Table of contents
Open Table of contents
1988年致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东信
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
1988年，我们的净资产增加了5.69亿美元，增幅为20.0%。在过去24年（即自现任管理层接手以来），我们每股的账面价值从19.46美元增长到了2,974.52美元，年复合增长率为23.0%。
原文
Title: 1988 Letter
Part 1/2
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.
我们过去在报告中一直强调，真正重要的是内在商业价值——这是一个必然的估算值，表明我们所有组成业务的价值总和。根据我们的计算，伯克希尔的内在商业价值显著超过其账面价值。在这24年间，商业价值的增长速度略快于账面价值；然而在1988年，账面价值增长得更快一些。
原文
We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value—the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.
伯克希尔过去在账面价值和商业价值上的增长率，是在与现在截然不同的环境下实现的。任何忽视这些差异的人，都犯了一个与棒球经理相同的错误：他仅凭一名42岁中外野手的职业生涯打击率来判断其未来前景。
原文
Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.
影响我们当前前景的重要负面因素包括：(1) 股票市场的吸引力远低于过去24年的大部分时期；(2) 大多数形式投资收益的公司税率更高；(3) 收购企业的市场价格远高于以往；(4) 资本城/ABC公司、GEICO保险公司和华盛顿邮报公司——伯克希尔的三项永久性投资，约占我们净资产的一半——所处的行业状况，从略微到显著地不如五到十年前有利。所有这些公司都拥有卓越的管理层和强大的资产。但是，按当前价格计算，它们今天的上涨潜力在我们看来远不如几年前那么令人兴奋。
原文
Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company—Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth—that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.
然而，我们面临的主要问题是资本基础不断扩大。你们以前听我们提过这个问题，但这个问题就像年龄一样，每年都变得更加突出。（而且，就像年龄一样，让这个问题继续增长，要好过把它“解决掉”。）
原文
The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)
四年前我曾告诉你们，我们需要39亿美元的利润才能在未来十年实现15%的年回报率。今天，要在下一个十年实现15%的回报，则需要103亿美元的利润。对我以及伯克希尔的副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格来说，这似乎是一个非常庞大的数字。（如果这个数字确实过于庞大，芒格先生会在未来的报告中被追溯认定为资深合伙人。）
原文
Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)
作为对我们不断扩大的资本基础拖累回报率的部分抵消，我们现在拥有一个24年前所没有的非常重要的优势。那时，我们所有的资本都捆绑在一家经济特性不可避免地糟糕的纺织业务上。今天，我们的部分资本投资于一些真正卓越的企业。
原文
As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.
去年，我们将这些业务称为“七圣徒”：水牛城新闻报、费海默、柯比、内布拉斯加家具城、斯科特·费泽制造集团、喜诗糖果和世界百科全书。1988年，圣徒们列队而来。你们可以通过查看第45页按历史成本编制的财务报表，看到它们非凡的资本回报率，该报表将“七圣徒”与几个较小单位的数字合并在一起。在没有财务杠杆的情况下，这个集团的平均权益资本回报率约为67%。
原文
Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.
在大多数情况下，这些单位卓越的表现部分源于其非凡的业务特许经营权；在所有这些案例中，卓越的管理层都是一个至关重要的因素。查理和我所做的贡献就是不去打扰这些管理者。
原文
In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.
依我判断，这些业务总体上将继续产生卓越的回报。我们需要这些回报：没有它们的帮助，伯克希尔就没有机会实现我们15%的目标。你们可以放心，我们的运营经理们会交出满意的答卷；我们未来的不确定因素在于，查理和我能否有效地运用他们所产生的资金。
原文
In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.
在这方面，我们在1989年初朝着正确的方向迈出了一步，收购了奥马哈一家珠宝企业Borsheim’s 80%的权益。这项收购（信中稍后描述）完全符合我们的期望：一家由我们喜欢、钦佩和信任的人经营的杰出企业。这是开启新一年的绝佳方式。
原文
In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.
会计变更
我们进行了一项重大会计变更，这是1988年的强制要求，并且可能在1990年还需要进行另一项变更。当我们在不改变经济实质的情况下，逐年调整数字时，就有必要进行一次我们一贯“激动人心”的会计讨论了。
原文
Accounting Changes
We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.
首先，我要进行我惯常的免责声明：尽管公认会计原则（GAAP）有缺陷，但我并不愿意去设计一套更好的规则。然而，现有规则的局限性并不一定是障碍：CEO们可以自由地将GAAP报表视为其向所有者和债权人履行告知义务的起点，而非终点——他们确实应该这样做。毕竟，任何子公司的经理，如果向作为其老板的母公司CEO提交一份仅包含GAAP核心数据而遗漏关键信息的报告，他都会陷入麻烦。那么，CEO本人又有什么理由，向他的老板——公司的股东所有者们——隐瞒对其至关重要的信息呢？
原文
First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors—and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses—the shareholder-owners of the corporation?
需要报告的是数据——无论GAAP数据、非GAAP数据还是GAAP以外的数据——这些数据要能帮助具备金融素养的读者回答三个关键问题：(1) 这家公司大约值多少钱？(2) 它履行未来义务的可能性有多大？(3) 鉴于其已有的条件，管理层的工作做得有多好？
原文
What needs to be reported is data—whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP—that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?
在大多数情况下，从最低限度的GAAP报告中，要找到上述一个或多个问题的答案，难度介于困难与不可能之间。商业世界过于复杂，单一的一套规则无法有效地描述所有企业的经济现实，特别是像伯克希尔这样业务种类繁多的企业。
原文
In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.
使问题更加复杂的是，许多管理层并不将GAAP视为需要达到的标准，而是视为需要克服的障碍。而他们的会计师常常乐于提供帮助。（“二加二等于几？”客户问道。“您心里想的数字是多少？”合作的会计师答道。）即使是诚实和善意的管理层，有时也会略微“灵活运用”GAAP，以呈现他们认为能更恰当描述其业绩的数字。无论是对收益进行平滑处理，还是在某个季度进行“巨额冲销”，都是正直的管理层采取的“善意谎言”技巧。
原文
Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.
还有一些管理者积极利用GAAP进行欺骗和欺诈。他们知道许多投资者和债权人将GAAP结果奉为金科玉律。因此，这些骗子“富有想象力地”解释规则，并以技术上符合GAAP但实际上向世界展示经济幻象的方式记录商业交易。
原文
Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.
只要投资者——包括那些理应精明的机构——对那些稳步攀升的报告“利润”给予高估值，那么可以确定的是，一些管理者和推广者就会利用GAAP来产生这样的数字，无论真相是什么。多年来，查理和我目睹了许多规模惊人的会计欺诈案。很少有作恶者受到惩罚；许多人甚至未被谴责。用一支笔窃取巨款远比用一把枪窃取小钱安全得多。
原文
As long as investors—including supposedly sophisticated institutions—place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.
