伯克希尔·哈撒韦 1989 年股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

What counts, however, is intrinsic value—the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business—in and out—and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals.

Back when Berkshire’s book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire’s intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.

The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.

We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This ‘til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire’s value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately “corrected” the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our “catch-up” rewards have been realized, which means we’ll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.

We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.

Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: “That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain…in two days, more than the sun—and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria.” Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. “The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public.”

Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing—financially—in public. Nevertheless, Sagan’s observations apply. From Berkshire’s present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.

Taxes

Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire’s share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.

Of this year’s tax charge, about $172 million will be paid currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.

We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987—about $1.2 billion—carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.

A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth, by about $71 million—the result of raising the reserve on our pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.

As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not—despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.

On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.

In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This “loan” is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size—daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of “transfer” tax on $224 million of gains.

Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor—if successful—has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let’s look at an extreme comparison.

Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.

The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we—taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000—though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.

We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after-tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that’s exactly what Charlie and I did.

Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good—though perhaps not optimal—financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money—a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have reprinted on page 71 Charlie’s May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S. League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent decision to resign.

* Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.

We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged Berkshire’s financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.

In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about $45 million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investees totaled about $212 million last year, not counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been close to $500 million rather than the $300 million shown in the table.

The question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are—and even think they may be more valuable. The reason for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these cases.

In our view, Berkshire’s fundamental earning power is best measured by a “look-through” approach, in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our “look-through” earnings must grow at about the same pace. We’ll need plenty of help from our present investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in order to reach this 15% goal.

Non-Insurance Operations

In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing and retail operations “The Sainted Seven.” With our acquisition of Borsheim’s early in 1989, the challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed: Let’s call the group “The Sainted Seven Plus One.”

This divine assemblage—Borsheim’s, The Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s Candies, World Book—is a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.

Most of these managers have no need to work for a living; they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that’s exactly what they do. Their combined financial statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers—the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey—I feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his 1927 New York Yankees.

• In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim’s met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim’s managing genius—and I mean that—has only one speed: fast-forward.

  If you haven’t been there, you’ve never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim’s. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store’s tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes ‘round and ‘round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.

  Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. “If you don’t know jewelry, know your jeweler” makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.

  A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I’m part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop’s Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.

  Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive—Bishop’s Lodge is no Fort Knox—and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. “See that safe?” he said. “This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn’t know what it is.” I breathed easier. Ike went on: “See those two big fellows with guns on their hips? They’ll be guarding the safe all night.” I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: “And besides, Warren,” he confided, “the jewels aren’t in the safe.”

  How can we miss with a fellow like that—particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.

• At See’s Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first in many years.

  Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4 million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make See’s special.

  In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses, such as See’s, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At See’s, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for this result.

  See’s splendid performances have become routine. But there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.

• The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B—Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500—quit in May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family/management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.

  Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American, but in this particular case I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past three years, while the store’s other departments increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).

  You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger’s heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age 96 she has started a new business selling—what else?—carpet and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.

  At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.

  NFM and Borsheim’s follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors’; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.

  Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989—off a record 1988—and remains the paper’s largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut space purchases in 1989; our experience at See’s and NFM would indicate they made a major mistake.

• The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration—the percentage of local households that purchase it each day. Second, in “news hole”—the portion of the paper devoted to news—the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news-rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.

  To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single “megaphone.” A low-penetration paper is a far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.

  It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the News, has been falling—from 1,113,000 in 1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988. Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County. Last year—with population at least 5% lower—the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase in penetration.

  When this kind of gain is made—and when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town—someone is doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that is frequently late, because of production problems or distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content.

  Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan’s managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a talented manager who knows—and cares—about every nut and bolt of the business.

  Stan’s knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business were spent on the news side and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.

• At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan—Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred—continue their extraordinary performance. Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.

  Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year’s annual meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That’s only a slight exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.

  Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We’re much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed.

• Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group—World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500. And he’s running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.

  For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago’s Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us.

  Kirby’s business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in 1990.

