many ways. I enjoyed the plays, but beyond that I met not only Carrie’s grandfather, who ran an insurance company in Omaha – Bill Kaiser – but I also met the Kiewit boys’ parents, Louis and Francis.

In connection with Carrie, her father ran a company called Central States, and later on we bought that company and her father ran it. Her sister went to work for Berkshire some years ago and then left to have a family with four kids. Carrie moved right in and had amazing talents. About 10 or 11 years ago, I asked Carrie to do a 50th anniversary book about Berkshire and just use her imagination. She’d never edited a book, never published a book, never dealt with printers before, but she put together the 50th anniversary book.

Then Carrie got married and had three kids, so she had to leave us. We go to a baseball game once a year and invite some of our distinguished alumni like Carrie to join us. Even though she was raising three children, she volunteered to create a 60th anniversary book. She kept doing things with her kids and every now and then I’d ask how it was going. She got it done about a week before the meeting because I gave her the assignment very late.

Yesterday we sold about 4,400 books. We printed 8,000 – we intended to print 5,000 – so we have roughly 3,600 left for today. It’s kind of whimsical but accurate, and she came out with just the book I hoped she would. Carrie wouldn’t take a dime, but I did get her to name her favorite charity – the Stephen Center, which takes care of homeless people and does many other things. It’s located about five or six miles south of here and has been doing wonderful work. Her grandfather helped form it, and her husband has now joined the board.

We are selling 20 special copies of the book. We sold 10 prior to the meeting and raised a few hundred thousand doing that – I think we sold one for $100,000. The only difference between these and the $25 version is that Carrie and I signed them. The six we sold yesterday brought $148,000, which is about $25,000 per book. We saved four more, and this afternoon when we disband at 1:00, the area behind us with the bookstore will sell the final four. When we’re all through, I’ll match whatever we’ve raised from the 20 books, and we’ll give the Stephen Center a boost both financially and in awareness.

When you look at that book, Carrie really did the whole thing. There’s a lot of information in there, and she dug through it all. She came by a couple times to check a fact or two, but she got material from the Munger family – she just did a wonderful job. I couldn’t get her to take a penny for it, so I’m going to ask her to do a lot of other things in the future.

With that, I think we’ve covered all the business. We will move to questions, alternating between Becky with questions she’s received from around the country and from our audience which we have organized by zones.

2. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:谢谢沃伦。第一个问题来自比尔·米切尔。我收到的关于这个问题比其他任何问题都多。他写道:“沃伦,在2003年《财富》杂志的一篇文章中,你主张用进口证书来限制贸易逆差,并说这些进口证书基本上相当于关税,但最近你称关税是经济战争行为。你对贸易壁垒的看法改变了吗?还是你认为进口证书与关税有所不同?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,进口证书确实有所不同,但它们的目标是平衡进口与出口,使贸易逆差不会以巨大的规模增长。它包含各种条款来帮助第三世界国家稍微追赶上来。它们旨在平衡贸易,我认为你可以提出很好的论据说明平衡贸易对世界是有益的。

可可适合在加纳种植,咖啡适合在哥伦比亚种植,还有其他一些情况。随着时间的推移,美国从一个农业国家——250年前这里只是一个农业国家——变成了一个高度工业化的国家。我们不想运行越来越大的逆差,积累越来越多的国家债务。

所以我设计了这种进口证书计划,查理认为这有点像鲁布·戈德堡机械——有点花哨,但肯定比我们现在谈论的要好。毫无疑问,贸易可能是一种战争行为,我认为它导致了不好的事情,比如在美国引发的各种态度。我们应该寻求与世界各国进行贸易。我们应该做我们最擅长的事,他们也应该做他们最擅长的事。

在有八个国家拥有核武器的情况下,其中一些我认为相当不稳定,我不认为设计这样一个世界是个好主意:少数国家说,“哈哈,我们赢了”,而其他国家则心怀嫉妒。

我的进口证书想法没有取得任何进展。最重要的是,贸易不应该成为一种武器。美国从250年前的一无所有变成了一个极其重要的国家——历史上从未有过这样的国家。当你有75亿人不怎么喜欢你,而你有3亿人自夸做得有多好时,这是一个大错误。

我认为这不正确,也不明智。世界其他地区越繁荣,它不会以我们的利益为代价——我们就会越繁荣,我们会感到更安全,你的孩子们将来也会感到更安全。但别指望我的进口证书想法会像亚当·斯密的《国富论》那样载入史册。

原文

2. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: Thanks Warren. This first question comes from Bill Mitchell. I received more questions about this than any other question. He writes, “Warren, in a 2003 Fortune article, you argued for import certificates to limit trade deficits and said these import certificates basically amounted to a tariff, but recently you called tariffs an act of economic war. Has your view on trade barriers changed or do you see import certificates as somehow distinct from tariffs?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the import certificates were distinct, but their goal was to balance imports against exports so that the trade deficit would not grow in an enormous way. It had various provisions to help third world countries catch up a little bit. They were designed to balance trade, and I think you can make very good arguments that balanced trade is good for the world.

It makes sense for cocoa to be raised in Ghana and coffee in Colombia and a few other things. Over time, America has gone from being an agricultural country – this was nothing but an agricultural country 250 years ago – to a very industrial country. We did not want to run greater and greater deficits building up greater and greater debts against the country.

So I designed this import certificate plan, which Charlie thought was a little too much like Rube Goldberg – it’s gimmicky, but it’s certainly better than what we’re talking about now. There’s no question that trade can be an act of war, and I think it’s led to bad things like the attitudes it’s brought out in the United States. We should be looking to trade with the rest of the world. We should do what we do best, and they should do what they do best.

With eight countries possessing nuclear weapons, including a few I would call quite unstable, I don’t think it’s a great idea to design a world where a few countries say, “Haha, we’ve won” while other countries are envious.

My import certificate idea went nowhere. The main thing is that trade should not be a weapon. The United States has become an incredibly important country starting from nothing 250 years ago – there’s never been anything like it. And it’s a big mistake when you have 7.5 billion people who don’t like you very well and you have 300 million people crowing about how well they’ve done.

I don’t think it’s right and I don’t think it’s wise. The more prosperous the rest of the world becomes, it won’t be at our expense – the more prosperous we’ll become and the safer we’ll feel and your children will feel someday. But don’t expect my import certificate idea to go down in history with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.

3. 现场观众提问

现场观众(区域1):巴菲特先生、阿贝尔先生、贾因先生,早上好。我是来自香港的St. J。巴菲特先生和芒格先生在过去五六年里对日本进行了一笔非常成功且出色的投资。目前日本的CPI高于3%,离其2%的目标并不远。日本央行似乎非常坚定地要加息,而美联储、欧洲央行和其他央行正在考虑降息。您认为日本央行加息的做法合理吗?其计划的加息会阻止您进一步投资日本股市,甚至考虑兑现当前利润吗?非常感谢您每年安排这个最盛大的活动。最后,祝您永远健康,并继续主持这个股东大会。

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我将把你对我表达的同样善意也传递给日本。我会让日本人自己决定他们经济的最佳行动方针。这是一个不可思议的故事。

从我们投资日本到现在已经大约六年了。我刚刚翻阅了一本小册子,里面可能包含两三千家日本公司。我遇到的一个问题是,我再也无法阅读那本手册了——字体太小了。但其中有这五家贸易公司,它们的价格低得离谱。所以我花了大约一年的时间收购它们。然后我们越来越了解那些人,我和格雷格看到的一切都让我们越来越喜欢。

所以我们一度接近了10%的持股上限,我们告诉这些公司,未经它们允许我们绝不会超过这个上限。我们确实问过它们是否可以提高这个上限,目前正在逐步放松的过程中。我想说——我会代表格雷格和我说——在未来的50年里,我们不会考虑卖出这些头寸。

日本的记录非常出色。我猜蒂姆·库克会告诉你,iPhone在那里的销量几乎与美国以外的任何国家一样大。美国运通会告诉你他们在日本销售其产品非常成功。可口可乐,我们的另一项大投资,在日本表现得非常出色。他们有许多不同的习惯和比我们不同的文明运作方式。日本是可口可乐软饮料容器最大的市场。

这五家公司对我们非常好。他们主要与格雷格沟通。我一两年前去过那里,但格雷格比我要国际化。

格雷格·阿贝尔:当你想到这五家公司时,沃伦,我们一年肯定要开几次会。我们与这五家公司建立关系的结果是:第一,这是一笔非常好的投资,但我们确实设想持有这笔投资50年或永久。同时,我们正在建立关系,以便与这些公司一起做增量的事情。我们真的希望在全球范围内与它们做大事。它们带来了不同的视角和不同的机会,这就是为什么我们正在与它们建立长期关系。

它们有不同的习俗,不同的商业方法——这在世界各地都是如此。我们无意试图改变它们所做的事情,因为它们做得非常成功。我们的主要活动就是欢呼和鼓掌,我在94岁还能做到这一点。

我们不会卖出任何股票。在几十年内这不会发生,甚至更久。我猜它们会发现机会——它们几乎覆盖全球——而我们也会发现可能对那里的任何单个公司来说都非常大的机会。它们可能会因为我们带来的一些帮助而受益,但将是一段不断扩大的关系。

遗憾的是,伯克希尔变得如此庞大,因为我们喜欢这个头寸,我希望它能大得多。即使这五家公司在日本非常大,我们在市场上投资了大约200亿美元,但我宁愿有1,000亿美元而不是200亿美元。我对我们的其他几项投资也有同样的感觉。但规模是伯克希尔业绩的敌人,我不知道有什么好方法来解决这个问题。

查理总是告诉我,有一些问题对我有好处。日本投资正好适合我们。

格雷格·阿贝尔:我完全同意,沃伦。我确实相信我们长期会看到一些非常大的机会,这真是这段关系的一个巨大的加分项。

沃伦·巴菲特:我想说它们希望向我们提供机会,我们也希望接受这些机会。我们有资金。我们彼此相处得很好。它们有一些与我们不同的习俗。它们喝佐治亚咖啡作为其第一号可口可乐产品。我没有让它们改喝樱桃可乐,它们也不会让我改喝佐治亚咖啡。但这是一种完美的关系。我只是希望我们能有更多这样的机会。

当我拿起那本手册时,我从未梦想到这一点。你只需翻翻页就能发现什么,这太神奇了。去年我们播放了一部关于”翻遍每一页”的电影,我想说翻遍每一页是带入投资领域的一个重要因素。很少有人真的翻遍每一页,而翻遍每一页的人不会告诉你他们发现了什么。所以你必须自己做一点功课。

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3. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 1): Mr. Buffett, Mr. Abel, and Mr. Jain. Good morning. I’m St. J. from Hong Kong. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger did a very good and successful investment in Japan in the past five or six years. The recent CPI in Japan is currently above 3%, not far away from its 2% target. Bank of Japan seems very determined in raising rates while Fed, ECB, and other central banks are considering cutting them. Do you think BOJ makes sense to proceed with the rate hike? Will its planned rate hike deter you from further investing in the Japanese stock market or even considering realizing your current profits? Thank you very much for arranging this greatest event every year. Finally, I wish you health always and to keep holding this shareholder meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m going to extend the same goodwill to Japan that you’ve just extended to me. I’ll let the people of Japan determine their best course of action in terms of economics. It’s an incredible story.

It’s been about six years now since our Japanese investments. I was just going through a little handbook that probably had two or three thousand Japanese companies in it. One problem I have is that I can’t read that handbook anymore – the print’s too small. But there were these five trading companies selling at ridiculously low prices. So I spent about a year acquiring them. And then we got to know the people better, and everything that Greg and I saw, we liked better as we went along.

So we got fairly close to the 10% limit that we told the companies we would never exceed without their permission. We did ask them whether that limit could be relaxed, and it’s in the process of being relaxed somewhat. I would say that – I’ll speak for Greg beyond me – in the next 50 years, we won’t give a thought to selling those positions.

Japan’s record has been extraordinary. My guess is that Tim Cook would tell you that iPhone sales there are about as great as any country outside the United States. American Express would tell you that they sell their product very well in Japan. Coca-Cola, another big investment of ours, does extraordinarily well in Japan. They have a number of habits and a civilization that operates differently than ours. Japan is by far the biggest market for Coca-Cola’s soft drink containers.

We have been treated extremely well by the five companies. They talk primarily with Greg. I went over there a year or two ago, but Greg’s more cosmopolitan than I am.

GREG ABEL: When you think of the five companies, there’s definitely a couple meetings a year, Warren. The thing we’re building with the five companies is, one, it’s been a very good investment, but we really envision holding the investment for 50 years or forever. We also are building relationships to do incremental things with each of those companies. We really hope to do big things with them globally. They bring different perspectives and different opportunities, and that’s why we’re building that long-term relationship with them.

They have different customs, different approaches to business – that’s true around the world. We don’t have any intention of trying to change what they’ve done because they do it very successfully. Our main activity is just to cheer and clap, and I can still do that at 94.

We will not be selling any stock. That will not happen in decades, if then. My guess is that they will find things – they cover the world pretty much – and we will find opportunities that may be very large for any individual company there. They may be assisted by some help we bring to the situation, but that will be an expanding relationship.

It’s too bad that Berkshire has gotten as big as it is because we love that position and I’d like it to be a lot larger. Even with the five companies being very large in Japan, we’ve got at market in the range of $20 billion invested, but I’d rather have $100 billion than $20 billion. That’s how I feel about several other investments we have. But size is an enemy of performance at Berkshire, and I don’t know any good way to solve that problem.

Charlie always told me that having a few problems was good for me. The Japan investment has just been right up our alley.

GREG ABEL: I absolutely agree, Warren. I do believe we’ll see some very large opportunities long term, and that’s just been a great plus of that relationship.

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say they want to present us with opportunities, and we would like to receive them. We’ve got the money. We get along very well with each other. They have some different customs than we have. They drink Georgia coffee as their number one Coca-Cola product. I haven’t converted them to Cherry Coke, and they’re not going to convert me to Georgia Coffee. But it’s a perfect relationship. I just wish we could get more like it.

I never dreamt of that when I picked up that handbook. It’s amazing what you can find when you just turn the page. We showed a movie last year about “turn every page,” and I would say that turning every page is one important ingredient to bring to the investment field. Very few people do turn every page, and the ones who turn every page aren’t going to tell you what they’re finding. So you’ve got to do a little of it yourself.

4. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:下一个问题来自纽约的阿德韦特·普拉萨德。他写道:“如今,伯克希尔持有超过3,000亿美元的现金和短期投资,约占总资产的27%,与过去25年平均13%的水平相比处于历史高位。这也使得伯克希尔实际上持有了近5%的美国国债市场。除了满足保险义务所需的流动性之外,增加现金的决定主要是为了应对高市场估值的去风险策略吗?还是有意为更平稳的领导层过渡做准备,为格雷格·阿贝尔提供最大灵活性和干净的资本配置决策基础?“我还要加上另一位股东迈克·康威的提问:“你是否感到鼓舞,可能会看到一些很好的机会向你走来?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我绝不会如此高尚地为了日后让格雷格看起来表现更好而克制自己不进行投资。如果他从我留下的东西中得到任何好处,我会感到不满的。

我们的现金数量——如果有东西对我们来说合理、我们理解、提供良好价值并且我们不用担心亏损,我们会花掉1,000亿美元。投资业务的问题在于,机遇不会以有序的方式出现,而且永远也不会。

在我的职业生涯中,大约有16,000个交易日。如果每天你都能得到四五个具有同等吸引力的机会,那会很好。如果我是在经营抽水生意,每天我都能预期保留总收入的40%,唯一的问题是我们做了多少交易。但我们经营的不是那种生意。

我们经营的是一种非常机会主义的生意。查理总是认为我做了太多事情。他认为如果我们一生中做大约五件事,最终会比做50件事做得更好,而且我们从来都不够专注。

我们宁愿让条件发展到我们拥有约500亿美元现金而不是3,350亿美元的国债。但这不是生意运作的方式。我们通过不想时时刻刻都满仓投资而赚了很多钱。

我们并不认为被动投资者进行一些简单的投资并终身持有是不合适的。但我们已经决定置身于这个行业,所以我们认为通过以非常不规则的方式行事,我们可以做得更好一点。

如果你告诉我,我必须每年投资500亿美元,直到现金降到500亿美元,那将是世界上最愚蠢的事情。机会偶尔才会变得非常有吸引力。长期趋势是向上的。但没有人知道——格雷格不知道,阿吉特不知道,没有人知道市场明天、下周或下个月会怎样。没有人知道企业明天、下周或下个月会怎样。但他们把所有时间都花在谈论这件事上,因为说起来容易,尽管它毫无价值。

翻阅像那本我已经无法阅读的大部头日本手册的过程——那是一场寻宝。时不时地你就会发现一些东西。偶尔,非常偶尔——但会再次发生,我不知道什么时候——可能是下周,也可能是五年后,但不会是在五十年后——我们将被提供大量机会,我们会庆幸那时我们手上有现金。

如果能明天发生,那会更有趣,但明天发生的可能性非常小。五年内发生并不少见,而且随着时间的推移,概率会越来越高。有点像死亡——如果你10岁,第二天去世的概率很低。如果你活到115岁,那几乎是确定无疑的,尤其是如果你是男性,因为所有长寿纪录都由女性保持。我曾试图让查理做变性手术,看看是否能延长他的寿命。作为一个男性,他做得相当不错,我这么说吧。

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4. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Advate Prasad in New York. He writes, “Today, Berkshire holds over $300 billion in cash and short-term investments, representing about 27% of total assets, a historically high figure compared to the 13% average over the last 25 years. This has also led Berkshire to effectively own nearly 5% of the entire US Treasury market. Beyond the need for liquidity to meet insurance obligations, is the decision to raise cash primarily a de-risking strategy in response to high market valuations? Or is it also a deliberate effort to position Berkshire’s balance sheet for a smoother leadership transition, providing Greg Abel with maximum flexibility and a clean slate for future capital allocation decisions?” And I will add one line from another shareholder, Mike Conway, who asks, “Are you encouraged you may see some fat pitches coming your way?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t do anything nearly so noble as to withhold investing myself just so that Greg could look good later on. If he gets any edge of what I leave behind, I’ll resent it.