根据1988年GAAP强制要求的一项重大变更，我们必须将所有子公司的资产负债表和利润表进行完全合并。过去，互助储蓄与贷款公司和斯科特·费泽金融公司（一家主要为其世界百科全书和柯比产品的分期销售提供融资的信贷公司）是按“单行法”合并的。这意味着我们(1) 将它们合并后的净资产权益作为单笔资产列示在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表上，以及(2) 将它们合并后的年度收益中归属于我们的份额作为单行收入项目包含在合并利润表中。现在，规则要求我们将这些公司的每一项资产和负债都合并到我们的资产负债表中，并将它们的每一项收入和费用都合并到我们的利润表中。
原文
Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.
这一变更凸显了公司也需要报告分部数据：在传统财务报表中，合并的经济多元化的业务运营越多，这些报表的用处就越小，投资者回答前面提出的三个问题的能力也越低。事实上，我们在伯克希尔编制合并报表的唯一原因是为了满足外部要求。另一方面，查理和我则不断研究我们的分部数据。
原文
This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.
既然我们现在被要求将更多数字捆绑进GAAP报表，我们决定发布我们认为有助于你们衡量企业价值和管理层绩效的额外补充信息。（伯克希尔履行其对债权人义务的能力——我们列出的第三个问题——无论你们查看哪份报表，都应该是显而易见的。）在这些补充报告中，我们不一定遵循GAAP程序，甚至不一定遵循公司结构。相反，我们将尝试以有助于分析且不会用细节淹没你们的方式，对主要业务活动进行分组。我们的目标是以我们希望获得的方式向你们提供重要信息——如果我们的角色互换的话。
原文
Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors—the third question we listed—should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.
在第41-47页，我们分别显示了以下各项的合并资产负债表和利润表：(1) 我们从事金融类业务的子公司，即互助储蓄与贷款公司和斯科特·费泽金融公司；(2) 我们的保险业务，并逐项列示其主要投资头寸；(3) 我们的制造、出版和零售业务，排除了某些非经营性资产和购买价格会计调整；以及(4) 一个“其他”类别，包括(3)中公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是可流通证券）以及Wesco和伯克希尔母公司的各种资产和债务。
原文
On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
如果你们将这四个分部的利润和净资产相加，得出的总和将与我们的GAAP报表显示的总额一致。但是，我们想强调，我们新的列报方式不在审计师的职责范围内，他们绝不会为其背书。（事实上，他们可能会感到震惊；我不想问他们。）
原文
If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)
我之前提到预计在1990年进行的一项GAAP重大变更。这项变更涉及递延税款的计算，既复杂又具争议性——以至于其实施原定于1989年，但被推迟了一年。
原文
I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial—so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.
实施后，新规则将在多方面影响我们。最重要的是，我们被要求改变计算保险公司所持股票未实现增值对应的递延税款负债的方式。
原文
When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.
目前，我们的负债是分层的。对于追溯到1986年及更早年份、金额为12亿美元的未实现增值，我们按28%的税率计提了税款负债。对于此后累积的6亿美元未实现增值，则按34%的税率计提了税款负债。这一差异反映了1987年生效的税率提高。
原文
Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.
然而，现在看来，新的会计准则将要求我们在1990年按34%的税率设立全部负债，并将这部分费用计入当期利润。假设到1990年税率不变，这一举措将使我们在该年度的利润（以及由此导致的报告净资产）减少7100万美元。拟议的规则还将影响我们资产负债表上的其他项目，但这些变化对利润和净资产的影响较小。
原文
It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.
关于递延税款计算的这一变更是否可取，我们没有强烈意见。然而，我们应该指出，无论是28%还是34%的税款负债，都无法精确描绘伯克希尔的经济现实，因为我们没有计划出售那些为我们带来绝大部分收益的股票。
原文
We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.
对于那些对会计不感兴趣的股东，我为这篇冗长的论述道歉。我知道你们许多人并不仔细检视我们的数字，而是持有伯克希尔主要因为你们知道：(1) 查理和我将我们大部分资金投在伯克希尔；(2) 我们打算经营公司，使你们的收益或亏损与我们的直接成正比；以及(3) 迄今为止的记录令人满意。这种“信仰”式的投资方法本身不一定有问题。然而，其他股东更偏好“分析”方法，我们希望提供他们所需的信息。在我们自己的投资中，我们寻找的是两种方法都给出相同答案的情况。
原文
To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.
报告利润来源
除了向你们提供我们新的四部门会计资料外，我们还将像过去一样，继续列出伯克希尔报告利润的主要来源。
原文
Sources of Reported Earnings
In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings just as we have in the past.
在下表中，商誉摊销及其他主要的购买价格会计调整并未分摊到其所属的特定业务，而是汇总后单独列示。这一程序使你们能够看到，如果我们没有收购这些业务，它们的利润本应如何报告。我在过去的报告中解释过，为什么我们认为这种列报形式对投资者和管理者来说，比在逐业务基础上进行购买价格调整的标准GAAP列报更有用。当然，我们在表中显示的总净利润与经审计财务报表中的GAAP总额相同。
原文
In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
关于这些业务的更多信息，请参见第32-34页的“业务分部”部分以及第36-40页的“管理层讨论”部分。在这些部分中，你们还可以找到我们按GAAP口径报告的分部利润。关于Wesco业务的信息，我强烈建议你们阅读查理·芒格从第52页开始的信。其中包含了我所见过的最好的描述，解释了导致当前储贷危机的事件。另外，请特别关注戴夫·希尔斯特罗姆在Wesco子公司精密钢带仓库的表现。精密钢带在一个竞争极其激烈的行业中运营，然而戴夫始终能获得良好的投入资本回报率。尽管缺乏数据来证明这一点，但我认为，无论1988年还是过去几年，他的表现在同行中很可能排名第一。
原文
Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave Hillstrom’s performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past, would rank him number one among his peers.