  Ralph’s operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.

And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.

Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

Source: A.M. Best Co.

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.

Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was “almost certain to continue—and probably will accelerate—for at least two more years.” This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year’s forecast. Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it down.

The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a “normal” year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree.

Commentators frequently discuss the “underwriting cycle” and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry’s fundamental economics.

The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new “corrected” rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term—which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire—delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.

The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at independently-established prices. Such a configuration—whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies—is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.

In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is, it’s considered appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.

All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry’s profits. Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely—and most assuredly is not happening now.

Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989’s catastrophes—Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake—will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won’t grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.

The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices. And we’re a long way from that point.

Berkshire’s premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in 1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit.

However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns “CAT covers,” which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies (and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer’s money.)

CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires

零息证券

1989年9月，伯克希尔发行了本金总额9.026亿美元的零息可转换次级债券，目前已在纽约证券交易所上市。所罗门兄弟公司以极其出色的方式承销了这批债券，为我们提供了宝贵的建议并完美执行了交易。

大多数债券都要求定期支付利息，通常是每半年一次。相反，零息债券则不需要当期支付利息；投资者通过以远低于到期价值的折扣价购买证券来获得收益。实际利率由原始发行价格、到期价值以及发行与到期之间的时间长度决定。

在我们的案例中，债券按到期价值的44.314%发行，期限为15年。对于购买债券的投资者来说，这在数学上相当于5.5%的当期收益按半年复利计算。由于我们每美元只收到44.31美分，此次发行的收益为4亿美元（扣除约950万美元的发行费用）。

债券以10,000美元面值发行，每张债券可转换为0.4515股伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票。由于一张10,000美元的债券成本为4,431美元，这意味着转换价格为每股9,815美元，比当时市场价格溢价15%。伯克希尔有权在1992年9月28日之后的任何时间按累计价值（原始发行价格加上5.5%半年复利）赎回债券，并且在1994年9月28日和1999年9月28日这两个指定日期，债券持有人可以要求伯克希尔按累计价值回购证券。

出于税务目的，伯克希尔有权每年扣除5.5%的利息应计额，尽管我们并未向债券持有人支付任何款项。因此，由于税负减少，对我们的净影响是正向现金流。这是一个非常重要的好处。一些未知变量使我们无法计算确切的实际利率，但在任何情况下，它都将远低于5.5%。同时，税法具有对称性：任何应税债券持有人每年都必须为这5.5%的利息缴税，即使他没有收到现金。

我们的债券以及其他几家去年发行类似债券的公司（特别是洛斯公司和摩托罗拉公司）的债券，与近年来发行的大部分零息债券截然不同。对于后者，查理和我一直是、并将继续是直言不讳的批评者。正如稍后我将解释的那样，这类债券经常被以最具欺骗性的方式使用，给投资者带来致命的后果。但在我们讨论这个话题之前，让我们先回到伊甸园，回到苹果尚未被咬下的时代。

如果你和我年纪相仿，你的第一只零息债券是在二战期间购买的，那就是著名的E系列美国储蓄债券，这是历史上发行量最大的债券。（战后，这些债券被一半的美国家庭持有。）当然，没有人把E系列称为零息债券，我怀疑这个术语当时甚至还没有被发明出来。但这正是E系列的本质。

这些债券面值小至18.75美元。这个金额可以购买一张美国政府10年后到期的25美元债券，条件是为买家提供2.9%的复利年回报率。在当时，这是一个有吸引力的报价：2.9%的利率高于政府债券的普遍利率，并且持有人没有市场波动风险，因为他可以随时兑现债券，仅会有轻微的利息损失。

第二种形式的零息美国国债，同样有益且实用，在过去十年中出现。普通债券的一个问题是，即使它支付给定的利率——比如10%——持有人也无法保证能实现10%的复利回报。要实现这个回报率，每半年的息票在收到时必须按10%进行再投资。如果这些息票到期时当前利率只有6%或7%，持有人就无法在债券存续期内按广告利率进行复利。对于养老金基金或其他有长期负债的投资者来说，这种“再投资风险”可能是一个严重的问题。储蓄债券本可以解决这个问题，但它们只面向个人发行，且没有大面额可供选择。大型买家需要的是大量的“储蓄债券等价物”。