The amount of cash we have – we would spend $100 billion if something is offered that makes sense to us, that we understand, offers good value, and where we don’t worry about losing money. The problem with the investment business is that things don’t come along in an orderly fashion, and they never will.

I’ve had about 16,000 trading days in my career. It would be nice if every day you got four opportunities or something like that with equal attractiveness. If I was running a numbers racket, every day would have the same expectancy that I would keep 40% of whatever the handle was, and the only question would be how much we transacted. But we’re not running that kind of business.

We’re running a business which is very opportunistic. Charlie always thought I did too many things. He thought if we did about five things in our lifetime, we would end up doing better than if we did 50, and that we never concentrated enough.

We would rather have conditions develop where we would have like $50 billion in cash rather than $335 billion in treasuries. But that’s just not the way the business works. We have made a lot of money by not wanting to be fully invested at all times.

We don’t think it’s improper for passive investors to make a few simple investments and sit with them for life. But we’ve made the decision to be in the business, so we think we can do a little better by behaving in a very irregular manner.

If you told me that I had to invest $50 billion every year until we got down to $50 billion in cash, that would be the dumbest thing in the world. Things get extraordinarily attractive very occasionally. The long-term trend is up. But nobody knows – Greg doesn’t know, Ajit doesn’t know, nobody knows what the market is going to do tomorrow, next week, or next month. Nobody knows what business is going to do tomorrow, next week, or next month. But they spend all their time talking about it because it’s easy to talk about, though it has no value.

The process of leafing through things like that big Japanese book I can’t read anymore – that’s a treasure hunt. Every now and then you find something. Occasionally, very occasionally – but it’ll happen again, I don’t know when – it could be next week, it could be 5 years off, but it won’t be 50 years off – we will be bombarded with offerings that we’ll be glad we have the cash for.

It would be a lot more fun if it would happen tomorrow, but it’s very unlikely to happen tomorrow. It’s not unlikely to happen in five years, and the probabilities get higher as you go along. It’s kind of like death – if you’re 10 years old, the chances that you’re going to die the next day are low. If you get to be 115, it’s almost a certainty, particularly if you’re a male, as all the longevity records are held by females. I tried to get Charlie to have a sex change so he could test out whether it would extend his life. He did pretty well for being a male, I’ll put it that way.

5. 现场观众提问

现场观众(区域2):早上好,沃伦、格雷格和阿吉特。我叫杰基·汉。我来自中国,现在加拿大多伦多工作。这是我第八次参加伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东大会。此时此刻,我可能花在你们身上的时间比大多数人在Netflix上花的时间还要多。你们可能猜到了,来自一个中国家庭,我们对房地产总是情有独钟。所以问题不是你为什么不住房子,而是你为什么不买更多房产而仍然买股票?所以我的问题是:在当今高利率和全球不确定性的环境下,你是否仍然相信在别人恐惧时贪婪,还是说价值投资在当今环境下面临新的挑战?谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,关于房地产,在交易谈判、时间投入和多人参与所有权方面,它比股票要困难得多。通常当房地产陷入困境时,你会发现你要打交道的不仅仅是股权持有人。

过去有段时间,大量房地产以廉价易手,但通常股票更便宜,而且做起来要容易得多。查理做过更多房地产交易。查理喜欢房地产交易,实际上在他生命的最后五年里,他做了相当多的交易。但他是在玩一种对他来说有趣的游戏。

我想如果你在他21岁时让他选择——要么余生只做股票交易,要么余生只做房地产——他会选择股票。至少在美国,证券市场提供的机会要比房地产多得多。

在房地产领域,你通常要面对单一所有者或一个长期拥有大型房产的家庭。也许他们用房产借了太多钱。也许人口趋势对他们不利。但对他们来说,这是一个巨大的决定。

当你走到纽约证券交易所,你可以进行数十亿美元的交易,完全匿名,而且可以在五分钟内完成。交易一旦完成就是结清的。在房地产领域,当你与困境中的贷方达成交易时,签署协议只是开始。然后人们开始谈判更多的事情,这完全是一种不同的游戏,需要享受这种游戏的不同类型的人参与。

我们在2008年和2009年做了一些出现在我们面前的房地产交易,但与做明智且可能更好的证券投资相比,它们需要投入的时间根本没有可比性。在房地产交易中,每一句话对对方都很重要。在股票中,如果有人需要卖出2万股伯克希尔的股票,他们打电话给我们,价格合适,五秒钟就完成了,而且立即交割。

假设在价格上达成一致,处理任何股票交易的完成率基本上是100%。在房地产中,当你同意交易时,谈判才刚刚开始,然后它们可能没完没了。对于一个94岁的人来说,参与一些可能耗时数年的谈判并不是最有趣的事。

我们看到一些巨大的房地产失败。如果你一路追溯到20世纪60年代的泽肯多夫,他曾要改变世界,加州的世纪城就是他愿景的产物。如果你去到莱克曼家族在伦敦的金丝雀码头大楼,他曾处于世界之巅,但人们往往在这个行业陷入困境。

银行通常不愿承认问题,但通过银行流程需要很长时间。他们刚刚完成了三年前马斯克在收购推特时获得的贷款的重新谈判。房地产交易的双方都没有准备好行动。我们发现,当人们准备好拿起电话,而你一天之内就能做数亿美元的交易时,要好得多。我被宠坏了,但我喜欢被宠坏,所以我们会继续保持这种方式。

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5. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 2): Good morning, Warren, Greg and Ajit. My name is Jackie Han. I’m from China and now work in Toronto, Canada. This is my eighth Berkshire Hathaway meeting. At this point, I’ve probably spent more time with you than most people spend on Netflix. As you might guess, coming from a Chinese family, we always had a soft spot for real estate. So the question isn’t why don’t you own a house, it’s why are you still buying stocks instead of more property? So here is my question: With today’s high interest rates and global uncertainty, do you still believe in being greedy when others are fearful, or is value investing facing new challenges in today’s environment? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in respect to real estate, it’s so much harder than stocks in terms of negotiation of deals, time spent, and the involvement of multiple parties in the ownership. Usually when real estate gets in trouble, you find out you’re dealing with more than just the equity holder.

There have been times when large amounts of real estate have changed hands at bargain prices, but usually stocks were cheaper and they were a lot easier to do. Charlie did more real estate. Charlie enjoyed real estate transactions, and he actually did a fair number of them in the last 5 years of his life. But he was playing a game that was interesting to him.

I think if you’d asked him to make a choice when he was 21 – either be in stocks exclusively for the rest of his life or real estate for the rest of his life – he would have chosen stocks. There’s just so much more opportunity, at least in the United States, that presents itself in the security market than in real estate.

In real estate, you’re usually dealing with a single owner or a family that owns a large property they’ve had a long time. Maybe they’ve borrowed too much money against it. Maybe the population trends are against them. But to them, it’s an enormous decision.

When you walk down to the New York Stock Exchange, you can do billions of dollars worth of business, totally anonymous, and you can do it in 5 minutes. The trades are complete when they’re complete. In real estate, when you make a deal with a distressed lender, when you sign the deal, that’s just the beginning. Then people start negotiating more things, and it’s a whole different game with a different type of person who enjoys the game.

We did a few real estate deals that came our way in 2008 and 2009, but the amount of time they would take compared to doing something intelligent and probably better in securities – there was just no comparison. In a real estate deal, every sentence is important to the person. In stocks, if somebody needs to sell 20,000 shares of Berkshire and they call us and the price is right, it’s done in 5 seconds and it closes right away.

The completion rate for working on anything in stocks, assuming you’ve got a meeting of the minds on price, is essentially 100%. In real estate, the negotiation just begins when you agree on deals, and then they take forever. For a 94-year-old, it’s not the most interesting thing to get involved in something where the negotiations could take years.

We have seen some huge failures in real estate. If you go all the way back to Zeckendorf in the 1960s, he was going to change the world, and Century City in California is a product of his vision. If you go to Reichmann with the Canary Wharf buildings in London, he was sitting on top of the world, but people tend to get in trouble in that business.

The banks usually don’t want to recognize problems, but it takes a long time to go through the bank processes. They just got through redoing the Musk loan that he made when he was buying Twitter three years ago. Real estate transactions have parties on both sides that aren’t ready to act. We find it much better when people are ready to pick up the phone and you can do hundreds of millions of dollars worth of business in a day. I’ve been spoiled, but I like being spoiled, so we’ll keep it that way.

6. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自旧金山的萨姆·英格兰,是问沃伦和阿吉特的。随着人工智能系统变得能力更强且更难解释,您如何看待这如何影响保险业评估、定价和转移风险的能力?伯克希尔在承保或资本配置方面过去经历的中断是否有相似之处?

阿吉特·贾因:在我看来,毫无疑问人工智能将真正改变游戏规则。它将改变我们评估风险、定价风险、销售风险以及最终理赔的方式。

话虽如此,我当然也认为人们最终会花费巨资追逐下一个时髦的东西。我们并不擅长成为最快或最先行动的人。我们的方法更倾向于等待观望,直到机会明朗,我们对于失败风险、上升空间和下行空间有更好的看法。

现在,各个保险业务部门确实在尝试使用人工智能,并试图找出利用它的最佳方式。但我们还没有有意识地大规模投入资金到这个机会上。我猜我们会处于一种准备就绪的状态,如果机会出现,我们会迅速抓住。

沃伦·巴菲特:我不会拿未来10年人工智能可能发展出的一切来交换阿吉特。如果你给我一个选择:在未来10年拥有1000亿美元参与财产意外险业务,并从任何正在开发人工智能的人那里获得最顶尖的人工智能产品,或者让阿吉特来做决策,我会随时选择阿吉特——我可不是在开玩笑。

原文

6. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Sam England in San Francisco and it’s for Warren and Ajit. As AI systems become more capable and harder to interpret, how do you see that affecting the insurance industry’s ability to assess, price, and transfer risk? Are there parallels to past disruptions Berkshire has navigated in underwriting or capital allocation?

AJIT JAIN: There is no question in my mind that AI is going to be a real game-changer. It’s going to change the way we assess risk, we price risk, we sell risk, and then the way we end up paying claims.

Having said that, I certainly also feel that people end up spending enormous amounts of money trying to chase the next fashionable thing. We are not very good at being the fastest or the first mover. Our approach is more to wait and see until the opportunity crystallizes and we have a better point of view in terms of risk of failure, upside, and downside.

Right now the individual insurance operations do dabble in AI and try to figure out the best way to exploit it. But we have not yet made a conscious big-time effort in terms of pouring a lot of money into this opportunity. My guess is we will be in a state of readiness, and should that opportunity pop up, we’ll jump in promptly.

WARREN BUFFETT: I wouldn’t trade everything that’s developed in AI in the next 10 years for Ajit. If you gave me a choice of having a hundred billion dollars available to participate in the property casualty insurance business for the next 10 years and a choice of getting the top AI product from whoever’s developing it or having Ajit making the decisions, I would take Ajit anytime – and I’m not kidding about that.

7. 现场观众提问

现场观众(区域3):你好,我是来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的西恩·西格尔。感谢您投入时间,也感谢您和执行委员会举办这次会议,并将这么多不同背景的人聚集在一个屋檐下。在伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有的所有公司中,有一家是您收购的——总部位于芝加哥的波蒂洛热狗店。您如何知道这将是公司整体投资组合中的一个好选择?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我得问格雷格这件事,因为我对此一无所知。所以,也许是在我没注意他买了它。但我想我得打电话问一个朋友了解这件事。我喜欢认为自己了解我们的大部分公司,但我对这家公司真的什么都不知道。对不起,但这也许是件好事。不过我确实知道一些关于热狗的事。而且我们在芝加哥确实有很多公司。

格雷格·阿贝尔:通过北方马蒙公司,这是一个很好的机会,我们在这个投资组合下积累了一系列优秀的公司,但我不认为波蒂洛属于那里。

沃伦·巴菲特:我每个月查看大约50到60家公司的财务报表。但以北方马蒙为例,北方马蒙本身拥有超过100家公司。它由杰伊·普利兹克和他的兄弟鲍勃创立,我们收购它时已经是一家了不起的公司,但当时它已经高度多元化,之后我们又进一步多元化。所以它在某种程度上是伯克希尔内的伯克希尔。

我们发现这种安排运作得很好。杰伊·普利兹克是一位了不起的管理者,普利兹克家族有多个分支。1954年,美国联邦税法发生了非常巨大的变化——对我来说是一个相当大的打击,因为我当时在哥伦比亚大学读一本J.K.拉瑟的税法书籍,然后他们就把整个体系改了。但1954年是变化的一年,这样的年份时不时会出现,比如1986年,你们可能有一天会看到一次大的变化。

有一家叫布鲁克林罗克伍德巧克力的公司,它们生产罗克伍德巧克力碎,我们曾在巴菲特杂货店出售它们用来制作巧克力曲奇饼干。结果后来可可豆——最近涨得很厉害——在1941年首次允许使用后进先出法时,每磅只有5美分。罗克伍德巧克力公司采用了后进先出法,所以它们拥有大约3000万磅的可可。

然后1955年可可价格飙升。我刚搬到纽约。新税法中有一个条款,如果你经营两种或更多业务,做了某些事情,并且在其中一个业务中已运营5年,然后退出其中一个,那么对于后进先出法下的存货收益将不征收资本利得税。当时税率大约在48%到52%之间,所以可可价格上涨产生了巨大的利润,但这对他们销售罗克伍德巧克力碎来说很糟糕,因为巧克力碎的零售价格跟不上批发价格的上涨。最近巧克力行业也发生了几乎完全相同的事情——好时刚刚报告说他们将有一个糟糕的季度,由于西非的事件,我们要支付每磅4.50美元的可可价格。

总之,杰伊·普利兹克控制了罗克伍德。我当时24或25岁,他们召开会议,打算分拆其中一个巧克力业务,以便能够确认这些可可豆的收益而无需支付50%的联邦税。所以我去了布鲁克林的会议,除了一个人之外没有人在场——我24岁,他29岁,那就是杰伊·普利兹克。

杰伊给我上了一堂关于税法的课,或者说是教训。我即使上几年研究生院,也学不到他那天教给我的那么多。后来我们实际上收购了北方马蒙公司,它在进行一些其他转型后,从一个曾经是罗克伍德的实体发展壮大。

北方马蒙,除此之外,还开发了赢得第一届印第安纳波利斯赛道比赛的赛车,并发明了后视镜。在印第安纳波利斯500比赛中,过去车上通常有两个人——一个人负责向后看其他赛车手在做什么,一个人负责驾驶。当我们的车手生病时,他们发明了后视镜。所以如果你想看看伯克希尔哈撒韦的实验室里在做什么,我们有人在研究像后视镜这样的东西。

格雷格·阿贝尔:确实有位朋友打电话了。经营我们一家伯克希尔子公司并且工作出色的彼得·伊斯特伍德追踪发现,波蒂洛热狗店由一家名为伯克希尔合伙人的私募股权公司所有。所以这就是这个问题的来源,但它与伯克希尔哈撒韦无关。所以,我们搞清楚了这件事。

沃伦·巴菲特:这仅仅是我们这里运作方式的一个例子。

原文

7. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 3): Hello, I’m Sean Seagull from Chicago, Illinois. Thank you for investing your time and to you and the executive committee for putting on this meeting and for bringing together a diverse group of people in attendance under one roof. Out of all the companies that Berkshire Hathaway owns, there was one that you acquired – the Chicago-based company Portillo’s Hot Dogs. How did you know that this would be a good fit for the overall company’s portfolio?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll have to ask Greg about that because I don’t know anything about it. So, maybe he bought it when I was looking the other way. But I think I got to call a friend on this one. I like to think I know most of our companies, but I really don’t know a thing about it. I’m sorry, but that may be a good thing. I do know something about hot dogs, though. And we do have a lot of companies in Chicago.

