伯克希尔·哈撒韦 1997 年股东信

Title: 1997 Letter

Part 1/2

1997 Chairman’s Letter

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually. *

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996.  The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move on. But last year’s performance was no great triumph: Any investor can chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.

So what’s our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our appraisal of 1997’s performance, then: Quack.

When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal income tax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth.

Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won’t be able to lick that handicap every year. But we expect over time to maintain a modest advantage over the Index, and that is the yardstick against which you should measure us. We will not ask you to adopt the philosophy of the Chicago Cubs fan who reacted to a string of lackluster seasons by saying, “Why get upset? Everyone has a bad century now and then.”

Gains in book value are, of course, not the bottom line at Berkshire. What truly counts are gains in per-share intrinsic business value. Ordinarily, though, the two measures tend to move roughly in tandem, and in 1997 that was the case: Led by a blow-out performance at GEICO, Berkshire’s intrinsic value (which far exceeds book value) grew at nearly the same pace as book value.

For more explanation of the term, intrinsic value, you may wish to refer to our Owner’s Manual, reprinted on pages 62 to 71. This manual sets forth our owner-related business principles, information that is important to all of Berkshire’s shareholders.

In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire’s operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 69 and 70), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

Pundits who ignore what our 38,000 employees contribute to the company, and instead simply view Berkshire as a de facto investment company, should study the figures in the second column. We made our first business acquisition in 1967, and since then our pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $1 million to $888 million. Furthermore, as noted, in this exercise we have assigned all of Berkshire’s corporate expenses—overhead of $6.6 million, interest of $66.9 million and shareholder contributions of $15.4 million—to our business operations, even though a portion of these could just as well have been assigned to the investment side.

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

During 1997, both parts of our business grew at a satisfactory rate, with investments increasing by $9,543 per share, or 33.5%, and operating earnings growing by $296.43 per share, or 70.3%. One important caveat: Because we were lucky in our super-cat insurance business (to be discussed later) and because GEICO’s underwriting gain was well above what we can expect in most years, our 1997 operating earnings were much better than we anticipated and also more than we expect for 1998.

Our rate of progress in both investments and operations is certain to fall in the future. For anyone deploying capital, nothing recedes like success. My own history makes the point: Back in 1951, when I was attending Ben Graham’s class at Columbia, an idea giving me a $10,000 gain improved my investment performance for the year by a full 100 percentage points. Today, an idea producing a $500 million pre-tax profit for Berkshire adds one percentage point to our performance. It’s no wonder that my annual results in the 1950s were better by nearly thirty percentage points than my annual gains in any subsequent decade. Charlie’s experience was similar. We weren’t smarter then, just smaller. At our present size, any performance superiority we achieve will be minor.

We will be helped, however, by the fact that the businesses to which we have already allocated capital—both operating subsidiaries and companies in which we are passive investors—have splendid long-term prospects. We are also blessed with a managerial corps that is unsurpassed in ability and focus. Most of these executives are wealthy and do not need the pay they receive from Berkshire to maintain their way of life. They are motivated by the joy of accomplishment, not by fame or fortune.

Though we are delighted with what we own, we are not pleased with our prospects for committing incoming funds. Prices are high for both businesses and stocks. That does not mean that the prices of either will fall—we have absolutely no view on that matter—but it does mean that we get relatively little in prospective earnings when we commit fresh money.

Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his “best” cell, he knew, would allow him to bat .400; reaching for balls in his “worst” spot, the low outside corner of the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.

If they are in the strike zone at all, the business “pitches” we now see are just catching the lower outside corner. If we swing, we will be locked into low returns. But if we let all of today’s balls go by, there can be no assurance that the next ones we see will be more to our liking. Perhaps the attractive prices of the past were the aberrations, not the full prices of today. Unlike Ted, we can’t be called out if we resist three pitches that are barely in the strike zone; nevertheless, just standing there, day after day, with my bat on my shoulder is not my idea of fun.

Unconventional Commitments

When we can’t find our favorite commitment—a well-run and sensibly-priced business with fine economics—we usually opt to put new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality. Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price. Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make money—the only question being when. With alternative investments, we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.

We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95. Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no opinion as to its attractiveness.

Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I have followed the metal’s fundamentals but not owned it. In recent years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver’s value.

Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6 billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros. Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in yearend book value.

In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful. However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment—not to avoid embarrassment—and we will occasionally make an unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.

How We Think About Market Fluctuations

A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer themselves.

But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the “hamburgers” they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.

For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire “saves” for them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make these buys, the more profitable our owners’ indirect savings program will be.

Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low, the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices benefitted Berkshire far more than do today’s repurchases, made at loftier prices.

At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire’s shares are held by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.

So smile when you read a headline that says “Investors lose as market falls.” Edit it in your mind to “Disinvestors lose as market falls—but investors gain.” Though writers often forget this truism, there is a buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other. (As they say in golf matches: “Every putt makes someone happy.”)

We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a corporate “saver,” Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities that get us truly excited.

Insurance Operations—Overview

What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound on that, though, let’s discuss “float” and how to measure its cost. Unless you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an informed judgment about Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

To begin with, float is money we hold but don’t own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company’s true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what’s presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire’s insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float—which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume—by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents’ balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money.

Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.

The expiration of several large contracts will cause our float to decline during the first quarter of 1998, but we expect it to grow substantially over the long term. We also believe that our cost of float will continue to be highly favorable.