于是一些富有创造力且在此情况下极其有用的投资银行家（我很高兴地说，以所罗门兄弟公司为首）应运而生。他们通过“剥离”标准政府债券的半年期息票，创造了所需的工具。每张被剥离的息票都具有了储蓄债券的基本特征，因为它代表了未来某个时间点到期的一笔款项。例如，如果你剥离一张2010年到期的美国政府债券的40张半年期息票，你将得到40份零息债券，期限从6个月到20年不等，每份都可以与其它相同期限的息票捆绑并销售。如果当前所有期限的利率都是10%，那么6个月期债券将以到期价值的95.24%出售，20年期债券将以14.20%出售。因此，任何特定期限的购买者都能保证在整个持有期内获得10%的复利回报率。近年来，随着从养老金基金到个人退休金账户等长期投资者认识到这些高等级零息债券非常适合他们的需求，政府债券的剥离已大规模进行。

但在华尔街屡见不鲜的是，智者起初所为，愚者最终效仿。在过去几年里，信用等级越来越低的发行人大量发行了零息债券（以及功能上等同的实物支付债券，这种债券每半年支付额外的实物支付债券作为利息，而不是支付现金）。对这些发行人来说，零息（或实物支付）债券提供了一个压倒性的优势：不可能因为承诺支付零利息而违约。事实上，如果欠发达国家政府在1970年代只发行长期零息债券，那么它们现在的债务记录将无可挑剔。

这个运作原则——只要你郑重承诺长期不支付任何东西，就可以长期不违约——并没有被那些寻求为越来越不稳固的交易融资的发起人和投资银行家所忽视。但贷款人接受它需要时间：当几年前杠杆收购热潮开始时，购买者只能在相当稳健的基础上借款，即保守估计的自由现金流——即营业收入加上折旧和摊销减去正常化的资本支出——足以覆盖利息和适度减少债务。

后来，随着交易撮合者的肾上腺素激增，企业的收购价格变得如此之高，以至于所有自由现金流都必须用于支付利息。这样一来，就没有任何资金用来偿还债务了。实际上，借款人对本金偿付采取了一种斯嘉丽·奥哈拉式的“我明天再想”的态度，而这种态度又被新一代贷款人——原始发行垃圾债券的购买者——所接受。债务现在变成了需要再融资的东西，而不是偿还的东西。这种变化让人想起《纽约客》上的一幅漫画：感激的借款人站起来与银行贷款员握手，并激动地说：“我不知道该怎么报答你。”

很快，借款人甚至觉得新的、宽松的标准也让人无法忍受地束缚。为了诱使贷款人为更愚蠢的交易融资，他们引入了一个可恶的概念，即EBITDA——息税折旧摊销前利润——作为衡量公司支付利息能力的标准。使用这个被截断的标尺，借款人忽略了折旧作为一项费用，理由是它不需要当前的现金支出。

这种态度显然是自欺欺人的。在95%的美国企业中，随着时间的推移大致等于折旧的资本支出是必要的，并且与劳动力或公用事业成本一样是真实的费用。即使是高中辍学生也知道，要为一辆车融资，他的收入必须不仅覆盖利息和运营费用，还要覆盖实际计算的折旧。如果他开始谈论EBITDA，他会被银行赶出去。

当然，企业的资本支出可以在任何一个月被跳过，就像人可以跳过一天甚至一周的进食一样。但如果这种跳过成为常态且没有补上，身体就会衰弱并最终死亡。此外，无论是人类还是企业，时断时续的供养政策长期来看都会产生一个不太健康的主体，而不是稳定膳食带来的效果。作为商人，查理和我很高兴看到有竞争对手无法筹集资金进行资本支出。