GREG ABEL: Through Marmon, that’s been a great opportunity where we’ve accumulated a variety of excellent companies under that portfolio, but I don’t believe Portillo’s falls under that.

WARREN BUFFETT: I look at the financial statements of about 50 or 60 of our companies every month. But in the case of Marmon, for example, Marmon itself owns over 100 companies. It was created by Jay Pritzker and his brother Bob, and it was a remarkable company when we bought it, but it was highly diversified already and then we’ve diversified it further. So it is something of a Berkshire within Berkshire.

We found that’s working very well as an arrangement. Jay Pritzker was a remarkable manager, and there are various branches of the Pritzker family. In 1954, they changed the federal tax code very dramatically in the United States – quite a blow to me because I’d been at Columbia reading a J.K. Lasser book about the tax code, and then they went and changed the whole thing. But 1954 was a big year of change, and those years come every now and then, like 1986, and you may see a big one one of these days.

There was a company called Rockwood Chocolates in Brooklyn, and they made Rockwood Chocolate Bits, which we used to sell at the Buffett grocery store for people to make chocolate chip cookies. It turned out that cocoa, which lately has had a big run, was 5 cents a pound in 1941 when LIFO was first allowed for tax purposes. The Rockwood chocolate company went on the LIFO method, so they owned about 30 million pounds of cocoa.

Then cocoa took a run in 1955. I had just moved to New York. There was a provision in the new tax code that if you were in two or more businesses and did certain things and had been in them for 5 years and got out of one of them, there would be no capital gains tax on LIFO inventory gains. Tax rates were around 48% or 52%, so there was this huge profit because cocoa had gone up in price, but that made it terrible for them selling Rockwood chocolate bits because the retail price of the chocolate bits did not match what was going on at wholesale. Something almost identical has been happening in the chocolate business recently – Hershey just reported they’re going to have a bad quarter as we’re paying $4.50 a pound for chocolate because of events in West Africa.

In any event, Jay Pritzker bought control of Rockwood. I was 24 or 25 years old, and they called a meeting to split off one of the chocolate businesses in a way that would enable them to recognize the gain on these cocoa beans without paying 50% federal taxes. So I went to the meeting in Brooklyn, and nobody was there except one guy – I was 24 and he was 29, and it was Jay Pritzker.

Jay gave me a lecture or really a lesson on the tax code. I could have gone to graduate school for years and never learned as much as he taught me that day. Later we actually bought the Marmon Company, which after some other transformations grew from what was once Rockwood.

Marmon, among other things, developed the car that won the first Indianapolis Speedway race and invented the rear view mirror. At the Indianapolis 500, they used to have two people in the car – one to look back and see what the other racers were doing and one to drive. When our guy got sick, they invented the rear view mirror. So if you want to see what’s going on in the laboratories of Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve got people working on things like the rear view mirror.

GREG ABEL: A friend did call. Peter Eastwood, who runs one of our Berkshire subsidiaries and does a great job, tracked down that Portillo’s is owned by a private equity firm called Berkshire Partners. So that was the basis of the question, but it’s not associated with Berkshire Hathaway. So, we got to the bottom of that one.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s just a sample of the way we operate around here.

8. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自杰西卡·普纳,她说:“您长期以来一直是美国顺风和美国韧性的坚定信奉者,历史证明了您是正确的。如今,美国似乎正在经历重大且潜在的革命性变化。一些投资者现在开始质疑美国例外论的概念。在您看来,投资者对美国经济是否过于悲观,还是这个国家确实正在进入一个需要从新角度重新评估的根本性变化时期?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我想说杰西卡——我认为她是我在年报中提到的一位经理人的继孙女——问了一个好问题。美国自建国以来就一直在经历重大和革命性的变化。我提到过,我们最初是一个农业社会,有着很高的承诺,但我们并没有很好地兑现。我们说人人生而平等,然后我们写了一部宪法,将黑人算作五分之三的人。在第2条中,你会发现男性代词使用了20次,没有女性代词。所以直到1920年,通过第19条修正案,才最终赋予女性投票权——这是我们早在1776年就承诺过的。

我们始终处于变革的过程中,我们总能找到各种各样批评这个国家的理由。但我一生中最幸运的一天是我出生的那一天,因为我出生在美国。当时,世界上大约3%的人口出生在美国。我只是幸运,而且我还幸运地生来是白人,等等。

如果你认为美国自从我1930年出生以来没有变化,那你就没有注意。我们经历过各种事情——大衰退、世界大战、原子弹的发展,这在我在出生时是无法想象的。所以我不会因为我们没有解决已经出现的每一个问题而感到气馁。

如果我今天即将出生,我会在子宫里不断谈判,直到他们允许我出生在美国。我们都相当幸运。我们这里有两位非美国出生的先生,现在都住在美国。

原文

8. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Jessica Pune who says, “You’ve long been a strong believer in the American tailwind and the resilience of the United States, and history has proven you correct. Today, the US appears to be undergoing significant and potentially revolutionary changes. Some investors are now questioning the concept of American exceptionalism. In your view, are investors being overly pessimistic about the US economy or is the country indeed entering a period of fundamental change that requires a reassessment from a new perspective?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that Jessica, who I believe is the step-granddaughter of one of our managers that I mentioned in the annual report, asks a good question. America has been undergoing significant and revolutionary change ever since it was developed. I mentioned that we started out as an agricultural society with high promises that we didn’t deliver on very well. We said all men were created equal, and then we wrote a constitution that counted blacks as three-fifths of a person. In Article 2, you’ll find male pronouns used 20 times and no female pronouns. So it took until 1920, with the 19th amendment, to finally give women the vote that we had promised back in 1776.

We’re always in the process of change, and we’ll always find all kinds of things to criticize in the country. But the luckiest day in my life is the day I was born, because I was born in the United States. At that time, about 3% of all births in the world were taking place in the United States. I was just lucky, and I was lucky to be born white, among other things.

If you don’t think the United States has changed since I was born in 1930, you’re not paying attention. We’ve gone through all kinds of things – great recessions, world wars, the development of the atomic bomb that we never dreamt of when I was born. So I would not get discouraged about the fact that we haven’t solved every problem that’s come along.

If I were being born today, I would just keep negotiating in the womb until they said I could be in the United States. We’re all pretty lucky. We’ve got two non-United States guys here who now live in the US.

9. 现场观众提问

现场观众(区域4):你好,巴菲特先生。我叫丹尼尔,来自新泽西州特纳弗莱。首先,我只想说我非常感激有机会向您提问。在谈到您的投资原则时,您经常谈到耐心的重要性。在您的投资生涯中,是否曾有过打破这一原则、快速行动反而让您受益的情况?谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:这是个好问题。有时你必须迅速行动。事实上,我们赚了很多钱,因为我们愿意比任何人都行动得快。

杰西卡·普纳是我们的一位经理本·罗斯纳的继孙女。1966年,我接到纽约一个叫菲尔·斯坦伯格的人的电话。他说:“我代表安嫩伯格夫人。我们有一家生意想卖给你。“所以我打电话给查理,了解了一些细节,听起来非常有趣。

查理和我去了威尔·斯坦伯格在纽约的办公室——他是个很棒的人。他代表安嫩伯格夫人处理事务,她的丈夫曾是本·罗斯纳的合伙人,但他去世了,本对于和她合作变得有点紧张。

所以他把这家生意以优惠的价格卖给了我们——600万美元。它拥有200万美元的现金,费城市场街价值200万美元的房产,而且每年税前利润200万美元。

本·罗斯纳也在那里,他对与他合伙人的遗孀做生意感到不安。她非常富有。他对我和查理说:“我为你们经营这个生意到12月31日,然后我就走了。“查理和我走到走廊里,我说:“如果这家伙年底辞职,你可以扔掉我读过的每一本心理学书。”

那开始了一段美好的关系。我们买下了公司,并建立了很好的合作伙伴关系。东部的人们心里对中西部人有一种刻板印象。本的第一任妻子来自爱荷华州,他就觉得任何来自中西部的人都挺好。

当你与一个想把价值600万美元的生意卖给你,而这个生意有200万美元现金、几百万房地产、每年赚200万美元的人打交道时,诀窍是此刻你不想有耐心。你想在等待偶尔接到电话时有耐心。我的电话总有一天会响,带来一些让我惊醒的事情。你永远不会知道它什么时候会发生。

这让一切变得有趣。所以耐心是耐心的结合,以及如果在当天下午有机会到来时愿意采取行动。你不应该对做有意义的交易有耐心,也不应该对那些跟你谈论永远不会发生的事情的人非常有耐心。

格雷格·阿贝尔:在你保持耐心的同时,据我所知——我想这对阿吉特和我们所有的经理也是如此——在我们寻找机会的同时,正如你提到的,我们想要快速行动,但永远不要低估为了准备快速行动而进行的大量阅读和工作。我们知道当机会出现时,无论是股票还是私人公司,我们都准备好行动,而耐心的一大部分就是利用这段时间做好准备。

沃伦·巴菲特:当然,机会不会以任何均匀的流量出现。这是你能从事的最不均衡的活动。主要的事情是你必须愿意在5秒钟后挂断电话,也必须愿意在5秒钟后说是。在这个行业里,你不能充满自我怀疑。

最大的乐趣之一——事实上是这个行业最大的乐趣——就是让人们信任你。这就是为什么我在94岁还在工作,尽管我拥有的钱多得数不过来。这对我的生活方式或我的孩子们如何生活等等没有任何意义。

但查理和我都非常享受人们信任我们这一事实。六十或七十年前,他们就在我们管理的合伙企业中信任我们。我们从未寻找过专业投资者加入我们的合伙企业。在我的所有合伙人中,我从未有过任何一个机构——我从不想要机构。我想要的是个人。我不想要那些每三个月坐在那里听报告、被告知他们想听的话的人。我们得到了这样的结果,这就是为什么我们有了今天在座的这群人。

这一切都很成功。但在该行动的时候,你不要有耐心——你要在当天就把它搞定。

原文

9. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 4): Hi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Daniel and I’m from Tenafly, New Jersey. First of all, I just want to say how grateful I am for getting the opportunity to ask you a question. When it comes to your principles of investing, you often talk about how important it is to be patient. Has there ever been a situation in your investing career where breaking that principle and acting fast has benefited you? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a good question. There are times when you have to act fast. In fact, we’ve made a great deal of money because we’re willing to act faster than anybody around.

Jessica Pune is the step-granddaughter of Ben Rosner, a manager of ours. In 1966, I got a call from a fellow named Phil Steinberg in New York. He said, “I represent Mrs. Anenberg. We have a business we’d like to sell you.” So I called Charlie up, got a few details, and it sounded very interesting.

Charlie and I went to Will Steinberg’s office in New York – he was a marvelous guy. He was handling things for Mrs. Anenberg, whose husband had been the partner of Ben Rosner, but he had died, and Ben got kind of tense about working with her.

So he offered us this business at a bargain price – $6 million. It had $2 million of cash, a $2 million piece of property on Market Street in Philadelphia, and it was making $2 million a year pre-tax.

Ben Rosner was there, and he was upset about doing business with his partner’s widow. She was extremely wealthy. He said to me and Charlie, “I’ll run this business for you until December 31st, and then I’m out of here.” Charlie and I went out in the hallway, and I said, “If this guy quits at the end of the year, you can throw away every book on psychology I’ve ever read.”

That began a wonderful relationship. We bought the company and had a great partnership. People in the East had a stereotype in their mind of what people from the Midwest were like. Ben had been married first to a woman from Iowa, and he just figured that anybody from the Midwest was okay.

The trick when you get in business with somebody who wants to sell you something for $6 million that’s got $2 million of cash, a couple million of real estate, and is making $2 million a year, is you don’t want to be patient at that moment. You want to be patient in waiting to get the occasional call. My phone will ring sometime with something that wakes me up. You just never know when it’ll happen.

That’s what makes it fun. So patience is a combination of patience and a willingness to do something that afternoon if it comes to you. You don’t want to be patient about acting on deals that make sense, and you don’t want to be very patient with people talking to you about things that will never happen.

GREG ABEL: As you’re being patient, I happen to know – and I think that goes for Ajit also and all our managers – while we’re looking at opportunities and as you touched on, we want to act quickly, but never underestimate the amount of reading and work that’s being done to be prepared to act quickly. We know that when the opportunity presents itself, whether it be equities or private companies, we’re ready to act, and that’s a large part of being patient – using the time to be prepared.

WARREN BUFFETT: And of course it doesn’t come in anything like an even flow. It’s the most uneven sort of activity you could get into. The main thing is you have to be willing to hang up after 5 seconds and you have to be willing to say yes after 5 seconds. You can’t be filled with self-doubt in this business.

One of the great pleasures – it is the great pleasure actually in this business – is having people trust you. That’s really why I work at 94 when I’ve got more money than anybody could count. It means nothing in terms of how I’m going to live or how my children are going to live or anything else.

But both Charlie and I just enjoyed the fact that people trusted us. They trusted us 60 or 70 years ago in partnerships we had. We never sought out professional investors to join our partnerships. Among all my partners, I never had a single institution – I never wanted an institution. I wanted people. I didn’t want people who were sitting around having presentations every three months and being told what they wanted to hear. That’s what we got, and that’s why we’ve got this group here today.

It’s all worked out. But you don’t want to be patient when the time comes to act – you want to get it done that day.

10. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自危地马拉的股东弗拉维奥·蒙特内格罗。几年前在这次会议上,贾因先生概述了GEICO在现代化和整合IT系统方面面临的重大挑战。当时也提到,由于使用远程信息处理技术,竞争对手在定价策略方面处于领先地位。现在,GEICO的扭亏为盈通过强劲的定价和运营改进显而易见。能否请您详细说明在托德的领导下采取了哪些具体行动,以及这些变化将如何帮助在未来几年维持长期竞争优势?