| (千美元省略) | |||||||
| 税前利润 | 伯克希尔应占净利润（税后及少数股东权益后） | ||||||
| 1988年 | 1987年 | 1988年 | 1987年 | ||||
| 营业利润： | |||||||
| 保险集团： | |||||||
| 承保业务 | $(11,081) | $(55,429) | $ (1,045) | $(20,696) | |||
| 净投资收益 | 231,250 | 152,483 | 197,779 | 136,658 | |||
| 水牛城新闻报 | 42,429 | 39,410 | 25,462 | 21,304 | |||
| 费海默 | 14,152 | 13,332 | 7,720 | 6,580 | |||
| 柯比 | 26,891 | 22,408 | 17,842 | 12,891 | |||
| 内布拉斯加家具城 | 18,439 | 16,837 | 9,099 | 7,554 | |||
| 斯科特·费泽制造集团 | 28,542 | 30,591 | 17,640 | 17,555 | |||
| 喜诗糖果 | 32,473 | 31,693 | 19,671 | 17,363 | |||
| Wesco——除保险外 | 16,133 | 6,209 | 10,650 | 4,978 | |||
| 世界百科全书 | 27,890 | 25,745 | 18,021 | 15,136 | |||
| 商誉摊销 | (2,806) | (2,862) | (2,806) | (2,862) | |||
| 其他购买价格会计费用 | (6,342) | (5,546) | (7,340) | (6,544) | |||
| 债务利息* | (35,613) | (11,474) | (23,212) | (5,905) | |||
| 股东指定捐赠 | (4,966) | (4,938) | (3,217) | (2,963) | |||
| 其他 | 41,059 | 23,217 | 27,177 | 13,697 | |||
| 营业利润 | 418,450 | 281,676 | 313,441 | 214,746 | |||
| 证券出售 | 131,671 | 28,838 | 85,829 | 19,806 | |||
| 所有实体总利润 | $550,121 | $310,514 | $399,270 | $234,552 |
* 不包括斯科特·费泽金融集团的利息费用。
我们运营业务所取得的利润是卓越的，无论是按绝对值衡量，还是与竞争对手相比。对此，我们感谢我们的运营经理们：你们和我们都非常幸运能与他们共事。
原文
| (000s omitted) | |||||||
| Pre-Tax Earnings | Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | ||||||
| 1988 | 1987 | 1988 | 1987 | ||||
| Operating Earnings: | |||||||
| Insurance Group: | |||||||
| Underwriting | $(11,081) | $(55,429) | $ (1,045) | $(20,696) | |||
| Net Investment Income | 231,250 | 152,483 | 197,779 | 136,658 | |||
| Buffalo News | 42,429 | 39,410 | 25,462 | 21,304 | |||
| Fechheimer | 14,152 | 13,332 | 7,720 | 6,580 | |||
| Kirby | 26,891 | 22,408 | 17,842 | 12,891 | |||
| Nebraska Furniture Mart | 18,439 | 16,837 | 9,099 | 7,554 | |||
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group | 28,542 | 30,591 | 17,640 | 17,555 | |||
| See’s Candies | 32,473 | 31,693 | 19,671 | 17,363 | |||
| Wesco—other than Insurance | 16,133 | 6,209 | 10,650 | 4,978 | |||
| World Book | 27,890 | 25,745 | 18,021 | 15,136 | |||
| Amortization of Goodwill | (2,806) | (2,862) | (2,806) | (2,862) | |||
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges | (6,342) | (5,546) | (7,340) | (6,544) | |||
| Interest on Debt* | (35,613) | (11,474) | (23,212) | (5,905) | |||
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (4,966) | (4,938) | (3,217) | (2,963) | |||
| Other | 41,059 | 23,217 | 27,177 | 13,697 | |||
| Operating Earnings | 418,450 | 281,676 | 313,441 | 214,746 | |||
| Sales of Securities | 131,671 | 28,838 | 85,829 | 19,806 | |||
| Total Earnings—All Entities | $550,121 | $310,514 | $399,270 | $234,552 |
* Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group.
The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.
在伯克希尔，这样的合作关系会持续很久。我们不会仅仅因为明星球员达到了特定年龄，就将他们从阵容中移除——无论是传统的65岁，还是1988年光明节前夕达到95岁的B夫人。卓越的管理者是太稀缺的资源，不能仅仅因为蛋糕上插满了蜡烛就被抛弃。此外，我们与那些刚毕业的MBA们打交道的经验并不那么美好。他们的学术记录总是非常出色，候选人总是知道该说什么；但他们往往缺乏对公司的个人承诺和一般的商业智慧。让老狗学新把戏很难。
原文
At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age—whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.
以下是我们的主要非保险业务的最新情况：
-
在内布拉斯加家具城，B夫人（罗斯·布卢姆金）和她的手推车一直滚滚向前。她已经当了51年的老板，44岁时用500美元创办了这家企业。（想想如果她有1000美元会怎么做！）对于B夫人来说，老年总是还有十年之遥。
这家家具城长期以来一直是该国最大的家居用品商店，并且还在持续增长。秋季，该店开设了一个独立的2万平方英尺的清仓中心，进一步扩大了我们在各个价位提供优惠的能力。
最近，全国最成功的百货公司之一迪拉德百货进入了奥马哈市场。在其许多门店中，迪拉德设有完整的家具部门，并且在这一领域表现不俗。然而，在奥马哈开业前不久，该公司董事长威廉·迪拉德宣布，他的新店将不销售家具。他提到NFM时说：“我们不想和他们竞争。我们认为他们是最好的。”
原文
Here’s an update on our major non-insurance operations:
-
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She’s been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.
The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.
Recently Dillard’s, one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard’s runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: “We don’t want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.”
在水牛城新闻报，我们宣扬广告的价值，而我们在NFM的政策证明我们言行一致。过去三年，NFM一直是《奥马哈世界先驱报》最大的ROP广告客户。（ROP广告是印在报纸上的那种，与预先印好的插页广告相对。）据我所知，在其他任何主要市场，都没有一家家居用品店是报纸的主要客户。有时，我们还在远至得梅因、苏城和堪萨斯城的报纸上投放大幅广告——效果总是不错。只要你有值得提供的产品，做广告确实物有所值。
原文
At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City—always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.
B夫人的儿子路易，以及他的儿子们罗恩和欧文，组成了成功的布卢姆金团队。与这个家庭共事是一种乐趣。所有成员都拥有与他们非凡能力相匹配的品格。
原文
Mrs. B’s son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It’s a joy to work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.
-
去年我明确表示，《水牛城新闻报》的税前利润率在1988年将会下降。这个预测对几乎所有与我们规模相当或更大的报纸都将是正确的。但是斯坦·利普西——感谢他——成功地让我看起来像个傻瓜。
尽管去年我们的提价幅度略低于行业平均水平，并且我们的新闻纸成本和工资率与行业标准同步上涨，但斯坦实际上将利润率略微提高了。在报业，没有人的管理记录比他更好。此外，他是在经营一份为读者提供大量新闻的报纸的同时取得这一成就的。我们相信，我们的“新闻版面”比例——报纸用于新闻的比例——比任何其他与我们规模相当或更大的主导报纸都要大。1988年这一比例为49.5%，而1987年为49.8%。无论利润率水平或趋势如何，我们都致力于将其保持在50%左右。
查理和我从小热爱报纸业，自12年前收购《新闻报》以来，我们一直乐在其中。我们很幸运，在接手时就有一位一流的主编默里·莱特在场，从那时起，他一直让我们为这份报纸感到骄傲。
原文
-
Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey—bless him—has managed to make me look foolish.
Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our “newshole” percentage—the portion of the paper devoted to news—is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.
Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.