你可能认为，为了把一个糟糕的交易变得好看而抹去折旧这样一笔主要费用，已经触及华尔街创造力的极限。如果是这样，那你在过去几年里肯定没有留意。发起人需要找到一种方法来证明甚至更高价格的收购是合理的。否则，他们就有可能——天理不容！——把交易输给其他更有“想象力”的发起人。

因此，穿过镜子，发起人和他们的投资银行家宣称，EBITDA现在应该只与现金利息进行比较，这意味着在评估交易的财务可行性时，可以忽略零息债券或实物支付债券上应计的利息。这种方法不仅将折旧费用归入“让我们忽略它”的角落，而且对通常占利息费用很大一部分的部分也给予了类似的待遇。可耻的是，许多专业投资经理屈从于这种胡言乱语，尽管他们通常小心翼翼地只用客户的钱，而不是自己的钱。（称这些经理为“专业人士”实际上太客气了；他们应该被称为“促销对象”。）

按照这个新标准，一家税前盈利比如说1亿美元、且债务需要当期支付9000万美元利息的企业，可能会使用零息或实物支付债券，再产生6000万美元的年度利息，这部分利息将累计并复利增长，但在未来几年内不会到期。这些债券的利率通常非常高，这意味着在第二年，情况可能是9000万美元现金利息加上6900万美元应计利息，以此类推，随着复利递增。这种高利率的再借款计划，几年前还仅仅局限于码头区，很快就在几乎所有主要投资银行中成为现代金融的典范。

当投资银行家提供这些产品时，他们展示了自己幽默的一面：他们为几个月前几乎没听说过的公司，提供未来五年或更长时间的损益表和资产负债表预测。如果你看到这样的时间表，我建议你也参与进来，乐一下：请这位投资银行家拿出他自己公司过去几年年初制定的当年预算，然后将这些预算与实际发生的情况进行比较。

不久前，肯·加尔布雷思在他诙谐而富有洞察力的著作《大崩盘》中创造了一个新的经济学术语：“bezle”，定义为当前未被发现的贪污总额。这种金融生物具有神奇的特质：贪污者因贪污金额而变得更富有，而被贪污者尚未感到更贫穷。

加尔布雷思教授敏锐地指出，这笔金额应该加到国民财富中，这样我们才能知道心理国民财富。逻辑上，一个想要感觉极其繁荣的社会，既会鼓励其公民贪污，也会尽量不发现这种罪行。通过这种方式，“财富”会膨胀，尽管没有完成一丁点儿生产性工作。

与零息债券的现实荒诞相比，bezle的讽刺荒诞相形见绌。通过零息债券，合同的一方可以经历“收入”，而其对手却不会感受到支出的痛苦。在我们的例子中，一家每年只能赚1亿美元——因此也只能支付这么多利息——的公司，奇迹般地为债券持有人创造了1.5亿美元的“收益”。只要大型投资者愿意自愿戴上彼得·潘的翅膀，反复说“我相信”，零息债券创造“收入”的能力就没有限制。

华尔街以不那么开明的人可能会留给轮子或犁的热情欢迎了这一发明。这里，终于有了一种工具，可以让华尔街达成的交易，其价格不再受实际盈利能力的限制。结果显而易见：交易会更多：愚蠢的价格总能吸引卖家。正如杰西·昂鲁可能说过的那样，交易是金融的母乳。

零息债券或实物支付债券对发起人和投资银行家还有一个额外的吸引力，那就是从愚蠢到失败的时间可以被拉长。这不是一个小好处。如果必须面对所有成本之前的时期很长，发起人可以在他们早期项目的恶果显现之前，制造一连串愚蠢的交易——并收取大量费用。

但最终，炼金术，无论是冶金还是金融，都会失败。一个基础业务无法通过会计或资本结构的把戏转变为黄金业务。自称金融炼金术士的人可能会变得富有。但通常他的财富来源是轻信的投资者，而非商业成就。