阿吉特·贾因:托德在扭转运营方面做得非常出色。当他接手时,GEICO在两个方面落后于竞争对手。首先,我们一直使用的术语是”使费率与风险匹配”,其次是远程信息处理。大约五六年前,我们在远程信息处理方面处于垫底的位置。从那时起,我们取得了快速的进步。远程信息处理曾经是我们的竞争劣势来源,现在已不再是,而且我认为GEICO的远程信息处理今天与其他任何公司一样好。

在使费率与风险匹配方面,同样,我认为我们已经赶上了竞争对手,并且在这个领域我们和其他人一样出色。所有这些,加上托德因成本削减努力而获得大量赞誉——他基本上将员工减少了2万人。从大约5万人开始,他将这个数字降到了3万人,这相当于每年至少节省20亿美元。

所以所有这些都使GEICO成为一家更有竞争力的公司。以至于在过去的七个季度中,GEICO的合并比率都是以8开头的。我从没想过我能活着看到有人能拥有像现在这样低的合并比率。GEICO做得非常出色——其80%的合并比率意味着它在个人汽车业务承保方面创造了最大的利润。

我们取得了很多成就,但我不想傲慢地说”任务完成”。我们取得了很大成就,但我仍然认为我们在技术方面还有很多工作要做。人工智能将是一股巨大的力量,我们需要处于准备就绪的状态。

沃伦·巴菲特:这是一个迷人的案例研究,这就是整个商业游戏如此有趣的原因——每个案例都略有不同。它们都有某种挑战,但也有机遇。

我们在1976年为GEICO的一半股权支付了5000万美元。现在我们拥有100%,第一季度我们赚的20亿美元的50%是10亿美元,相对于5000万美元的投资,在一季度内是20比1。这需要很多年的发展,但有趣的是,汽车保险保单——120年前甚至还不存在——是财产意外险中最大的险种。它非常庞大。

阿吉特·贾因:我只想补充一点,除了承保利润,GEICO还提供了290亿美元的浮存金。

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,当你花了5000万美元买到一个给你290亿美元免费使用的业务,而且在此基础上还给你一个季度10亿美元的利润,这一点并不不重要。

汽车保险的有趣之处在于,我们销售的产品与1936年公司成立时一样。我们只是在定价上更加复杂。创始人来自USAA,他判断政府雇员(GEICO的全称是政府雇员保险公司)是比平均水平更好的驾驶员。他不是精算师,但他做出了这个观察,离开了USAA,用几十万美元创办了GEICO。他在第一年和第二年都从承保中赚了钱。

这不是那种有10年虚假会计的公开募股交易——他只是定价以赚取利润,而自1936年以来一直如此。保单看起来很像当时的保单。这个巨大的领域在我们周围兴起,而且仍在增长。没有人喜欢买保险,但他们确实喜欢开车。

GEICO是一个迷人的故事。多年来,这家公司大约有三次以某种方式偏离了轨道,然后又回归基本。这是一项精彩的业务。

我们曾在这个年会上展示过来自洛里默·戴维森的消息。1951年1月,当我周六去参观时,他是大楼里唯一的人。结果发现他们周六在华盛顿不工作,我敲门直到一个看门人最终让我进去。我对看门人说:“除了你,这里有没有我可以交谈的人?“他没有在意。他说:“嗯,六楼有一个人,“一个叫洛里默·戴维森的人为我做了很棒的事情。

在生活中,你会遇到一些人,他们只是戏剧性地改变了你的人生,你得到了一些好运。如果有过那么几次,你会珍惜它们。在伯克希尔的董事会我们也有过这样的人——汤姆·墨菲、桑迪·戈特斯曼、沃尔特·斯科特、比尔·斯科特——我们结交了一辈子的财富,他们都是合适的人,拥有不可思议的才能,和他们一起工作很有趣,总是做得比别人多。在一个周六的下午有机会与洛里默·戴维森交谈,你只需仔细倾听。这属于”翻遍每一页”的范畴。你只在生活中变得幸运,而你想利用你的幸运。

原文

10. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Flavio Montenegro, a shareholder from Guatemala. A couple of years ago in this meeting, Mr. Jain outlined the significant challenges GEICO faced in modernizing and integrating its IT systems. It was also mentioned that competitors were ahead in their pricing strategies because of the use of telematics. Today, Geico’s turnaround is evident through strong pricing and operational improvements. Could you provide more details on the specific actions taken under Todd’s leadership and how those changes will help sustain a long-term competitive advantage in the coming years?

AJIT JAIN: Todd has done a great job in turning around the operations. When he took over, there were two major issues that GEICO was behind its competitors on. First, the term we’ve been using is “matching rate to risk,” and second, telematics. We were at the bottom of the list in telematics about five or six years ago. Since then, we have made rapid strides. Telematics, which used to be a source of competitive disadvantage to us, is no longer so, and I would argue that our telematics at GEICO is about as good as anyone else’s today.

In terms of matching rate to risk, there again, I think we have caught up with our competitors and we’re as good as anyone else in the field. All this, together with the cost reduction effort that Todd gets a lot of credit for – he has basically reduced the workforce by 20,000. Starting with around 50,000, he’s brought it down to 30,000, which translates to at least $

标题:2025年股东大会

第二部分/第四部分

人们可以研究经济学,可以有各种各样的安排,但归根结底,如果你拥有控制货币的人,你可以发行纸币,或者像几个世纪前那样进行货币贬损。总有一些人,由于其工作的性质——我并非特意指责他们是特别邪恶的人——但政府的自然趋势是随着时间的推移使货币变得一文不值。这会产生重要的后果,并且很难在系统中建立制衡机制来防止这种情况发生。

原文

People can study economics and you can have all kinds of arrangements, but in the end, if you’ve got people who control the currency, you can issue paper money or engage in clipping currencies like they used to centuries ago. There will always be people who, by the nature of their job – I’m not singling them out as particularly evil – but the natural course of government is to make the currency worthless over time. That’s got important consequences, and it’s very hard to build checks and balances into the system to keep that from happening.

我们在这里看着人们试图确保自己不会承担财政风险时所发生的一切,觉得很有意思。这场游戏没有结束,也永远不会彻底结束。如果你查一下二战后的几次恶性通货膨胀,那只是一份永无止境的名单,而同样的名字不断出现。

原文

We’ve had a lot of fun here watching what happens when people try to make sure they aren’t running fiscal risks. That game isn’t over and never will be over in finality. If you look up the great inflations of post-World War II, it’s just a list that goes on forever, and the same names keep popping up.

所以货币价值是一件可怕的事情,而我们没有很好的体系来战胜这一点。我们在这个特定的日本头寸上做到了,因为我们预计会持有它50年或100年甚至更久,并且我们将会持有以日元计价且易于预测的资产。只要利差合适,我们就会尝试发行日元计价的负债,但这并非因为我们关心季度或年度收益。

原文

So currency value is a scary thing, and we don’t have any great system for beating that. We do in this particular Japanese position because we expect to hold it for 50 or 100 years or more, and we’ll be owning something denominated in yen and easily predictable. As long as the carry on it is right, we’ll attempt to issue Japanese-denominated liabilities, but that’s not because of anything we care about in terms of quarterly or annual earnings.

格雷格·阿贝尔:关于这个问题,毫无疑问,我们在根本上对于投资这五家日本公司感到非常安心,并且认识到我们是在以日元进行投资。我们能够以日元借款这一事实,几乎只是一个不错的额外机会。但我们对这些日本公司以及我们最终将以日元实现的货币本身都感到非常满意。

原文

GREG ABEL: Relative to the question, there’s no question we were fundamentally very comfortable with investing in the five Japanese companies and recognizing we’re investing in yen. The fact we could then borrow in yen was almost just a nice incremental opportunity. But we were very comfortable both with the Japanese companies and with the currency we would ultimately realize in yen.

沃伦·巴菲特:我们只做过一次大的外汇押注,这与我为《财富》杂志写那篇文章时有点关联。我们做多了其他12种货币——我只记得其中四五种是真正的主要货币。当我说我们做多时,意味着我们做空美元。我们持有那个头寸几年时间,并从中赚了数十亿美元,这对当时的我们来说意义重大,现在也是如此。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: We only made one big currency play, which was connected a little bit with when I wrote that article for Fortune. We went long 12 other currencies – I remember only four or five of them are really big currencies. When I say we got long, that means we’re short the dollar. We held that position for a couple years and made several billion dollars on it, which was significant to us then and still is.

查理总是觉得,如果要在股票之外选择一个投资领域——他对债券、房地产和其他东西也了解很多——他认为自己可以在外汇上赚很多钱。但我们只做过一次。我们不能说绝无可能再做一次,但这不太可能。

原文

Charlie always felt that if he had to pick an area outside of stocks in which to invest – and he knew a lot about bonds, real estate, and other things – he thought he could make a lot of money in foreign currency. But we’ve done it once. It’s not inconceivable we would do it again, but it’s unlikely.

美国可能会发生一些事情,让我们想要持有大量其他货币。我想,如果我们对某个欧洲国家进行了一笔非常大的投资,可能会出现我们用其货币进行大量融资的情况。但这并非一项常规活动。在日本的情况下,这是一个显而易见的选择,因为我们能够以非常低的持有成本借款,并且我们对将从这些证券中获得的收入感觉非常好。

原文

There could be things happen in the United States that would make us want to own a lot of other currencies. I suppose if we made some very large investment in a European country, there might be a situation where we would do a lot of financing in their currency. But it’s not a regular activity. It was something that was obvious to do in the Japanese situation where we had the ability to borrow at a very low carrying cost, and we felt very good about the income we’d be receiving from these securities.

如果目前的状况——它们并不会,它们从未如此——持续几十年,我们可能会继续做同样的事情。但世事变化,所以不要把这当作一个预测。

原文

If the present conditions, which they won’t – they never do – prevail for decades and decades, we would probably keep doing the same sort of thing. But things change in the world, so don’t take that as a prediction.

13. 观众提问

观众(6区):早上好,沃伦,格雷格,阿吉特。非常感谢你们举办这次活动。很高兴来到这里。我叫达什·博亚尔,来自伟大的国家蒙古。介绍一下我的国家背景:蒙古是一个新兴市场,是一个被俄罗斯和中国夹在中间的内陆国家。但我们拥有丰富的历史和矿产资源,实行充分的民主,经济也在增长。

原文

13. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 6): Good morning Warren, Greg, and Ajit. Thank you so much for hosting this event. Good to be here. My name is Dash Boyar and I’m from the great country of Mongolia. A little background about my country: Mongolia is an emerging market and landlocked country sandwiched between Russia and China. But we are rich in history and minerals and have full democracy and a growing economy.

上周,我们在纽约举办了第二届年度蒙古投资者大会,以吸引像您这样的投资者。我知道您会非正式地会见并向韩国、中国和印度等政府领导人提供建议。对于像蒙古这样的新兴市场的政府和商业领袖,您有什么建议来吸引像您这样的机构投资者?如果您有长期计划将新兴市场作为对冲或机会性投资,那就太好了。最后,我欢迎各位到蒙古来,如果你们能参加今年七月的经济论坛,我的同胞们会非常高兴。

原文

Last week, we hosted our second annual Mongolia investor conference in New York to attract investors like yourself. I know you meet and give advice informally to government leaders such as South Korea, China, and India. What advice would you give to government and business leaders of emerging markets like Mongolia to attract institutional investors like yourself? It’d be great if you have long-term plans for exposure to emerging markets as a hedge or an opportunistic investment. Lastly, I welcome all of you to Mongolia, and my country folks would be very happy if you can make it to our economic forum this July.

沃伦·巴菲特:我连去康瑟尔布拉夫斯(离这里只有几英里)都计划不好。但还是谢谢你的邀请。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I have trouble planning a trip to Council Bluffs, which is just a few miles from here. But thank you for the invitation.

实际上,大约20多年前,我在这里的年会上遇到过一个在蒙古做了很多事的人。他在那里做得非常好,实际上还在那里住了相当长一段时间。

原文

I actually met a fellow here at the annual meeting about 20 years ago or more who did a lot in Mongolia. He did very well there and actually moved there for quite a while.

如果你想给那里的政府提建议,那就是要随着时间的推移建立起货币稳健的声誉。我们真的不想进入任何一个我们认为存在显著恶性通货膨胀风险的國家。那太难判断了。其他人在恶性通胀情况下找到了赚钱的方法,但那不是我们的游戏,我认为我也玩不好。所以这对我们来说是一个考虑因素。

原文

If you’re looking for advice to give the government over there, it’s to develop a reputation for having a solid currency over time. We don’t really want to go into any country where we think there’s a significant probability of runaway inflation. That’s too hard to figure. Other people have figured out ways to make money in hyperinflationary situations, but that’s not our game, and I don’t think I’d play it well. So that would be a factor for us.

除此之外,我们很可能不会在蒙古找到符合我们规模要求的投资机会。但就像我说的,我认为我20年前在这里认识的那位朋友在蒙古做得非常好。

原文

The chances are we won’t find anything in Mongolia that fits our size requirements aside from that. But like I say, I think my friend that I met here 20 years ago has done very well in Mongolia.

如果这个国家建立起商业友好和注重货币稳定的声誉,那对这个国家的居民来说是个好兆头,特别是如果它有一些可以依托的自然资源。我对其矿产之类的东西了解不多,但1790年时谁会押注于美国呢?

原文

If the country develops a reputation for being business-friendly and currency-conscious, that bodes very well for the residents of that country, particularly if it has some natural assets that it can build around. I don’t know that much about the minerals there or anything of the sort, but who would have bet on the United States in 1790?

我们不必完美无缺。我们只需要在相当长一段时间内比对手好就行。我们最初一无所有,最终却占到了全球GDP的近25%,拥有更快的增长率、总体更稳健的货币以及各种优势。所以我祝你一切顺利。

原文

We didn’t have to have perfection. We just had to be better than the other guy for quite a while. We started out with nothing and ended up with close to 25% of the world’s GDP, faster growth rates, generally sounder currencies, and all kinds of things. So I wish you well.

14. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自新泽西的彼得·沈,是问巴菲特先生和贾恩先生的。近年来,像黑石、阿波罗和KKR这样的大型私募股权公司大举进军保险业,筹集永久资本,管理浮存金,旨在复制伯克希尔几十年前开创的模式。鉴于这些公司现在直接竞争保险资产,通常使用更高的杠杆和更激進的投资策略,您如何看待它们对伯克希尔保险业务和承保纪律的影响?您认为私募股权模式是否给整个金融体系的保单持有人带来了风险?这种竞争是否使得伯克希尔如今更难安全、有利地寻找和定价保险机会?

原文

14. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Peter Shen in New Jersey. It’s for Mr. Buffett and Mr. Jain. In recent years, large private equity firms like Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR have aggressively expanded into insurance, raising permanent capital, managing float, and aiming to replicate the model that Berkshire pioneered decades ago. Given that these firms are now directly competing for insurance assets, often using higher leverage and more aggressive investment strategies, how do you view their impact on Berkshire’s insurance operations and underwriting discipline? Do you believe that the private equity model poses risks to policyholders in the broad financial system, and has this competition made it more challenging for Berkshire to find and price insurance opportunities safely and profitably today?

阿吉特·贾恩:问题的一部分很容易回答。毫无疑问,私募股权公司已经进入了这个领域,我们在这个领域已经不再具有竞争力。我们过去在这个领域做了相当多的业务,但在过去的三四年里,我认为我们一个交易都没做成。

原文

AJIT JAIN: Part of the question is very easy. There’s no question the private equity firms have come into the space, and we are no longer competitive in the space. We used to do a fair amount in this space, but in the last 3-4 years, I don’t think we’ve done a single deal.

你应该把整个领域分成两部分:财产意外险业务和人寿险业务。你提到的那些私募股权公司都非常活跃在人寿险领域,而不是财产意外险领域。

原文

You should separate this whole segment into two parts: the property casualty end of the business and the life end of the business. The private equity firms you mentioned are all very active in the life end of the business, not the property casualty end.

你正确地指出了这些私募股权公司在杠杆和信用风险方面承担的风险。只要经济表现良好且信用利差较低,这些公司就把资产从非常保守的投资转向那些能获得更高回报的投资。只要经济好、信用利差低,它们就能赚钱——由于杠杆作用,它们会赚很多钱。

原文

You are right in identifying the risks these private equity firms are taking on both in terms of leverage and credit risk. While the economy is doing great and credit spreads are low, these firms have taken the assets from very conservative investments to ones where they get a lot more return. As long as the economy is good and credit spreads are low, they will make money – they’ll make a lot of money because of leverage.

然而,总是存在一种危险,即在某个时候,监管机构可能会变得不满,说它们代表保单持有人承担了太多风险,这最终可能导致糟糕的结局。我们不喜欢这种情况下提供的风险回报比,因此我们举了白旗,并表示目前我们无法在这个细分领域竞争。

原文

However, there is always the danger that at some point the regulators might get cranky and say they’re taking too much risk on behalf of their policyholders, and that could end in tears. We do not like the risk-reward that these situations offer, and therefore we put up the white flag and said we can’t compete in this segment right now.

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为有些人想要复制伯克希尔的模式,但他们通常不想通过同时复制CEO将其所有资金永远留在公司里的模式来实现。他们有不同的考量——他们对别的东西感兴趣。这就是资本主义,但他们面临完全不同的情况,并且可能对其所做之事有着不同的受托责任感受。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I think there are people that want to copy Berkshire’s model, but usually they don’t want to copy it by also copying the model of the CEO having all of his money in the company forever. They have a different equation – they’re interested in something else. That’s capitalism, but they have a whole different situation and probably a somewhat different fiduciary feeling about what they’re doing.

有时候这行得通,有时候行不通。如果行不通,他们会继续做别的事情。如果我们在伯克希尔做的事情行不通,我会在生命的最后时光里为自己所创造的一切感到后悔。所以这完全是不同的个人考量因素。

原文

Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t work. If it doesn’t work, they go on to other things. If what we do at Berkshire doesn’t work, I spend the end of my life regretting what I’ve created. So it’s just a whole different personal equation.