-
喜诗糖果在1988年销售了创纪录的2510万磅。10月底的前景看起来并不乐观，但出色的圣诞销量——远高于1987年创下的记录——扭转了局面。
正如我们以前告诉过你们的，喜诗的业务越来越集中在圣诞节。1988年，该公司在12月份赚取了创纪录的全年度利润的90%：在税前3250万美元中占了2900万美元。（这足以让你相信圣诞老人了。）12月份的业务洪流使伯克希尔的整体利润在当季出现适度增长。第一季度还有另一个小幅度增长，那时世界百科全书的大多数年鉴得以售出。
查理和我在收购喜诗大约五分钟后，就任命查克·哈金斯负责管理。回顾他的记录，你们可能会好奇我们为什么花了那么久才做出决定。
原文
-
See’s Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.
As we’ve told you before, See’s business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out of $32.5 million before tax. (It’s enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December’s deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire’s corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.
Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See’s about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.
-
在费海默，海尔德曼一家——鲍勃、乔治、加里、罗杰和弗雷德——是布卢姆金家在辛辛那提的翻版。家具零售和制服制造都不具备内在的吸引力经济学。在这些行业中，只有卓越的管理层才能带来高额的投入资本回报率。而这正是海尔德曼五兄弟所做的。（正如大都会队解说员拉尔夫·基纳有一次在比较投手史蒂夫·特劳特和他父亲、著名的底特律老虎队投手迪齐·特劳特时所说：“那个家族遗传因素很强。”）
费海默在1988年进行了一笔相当大规模的收购。查理和我们对海尔德曼家族把握商机的智慧充满信心，甚至没看一眼就批准了这笔交易。在任何地方，包括在《财富》500强的一流公司中，能让我们表现出类似信心的管理层也寥寥无几。
由于这次收购和内部增长，费海默在1989年的销售额应该有显著增长。
原文
-
At Fechheimer, the Heldmans—Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred—are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that’s exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: “There’s a lot of heredity in that family.”)
Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere—including those running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500—in which we would exhibit similar confidence.
Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.
-
由拉尔夫·谢伊管理的所有业务——世界百科全书、柯比和斯科特·费泽制造集团——在1988年都表现出色。委托给拉尔夫的资本的回报率持续异常优异。
在斯科特·费泽制造集团内部，其最大的子公司坎贝尔·豪斯菲尔德取得了尤其出色的进展。这家公司是美国中小型空气压缩机的领先生产商，自1986年以来利润增长了一倍多。
柯比和世界百科全书在1988年的单位销量都有显著增长，出口业务尤其强劲。世界百科全书于9月在苏联上市，当时该国最大的美国书店在莫斯科开业。我们是该店提供的唯一一部综合性百科全书。
拉尔夫个人的生产力令人惊叹：除了以出色方式管理19项业务外，他还活跃于克利夫兰诊所、俄亥俄大学、凯斯西储大学以及一家风险投资业务，该业务已催生了16家俄亥俄州的公司并复兴了许多其他公司。俄亥俄州和伯克希尔都很幸运有拉尔夫站在它们这边。
原文
-
All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey—World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group—performed splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.
Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.
Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country’s largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.
Ralph’s personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.
Borsheim’s
1983年，伯克希尔收购了内布拉斯加家具城80%的权益。当时，你们的董事长犯了一个错误，忘了问B夫人一个任何小学生都会想到的问题：“家里还有像你这样的人吗？”上个月我纠正了这个错误：我们现在与这个家庭的另一支成为80%的合伙人。
原文
Borsheim’s
It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: “Are there any more at home like you?” Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.
B夫人1917年从俄罗斯过来后，她的父母和五个兄弟姐妹也跟来了。（她的另外两个兄弟姐妹先于她到来。）姐妹中有丽贝卡·弗里德曼，她与丈夫路易斯于1922年经由拉脱维亚向西逃亡，其旅途之艰险，不亚于B夫人早年经由满洲里向东的奥德赛之旅。当家庭成员在奥马哈重聚时，他们没有任何有形资产。然而，他们装备了智慧、正直和对工作热忱的非凡组合——而这正是他们所需要的全部。此后，他们证明了自己是不可战胜的。
原文
After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B’s earlier odyssey to the east through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work—and that’s all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.
1948年，弗里德曼先生购买了Borsheim’s，一家奥马哈的小珠宝店。他的儿子艾克于1950年加入生意，随着岁月流逝，艾克的儿子艾伦，以及他的女婿马文·科恩和唐纳德·耶鲁也陆续加入。
原文
In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.
你们不会惊讶地得知，这个家族将布卢姆金家族在家具业务中采用的完全相同的方法带到了珠宝业务中。两家企业的基石都是B夫人的信条：“卖得便宜，说实话。”这两家企业的其他基本原则包括：(1) 单店运营，拥有庞大的库存，为顾客提供所有价位的巨大选择；(2) 高层管理人员每日关注细节；(3) 快速周转；(4) 精明采购；以及(5) 令人难以置信的低成本。后三个因素的结合，使得这两家商店能够提供国内无人能及的每日低价。
原文
You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.
大多数人，无论在其他事情上多么老练，在购买珠宝时都感觉自己像林中的婴儿（懵懂无知）。他们既无法判断质量也无法判断价格。对他们来说，只有一条规则有意义：如果你不懂珠宝，就要懂珠宝商。
原文
Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.
我可以向你们保证，那些信任艾克·弗里德曼及其家人的人永远不会失望。我们收购他们业务权益的方式就是最终的证明。Borsheim’s没有经过审计的财务报表；尽管如此，我们没有盘点存货、核实应收账款或以任何方式审计其运营。艾克只是告诉了我们实情——在此基础上，我们起草了一份一页纸的合同，并开出了一张大额支票。
原文
I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so—and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.
随着弗里德曼家族声誉的传播，近年来Borsheim’s的业务迅猛发展。如今，顾客从全国各地涌向这家商店。其中包括我一些来自东西海岸的朋友，他们后来都感谢我带他们去了那里。
原文
Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.
Borsheim’s与伯克希尔的新联系不会改变其经营方式。弗里德曼家族的所有成员将继续像以前一样运营；查理和我将退居我们应处的场外。当我们说“所有成员”时，这个词具有真实意义。弗里德曼先生和夫人，分别为88岁和87岁，每天都待在店里。艾克、艾伦、马文和唐纳德的妻子们都在忙碌时搭把手，第四代人也在开始学习业务门道。
原文
Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.
与你们长期钦佩的人共事非常愉快。弗里德曼家族，如同布卢姆金家族，之所以取得成功，是因为他们理应成功。两个家族都专注于什么对顾客最有利，这反过来也必然对他们有利。我们找不到更好的合伙人了。
原文
It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.
保险业务
以下是我们通常列出的保险业关键数据表格的更新版：
| 保费收入年变化率 (%) | 含保单持有人分红的法定综合比率 | 已发生损失年变化率 (%) | GNP平减指数衡量的通货膨胀率 (%) | ||||
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 | |||
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.4 | |||
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 | |||
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 3.7 | |||
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.2 | |||
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 | |||
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.3 | |||
| 1988 (估计) | 3.9 | 105.4 | 4.2 | 3.6 |
来源：A.M. Best公司
原文
Insurance Operations
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) | Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) | Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) | ||||
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 | |||
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.4 | |||
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 | |||
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 3.7 | |||
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.2 | |||
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 | |||
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.3 | |||
| 1988 (Est.) | 3.9 | 105.4 | 4.2 | 3.6 |
Source: A.M. Best Co.