无论它们的弱点如何，我们应该补充一点，许多零息债券和实物支付债券不会违约。事实上，我们拥有一些，如果它们的市场变得足够低迷，我们可能会购买更多。（然而，我们甚至从未考虑过从信用薄弱的发行人那里购买新发行债券。）没有一种金融工具本身是邪恶的；只是有些变体比其他变体具有更大的潜在危害性。

危害最大的大奖应该颁给那些无法按时支付利息的零息债券发行人。我们的建议是：每当投资银行家开始谈论EBITDA时——或者每当有人创造的资本结构无法让所有利息（包括应付和应计利息）都能从当前现金流（扣除充足的资本支出后）中轻松满足时——就拉上你的钱包拉链。反过来建议那位发起人和他高薪的随从接受零息费用，将他们的收入推迟到零息债券全部付清之后。到那时再看看他们对这笔交易还有多少热情。

我们关于投资银行家的评论可能听起来很刺耳。但查理和我——以我们无可救药的老派方式——相信他们应该扮演守门人的角色，保护投资者免受发起人过度放纵的倾向。毕竟，纵观历史，发起人在接受金钱时表现出的判断力和克制力，与酗酒者在接受酒精时表现出的判断力和克制力如出一辙。因此，银行家的行为至少应该上升到一位负责任的调酒师的标准，他在必要时拒绝下一杯酒的利润，以避免将醉汉送上高速公路。不幸的是，近年来，许多领先的投资公司发现调酒师的道德标准是一个令人无法容忍的约束条件。最近，那些在华尔街走正道的人路上没有遇到什么交通拥挤。

一个令人痛心的附注：零息债券愚蠢行为的代价不会仅由直接参与者承担。某些储蓄和贷款协会是这些债券的积极买家，使用的是由联邦储蓄与贷款保险公司（FSLIC）保险的存款。为了努力展示出色的收益，这些买家记录了——但并未收到——这些债券上的超高利息收入。这些协会中有许多现在都陷入了大麻烦。如果他们对信用疲软的贷款成功，协会的所有者将会把利润收入囊中。在许多贷款将会失败的情况下，纳税人将承担账单。套用杰基·梅森的话说，在这些协会里，应该是经理们戴着滑雪面罩。

第一个二十五年的错误（精简版）

引用罗伯特·本奇利的话：“养狗教会一个男孩忠诚、毅力，并且在躺下之前先转三圈。”这就是经验的局限性。尽管如此，在犯新错误之前回顾过去的错误是个好主意。那么，让我们快速回顾一下过去的25年。

• 我的第一个错误当然是买下伯克希尔的控股权。虽然我知道它的业务——纺织制造——前景不佳，但我被看起来便宜的价格诱使购买了。在我早年，这类股票购买被证明是相当有利可图的，尽管到了1965年伯克希尔出现时，我已经开始意识到这种策略并不理想。

  如果你以足够低的价格买入一只股票，通常业务上会出现一些波折，让你有机会以不错的利润卖出，即使该业务的长期表现可能很糟糕。我称此为投资的“烟蒂”方法。在街上找到的只剩一口可抽的烟蒂可能不会提供多少烟雾，但“便宜购买”将使那一口烟成为全部利润。

除非你是一名清算人，否则这种购买企业的方法是愚蠢的。首先，最初的“便宜”价格很可能最终不会那么便宜。在一个困难的企业中，一个问题刚解决，另一个问题又会冒出来——厨房里从来不会只有一只蟑螂。其次，你获得的任何初始优势都会被企业赚取的低回报迅速侵蚀。例如，如果你以800万美元购买一家可以出售或清算获得1000万美元的企业，并立即采取其中任一行动，你可以实现高回报。但如果这家企业在十年后以1000万美元出售，并且在此期间每年仅赚取并分配几个百分点的成本收益，那么这项投资将会令人失望。时间是优秀企业的朋友，是平庸企业的敌人。