没有哪家财产意外险公司能够从根本上复制伯克希尔。一开始并非如此——一开始我们只有距离这里几英里远的国民保险公司,任何人都可以复制我们所拥有的。但那是在1986年阿吉特加入我们之前,从那时起,其他家伙就应该放弃了。

原文

There is no property casualty company that can basically replicate Berkshire. That wasn’t the case at the start – at the start we just had National Indemnity a few miles from here, and anybody could have duplicated what we had. But that was before Ajit came with us in 1986, and at that point the other fellows should have given up.

15. 观众提问

观众(7区):嗨,我叫玛丽。我来自马萨诸塞州的梅尔罗斯。感谢您今天抽出时间。作为一个像我这样对投资感兴趣的年轻人,我很想听听您的见解,巴菲特先生。您职业生涯早期学到的重要教训是什么?对于那些希望形成自己投资理念的年轻投资者,您有什么建议?谢谢。

原文

15. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 7): Hi, my name is Marie. I’m from Melrose, Massachusetts. Thank you for the time today. As a young person interested in investing like myself, I would love to hear your insights, Mr. Buffett. What were some pivotal lessons you learned early in your career? And what advice do you have for young investors who are looking to develop their investment philosophy? Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特:这些问题问得好。你和谁交往极其重要。不要指望你在这方面每个决定都是正确的,但你人生的进程大体上会朝着你共事、钦佩并成为朋友的那些人的方向前进。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Those are good questions. Who you associate with is just enormously important. Don’t expect that you’ll make every decision right on that, but you are going to have your life progress in the general direction of the people that you work with, that you admire, that become your friends.

我提到过几个在过去几年去世的朋友。这些人都是那种,即使我们合伙做的事情只有伯克希尔的万分之一大小,你也会选择与他们共事的人。他们是那些让你想要变得比自己更好的人。你想和比你优秀的人、你觉得比你优秀的人待在一起,因为你会在你交往的人的影响下前行。

原文

I mentioned a few fellows that have died in the last couple years. All of those people were people that, if we were working together on something one-ten-thousandth the size of Berkshire, they’d be the kind of people you’d choose. They’re people that make you want to be better than you are. You want to hang out with people that are better than you are and that you feel are better than you are because you’re going to go in the direction of the people you associate with.

这是你以后才会学到的东西——直到你年纪更大一些,才很难真正体会到其中一些因素的重要性。但是,当你身边有像汤姆·墨菲、桑迪·戈特斯曼和沃尔特·斯科特这样的人时,你的生活肯定会比那些随便找一个赚了很多钱的人并决定模仿他们过得好。

原文

That’s something you learn later in life – it’s hard to really appreciate how important some of those factors are until you get much older. But when you’ve got people around you like Tom Murphy and Sandy Gottesman and Walter Scott, you’re just going to live a better life than if you just go out and look at somebody that’s making a lot of money and decide you’re going to try and copy them.

我也会尝试与聪明人交往,从他们那里学到很多,并且我会尝试寻找那份即使我不需要钱也会去做的工作。你一生中真正在寻找的是这样一份工作:即使你不需要钱,你也会去做。而我已经拥有这样一份工作很久了。

原文

I would try to be associated with smart people too where I could learn a lot from them, and I would try to look for something that I would do if I didn’t need the money. What you’re really looking for in life is something where you’ve got a job that you’d hold if you didn’t need the money, and I’ve had that for a very long time.

我提到的所有那些人也都如此,他们总是承担超出自己份额的工作,但从不索取超出自己份额的功劳。他们的行为方式正是你希望任何同事都应有的样子。当你找到他们时,你要珍惜;当你找不到时,你仍然要继续做那些能让你维持生计的事情。但不要放弃四处寻找,你会找到那些为你做出美妙事情的人。

原文

All the fellows I named had it, and they also always did more than their share and never sought more than their share of the credit. They behaved the way you’d like anybody you work with to behave. When you find them, you treasure them, and when you don’t find them, you still keep doing whatever enables you to eat. But you don’t give up on looking around, and you will find people who do wonderful things for you.

我早些时候提到去GEICO,在门锁着的时候敲门。谁知道门后面是什么?但十分钟内,我发现遇見了一位将对我非常有帮助的人。当然,如果有人愿意帮助你,你也应该想方设法帮助他们。这样你就会得到善意和良好行为的复利。不幸的是,在生活中你也可能遇到相反的情况。

原文

I mentioned earlier going down to GEICO and knocking on the door when the door was locked. Who knows what was behind that door? But in 10 minutes, I found that I had a man that was going to be just wonderfully helpful to me. And of course, if somebody’s going to be helpful to you, you want to try to figure out ways to be helpful to them. So you get a compounding of good intentions and good behavior. Unfortunately, you can get the reverse of that in life, too.

我很幸运,有一个良好的环境来过这种生活,而其他人则面临着完全不同的环境需要去克服。但如果你拥有好运,不要为此感到内疚。如果你生活在美国,世界上有80亿人,美国有3.3亿人,你已经很大程度上赢得了这场游戏。继续充分利用它。

原文

I was lucky in having a good environment for living that kind of life, and other people have a whole different environmental situation they have to overcome. But don’t feel guilty about your good luck if you’ve got it. If you live in the United States, with 8 billion people in the world and 330 million in the United States, you’ve already won the game to a great degree. Just keep making the most of it.

你不应该与那些要求你做你不该做的事情的人或企业为伍。不同的职业会吸引不同类型的人。对我来说有趣的是,在投资行业,这么多人在赚了一大笔钱后就离开了。你真正需要的是那种不管你是否需要钱都会坚持下去的事情。

原文

You don’t want to associate with people or enterprises that ask you to do something that you shouldn’t be doing. Different professions select for different types of people. It’s interesting to me that in the investment business, so many people get out of it after they’ve made a pile of money. You really want something that you’ll stick around for whether you need the money or not.

格雷格不需要钱,阿吉特也不需要钱——一点也不需要——但他们享受自己所做的事情,而且他们做得非常出色。我有幸随着时间的推移看到了这一切是如何运作的。

原文

Greg doesn’t need the money, Ajit doesn’t need the money – not remotely – but they enjoy what they do and they’re so damn good at it. I’ve had the advantage of seeing how that works over time.

我所认识的最优秀的经理——谁是最好的竞争很激烈——实际上是老汤姆·墨菲,他活到了将近98岁。我从未见过有人能像墨菲那样激发他人的潜能。如果你想成为一个更好的人,你会愿意为汤姆·墨菲工作。各种各样成功的人并不具备这种特质。我并不是说这是成功的唯一途径,但我认为这肯定是最令人愉快的成功之道。

原文

The best manager I ever knew – and there’s a lot of contention for who that would be – but actually was Tom Murphy Sr., who lived to almost 98. I’ve never seen anybody who could get the potential out of other people more than Murph. If you wanted to become a better person, you’d want to work for Tom Murphy. There are all kinds of successful people that don’t bring that to the party. I’m not saying that’s the only way to succeed, but I think it’s the most pleasant way to succeed for sure.

伯克希尔的经历非常引人注目——与桑迪·戈特斯曼从1963年合作到几年前他去世,与沃尔特·斯科特合作了30年——你真的不可能错过。你会一直学习,不仅学习如何在商业上成功,也会学习如何成功地生活。

原文

The Berkshire experience is pretty dramatic – to operate with Sandy Gottesman from 1963 until he died a couple years ago, Walter Scott for 30 years – you really can’t miss it. You’ll learn all the time, but you’ll not only learn how to be successful at business, you’ll learn how to be successful at life.

所以这就是我的建议。而且出于某种原因,显然你也会活得更久。这太神奇了——我提到的这些人,包括我自己。我认为一个快乐的人比那些做着自己并不真正欣赏的事情的人活得更久。

原文

So that’s my recommendation. And for some reason, apparently you live longer too. It’s pretty amazing – these people I’m talking about, including myself. I think a happy person lives longer than somebody that’s doing things they don’t really admire that much in life.

16. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:第一季度于3月31日结束,数据显示伯克希尔的现金储备较去年年底有所增加。但最大的市场动荡发生在4月。今天出席年会的苏格兰股东马丁·迪瓦恩想知道:最近的市场波动是否为伯克希尔带来了机会?马丁在大概40分钟前刚刚补充写道,您提到伯克希尔最近几乎投资了100亿美元,他想知道您能否再多谈一点。

原文

16. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: The first quarter ended March 31st and it did show that Berkshire’s cash pile expanded from the end of the last year. But the greatest market turmoil came in April. Martin Devine, a shareholder from Scotland who is attending the meeting today, wants to know: has the recent market volatility presented Berkshire with opportunities? And Martin just wrote in an addendum in the last 40 minutes or so, pointing out that you mentioned Berkshire almost invested $10 billion recently and wanting to know if you could talk more about that.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,对于第二部分我可以给你一个很好的回答,那就是不能。不过,100亿美元无论如何也起不了那么大的作用。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can give you a good answer to the second part, which is no. But $10 billion wouldn’t have done that much anyway.

过去30到45天、100天,不管这段时间是什么,发生的事情其实根本不算什么。自从我们收购伯克希尔以来,伯克希尔的股价在相当短的时间内下跌了50%——这种情况发生过三次。公司本身在任何时候都没有根本性的问题。这次并不是一个大变动。

原文

What has happened in the last 30-45 days, 100 days, whatever this period has been, is really nothing. There have been three times since we acquired Berkshire that Berkshire has gone down 50% in a fairly short period of time – three different times. Nothing was fundamentally wrong with the company at any time. This is not a huge move.

1929年9月,道琼斯指数为381点,后来跌到了42点。这相当于从100跌到了11。这次不是什么戏剧性的熊市或类似的情况。我经历过大约17,000或18,000个交易日。有太多的时期与此截然不同。

原文

The Dow Jones average was at 381 in September of 1929 and got down to 42. That’s going from 100 to 11. This has not been a dramatic bear market or anything of the sort. I’ve had about 17,000 or 18,000 trading days. There have been plenty of periods that are dramatically different than this.

我出生于1930年8月30日,当时道琼斯指数是240点。从那时到最低点,它从240跌到了41。所以如果有人觉得发生了什么真正重大的变化,其实并没有。如果它上涨了15%而不是下跌了15%,人们会非常平静地接受。但是,如果股票跌了15%与否对你来说有区别,那么你需要一种稍微不同的投资理念,因为世界不会适应你,而是你必须适应世界。

原文

When I was born on August 30, 1930, the Dow Jones was at 240. Between that and the low, it went from 240 to 41. So if people think there’s been a really major change, there hasn’t been. If it had gone up 15% instead of down 15%, people would take that with remarkable grace. But if it makes a difference to you whether your stocks are down 15% or not, you need to get a somewhat different investment philosophy because the world is not going to adapt to you. You’re going to have to adapt to the world.

在未来20年里,你们一定会看到一个与以往相比让你“头皮发麻”的时期。这种事情只是周期性发生。世界会犯大错,惊喜也会以戏剧性的方式出现。系统越复杂,惊喜就越可能来自意想不到的地方。

原文

You will see a period in the next 20 years that will be a “hair curler” compared to anything you’ve seen before. That just happens periodically. The world makes big mistakes, and surprises happen in dramatic ways. The more sophisticated the system gets, the more the surprises can come out of left field.

这是股票市场的一部分,如果你有合适的气质,这是一个值得你投入精力的好地方;如果你被下跌的市场吓到,在股市上涨时又兴奋不已,那么这绝对是一个糟糕的介入场所。我并不是想说得特别苛刻——我知道人们有情绪,但你在投资时必须把它们留在门外。

原文

That’s part of the stock market, and that’s what makes it a good place to focus your efforts if you’ve got the proper temperament for it and a terrible place to get involved if you get frightened by markets that decline and get excited when stock markets go up. I don’t mean to sound particularly critical – I know people have emotions, but you’ve got to check them at the door when you invest.

17. 观众提问

观众(8区):早上好,巴菲特先生,阿贝尔先生,贾恩先生。我叫彼得·陈,来自中国上海。这是我第一次参加股东大会。我想问一个关于生活智慧的问题。您在人生中是否遇到过重大挫折或低谷,您是如何度过并克服它们的?非常感谢。

原文

17. Question from audience

AUDIENCE MEMBER (ZONE 8): Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Abel, and Mr. Jain. My name is Peter Chen. I’m from Shanghai, China. This is my first time attending this shareholders meeting. I would like to ask a question about the wisdom of life. Have you ever encountered any major setbacks or low points in your life, and how did you get through and overcome them? Thank you very much.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,每个人都会遇到挫折。有些人在这方面运气特别差,而另一些人则只遇到相对较小的挫折就过去了。查理有挫折,我也有挫折——这是生活的一部分,而且一点也不好玩。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, everybody gets setbacks. Some people have particularly bad luck in that respect, and others get through with fairly minor ones. Charlie had setbacks, I had setbacks – it’s part of life, and they’re not any fun.

在你经历重大挫折时,我没有什么好的建议能让你过得开心,但它会与生活相伴。你死的时候当然是一个挫折,每个人都肯定会遇到这个。有些人运气特别差,有些人运气特别好。通常运气好的人并不认为那主要是运气,而是自己的原因,但你总会遇到挫折。

原文

I don’t have any great advice about having the time of your life while you’re having some major setback, but it comes with life. You certainly have a setback when you die, and everybody’s got that one guaranteed. Some people get extraordinary bad luck, and other people get extraordinary good luck. Usually the people who get good luck don’t really think it was so much luck as themselves, but you’re just going to have setbacks.

我想,现在你在医疗问题和生活中的各种事情上遭遇挫折的可能性更小了。你出生在一个好时代。如果你纵观整个中国历史,你会愿意出生在哪个时代?100年前,500年前,1000年前,还是现在?毫无疑问——你很幸运。

原文

I think you’re less likely to have setbacks now in terms of medical problems and various things in life. You were born at a good time. If you look all the way through the history of China, when would you rather have been born? 100 years ago, 500 years ago, 1,000 years ago, or now? It’s just hands down – you’ve been lucky.

如果我来自20代都是牧羊人的家族,我想我会厌倦每天看羊。生活中的一切都变得如此美好。你必须意识到,你在子宫里待了几十万年,然后在正确的时间出现,这本身就是抽到了一支幸运签。

原文

If I came from 20 generations of shepherds, I think I’d get kind of tired of looking at sheep every day. Everything in life has been made so much better. You’ve got to figure that you drew a lucky straw by staying in the womb for a couple hundred thousand years and then emerging at the right time.

所以我会专注于生活中美好的事物,而不是发生的坏事,因为坏事确实会发生。即使遇到一些倒霉事,生活也常常可以是美好的。到目前为止,我还没遇到这种情况,但我的一些朋友遇到过。

原文

So I would focus on the things that have been good in your life rather than the bad things that happen, because bad things do happen. It can often be a wonderful life even with some bad breaks. So far that really hasn’t happened with me, but it’s happened with some of my friends.

94年来,我一直想喝什么就喝什么。他们预言我会因此有各种可怕的后果,但还没发生。如果你看看职业运动员退役后的寿命,你很快就会觉得,如果你不是棒球队或篮球队里第一个被选上的,反而更好。

原文

For 94 years I’ve been able to drink whatever I want to drink. They predict all kinds of terrible things for me, but it hasn’t happened yet. If you look at the lifespan of professional athletes after a while, you really decide that you’re better off if you weren’t the first one chosen to be on the baseball team or the basketball team.

查理和我真的不怎么运动或做任何事——我们小心翼翼地保存体力,就是为了这些岁月。

原文

Charlie and I never really exercised that much or did anything – we were carefully preserving ourselves for these years.

尽可能看到事物积极的一面。你今天能在这里很幸运,你很健康,你从很远的地方来,有机会了解更多你感兴趣的东西。相比之下,几百年前你的处境会是怎样呢。

原文

Look at the bright side of things to the extent that you can. You’re lucky enough to be here today, you’re healthy, you’ve come from a long distance, and you’re getting a chance to learn more about something that interests you. Compare that with the situation a couple hundred years ago that you would have been offered.

18. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自希曼舒·宾达尔,是问阿吉特和沃伦的。自动驾驶汽车已经在美国城市的道路上行驶,无需驾驶员操作。沃伦和阿吉特如何看待这些自动驾驶汽车对GEICO汽车保险业务的潜在颠覆风险?GEICO的业务正是围绕理解和承保人类驾驶员建立的。我们今天所说的汽车保险,难道不会仅仅变成自动驾驶汽车和自动驾驶软件公司的产品责任险吗?