综合比率表示保险总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入之比：比率低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示亏损。如果考虑到保险公司因持有保单持有人资金（“浮存金”）而赚取的投资收益，那么综合比率在107-111之间通常会产生整体的盈亏平衡结果（不包括股东提供的资金所赚取的收益）。
原文
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
基于之前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计行业的已发生损失每年将增长约10%，即使在整体通胀率低得多的年份也是如此。如果与此同时，保费增长显著落后于10%这个比率，承保损失将会增加，尽管行业在经营恶化时倾向于准备金不足，可能会暂时掩盖问题的严重性。如表所示，行业的承保损失在1988年有所增长。这一趋势几乎肯定会持续下去——并且很可能会加速——至少再持续两年。
原文
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue—and probably will accelerate—for at least two more years.
财产意外伤害保险业不仅利润低于正常水平，而且受欢迎程度也低于正常水平。（正如塞缪尔·戈德温的哲理所说：“在生活中，一个人必须学会接受苦涩与酸楚。”）商业的讽刺之一在于，许多利润相对较低、饱受价格不足困扰的行业，习惯性地遭到愤怒客户的抨击；而其他利润丰厚的行业，无论其价格多高，都很少受到抱怨。
原文
The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.
以早餐麦片行业为例，其投入资本回报率是汽车保险行业的两倍多（这就是为什么像家乐氏和通用磨坊这样的公司以五倍账面价值交易，而大多数大型保险公司则接近账面价值交易）。麦片公司定期提价，其中很少有与成本大幅上升相关的。然而，消费者却一声不吭。但是，当汽车保险公司以甚至没有弥补成本增长的幅度提价时，顾客们就愤怒了。如果你想被爱，显然卖高价玉米片比卖低价汽车保险要好。
原文
Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.
公众对该行业的敌意可能产生严重后果：去年秋天通过的加州103法案（一项倡议）威胁要大幅压低汽车保险价格，尽管成本一直在飙升。价格下调已在法院审查该倡议期间暂停，但引发投票的不满情绪并未暂停：即使该倡议被推翻，保险公司在加州盈利运营也可能面临困难。（谢天谢地，市民们没有对夹心巧克力感到愤怒：如果103法案既适用于保险也适用于糖果，喜诗将被迫以每磅5.76美元的价格销售产品，而不是我们收取的7.60美元——并且会大把地赔钱。）
原文
The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we charge—and would be losing money by the bucketful.)
该倡议对伯克希尔的直接近期影响很小，因为我们在投票前加州存在的费率结构中看到的盈利机会很少。然而，价格被迫下降将严重影响我们持股44%的被投资公司GEICO，其约10%的保费收入来自加州。对GEICO更具威胁的是，其他州也可能通过倡议或立法采取类似的定价行动。
原文
The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.
如果选民坚持要求汽车保险以低于成本的价格出售，那么最终必须由政府来提供。股东可以在短期内补贴保单持有人，但只有纳税人才能在长期内补贴他们。对于大多数财产意外伤害保险公司来说，汽车保险社会化对股东不一定是灾难。由于该行业的商品特性，大多数保险公司赚取平庸的回报，因此如果政府强制他们退出汽车保险业务，他们几乎没有或根本没有经济商誉损失。但是GEICO，作为低成本生产商，能够获得高净资产收益率，其面临巨大的经济商誉风险。相应地，我们也是如此。
原文
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.
在伯克希尔，1988年我们的保费收入持续下降，而1989年我们将因一个特殊原因经历大幅减少：我们从中获取消防员基金7%业务份额的合同将于8月31日到期。届时，我们将把与该合同相关的未赚保费返还给消防员基金。这笔资金转移将在我们的“保费收入”账户中显示为约8500万美元的负值，并将使我们的第三季度数据看起来相当奇特。然而，该合同的终止不会对利润产生重大影响。
原文
At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.
伯克希尔的承保结果在1988年继续表现出色。我们的综合比率（按法定口径，不包括结构化结算和财务再保险）为104。准备金发展情况连续第二年表现良好，此前一连数年都非常不理想。承保和准备金发展的细节均在第36-38页。
原文
Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.
未来几年，我们的保险业务量可能会非常低，因为具有合理盈利潜力的业务几乎肯定会稀缺。就这样吧。在伯克希尔，我们绝不会以预期会遭受经济损失的费率签发保单。即使在我们预期盈利的情况下，我们遇到的麻烦也够多了。
原文
Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.
尽管——或者也许正是因为——业务量低，未来几年我们的盈利情况很可能比行业要光明得多。我们肯定会拥有相对于保费收入而言异常大量的浮存金，这预示着利润前景良好。在1989年和1990年，我们预计我们的浮存金/保费比率至少是典型财产/意外伤害保险公司的三倍。在阿吉特·贾恩、迪诺斯·约达努和国家赔偿保险公司管理团队的特殊帮助下，迈克·戈德堡在这方面让我们占据了有利地位。
原文
Despite—or perhaps because of—low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.
在某个时候——我们不知道是什么时候——我们将被保险业务淹没。原因可能是某次重大的物理或金融灾难。但也可能像1985年那样，业务量激增，因为其他公司巨大且不断增长的承保损失恰逢它们认识到自己准备金严重不足。与此同时，我们将留住我们才华横溢的专业人员，保护我们的资本，并尽力不犯重大错误。
原文
At some point—we don’t know when—we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.
可流通证券
在为我们的保险公司选择可流通证券时，我们可以在五大类别中进行选择：(1) 长期普通股投资，(2) 中期固定收益证券，(3) 长期固定收益证券，(4) 短期现金等价物，以及(5) 短期套利承诺。
原文
Marketable Securities
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
在选择这些类别时，我们没有特别的偏见。我们只是在其中持续寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，并且始终将自己限制在我们认为自己能够理解的投资替代方案中。我们的标准与最大化立即报告利润无关；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终的净资产。
原文
We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
- 下面我们列出了我们持有价值超过1亿美元的普通股，不包括将在后面讨论的套利承诺。这些投资的一小部分属于伯克希尔持股不到100%的子公司。
| 股份数 | 公司 | 成本 | 市值 | |||
| (千美元省略) | ||||||
| 3,000,000 | 资本城/ABC公司 | $517,500 | $1,086,750 | |||
| 14,172,500 | 可口可乐公司 | 592,540 | 632,448 | |||
| 2,400,000 | 联邦住房贷款抵押公司优先股* | 71,729 | 121,200 | |||
| 6,850,000 | GEICO保险公司 | 45,713 | 849,400 | |||
| 1,727,765 | 华盛顿邮报公司 | 9,731 | 364,126 |
* 名义上为优先股，但此证券在财务上等同于普通股。
原文
- Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
| Shares | Company | Cost | Market | |||
| (000s omitted) | ||||||
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | $517,500 | $1,086, |
在评估这次套利机会时，我们必须问自己：KKR是否会完成这笔交易？因为其报价附带了“获得满意融资”的条件。这类条款对卖方来说总是危险的：它为求爱者在求婚与结婚之间热情消退时提供了轻松的退出通道。不过，我们并不特别担心这种可能性，因为KKR过往的成交记录良好。
原文
Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.