你可能认为这个原则显而易见，但我不得不通过艰难的方式学习它——事实上，我不得不学习好几次。在收购伯克希尔后不久，我通过一家名为多元零售的公司收购了巴尔的摩的一家百货公司霍士德·科恩，该公司后来与伯克希尔合并。我以远低于账面价值的折扣价购买，人员是一流的，而且交易还包含一些额外好处——未记录的房地产价值和大量的后进先出法（LIFO）存货缓冲垫。我怎么可能失手？所以——三年后，我很幸运地以大约我支付的价格卖掉了这家公司。在结束了我们与霍士德·科恩的公司联姻后，我的回忆就像乡村歌曲《我的妻子和我的最好的朋友跑了，我仍然非常想念他》中的丈夫一样。

我还可以给你举其他个人“廉价购买”愚蠢行为的例子，但我相信你明白这个道理：以合理的价格购买一家优秀的公司，远胜于以美妙的价格购买一家普通的公司。查理很早就明白了这一点；我是一个学习迟钝者。但现在，在购买公司或普通股时，我们寻找一流的业务和一流的管理层。

• 这直接引出了一个相关的教训：好骑师在好马上会表现出色，但在破败的老马上则不行。伯克希尔的纺织业务和霍士德·科恩都拥有能干且诚实的人管理。同样的管理者如果受雇于经济特性良好的企业，本可以取得优异的成绩。但当他们在流沙中奔跑时，他们永远无法取得进展。

  我已经说过很多次，当一个以才华横溢闻名的管理层接手一家以糟糕经济状况闻名的企业时，最终完好无损的是企业的不良声誉。我只是希望自己没有如此积极地创造案例。我的行为与梅·韦斯特承认的相符：“我曾经是白雪公主，但后来我跑偏了。”

• 另一个相关的教训：稳健行事。在25年购买和监督各种企业的经历中，查理和我并未学会如何解决困难的商业问题。我们学到的是如何避开它们。就我们成功的程度而言，那是因为我们专注于识别我们可以迈过的一英尺高的障碍，而不是因为我们获得了跨越七英尺高障碍的能力。

  这个发现可能看起来不公平，但在商业和投资中，通常坚持简单和明显的做法比解决困难的问题要有利可图得多。有时，必须解决棘手的问题，就像我们在布法罗创办周日版报纸时的情况。在其他情况下，当一个绝妙的企业遇到一次性的、巨大的但可解决的问题时，就会产生极好的投资机会，就像多年前的美国运通和GEICO的情况一样。然而，总的来说，我们通过避开恶龙而不是与它们搏斗，做得更好。

• 我最令人惊讶的发现：企业中一种看不见的力量的巨大重要性，我们可以称之为“制度性强制力”。在商学院，我完全没有被告知这种强制力的存在，当我进入商界时，我也并非直觉地理解它。我当时认为，正派、聪明且有经验的管理者会自动做出理性的商业决策。但随着时间的推移，我了解到并非如此。相反，当制度性强制力发挥作用时，理性常常会减弱。

  例如：（1）仿佛受牛顿第一运动定律支配，机构会抵制其当前方向的任何改变；（2）就像工作会膨胀以填满可用时间一样，公司项目或收购会涌现以消耗掉可用资金；（3）领导者的任何商业渴望，无论多么愚蠢，都会被其下属准备的详细的回报率和战略研究所迅速支持；（4）同行的行为，无论是扩张、收购、设定高管薪酬还是其他，都会被盲目模仿。

制度动态，而非贪婪或愚蠢，使企业走上这些经常被误导的轨道。在因为忽视制度性强制力的力量而犯下一些代价高昂的错误之后，我试图以最小化其影响的方式来组织和经营伯克希尔。此外，查理和我努力将我们的投资集中在那些似乎对这一问保持警觉的公司。

• 在犯了一些其他错误之后，我学会了只与我喜欢、信任且钦佩的人共事。正如我之前指出的，这条政策本身并不能保证成功：一家二流的纺织或百货公司不会仅仅因为其管理者是你乐意看到女儿嫁给他的人而繁荣。然而，如果一个所有者（或投资者）能够与这样的人在具有良好经济特性的企业中结盟，他就能创造奇迹。相反，我们不想与缺乏令人钦佩品质的管理者合作，无论他们业务的吸引力有多大。我们从未成功与一个坏人做成过一笔好交易。