原文

18. Question from Becky

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Himanshu Bindal for Ajit and Warren. Autonomous vehicles are already driving across roads in American cities with no driver involvement. How do Warren and Ajit think about any disruption risk from these autonomous vehicles to GEICO’s auto insurance business, which is built around understanding and underwriting human drivers? Wouldn’t what we call auto insurance today just become product liability for autonomous vehicles and autonomous software companies?

阿吉特·贾恩:毫无疑问,一旦自动驾驶汽车成为现实,汽车保险将会发生巨大变化。最大的变化就是你指出的这一点。目前售出和购买的保险大部分都与操作员的错误有关——错误发生的频率、严重程度,以及我们因此应该收取多少保费。

原文

AJIT JAIN: There’s no question that insurance for automobiles is going to change dramatically once self-driving cars become a reality. The big change will be what you identified. Most of the insurance that is sold and bought revolves around operator errors – how often they happen, how severe they are, and therefore what premium we ought to charge.

如果这些新的自动驾驶汽车更安全,涉及的事故更少,那么对这类保险的需求就会减少。相反,它将被产品责任险所取代。因此,我们在GEICO以及其他地方当然都在努力为这种转变做好准备,即从为操作员错误提供保险,转向更倾向于为自动驾驶汽车制造过程中的产品错误以及错误和疏忽提供保护。

原文

To the extent these new self-driving cars are safer and involved in fewer accidents, that insurance will be less required. Instead, it’ll be substituted by product liability. So we at GEICO and elsewhere are certainly trying to get ready for that switch, where we move from providing insurance for operator errors to being more ready to provide protection for product errors and errors and omissions in the construction of these automobiles.

沃伦·巴菲特:我们预期所有业务都会发生变化。如果我满足于待在新英格兰的纺织行业——尽管它在此前大约70年里都运行良好——但世界会变。如果游戏不改变,那实际上就不会那么有趣了。如果你每次挥棒都能打出本垒打,或者每次击球都能一杆进洞,那就没意思了。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: We expect change in all our businesses. If I’d settled for being in New England textiles – even though it worked well for 70 years or so prior – the world changes. If the game didn’t change, it really wouldn’t be very interesting. If every time you swung at a baseball you hit a home run, or every time you hit a golf ball you had a hole in one, it wouldn’t be interesting.

事实上,你在前进过程中总会有需要思考的事情,而且你会犯错——这其实是乐趣的一部分。如果你时不时没有遇到一些问题,你的大脑就会变得迟钝。

原文

The fact that there will be things you have to think about all the time as you go along and you’ll make mistakes – that’s really part of the fun. Your brain would turn to mush if you didn’t have a few problems now and then.

汽车保险会发生变化,尽管在其相对较短的历史中变化之小令人惊讶。谁知道100年后我们的交通方式会是什么样?如果你回到几百年前,谁能预见到美国会是今天这个样子,人们会像现在这样出行、这样享受生活呢?

原文

Auto insurance will change, although it’s remarkable how little it has changed in its relatively short history. Who knows what we’ll be doing in transportation 100 years from now? If you go back a couple hundred years ago, who could have predicted the United States would look like what it does and people would move like they do and enjoy themselves like they do?

这是一个动态的世界。不幸的是,我们最需要担心的事情是,我们也学会了如何毁灭世界。我们拥有这个美妙的世界,但现在我们知道有八个国家——很可能第九个也即将出现——能够毁灭它,而且领导这些国家的不一定都是完美的人。

原文

It’s a dynamic world. The biggest thing we have to worry about, unfortunately, is that we’ve learned how to destroy the world too. We’ve got this wonderful world, but now we know there are eight countries – and probably a ninth coming – that can destroy it, and we don’t necessarily have the perfect people leading each of those countries.

当爱因斯坦在1905年提出E=mc²时,他并没有梦想过质量可以转化为能量,并以一种会改变世界的方式实现。我1930年出生时,人们已经知道爱因斯坦的物理定律25年了,但没有人想过它会对未来的战争产生什么影响。

原文

When Einstein came up with E=mc² back in 1905, he didn’t dream that mass could be converted into energy in a way that would change the world. When I was born in 1930, they had known about Einstein’s law of physics for 25 years, but nobody had thought about what it could do to change warfare in the future.

然后在1939年8月,罗斯福收到了历史上最著名的一封信,来自利奥·西拉德。西拉德无法让自己的信呈递给罗斯福,因为谁知道利奥·西拉德是谁?但他让爱因斯坦签了名。罗斯福对物理学的了解可能和我差不多,但他明白是爱因斯坦签了字。于是他叫来格罗夫斯将军,说:“我们应该对此做点什么。”我们所做的只是学会了如何毁灭世界。

原文

Then in August 1939, Roosevelt got the most famous letter in history from Leo Szilard. Szilard couldn’t get his letter in front of Roosevelt because who had heard of Leo Szilard? But he got Einstein to sign it. Roosevelt probably understood about as much about physics as I do, but he understood that Einstein signed it. So he called in General Groves and said, “We should do something about this.” All we did was learn how to destroy the world.

我们不得不这样做——德国有海森堡,他看起来领先于我们。我们无法把那个妖怪塞回瓶子里。世界在变化,我们有了美妙的东西,但我们也有一个拥有核武器的朝鲜人。朝鲜要核武器做什么?这能是件好事吗?但它们不会消失。

原文

We needed to do it – Germany had Heisenberg and he looked like he was ahead of us. We can’t put that genie back in the bottle. The world changes, and we’ve got wonderful things, but we also have a guy in North Korea with nuclear weapons. What does North Korea need nuclear weapons for? Can that be a good thing in the world? But they’re not going to go away.

所以这是一个变化的世界。我们正在享受令人难以置信的变化,这些变化使在座的每一个人都比几百年前的人们生活得好得多。但到目前为止,我们并没有太大改变人类本身。我们确实改变了大规模杀伤性武器,但我们在人类种族方面没有取得多少进步。我们会看看在这方面会发生什么。

原文

So it’s a world of change. We are enjoying incredible change that’s contributed to everybody in this room living so much better than people were living a couple hundred years ago. But we haven’t changed human beings very much so far. We’ve certainly changed weapons of mass destruction, but we haven’t made much progress with the human race. We’ll see what happens with that.

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标题:2025年年度股东大会

第三部分(共四部分)

原文

To take it to the last step – and Warren touched on this in general on energy policy – we have to work with our states and our regulators to ensure they understand this was never a risk we took on or envisioned when we were investing in utilities, nor would any of the investors who’ve invested in other energy companies.

You earn a very set return for taking on a very defined risk associated with that asset, and this has gone well beyond that. We don’t earn the type of returns nor can you earn a large enough return to take on these risks. So it’s not just solving the return side. We really have to solve the risk side, which means we work with our regulators and state legislators to get to the right answer. That’ll be an ongoing process. There are no silver bullets, but every day our teams across utilities are working hard to reduce that risk, recognizing the fundamental risk of the wildfires is not going away.

再进一步说——沃伦在能源政策方面也提到了这一点——我们必须与各州和监管机构合作,确保他们明白,这从来不是我们在投资公用事业时承担或预想过的风险,任何投资于其他能源公司的投资者也不会承担这类风险。

你通过承担与该资产相关的特定风险来赚取一个固定的回报,但这已经远远超出了那个范围。我们赚不到那种回报,也无法获得足够高的回报来承担这些风险。所以这不只是解决回报端的问题。我们真正需要解决的是风险端的问题,这意味着我们要与监管机构和州立法者合作,找到正确的答案。这将是一个持续的过程。没有灵丹妙药,但每天我们的公用事业团队都在努力降低这种风险,同时认识到野火的基本风险不会消失。

沃伦·巴菲特:有些问题是无法解决的,我们不应该拿投资者的钱去处理那些我们不知道解决方案的事情。你可以陈述论点,但当你面对州政府或联邦政府时,这是一个政治决定。

如果你在做一件会输的事,最好的办法就是退出。你可以尽可能好地陈述你的理由,但如果你最终无法掌握决定权,我们就没有资格拿你的钱去做蠢事。我们可以尽力解释什么是明智的做法,但这是你的钱。

很难说清楚如何处理那些在很多情况下最终要由法院裁决的政治决定。我们知道我们认为合理的制度应该是什么,我们应该解释清楚我们的想法,并尽力争取我们的立场,因为找到正确的解决方案对社会是有益的。但有些问题是无法解决的,我们不是要试图解决无解问题的。

当然,你的问题是,为你工作的人——那是他们的工作。所以他们想要有理由继续下去。如果你在管理,这些是艰难的选择,但这就是为什么他们需要有管理者。

格雷格·阿贝尔:我想补充一点,实际上,例如在公用事业和野火问题上,我们不能仅仅成为最后的保险人,去承担所有成本,无论发生了什么。这有点像我们目前面临的最大挑战——2020年野火的情况。

当时在一个困难时期发生了四起火灾。其中一起我们一直坚称是由闪电引起的,不在我们的服务区域内。大火烧进了我们的服务区域,通过法院的判决,我们实际上对这起火灾负责。我们仍然坚持认为我们不应为此负责——我们没有导致火灾,没有引发火灾,也从未觉得自己有任何贡献。但情况已经发展到,如果你看看那里的风险,我们必须处理类似的事情。

我们会挺过那场诉讼的。例如,我们很高兴地报告,在五年后,俄勒冈州林业局已经表示,我们确实处理并扑灭的其他火灾对那起火灾没有贡献。而那第四起火灾是四起中最大的一起——占了60%的索赔。我们花了五年时间才将那些信息提交给法庭。

这将勾勒出我们未来的法律策略,但这就是我们正在处理的事情。我们作为公用事业行业,继续从中学习。我们正在与每个州的立法者合作,确保明确界定责任归属、经济损害赔偿金额是多少,但最重要的是,非经济损害赔偿金额是多少。再次强调,我们的想法是,我们不能成为最后的保险人。我们不能对一个州内发生的所有事情都负责。

沃伦·巴菲特:如果我们想用自己的钱来做,我们可以做,但我们不会用你的钱去做我们认为愚蠢的事情。如果我们那样做,你应该甩掉我们。用别人的钱做蠢事比用自己的钱做蠢事更容易。这是政府普遍存在的问题之一——我们不想把它带到私营企业。

但美国有一个明智的能源政策很重要,就像在第二次世界大战期间,我们学会如何以极快的速度制造船只而不是汽车一样重要。我们找到了答案。我们将私营企业与政府的力量结合了起来。

但这事在民主国家有多可行呢——在二战期间,需要做什么是显而易见的,我们也做到了。但当你有3.3亿人都在争论自己的利益,而做决定的人往往是根据他们20年前的经验来反应,并且并不真正承担决定的责任时,事情就不那么清楚了。但不管怎样,这就是管理,我们会尽最大努力。

5. 观众提问

观众(第11区):大家好,我是Alitia Burk,来自波兰,但目前住在芝加哥。这个问题是代表一位我认识的、令人鼓舞的人Wid Ahmed提出的,他今天也在这里。

巴菲特先生,大约74年前,在1951年1月一个寒冷的星期六,你花了8个小时坐火车从纽约到华盛顿。你一路前往,只怀着希望,希望有人能教你更多关于保险行业的知识。到达GEICO办公室时,发现门锁着,你坚持不懈,直到一个看门人让你进去。你归功于那次与Lorimer Davidson的会面,带来了保险浮存金,那是伯克希尔成功的火箭燃料。

2011年,我15岁时,怀着类似的决心写信给你,请求见面。你好心地回信说,你只剩下大约3000天,还有更紧迫的事情要做。那么,巴菲特先生,自你回信以来,现在已经过去了5000天。受到你1951年的坚持和B夫人坚韧精神的启发,我谦卑地重新提出请求,只要求大卫给予你的时间的四分之一——在你的办公室里待一个小时。

你可能想知道为什么一定是你?你经常分享一个在奥斯维辛幸存下来的波兰犹太人的轶事,他曾对你说:“沃伦,我非常慢地结交朋友,因为当我看着一个人时,我会问自己,他们会藏匿我吗?”你说,愿意藏匿你的人的数量,是衡量一个活得好的人生最好的标准。那么,我相信在这次会议上,你拥有的不是4万名股东,而是4万个愿意藏匿你的人。你是一个活得极其精彩的人生的见证。

所以,我恭敬地再次请求,巴菲特先生,在“时间之父”获胜之前,你能答应给Wid Ahmed一个小时的时间,或者任何你能抽出的时间吗?

沃伦·巴菲特:我答应给这里的4万人每个人都一个小时。在我余下的生命里,我们会过得很愉快。

但我可以给你一个建议。我发现,在我非常年轻的时候,我会开车去全国各地的各种公司。因为我非常年轻,这些又是些非主流的公司,他们当时没有投资者关系部门,几乎每个CEO都会见我,因为他们觉得以后再也见不到我了。他们也不会接到这样的电话。

我会问他们两个问题。顺便说一句,这不是个坏主意——如果你要走进某人的办公室,说想要他们十分钟的时间,带一个沙漏,放在你谈话对象的桌子上,然后把它翻过来,让它走上十分钟。你说你会在十分钟后离开,除非他们要求你留下。这就设定了规则。

但一旦你做到了这一点,如果他们是做煤炭生意的(大约70年前,这正是我感兴趣的行业之一),你只需问他们一个问题:如果他们被困在荒岛上,在岛上的十年里只能持有一家竞争对手公司的股票,他们会选择哪一家,为什么?然后在他们给出答案后,你问同样的问题:如果他们要做空一家竞争对手公司的股票,会选择哪一家,为什么?

因为每一个经理都喜欢谈论他们的竞争对手。一谈起竞争对手,他们就像小学生一样。我可能通过确保他们觉得我不会待太久,同时让他们畅谈竞争对手,学到了更多关于各种行业的知识。那些日子里,我管住了自己的嘴。这是我在某处失传的一课。

坦白说,现在所有大型公司都把投资者关系部门化了。你们有3000家或多少家公司,每家公司都有部门,每个部门都有一个投资者关系部。他们的工作就是说,你今天能做的最好的事就是买我们的股票。嗯,整个概念完全是愚蠢的。但这是一门大生意,而且越来越大,投资者关系部也越来越大。这就是我们现在的状况。

但自己做一些功课,用自己的方式。伯克希尔·哈撒韦有大量的材料供你阅读。当你读完所有这些,你会比大多数在伯克希尔工作的人知道得多得多。所以,你不需要私人面谈。如果我们和可能在这里的4万人,再加上贝基的众多听众和观众每人花一个小时,那根本行不通。我佩服你的努力,但你只能满足于你得到的钦佩了。

6. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题你在上一个回答中已经以很多方式触及了,但我确实从几个人那里收到了这个问题,所以我想问一下。

长期股东Ricardo Bri(居住在巴拿马)说,他很高兴看到伯克希尔收购了BHE 100%的股权。这是分两步完成的:第一次是在2022年底——从格雷格·阿贝尔手中以8.7亿美元购买了1%的股份,意味着对BHE的估值为870亿美元;然后在2024年,从沃尔特·斯科特家族手中以39亿美元购买了剩余的8%股份,意味着该企业的估值为488亿美元。这第二次较大的交易在仅仅两年内估值下降了44%。

Ricardo写道,PacifiCorp的负债似乎太小,无法解释这一点。那么,是什么因素导致了BHE在这两个时间点之间的价值差异?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我们不知道我们会从PacifiCorp和已经做出的决定中损失多少,但我们也知道,那个特定例子所展示的某些态度,在整个公用事业系统中都有类似的情况。有很多州到目前为止运营情况非常好,而有些州现在,用查理的话说,运营起来就像老鼠药一样。

当我们在太平洋西北地区看到发生的事情时,这种认识被强化了,并且通过我们在其他一些情况下看到的公用事业公司受到的待遇而最终体现出来。所以,这不仅仅是PacifiCorp直接涉及的问题。这是对社会趋势的一种推论。

其次,我们在房地产业务中也做了一个完全没有预料到的决定。这类事情会改变价值,法院也可以改变价值。当你只持有有价证券时,做出这些决定要容易得多,而不是当你拥有企业时。我在70年里,观察了各个行业和公司发生的事情,已经做过很多这类决定了。

格雷格做出了退出(某些业务)的决定,我们对此没有意见。他对房地产业或公用事业领域将要发生的事情毫无预知。

我们没有出售任何业务的情绪。但根据社会因素,伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司现在的价值比两年前低得多。这在我们的一些业务中也会发生。我们的纺织业务肯定也是这样。公用事业业务现在不如几年前那么好了。

如果谁不相信这一点,他们可以看看夏威夷电力公司,看看爱迪生公司在加利福尼亚当前野火情况下的表现。有些社会趋势正在改变事物。

我刚刚在我的显示器上收到一条消息,说书现在已经卖完了。所以你只能把钱花在其他东西上了。

但这就是解释——价值会变,而且它们并不总是向上变。当我们与格雷格达成交易时,我们本来很乐意以那个价格收购斯科特家族的股份。而当我们与斯科特公司达成交易时,我们就不乐意支付格雷格当时获得的价格了。

但这就像伯克希尔的股票——我们在X价位回购股票,如果情况变了,我们会在低于X的价位回购。随着时间的推移,我们支付的价格越来越高,因为它在积累价值,但这并非一条直线。

我想说的是,我们现在收购公用事业公司的热情与几年前不同了。其他行业也会发生这种情况,但在公用事业领域尤其显著。在公用事业领域尤其显著,因为它们将需要大量资金。所以,如果你将需要大量资金,你可能应该采取一种鼓励人们给你大量资金的行为方式。

我们将拭目以待我们将走向何方。我们希望公用事业公司表现良好,但我们对伯克希尔的股东负有责任。

7. 观众提问

观众(第1区):亲爱的沃伦,亲爱的格雷格,亲爱的股东伙伴们,非常高兴来到这里。我的名字是Revy Paneida。我出生在共产主义时期的阿尔巴尼亚,但现在我在英国伦敦教授经济学。沃伦和查理精彩的著作极大地塑造了我的思维和教学。我非常感谢你们多年来提供的许多见解。

沃伦经常写到伯克希尔的盈利能力对股东的重要性。我的问题是,在您估计中,伯克希尔上一个财年的盈利能力是多少?如果您能评论一下与伯克希尔报告的净利润指标相比,有哪些重大项目是增加或减少了盈利能力的,那就太好了。谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我认为我们的基础盈利能力在不久前受到公用事业领域所发生事情的负面影响。我认为我们的盈利能力没有因为任何大型收购而扩大,但大型收购会定期出现。我们会在某个时候看到一些能增加盈利能力的事情。我的意思是,否则我们为什么要做收购?