我们还必须自问：如果KKR的交易最终失败，会发生什么？对此我们感到相当安心。Arcata的管理层和董事会已在寻求出售公司一段时间，显然决心卖出手中的业务。如果KKR退出，Arcata很可能会找到另一位买家，尽管价格可能会更低。
原文
We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.
最后，我们必须自问：红杉林的索赔价值几何？你们的董事长连榆树和橡树都分不清，但处理这个问题毫无困难：我冷静地评估了这项索赔的价值，介于零和一大笔钱之间。
原文
Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.
我们于9月30日开始购买Arcata股票，当时股价约为33.50美元，并在八周内买入了大约40万股，占公司股份的5%。最初的公告显示，每股37.00美元将于1982年1月支付。因此，如果一切顺利，我们的年化回报率将达到约40%——这还不包括红杉林的索赔，那将是额外的利润。
原文
We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40%—not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.
并非一切顺利。12月，有消息称交易完成将稍有延迟。尽管如此，一份最终协议于1月4日签署。受到鼓舞，我们提高了持股比例，以每股约38.00美元的价格买入，将持股增至65.5万股，占公司股份的7%以上。我们愿意支付更高的价格——尽管交易完成已被推迟——这反映了我们对红杉林索赔的评估偏向于“一大笔钱”而非“零”。
原文
All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up—even though the closing had been postponed—reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.
随后，2月25日，贷款人表示，鉴于“严重低迷的房地产业及其对Arcata前景的影响”，他们将“重新审视”融资条款。股东大会再次被推迟至4月。一位Arcata发言人表示，他“不认为收购本身的前景受到威胁”。套利者听到这类保证时，脑海中会浮现一句老话：“他撒谎的样子就像货币贬值前夕的财政部长。”
原文
Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”
3月12日，KKR表示其之前的交易方案不可行，先是将其报价降至每股33.50美元，两天后又提高至35.00美元。然而，3月15日，董事会拒绝了这一报价，转而接受了另一个集团每股37.50美元加上一半红杉林赔偿金的要约。股东们批准了该交易，每股37.50美元于6月4日支付。
原文
On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.
我们获得了2460万美元，而成本是2290万美元；我们的平均持有期接近六个月。考虑到这笔交易遇到的麻烦，我们15%的年化回报率（不包括红杉林索赔的任何价值）已经是相当令人满意了。
原文
We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim—was more than satisfactory.
但最好的还在后面。主审法官任命了两个委员会，一个负责评估木材价值，另一个负责考虑利率问题。1987年1月，第一个委员会认定红杉林价值2.757亿美元，第二个委员会建议采用约14%的复合混合回报率。
原文
But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.
1987年8月，法官维持了这些结论，这意味着Arcata将获得约6亿美元的净额。政府随后提出上诉。然而，在1988年，在上述上诉被审理之前，该索赔以5.19亿美元和解。因此，我们额外获得了每股29.48美元，约1930万美元。我们将在1989年再获得约80万美元。
原文
In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.
伯克希尔的套利活动与许多套利者的做法不同。首先，我们每年只参与少数几笔交易，而且通常是非常大的交易。大多数从业者会参与大量交易——也许每年50笔或更多。同时进行这么多项目，他们必须花费大部分时间监控交易进展和相关股票的市场波动。查理和我并不希望以这种方式度过一生。（发财之后整天盯着股票行情机看，有什么意义呢？）
原文
Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)
由于我们分散化程度很低，一笔特别有利可图或无利可图的交易对我们年度套利业绩的影响，将远大于对典型套利操作的影响。到目前为止，伯克希尔还没有经历过真正的糟糕情况。但将来会的——到那时我们会向你们报告血淋淋的细节。
原文
Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will—and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.
我们与其他一些套利操作的另一个区别是，我们只参与已经公开宣布的交易。我们不会根据谣言进行交易，也不会试图猜测收购候选目标。我们只是阅读报纸，思考一些重大的交易提案，并依据我们自己的概率判断行事。
原文
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.
年底时，我们唯一的重大套利头寸是334.2万股RJR纳贝斯克股票，成本为2.818亿美元，市值为3.045亿美元。1月份我们将持股增加到约400万股，2月份我们清仓了。当我们向收购RJR的KKR公司投标时，大约有300万股被接受，退回的股票随即在市场上出售。我们的税前利润为6400万美元，超出了预期。
原文
At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.
此前，另一位熟悉的面孔出现在RJR的竞标战中：杰伊·普利茨克，他是第一波士顿集团的一员，该集团提出了一个以税收为导向的报价。引用尤吉·贝拉的话说：“这完全是似曾相识的感觉。”
原文
Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”
在我们本可以购买RJR股票的大部分时间里，由于所罗门参与了一个竞标集团，我们在该股票上的活动受到了限制。通常，尽管查理和我是所罗门的董事，但我们会被隔离，不接触其并购业务的信息。我们要求这样做：这些信息对我们没有好处，实际上有时还会妨碍伯克希尔的套利操作。
原文
During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.
然而，所罗门提议在RJR交易中做出的异常巨大的承诺，要求所有董事都被充分告知并参与其中。因此，伯克希尔购买RJR股票仅发生在两个时间段：首先，在管理层宣布收购计划后的最初几天，在所罗门介入之前；其次，在相当晚之后，RJR董事会做出支持KKR的决定之后。由于我们无法在其他时间购买，我们的董事职位让伯克希尔损失了一大笔钱。
原文
However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.
考虑到伯克希尔在1988年的良好业绩，你可能会预期我们在1989年会大举进行套利。相反，我们预计会保持观望。
原文
Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.
一个令人愉快的原因是，我们的现金持有量减少了——因为我们预期将长期持有的股票头寸大幅增加了。正如本报告的老读者所知，我们的新承诺并非基于对股市短期前景的判断。相反，它们反映了我们对特定公司长期业务前景的看法。对于一年后的股票市场、利率或商业活动会是什么样子，我们过去没有、现在没有、将来也不会有任何看法。
原文
One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down—because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.