• 我一些最严重的错误是不为人知的。这些是我了解其优点却没有进行的股票和业务购买。错过自己能力圈之外的绝佳机会并非过错。但我错过了几个送上门的、我完全能够理解的真正的大宗收购。对于伯克希尔的股东，包括我自己，这个犹豫不决的代价是巨大的。

• 我们一贯保守的财务政策可能看起来是一个错误，但在我看来并非如此。回顾过去，很明显，在伯克希尔采用显著更高但仍然传统的杠杆比率，本可以产生比我们实际平均23.8%高得多的股本回报率。即使在1965年，也许我们可以判断，有99%的概率更高的杠杆率只会带来好处。相应地，我们可能只看到1%的概率，某个外部或内部的冲击因素会导致传统的债务比率产生介于暂时痛苦和违约之间的结果。

  我们不喜欢那些99:1的赔率——而且永远不会。在我们看来，一小部分痛苦或耻辱的风险，不能被大量的额外回报所抵消。如果你的行动是明智的，你肯定会得到好结果；在大多数此类情况下，杠杆只是让事情进展得更快。查理和我从不急于求成：我们享受过程远胜于结果——尽管我们学会了也与后者共存。

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我们希望再过25年，能够报告第一个五十年的错误。如果我们能在2015年做到这一点，你可以放心，这一节将占据比现在多得多的篇幅。

其他事项

我们希望购买更多类似我们已有的企业，并且我们可以得到一些帮助。如果你有一家企业符合以下标准，请给我打电话，或者最好写信。

以下是我们正在寻找的：

1. 大额收购（至少1亿美元的税后利润），
2. 已证明的持续盈利能力（未来预测对我们没什么兴趣，“扭亏为盈”的情况也一样），
3. 在很少或没有负债的情况下获得良好股本回报率的企业，
4. 现有管理层（我们无法提供），
5. 简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们无法理解），
6. 报价（我们不想在价格未知的情况下进行谈判，哪怕是初步的，浪费我们的时间或卖家的时间）。

我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内——关于我们是否有兴趣。我们更喜欢现金收购，但当我们获得与付出同等的内在商业价值时，我们也会考虑发行股票。

我们最喜欢的购买形式是符合布林金-弗里德曼-赫尔德曼模式的。在这种情况下，公司的所有者兼经理希望产生大量现金，有时是为了自己，但通常是为了他们的家人或不活跃的股东。同时，这些经理希望保持重要所有者的身份，并继续像过去一样经营他们的公司。我们认为我们特别适合有这些目标的所有者。我们邀请潜在的卖家通过联系与我们过去有业务往来的人来考察我们。

查理和我经常收到关于不符合我们测试标准的收购提议：我们发现如果你登广告说想买柯利牧羊犬，很多人会打电话来想卖给你他们的可卡犬。我们对新创企业、扭亏为盈或竞价式销售的兴趣，最好用戈尔迪的话来表达：“请把我排除在外。”

除了有兴趣按上述描述购买企业外，我们也有兴趣通过谈判购买大量但非控股的股票，类似于我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空和冠军国际所持有的股份。去年我们说过，我们对大量购买可转换优先股有特殊兴趣。我们仍有这种胃口，但有限，因为我们现在已经接近我们认为适合此类投资的最大头寸。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

两年前，我告诉过你们关于哈利·博特尔的事，他在1962年迅速解决了我的第一家工业公司——邓普斯特风车制造（我的一次“廉价”购买）——的重大业务混乱，24年后他又出现，再次拯救了我，这次是解决K&W产品公司的问题，伯克希尔一家生产汽车化合物的子公司。正如我之前报告的，哈利在短时间内减少了K&W的资本占用，理顺了生产，削减了成本，并使利润翻了两番。你可能以为他会喘口气。但去年，现年70岁的哈利参加了一场破产拍卖，以极低的价格收购了一条非常适合K&W的产品线。这家公司的盈利能力可能会因此举提高50%。敬请关注这个版面，了解哈利未来胜利的报道。