这非常视情况而定,当然很大程度上取决于整体市场的走向、利率的走向以及心理因素的走向。我们会在人们最悲观的时候做成最好的交易。自从我1930年出生以来,一直如此。接下来的两年里,事情变得有吸引力得多,而显然我什么都没做——我搞砸了,可能是因为担心隔壁婴儿床里的孩子什么的。

在我的一生中,有时会得到极好的机会,它们之所以出现是因为人类就是人类。对于别人在财务上害怕的事情,我不会感到恐惧。如果伯克希尔下周下跌50%——我会认为这是一个绝佳的机会,而且我一点也不在乎。大多数人的反应不同。

并不是说我没有情绪,而是我对股票价格没有情绪。这些决定会直接传到我的大脑,而情绪则可能在别处卡住。

随着我们保留资金,伯克希尔将随着时间的推移增加其盈利能力。我们每天都在做决定。人们在努力工作。我们正在保留盈利。我们会建立盈利能力,但它不会以任何平稳的流到来。而且,它肯定不会与市场价格的上涨或下跌一一对应。但正是这一点让它成为一个好生意——投资生意就是,并非所有东西都被恰当评估,别人越是恐惧,你的机会就越好。

8. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自Achie Patel,是关于大型科技股的。在2017年的股东大会上,你说,沃伦,你真的不需要任何资金来运营这些公司,并称它们为理想的企业,指的是大型科技公司——苹果、Alphabet、微软和亚马逊。现在所有这些公司都宣布了围绕人工智能雄心的大量资本投资计划,你是否已经重新思考了上述关于它们轻资产的评论,以及你因此对它们的看法?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,不花钱赚大钱总是比花大钱赚大钱要好。

一个几乎不需要资本就能运营的企业——可口可乐,它的成品通过装瓶公司需要大量资本,但就销售糖浆或浓缩液而言,那并不需要太多资本。所以,一个是极好的生意,另一个则取决于具体情况。

可口可乐在每个地方都很受欢迎,但如果你在做装瓶生意,那需要真金白银。你有真正的卡车在外面,有各种机器和即将到来的资本支出。我们有一些需要很少资本却能产生很高资本回报率的业务。政客们谈论的那些获得高回报的企业,通常就资本而言,回报率并不高。

财产意外保险是一种罕见的业务,因为你需要资本作为保证基金来履行你的承诺,但你可以用它来购买其他低资本密集型的业务。你可以买入苹果公司,并用它来支撑那个业务。这可能是一个相当不错的生意,也是我们多年来表现良好的原因之一。

现在看看“七巨头”相比几年前,资本密集度有多高将会很有趣。基本上,苹果多年来确实没有真正需要任何资本,并且通过大规模减少流通股来回购股票。那个世界在未来是否一样,还有待观察。

好莱坞的答案总是从别人那里弄到钱来投入资本。在这个国家,很多人通过基本上弄清楚如何让别人提供资本而变得非常富有。这正是人们在资金管理行业所做的——他们变得非常富有,因为他们从别人的资本中提取费用。

顺便说一句,如果你们所有人去年都为伯克希尔支付1%的投资管理费,你们将为此支付80亿美元,而你们其实并不需要这样做。投资管理是一个非常棒的游戏,因为别人提供资本,无论他们表现好坏,你都向他们收费,然后如果他们表现好,你收取更多费用。对于从事这一行的人来说,这是一个设计精良的生意——谁能责怪他们呢?这就是资本主义。

我在所罗门兄弟工作时就看到了这一点,但我不需要亲眼看到。我知道它本来就存在。生活中的诀窍就是拿到别人的资本,并从中提取费用。查理和我在一段时间后认为这不是一个太优雅的生意。我们不是在批评它的效用——它只是在一段时间后不再吸引我们。不过,我确实做了12年。

查理和我和其他人之间的一个不同之处是,我们把自己所有的钱都投了进去。所以,我们确实用我们自己的资本分担了损失,但我们从别人的资本中提取了费用。人们取得了进步,他们从别人的资本中提取费用,而自己几乎不用投入任何资本。这是一个非常好的生意,但它可能导致很多滥用。

沃伦·巴菲特:美国的资本主义取得了前所未见的成功。但它是这个宏伟的“大教堂”(它产生了一个世界从未见过的经济)和一个巨大的“赌场”的结合体。

在赌场里,每个人都玩得很开心,有大量资金易手,但你必须确保大教堂也能得到滋养。现在,走向赌场的诱惑非常大,那里的人们说,我们有魔法盒子,各种能为你带来美妙事物的东西。那是人们最快乐的地方,那里有最多的承诺,那里有最多的钱给那些推销东西的人。

大教堂和赌场之间的平衡——在未来的100年里,美国确保大教堂不被赌场压倒是非常重要的。人们真的喜欢去赌场——只是有趣得多。当你赢的时候,他们会摇铃,给你饮料和其他一切。它旨在把钱从一个口袋转移到另一个口袋。

在大教堂里,他们设计着能为3亿多人生产商品和服务的东西,这是史无前例的。我们开发的这个系统很有趣,而且它很有效。它以一种看起来极其反复无常的方式分配奖励。认为人们在生活中得到他们应得的东西——这个论点很难站住脚。但如果你争辩说任何其他系统运作得更好,答案是,我们还没找到一个。

9. 观众提问

观众(第2区):嗨,我是Patrick Nester。我13岁,来自佛罗里达州坦帕市。我和我15岁的哥哥约翰以及我爸爸一起来的。谢谢你们主持这次会议。这是我第一次参加股东大会。我的问题是,哪一门高中课程或活动对你成为今天有史以来最伟大的投资者影响最大?

沃伦·巴菲特:你生活中的老师会对你产生难以置信的影响,其中很大一部分是正式的学校老师,但也有些是非正式的老师。我从某些雇主那里学到了很多。你真的希望你从你遇到的每一个善意且经验丰富的人那里学习。在这方面我有很多好运气。

我想说,我真正的幸运是我父亲在投资行业工作。所以我会在周六去他办公室,等着他去吃午饭,然后我会读一些别人从来不读的书。数字对我来说会说话,我永远也读不够。

然后我发现了公共图书馆,我读完了奥马哈公共图书馆里所有关于投资的书,真的是全部。我很喜欢学习这些。不像查理——如果查理读关于电力的书,他会想了解托马斯·爱迪生知道的一切,甚至更多,并且经历同样的思维过程,理解一切是如何运作的。我不关心它是如何运作的。我只关心它是否有效。这是一个局限——我在这里坦白,不是在吹嘘。

正如查理会说的那样,人们总是问,“如果你只能和一个人共进午餐,无论是活着的还是已故的,你会选择谁?”查理说,“我已经和他们都吃过午餐了,因为我读过他们所有的书。”

我认为拥有好奇心并找到有共鸣的老师非常有帮助。我在高中和大学都遇到过几位这样的老师。事实上,我可以说我上过三所不同的大学,高中在华盛顿上的,在每个地方我都找到了大约两三个真正杰出的人。我只花时间和他们在一起,不太关注其他课程。

我很幸运,很早就找到了适合我的东西。如果我的抱负是成为口技表演者或其他什么,那可能行不通。我只是花了无数个小时在投资上。

我不相信那本关于在一件事上花费一万小时的书。我可以花一万小时在踢踏舞上,如果你看我跳,你会吐的。但如果我花10个小时读本·格雷厄姆的书,读完后我会聪明得要命。

大脑真的很不同。我观察到很多优秀的桥牌选手、优秀的医生——人们真的有非常不同的才能。我认为你的大脑里应该有880亿个细胞。我不确定我所有的细胞都在闪烁亮光,但你和其他任何人都不同。这是我父亲过去经常告诉我的——你是与众不同的。可能在当下感觉不太好,但你会找到自己的路,在学校里你会找到愿意和你说话的人。

教书的人,总的来说,喜欢有一个对这门学科真正感兴趣的年轻学生,他们会额外花时间陪你。我就遇到过这种情况。我在哥伦比亚大学有格雷厄姆和多德。戴夫·多德基本上把我当儿子一样对待。但我对他们说的很感兴趣,他们觉得我这么感兴趣有点好玩,所以我会留意什么真正让你着迷。我不会试着去做别人。

你会在学校里找到老师,你会找到一些杰出的老师。我生命中至少有10个人对我产生了巨大影响,每个人都是正面的,因为在某种意义上,我可以选择。很多人真的喜欢帮助年轻人。我在学校发现了这一点,而且看起来有点迷茫、需要帮助的样子可能也有帮助。

我想说我的学校经历很好,但我更多地将其归功于个人,而不是机构。

10. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自俄勒冈州波特兰市的Scott Williams。他说:“你认为DOGE的净收益对美国的长期健康是正面的还是负面的?”

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为官僚主义是一种令人惊讶地普遍且具有传染性的东西,甚至在我们的资本主义体系中也一样,绝大多数大型公司,看起来很多都可以管理得更好。我确信伯克希尔在许多方面也是如此。而政府是终极形式。它真的没有对它施加的任何制衡。

这就是为什么在某种程度上,它让你对未来货币的走向感到恐惧,因为他们可以印钞票。如果人们通过向人民承诺各种事情而当选——这并不意味着他们对各种事情不真诚,但没有哪个政客会对有钱人说:“我真的觉得你有口臭,如果你不介意,请离我远点。”这种事根本不会发生。

我认为,如何控制政府收入和支出这个问题从未被完全解决,并且确实严重损害了许多文明。我不认为我们能免疫于此,而且我们已经接近过这个临界点。

我们目前的财政赤字,在很长一段时间内是不可持续的。我们不知道这意味着两年还是20年,因为从来没有一个像美国这样的国家。但正如著名经济学家赫伯特·斯坦所说,“如果某件事不能永远持续下去,它就会终结。”我们正在做一些不可持续的事情,而且它具有在某个点上变得不可控制的属性。

保罗·沃尔克阻止了这种情况在美国发生,但我们离得很近。我们多次接近过。美国仍然经历了非常严重的通货膨胀,但还从未失控过。这不是你想尝试去做实验的东西,因为它会自我强化。

我不想承担试图纠正美国收入和支出问题的职责,目前大约有7%的缺口,而可能3%的缺口是可持续的。你离那个数字越远,你就越接近失控开始的地方。这是一份我不想要的工作,但这是一份我认为应该完成的工作。而国会似乎不擅长做这件事。

作为一个国家,我们总是有很多问题,但这是我们自找的。我们拥有世界上从未见过的收入来源、资本生产机器、智慧生产机器。如果你选择一种搞砸它的方式,那将涉及货币。这已经在很多地方发生过。

从理论上讲,你应该让任何把事情搞砸的人承受巨大的不利后果,但并没有不利后果。只有有利可图。这在这个国家历史上、世界历史上最成功的公司中是个问题。

11. 观众提问

观众(第3区):你好,巴菲特先生。我叫Saskia,来自德国。首先,我想感谢你,因为你对我以及我所爱的人的生活产生了巨大影响,这是无价的。

巴菲特先生,想象一下现在是1776年,你与本杰明·富兰克林坐在一起,帮助塑造一个新国家的基础。你会倡导哪些核心经济原则来建立一个公平、有韧性、充满机会驱动的资本主义社会——一个支持子孙后代长期繁荣的社会?

沃伦·巴菲特:这是个好问题,但我可能会对本·富兰克林说:“你继续思考,别跟我说话,因为你会想出比我更好的主意。”他是一个非常了不起的人。他几乎可能是最后一个几乎了解这个国家活动各个方面的人。

他发明了各种各样的东西。顺便说一句,我们谈论复利的力量——他留下一份遗嘱,给费城留下一笔钱,给波士顿也留下一笔钱,作为复利力量持续两百年的例证。他远远领先于他的时代,如果我当时和他坐在那棵树下,我能做的最好的事情就是给他让路,让他继续思考。

他看到了成功可能给社会带来的问题,以及其他问题。如何处理80亿人的问题——因为我们无法将自己与世界其他地区分开。我们可以成为世界其他地区的榜样,我认为,既然我们在这个国家拥有所有这些好运,并且我们确实有一个相当不错的体系,那么我们应该做出榜样。

我不认为通过向世界说教,告诉他们你是那个应该告诉他们该如何生活的人,你能取得多大进展。你会招致一定的怨恨,因为就在几百年前,一群完全不同的国家在统治世界,现在你开始给他们提建议。我认为,当你刚刚赢得游戏时,却去对一群人进行说教,这在沟通或说服上是一个真正的错误。

我会建议本弄清楚如何赢得游戏,同时保持一定的谦逊。我会告诉他,试着设计一个系统,不要发明太多可以毁灭地球的东西——这些事物一旦问世就会变得无法控制。

我们当时除了开发原子弹别无选择,但拥有这种能力的人数从一个增加到八个,可能很快就要增加到九个,包括伊朗——这是社会根本无法承受的错误。解决九个变量的问题,而不是仅仅一个变量。

这完全可以理解——我父亲在原子弹首次使用时正在国会任职。令人惊奇的是,萨姆·雷伯恩是如何让众议院对此一无所知的,因为本来应该由他们来拨款。他们有435名国会议员,他们完全不知道他们是在为洛斯阿拉莫斯拨款,也不知道芝加哥或田纳西州在发生什么。

我们确实拥有一个远远超出本杰明·富兰克林梦想的社会。它正朝着解决某些问题的正确方向前进,我们做出了关于“人人生而平等”等问题的广泛宣言。然后我们做了我们做过的那些事,但总的来说,我们在朝着正确的方向前进。

但我们面临问题——我不知道本杰明·富兰克林会如何解决当大规模杀伤性武器落入多人手中时该怎么办的问题,以及当你本质上将世界视为一个存在赢家和输家的地方,而赢家羞辱输家并做出各种事情时怎么办的问题。

我会让更年轻得多的人去弄清楚答案。但这仍然是——最奇妙的,你无法梦想任何像美国已经发生的事情那样。所以,这是活着的最好地方和最好时代,遥遥领先。

想想几百年前,有人拔掉你几颗牙,把威士忌倒进你嘴里。那种勉强维持生活,尤其是在中西部——想象一下每年都要等到密苏里河结冰,才能看看你的马车能否过河,也许后面还有一个怀孕的女人。在我的一生中,积极性质的事情发生了多么惊人的变化。

问题是你如何保持它,如何改进它?我确实认为,这一切的根本是拥有一种不会被贬值的货币。如果货币贬值,会让所有信任其政府的人吃亏,而所有想办法从中获利的人变得更富有——我不认为你想要一个以这种方式运作的社会。

12. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题是问你的,格雷格。它来自一位名叫Jay Milroy的股东,他写道:“巴菲特先生对运营子公司采取放手的管理方式。你会如何描述你的方法?”