即使我们有很多现金，1989年我们在套利方面也可能做得很少。收购领域已经出现了一些极端的过度现象。正如多萝西所说：“托托，我感觉我们已不在堪萨斯了。”
原文
Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”
我们不知道这种过度会持续多久，也不知道是什么会改变推动它们的政府、贷款人和买家的态度。但我们确实知道，别人行事越不谨慎，我们就应该越谨慎地处理自己的事务。我们无意参与那些反映买家和贷款人毫无节制——而且在我们看来，往往是不合理——乐观情绪的套利交易。在我们的活动中，我们将遵循赫伯·斯坦的智慧：“如果某件事不可能永远持续下去，那么它终将结束。”
原文
We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled—and, in our view, often unwarranted—optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”
有效市场理论
前面关于套利的讨论，也让我们觉得简要讨论一下“有效市场理论”（EMT）是相关的。这一理论在20世纪70年代的学术界变得极为流行，几乎成了神圣的经文。本质上，它认为分析股票是无用的，因为所有关于股票的公开信息都已恰当地反映在其价格中。换句话说，市场总是无所不知。作为推论，教授EMT的学者们声称，向股票行情表扔飞镖的人所选出的股票投资组合，其前景可能与最聪明、最勤奋的证券分析师所选出的不相上下。令人惊讶的是，EMT不仅被学术界接受，也被许多投资专业人士和公司高管所接受。他们正确地观察到市场 经常 是有效的，但却错误地得出结论说市场 总是 有效的。这两种说法的差异是截然不同的。
原文
Efficient Market Theory
The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of “efficient market theory” (EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable—indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.
在我看来，格雷厄姆-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙公司和伯克希尔公司连续63年的套利经验，充分说明了EMT是多么愚蠢。（当然还有其他大量证据。）在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司期间，我研究过该公司从1926年到1956年整个存续期间套利业务的收益。非杠杆化的平均回报率为每年20%。从1956年开始，我运用本·格雷厄姆的套利原则，先是在巴菲特合伙公司，后来是在伯克希尔。虽然我没有做过精确计算，但我做过的足够多的工作表明，1956年至1988年的平均回报率远高于20%。（当然，我经营的环境比本的要有利得多；他还要对付1929-1932年的大萧条。）
原文
In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There’s plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham’s arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I’ve not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben’s; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)
所有公平测试投资组合业绩所需的条件都存在：(1) 三个组织在创造这63年记录的过程中，交易了数百种不同的证券；(2) 结果并未因少数幸运经历而失真；(3) 我们无需挖掘晦涩的事实或对产品或管理层形成深刻见解——我们只是根据高度公开的事件行事；(4) 我们的套利头寸是一个明确界定的领域——它们并非事后选择。
原文
All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements—we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe—they have not been selected by hindsight.
在这63年里，包括股息在内，整体市场的年化回报率略低于10%。这意味着，如果所有收入都进行再投资，1000美元将增长到40.5万美元。然而，20%的回报率将产生9700万美元。在我们看来，这是一个统计上显著的差异，它可能会引起人们的好奇心。
原文
Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one’s curiosity.
然而，该理论的支持者似乎从未对这种不一致的证据感兴趣。确实，他们现在不像以前那样经常谈论他们的理论了。但据我所知，没有人曾承认自己错了，无论他误导了多少千名学生。此外，EMT仍然是主要商学院投资课程中不可或缺的一部分。显然，不愿认错、不愿揭开神职人员神秘面纱的倾向，并非神学家所独有。
原文
Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don’t talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians.
自然而然地，EMT给那些轻信它的学生和容易上当的投资专业人士带来的伤害，对我们以及其他格雷厄姆的追随者来说，却是一份巨大的恩惠。在任何形式的竞赛中——无论是金融、智力还是体能方面——如果对手被教导说连尝试都没用，那将是一个巨大的优势。从自私的角度看，格雷厄姆学派或许应该资助设立一些教席，以确保EMT能被永久传授下去。
原文
Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest—financial, mental, or physical—it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.
尽管说了这么多，一个警告是恰当的。近来套利看起来很容易。但这并非一种能保证每年20%利润，或保证任何利润的投资形式。如前所述，市场在很多时候是相当有效的：在那63年期间，我们抓住的每一个套利机会，都有更多因为定价看似合理而被我们放弃。
原文
All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.
投资者不能仅仅通过承诺特定的投资类别或风格来从股票中获得超额利润。只有通过仔细评估事实和持续遵守纪律，才能获得超额利润。投资于套利情形本身，并不比通过扔飞镖选择投资组合更好的策略。
原文
An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.
纽约证券交易所上市
伯克希尔的股票于1988年11月29日在纽约证券交易所上市。在第50-51页，我们转载了我们就上市事宜致股东的信。
原文
New York Stock Exchange Listing
Berkshire’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.
让我澄清信中未涉及的一点：尽管我们在纽交所的整手交易单位是10股，但任何数量从1股起都可以买卖。
原文
Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.
正如信中所解释的，我们上市的主要目标是降低交易成本，我们相信这一目标正在实现。总的来说，纽交所的买卖价差远低于场外交易市场的价差。
原文
As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.
亨德森兄弟公司（Henderson Brothers, Inc.）是我们股票的特许交易商，也是交易所历史最悠久的持续营业的特许交易商公司；其创始人威廉·托马斯·亨德森于1861年9月8日以500美元的价格买下了他的席位。（最近，席位售价约为62.5万美元。）在54家特许交易商公司中，HBI因被分配到83只股票而排名第二。当伯克希尔被分配给HBI时，我们很高兴，而且我们对其表现非常满意。HBI董事长吉姆·马奎尔亲自管理伯克希尔的交易，我们找不到更可靠的人选了。
原文
Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about $625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm’s performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.
在两个层面上，我们的目标可能与大多数上市公司有所不同。首先，我们不想最大化伯克希尔股票的交易价格。相反，我们希望它们在一个以内在商业价值为中心的狭窄范围内交易（我们期望内在价值以合理的——或者更好的是，不合理的——速度增长）。查理和我对股价被显著高估和显著低估同样感到困扰。这两种极端情况都将不可避免地导致许多股东的回报与伯克希尔的业务业绩大相径庭。相反，如果我们的股价始终反映商业价值，那么每位股东在其持有期间获得的投资结果，将大致与他持有期间伯克希尔的业务结果平行。
原文
In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable—or, better yet, unreasonable—rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire’s business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.
其次，我们希望交易活动非常少。如果我们经营一家只有少数被动合伙人的私人企业，当那些合伙人以及他们的接替者频繁想要退出合伙关系时，我们会感到失望。经营一家上市公司，我们也有同样的感觉。
原文
Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.
我们的目标是吸引长期持有者，他们在购买时没有出售的时间表或价格目标，而是打算无限期地与我们在一起。我们无法理解那些希望股票交易活跃的首席执行官，因为这只有在他的许多所有者不断退出时才能实现。在哪个其他组织——学校、俱乐部、教堂等——领导们会为成员的离开而欢呼？（然而，如果有一个经纪人的生计依赖于这些组织成员的高流动性，那么可以肯定，至少会有一个活跃度的支持者，就像这样说：“基督教已经有一阵子没什么动静了；也许我们下周应该改信佛教。”）
原文
Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don’t understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization—school, club, church, etc.—do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: “There hasn’t been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.”)