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我们的庄家——亨德森兄弟公司（HBI）的吉姆·马奎尔——在纽约证券交易所交易伯克希尔股票已逾一年，继续表现出色。在我们上市前，做市商价差通常是市场价格的3%或更多。吉姆将价差维持在50点或以下，按当前价格计算远低于1%。买卖股票的股东从交易成本的降低中显著受益。

因为我们对吉姆、HBI和纽交所的体验感到非常满意，我在纽交所系列广告中表达过这一点。通常我回避推荐语，但这次我很高兴公开赞扬交易所。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

去年夏天，我们卖掉了三年前花85万美元购买的公司飞机，又花了670万美元买了另一架二手飞机。你们中那些还记得第5页上细菌繁殖数学的人，肯定会感到恐慌：如果我们的净资产继续以当前速度增长，并且更换飞机的成本也继续以目前确定的100%年复利速度上升，那么用不了多久，伯克希尔的整个净资产就会被它的飞机消耗殆尽。

当我把飞机等同于细菌时，查理不喜欢这样；他觉得这对细菌是一种侮辱。他以时尚方式旅行的想法是一辆空调巴士，只有在票价便宜时他才会升级到这个奢侈品。我本人对飞机的态度可以用一段祈祷文来概括，这段祈祷文据称（我确信是杜撰的）出自圣奥古斯丁，当时他正考虑放弃世俗享乐去当牧师。在理智和欲望的冲突中挣扎，他恳求道：“主啊，帮助我变得贞洁——但还不是现在。”

给飞机起名并不容易。我最初建议叫“查尔斯·T·芒格号”。查理回击说叫“反常号”。我们最终定为“难以辩护号”。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

大约96.9%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1989年的股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划进行的捐款总额为590万美元，有2,550家慈善机构受益。

我们敦促新股东阅读第52-53页关于我们股东指定捐款计划的描述。如果您希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈敦促您立即确保您的股票以实际所有者的名义注册，而不是以经纪商、银行或存管机构的提名名义。未能在1990年8月31日如此注册的股份将没有资格参加1990年的计划。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

今年的年度会议将于1990年4月30日星期一上午9:30举行。去年参会人数增长到大约1,000人，非常接近乔斯林博物馆威瑟斯彭厅的座位容量。因此，今年的会议将移至奥芬剧院举行，该剧院位于奥马哈市中心，距离红狮酒店约四分之一英里。Radisson-Redick Tower是一家规模较小但不错的酒店，位于奥芬剧院对面。或者您可能希望入住万豪酒店，该酒店位于奥马哈西部，距离波仙珠宝店约100码。我们将在万豪酒店安排巴士，于8:30和8:45出发前往会场，并在会议结束后返回。

查理和我一直很喜欢这次会议，我们希望您能参加。我们股东的质量体现在我们收到的提问质量上：我们从未在任何一个年会上看到过如此一贯高水平的、与所有者相关的智慧型问题。

我们的代理材料中的附件说明了如何获得参加会议所需的门卡。由于工作日奥芬剧院周边停车位可能紧张，我们为股东安排了许多附近的停车场。附件中也包含了相关信息。

像往常一样，会议结束后我们将安排巴士送您前往内布拉斯加家具城和波仙珠宝店，稍后再送您前往市区酒店或机场。我希望您能留出充足的时间充分探索这两家商店的魅力。提前到达的您可以在周中任何一天参观家具城；周六开放时间为上午10点至下午5:30，周日为中午12点至下午5:30。

波仙珠宝店通常周日不营业，但在4月29日周日，我们将为股东和嘉宾开放，营业时间为中午12点至下午6点。艾克喜欢展示，您可以相信他会为我们股东准备一些非常特别的东西。

在这封信中，我们谈了很多关于复利速度的问题。如果您能忍受让您自己的利率在某一天变为负数——我承认这不是一个愉快的想法——那就在29日去拜访艾克吧。

1990年3月2日

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席