格雷格·阿贝尔:嗯,我们有我们的经理在那里,我想说回到2018年,能担任这个角色非常幸运,因为首先,我必须了解很多业务,毫无疑问,当沃伦购买这些业务时,他拥有那种全面的知识。

我绝对必须与每个经理接触,他们非常乐于分享他们的商业模式、方法、关于风险和机会在哪里的想法。而且我认为在我们经历这个过程时,毫无疑问我有问题并且想与他们互动。沃伦谈到好奇心在你经历事情时的重要性。

我的风格就是围绕他们的业务、他们的框架提出问题和意见。同时,他们拥有出色的业务,并且非常自主地运营,这一点保持不变。但如果有机会看到我在其他业务中可能见过的东西,或者我可能在他们行业中看到的机会,我们会讨论,看看这是否是我们应该追求的机会,或者我们是否恰当地处理了风险。

我发现我们所有的经理都完全愿意参与其中,并希望进行这样的对话。我想说这反映了我(的管理)方法。我还要说,当你想到我们的经理时,再次强调,他们非常自主。他们经营着自己的业务。他们比我将永远都要了解得更好。

但是,如果我看到一个机会,值得他们花时间与我们另一位经理交谈,比如Geico,他们经历了技术转型,他们不是唯一需要这样思考的人。我们希望确保合适的人相互交流,弄清楚我们如何从先前的经验中受益。

所以,我会说更主动一些,但希望是以一种非常积极的方式,而且我们有一个杰出的团队。所以,在我经历的那段时期里,结果异常出色。

沃伦·巴菲特:格雷格做得比我好得多,因为我就是不想像他那样努力工作,而我能够偷懒是因为我们有一个本质上不错的业务,非常好的业务,而且我不担心你会因为所有权以及我们表现相当不错的事实而解雇我。

但你能做得相当好,并不意味着你不能做得更好。而格雷格在很多事情上可以做得更好。很多人想要被管理,需要在管理上得到帮助。有些人不这样。有些人你只能让他们自己待着。

我们有这样的经理,开始给他们发号施令是疯狂的,因为他们会直接辞职。我不会责怪他们,因为我自己也是这样类型的人。但很多人确实欢迎指导和支持,特别是当他们从像格雷格这样的人那里得到指导时,格雷格自己就是这样生活的,而不是仅仅从高处发号施令:“这是你要做的”,而我自己去做别的事。一个管理者,其行为与他要求下属的行为不同——时间长了是行不通的。

而且人们想要一个他们钦佩的管理者,如果那些人口是心非,他们就不会钦佩他们。更容易的是——这是一件悲哀的事,但一个组织看到其质量向下滑坡比向上提升更容易。

我的意思是,如果老板行为不端,会导致所有人行为不端。这真的很有传染性。在上层管理中,向上提升的传染性没那么强。但如果管理者做了很多小动作来为自己谋利,很快,比如说你经营一家零售店,很快所有雇员或很多雇员就会告诉他们的朋友,他们在零售店有折扣,如果他们想要什么,他们会记在自己的账上,然后得到折扣。

一旦你开始向下偏离,它真的很有传染性,而且很难重建。所以,你真的需要一个在顶层行为端正、不为个人利益耍花招的人。我们有非常多经理人会不遗余力地避免做那种事。然后我们也有少数人会不遗余力地做那种事。如果你有足够多的公司,你会看到很多不同形式的行为,格雷格会对此采取行动,而我通常对此很松懈,但他在那方面做得比我好得多。

13. 观众提问

观众(第4区):你好,巴菲特先生和阿贝尔先生。我叫Kansas Lomire。我是Elkhorn South High School的一名高二学生,在奥马哈出生长大。我的问题是问格雷格·阿贝尔的。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦是美国第二大公用事业供应商,2025年路透社的一项调查发现,其燃煤机组是全美最脏的。目前没有具体的计划来退役煤电并完全过渡到可再生能源。我17岁。考虑到这一点,对于像我这样将要承受像伯克希尔这样的公司造成的气候变化后果的年轻人,你有什么话要说?

格雷格·阿贝尔:谢谢你的提问和评论,因为了解伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司以及它们如何运营很重要。也许以爱荷华州作为一个起始例子,因为我认为那是报告中引用的州之一。

我想说,在我们早期收购能源公司时,非常重要的一点——我回想我们1999年收购中美能源公司,伯克希尔在2000年收购了它。有一件事对我来说和我们的团队变得非常清楚,那就是我们在公用事业内部所做的事情,实际上是由两个方面驱动的。第一,我们绝对必须满足联邦层面制定的要求和法律,但最重要的是,我们必须认识到我们在这些州实施公共政策。

当我回顾爱荷华州时,那是一个有趣的对话。再次,报告将其列为重大问题。那是在21世纪初,爱荷华州作为公用事业公司,我们首次将面临电力短缺。所以,我们没有能源,我们与当时的州长进行了一次重要的讨论,真的坐下来谈:“你希望我们作为中美能源公司走向何方,你作为州希望拥有什么资源?”

当时,爱荷华州主要是一个以煤为基础的州。我们认识到这一点,显然并且从根本上个人视其为一种风险,但我们需要与我们的州进行对话,讨论今后如何管理。有趣的是,当我们早在21世纪初再次与州领导层进行那次对话时,我们明确决定希望继续拥有充足电力,也就是不会让我们的客户出现电力短缺。

我们讨论了资源类型,我记得一个非常清晰的对话,我们希望在各种能源来源之间保持平衡。当时,主要是煤和天然气,那时我们决定在爱荷华州建设美国最大的风电项目。

所以我们着手建设三个资源:一个燃煤电厂、一个燃气电厂,以及我们在中美能源公司拥有的第一个风电项目。再次强调,这与州的意愿非常一致。但我们也为此奠定了一些重要的基础,因为那时我们开始定义可再生能源、非碳资源的重要性,但这必须与州的意愿一致。

自那以后,我们继续在爱荷华州部署了160亿美元用于可再生能源。再次强调,这与我们州希望我们做的事情非常一致,也就是基本的政策。我们不能自己做出那个决定并直接花160亿。这是与我们的州长、立法者、监管机构共同完成的。

与此同时,我们有机会退役了10台燃煤机组中的5台。现在,正如报告所强调的,我理解人们希望剩下的5台燃煤机组也在这个时候退役,但想想我们已经部署了160亿美元来退役5台机组,这对我们的客户来说是一个非常不错的结果。

我们得以维持我们的电价。它们是全美最低的之一。所以,这一切做得非常高效。但现实是,我们仍然需要那5台燃煤机组来维持系统稳定。我们不能出现西班牙/葡萄牙那样的情况。

所以,我们绝对尊重意见。我们绝对尊重这个过程,并将继续与我们的每个州合作,确定他们想要规划的路径,我们努力确保有良好的平衡结果,因为我们认识到与其他人愿望相关的挑战。所以,我认为你会继续看到我们的公用事业公司实施与其利益相关者、客户需求一致的政策,同时始终尊重任何联邦标准的要求。

14. 贝基提问

贝基·奎克:这个问题来自Billy D. Ross。他写道:“巴菲特先生,作为一名来自纽约州的护士,我多年来一直努力为自己争取良好的健康保险,即使在前线拯救生命。在纽约,获取保险意味着要导航一个混乱的州营系统,感觉它就是为了让人不堪重负而设计的。”

“我很好奇是什么最终导致了你与摩根大通和亚马逊的医疗保健合资企业的结束,并且鉴于你对价值和长期思维的承诺,你是否会考虑再次审视美国的医疗保险改革?”

沃伦·巴菲特:我们花费接近——很难得到精确数字,但接近GDP的20%在医疗保健上。如果你回到1960年,当时有许多国家各自花费在5%左右。然后曲线开始急剧分化。但数学上的事实是,等式中只有100个百分点的比例没有改变。

所以我们尝试了与摩根大通和亚马逊的那个实验,我们三个人不知道答案,但在我这里,我认为用了一个说法,它是经济中的一条绦虫。我们还发现,这条绦虫在国家的每个角落都很活跃。我的意思是,医院喜欢它。医院有显赫的人士与人们合作。人们通常喜欢他们的医生,不喜欢这个系统。我说的是各种各样的事情,但最终,摩根大通、亚马逊和伯克希尔无法对改变那20%产生任何影响。

现在,那20%——只有100个百分点的比例可用,而其他国家花费6%或7%,并且可能利用我们的系统为自己谋利,这也是非常真实的。这是经济中巨大的一部分,而我们——它太根深蒂固了,以至于无法做出多少改变。

我们在上面花了一些钱,做了一些工作,对自己系统了解更多,我们看到了当前系统在多少人的生活中根深蒂固,无论是医疗保健提供者还是每个人。这些人不是恶人。我的意思是,他们只是在做自己工作,试图拯救生命。

但我们发现,无论是在加拿大、法国、英国还是其他地方,如果你看看我们的成本,它们就是高得多,并且在某种程度上,我们在补贴世界其他地方。人们会来美国做真正不寻常或具挑战性的医疗方面的事情,比如手术之类的。

但我们没有取得任何进展,到了某个点,政府——我的意思是它如此深地介入其中,健康对几乎所有人都如此重要,而我们无法——正如我对杰米和杰夫说的,我说,嗯,绦虫赢了。

当一个社会GDP的20%流入一个特定行业时,改变该行业的热情程度、该行业将拥有的政治力量——这并不意味着他们是邪恶的。只是每个人——他们最终都落到了那里。

所以,我不知道——我们得出的结论是我们不知道答案,我们三个人,我们有资金去做,但我们不知道如何改变3.3亿人对他们的医生、对我们的医疗保健、对他们感到有权得到什么的想法。

它不会自行改变,唯一能改变它的只有政府,而政府中能改变它的是得到435人和100人中多数支持的。我父亲在他一生中输掉过一次选举,在1948年,他是一个非常坚定的共和党人,在1950年他又回去打败了1948年击败他的那个人,他得到了医生们的支持。他们百分之百相信自己在做的事情。他们每天都在帮助别人。

在大流行期间,人们为拯救他人所做出的牺牲——简直不可思议。你能想象从事这样的工作吗?他们送来成打成打即将死亡的人,你努力保持自己的士气,并继续和他们一起工作。所以,你不能争论其重要性。

但我们的成本与世界任何其他国家都是如此不同,以至于这是一个巨大的因素,而我们是一个非常富有的国家。所以,我们可以做其他国家做不到的事情。通过我们选出的代表以及随着时间的推移各种各样的事情,我们发展出一个对任何重大改变都极其抗拒的系统,而且它在每一个它所处的社区中都很重要。

所以,我希望我们有一个答案给你,但我进去时有点悲观,出来时更悲观了一点。但我很高兴我们做了我们所做的,并在这个过程中了解到了我们自己的一些不足之处。所以,伯克希尔实质上物有所值,但我们没有杀死绦虫。

在这个国家试图改变政府的事情是一个有趣的命题,因为人们在选择进入政府并继续留在那里时会进行自我选择。在某种程度上,他们一路上不断做出他们不喜欢的决定,他们学会接受它们或将其合理化,或其他什么。

但它仍然是——这个国家比世界上任何国家都运作得好。所以,你不能说它是一个失败,但你不能说某些问题非常难以找到解决办法。当然,其中一个又回到我之前提到的财政问题,因为花钱容易,削减人们的收入难。

如果你当选了,你会对自己说,嗯,如果我留下来,我可以做更多的好事,然后如果我在这方面真的凭良心投票的话。所以,你在这里放弃一点,那里放弃一点,再那里放弃一点,最后你在镜子里认不出自己了。这就是——我在一个政治家庭长大,但我观察到人们的行为方式,他们的行为方式像人类一样,这是你必须期待的,而我的行为方式也像人类。

我们仍然设法以戏剧性的方式向前迈进。在这里生活比100年前或200年前好太多了。这是戏剧性的。所以,你不能说这个系统是失败的,但你可以说对它做出重大改变是非常困难的。

15. 观众提问

观众(第5区):嗨,沃伦,格雷格。我叫Pig Huang Chen。我来自台湾。这是我第七次来这里。首先,我要感谢你沃伦,感谢你慷慨地分享你的智慧和经验教训。你改变了我的生活,你是我的人生榜样和英雄。我的问题是,沃伦,你提到格雷格将来会负责资本配置,我想知道你的看法是,业务经营者更容易成为投资者,还是投资者更容易成为业务经营者?谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特:不,这是个好问题。我看到我们甚至叫他格雷格。谢谢你。我来回答——当经营者要难得多。我的意思是,确实如此。像我这样坐在房间里摆弄钱更容易。这只是更容易的生活。这并不意味着是更令人钦佩的生活。不是,但对我来说,这实际上是一种愉快的生活。所以,我一点也不抱怨。

而且我能够选择我的朋友,这对我的人生产生了巨大的影响。我从未为任何一个我真正不钦佩的人工作过。我的意思是,那是生活中的奢侈品。我为之工作过五个人,他们都棒极了,无论是当地彭尼百货公司的经理(以前就在离这里几英里的地方),还是报社经理,所有一切。我从未对我有过的任何一位老师真正失望过。

标题:2025年年度股东大会

第4部分/共4部分

但我必须承认,与作为企业经营者相比,我能够以极高的自由度选择如何度过每一天。在许多情况下,我不愿意为了竞争成为顶尖企业经营者而被迫接受某些行为方式。

我是主人。我是说,我已经处于这样一种位置,可以经营自己想要的类型的公司,这是一种极大的奢侈。

原文

But I have to admit that I’ve been able to choose what I do with my day to an extraordinary degree compared to being a business operator. And in many cases, I wouldn’t like to compete to be a top-notch business operator in terms of some of the behavior that might be forced upon me.

I am the master. I mean, I’ve found myself in this position where I can run the kind of company I want to run and that’s an extraordinary luxury.

16. 巴菲特卸任首席执行官

沃伦·巴菲特:我还有五分钟的提醒,所以我想花几分钟谈谈一个话题。

明天我们将召开伯克希尔的董事会会议,我们有11位董事。其中有两位董事是我的孩子,霍华德和苏茜,他们知道我接下来要讲的内容。至于其他人——这将是他们第一次听到。

我认为是时候让格雷格在年底成为公司的首席执行官了。我想以此给董事们一个惊喜,并将其作为我的建议提出。让他们有时间思考他们可能有的任何问题、结构或其他事宜,然后在几个月后的下一次会议上,我们将根据11位董事的意见采取行动。我相信他们会一致赞成。

这意味着,到年底格雷格将成为伯克希尔的首席执行官。我还会继续留在公司,在某些情况下可能有所帮助。但最终决定权将属于格雷格,无论是在运营、资本配置还是其他任何方面。

我认为,如果在某些方面遇到重大机遇或类似情况,我可能会有所帮助。我相信伯克希尔拥有特殊的声誉,即在政府遇到困难时,我们是资产而非负债,这是非常难得的,因为通常在这种时期,公众和政府对商业会非常负面。

但格雷格将掌握决策权。无论是收购事宜——我认为如果董事们知道我在身边,他们可能会更愿意在大型收购上赋予他更多权力。但格雷格将是首席执行官,就是这样。

计划是——而格雷格直到此刻听到才知道这事——董事会明天将能够向我提问更多关于他们应该思考的具体细节。他们将消化这些信息,然后在接下来的董事会上,如果他们采取行动,显然我们将向世界宣布这一重大变化,并将推进这一操作。

我会根据占卜板或任何结果来行事。但我没有任何意图,零意图,出售一股伯克希尔哈撒韦股票——这些股票将被捐赠出去。

我还要补充一点——保留每一股的决定是经济上的决定,因为我认为伯克希尔在格雷格的管理下的前景会比在我的管理下更好。也许将来我们会有机会投资大量资金,如果时机到来,我认为董事们知道我把所有钱都投在了公司,并且我认为这是明智之举,这可能会有所帮助。而且我亲眼目睹了格雷格的成就。所以这就是今天的新闻要点。感谢各位的到来。

观众反应中的热情可以从两方面解读。但我将其视为积极信号。谢谢。

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦 2024 年股东信