当然，一些伯克希尔的所有者时不时会需要或想要卖出，我们希望有好的接替者能向他们支付公平的价格。因此，我们试图通过我们的政策、业绩和沟通，吸引那些理解我们业务、认同我们时间跨度、并像我们衡量自己一样衡量我们的新股东。如果我们能继续吸引这类股东——同样重要的是，能继续对那些抱有短期或不切实际期望的人缺乏吸引力——那么伯克希尔的股票应该会持续以与商业价值合理相关的价格进行交易。
原文
Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder—and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations—Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.
戴维·L·多德
我的朋友和老师戴夫·多德于去年去世，享年93岁。你们大多数人不知道他。然而，任何长期持有伯克希尔股票的股东，都因他对我们公司产生的间接影响而变得更加富有。
原文
David L. Dodd
Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don’t know of him. Yet any long-time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.
戴夫一生都在哥伦比亚大学任教，并与本·格雷厄姆合著了《证券分析》。从我到达哥伦比亚大学那一刻起，戴夫就亲自鼓励和教育我；这两种影响同等重要。他直接或通过他的书教给我的一切，都合情合理。后来，通过几十封信件，他继续指导我，直到他去世。
原文
Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.
我认识许多金融和投资学教授，但除了本·格雷厄姆之外，没有人能与戴夫相提并论。他才华的证明是他学生的记录：没有其他投资老师能培养出如此多取得非凡成就的学生。
原文
I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.
当学生们离开戴夫的课堂时，他们已具备终生明智投资的能力，因为他所教授的原则简单、可靠、有用且持久。尽管这些看起来可能是平凡的优点，但传授包含这些优点的原则的情况却很少见。
原文
When students left Dave’s classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.
尤其令人印象深刻的是，戴夫不仅能言传，更能身教。正如凯恩斯通过将他的学术思想应用于很少的本金而变得富有一样，戴夫也是如此。事实上，他的财务表现远超凯恩斯，凯恩斯最初是一个市场择时者（依赖商业和信贷周期理论），经过深思熟虑后转变为价值投资。而戴夫从一开始就是正确的。
原文
It’s particularly impressive that Dave could practice as well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.
在伯克希尔的投资中，查理和我运用了戴夫和本·格雷厄姆教导的原则。我们的繁荣是他们智慧之树的果实。
原文
In Berkshire’s investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.
其他事项
我们希望购买更多与我们现有业务类似的企业，我们可以得到一些帮助。如果您有符合以下标准的企业，请给我打电话，或者最好写信。
原文
Miscellaneous
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
以下是我们的寻找目标：
- 大宗收购（至少1000万美元的税后利润），
- 证明具有持续的盈利能力（未来预测我们不太感兴趣，对“扭亏为盈”的情况也不感兴趣），
- 企业净资产回报率良好，且很少或没有使用债务，
- 有现成的管理层（我们无法提供），
- 简单的业务（如果涉及太多技术，我们无法理解），
- 一个报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下，即使是初步地，讨论交易，以免浪费我们或卖家的时间）。
原文
Here’s what we’re looking for:
-
large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
-
demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
-
businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
-
management in place (we can’t supply it),
-
simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
-
an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常五分钟内——告知我们是否有兴趣。我们偏好现金购买，但如果我们获得的企业内在价值与我们付出的相同，也会考虑发行股票。
原文
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们最喜欢的收购方式是符合布卢姆金-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的类型。在这些情况下，公司的所有者管理者希望产生大量现金，有时是为了他们自己，但通常是为了他们的家人或不活跃的股东。然而，这些管理者也希望继续作为重要所有者，并像过去一样继续经营他们的公司。我们认为，对于有这些目标的所有者来说，我们提供了一个特别合适的契合点，并邀请潜在卖家通过联系我们过去打过交道的人来评估我们。
原文
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
查理和我经常接到一些与我们标准相去甚远的收购要约：我们发现，如果你广告说有兴趣购买柯利犬，很多人会打电话来希望卖给你他们的可卡犬。我们对新项目、扭亏为盈或类似拍卖的销售的兴趣，最好用另一句高德温名言来表达：“请别算上我。”
原文
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: “Please include me out.”
除了有兴趣购买上述类型的企业外，我们也有兴趣协商购买大额但非控股的股票，类似于我们持有大都会/ABC和所罗门的头寸。我们对长期投资购买可转换优先股有特殊兴趣，就像我们在所罗门所做的那样。
原文
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.
* * *
几周前，我们得到了一些好消息：标准普尔将我们的信用评级上调至AAA，这是其授予的最高评级。目前只有15家其他美国工业或财产意外险公司获得AAA评级，低于1980年的28家。
原文
* * *
We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor’s raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.
近年来，公司债券持有人因“事件风险”而遭受损失。这个术语指的是，当一家此前财务政策保守的企业遭遇高杠杆收购或资本重组时，其信用评级会在一夜之间恶化。在一个由少数所有者管理者主导的收购世界中，大多数公司都存在这种风险。伯克希尔不会。查理和我向债券持有人承诺，我们会给予他们与股东同样的尊重。
原文
Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from “event risk.” This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.
* * *
大约97.4%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1988年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划进行的捐赠总额为500万美元，共有2319家慈善机构受益。如果我们取得合理的业务成果，我们计划在1989年增加每股捐赠额。
原文
* * *
About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.
我们敦促新股东阅读第48-49页关于我们股东指定捐赠计划的描述。如果您希望在未来的计划中参与，我们强烈建议您立即确保您的股票是以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代理人名义注册。在1989年9月30日未按此注册的股份将没有资格参与1989年的计划。
原文
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.
* * *
伯克希尔的年度股东大会将于1989年4月24日星期一在奥马哈举行，我希望您能参加。会议为您提供了一个提问任何与所有者相关问题的论坛，我们会一直回答，直到所有问题（除了那些涉及投资组合活动或其他专有信息的问题）都得到处理。
原文
* * *
Berkshire’s annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.
会议结束后，我们将提供几辆巴士，带您前往内布拉斯加家具城拜访B夫人，以及波仙珠宝店拜访艾克·弗里德曼。准备好享受折扣吧。
原文
After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim’s. Be prepared for bargains.
外地来客可能更喜欢提前到达，并在周日下午12点到5点的营业时间拜访B夫人。（这些周日的营业时间在B夫人看来短得可笑，她觉得这点时间几乎不够她热身；她更喜欢商店从上午10点营业到晚上9点的日子。）然而，波仙珠宝店周日不营业。
原文
Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.
问问B夫人她那惊人低价地毯的秘密。她会像对每个人一样，向您吐露秘诀：“我能卖得这么便宜，是因为我给这个对地毯一窍不通的傻瓜干活。”
原文
Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you—as she does to everyone—how she does it: “I can sell so cheap ‘cause I work for this dummy who doesn’t know anything about carpet.”
1989年2月28日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
原文
February 28, 1989
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board