Super-Cat Insurance

Occasionally, however, the cost of our float will spike severely. That will occur because of our heavy involvement in the super-cat business, which by its nature is the most volatile of all insurance lines. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies purchase in order to limit their losses when mega-catastrophes strike. Berkshire is the preferred market for sophisticated buyers: When the “big one” hits, the financial strength of super-cat writers will be tested, and Berkshire has no peer in this respect.

Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years—and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility—it’s a certainty. The only question is when it will come.

Last year, we were very lucky in our super-cat operation. The world suffered no catastrophes that caused huge amounts of insured damage, so virtually all premiums that we received dropped to the bottom line. This pleasant result has a dark side, however. Many investors who are “innocents”—meaning that they rely on representations of salespeople rather than on underwriting knowledge of their own—have come into the reinsurance business by means of purchasing pieces of paper that are called “catastrophe bonds.” The second word in this term, though, is an Orwellian misnomer: A true bond obliges the issuer to pay; these bonds, in effect, are contracts that lay a provisional promise to pay on the purchaser.

This convoluted arrangement came into being because the promoters of the contracts wished to circumvent laws that prohibit the writing of insurance by entities that haven’t been licensed by the state. A side benefit for the promoters is that calling the insurance contract a “bond” may also cause unsophisticated buyers to assume that these instruments involve far less risk than is actually the case.

Truly outsized risks will exist in these contracts if they are not properly priced. A pernicious aspect of catastrophe insurance, however, makes it likely that mispricing, even of a severe variety, will not be discovered for a very long time. Consider, for example, the odds of throwing a 12 with a pair of dice—1 out of 36. Now assume that the dice will be thrown once a year; that you, the “bond-buyer,” agree to pay $50 million if a 12 appears; and that for “insuring” this risk you take in an annual “premium” of $1 million. That would mean you had significantly underpriced the risk. Nevertheless, you could go along for years thinking you were making money—indeed, easy money. There is actually a 75.4% probability that you would go for a decade without paying out a dime. Eventually, however, you would go broke.

In this dice example, the odds are easy to figure. Calculations involving monster hurricanes and earthquakes are necessarily much fuzzier, and the best we can do at Berkshire is to estimate a range of probabilities for such events. The lack of precise data, coupled with the rarity of such catastrophes, plays into the hands of promoters, who typically employ an “expert” to advise the potential bond-buyer about the probability of losses. The expert puts no money on the table. Instead, he receives an up-front payment that is forever his no matter how inaccurate his predictions. Surprise: When the stakes are high, an expert can invariably be found who will affirm—to return to our example—that the chance of rolling a 12 is not 1 in 36, but more like 1 in 100. (In fairness, we should add that the expert will probably believe that his odds are correct, a fact that makes him less reprehensible—but more dangerous.)

The influx of “investor” money into catastrophe bonds—which may well live up to their name—has caused super-cat prices to deteriorate materially. Therefore, we will write less business in 1998. We have some large multi-year contracts in force, however, that will mitigate the drop. The largest of these are two policies that we described in last year’s report—one covering hurricanes in Florida and the other, signed with the California Earthquake Authority, covering earthquakes in that state. Our “worst-case” loss remains about $600 million after-tax, the maximum we could lose under the CEA policy. Though this loss potential may sound large, it is only about 1% of Berkshire’s market value. Indeed, if we could get appropriate prices, we would be willing to significantly increase our “worst-case” exposure.

Our super-cat business was developed from scratch by Ajit Jain, who has contributed to Berkshire’s success in a variety of other ways as well. Ajit possesses both the discipline to walk away from business that is inadequately priced and the imagination to then find other opportunities. Quite simply, he is one of Berkshire’s major assets. Ajit would have been a star in whatever career he chose; fortunately for us, he enjoys insurance.

Insurance—GEICO (1-800-555-2756) and Other Primary Operations

Last year I wrote about GEICO’s Tony Nicely and his terrific management skills. If I had known then what he had in store for us in 1997, I would have searched for still greater superlatives. Tony, now 54, has been with GEICO for 36 years and last year was his best. As CEO, he has transmitted vision, energy and enthusiasm to all members of the GEICO family—raising their sights from what has been achieved to what can be achieved.

We measure GEICO’s performance by first, the net increase in its voluntary auto policies (that is, not including policies assigned us by the state) and, second, the profitability of “seasoned” auto business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year and are thus past the period in which acquisition costs cause them to be money-losers. In 1996, in-force business grew 10%, and I told you how pleased I was, since that rate was well above anything we had seen in two decades. Then, in 1997, growth jumped to 16%.

Below are the new business and in-force figures for the last five years:

Of course, any insurer can grow rapidly if it gets careless about underwriting. GEICO’s underwriting profit for the year, though, was 8.1% of premiums, far above its average. Indeed, that percentage was higher than we wish it to be: Our goal is to pass on most of the benefits of our low-cost operation to our customers, holding ourselves to about 4% in underwriting profit. With that in mind, we reduced our average rates a bit during 1997 and may well cut them again this year. Our rate changes varied, of course, depending on the policyholder and where he lives; we strive to charge a rate that properly reflects the loss expectancy of each driver.

GEICO is not the only auto insurer obtaining favorable results these days. Last year, the industry recorded profits that were far better than it anticipated or can sustain. Intensified competition will soon squeeze margins very significantly. But this is a development we welcome: Long term, a tough market helps the low-cost operator, which is what we are and intend to remain.

Last year I told you about the record 16.9% profit-sharing contribution that GEICO’s associates had earned and explained that two simple variables set the amount: policy growth and profitability of seasoned business. I further explained that 1996’s performance was so extraordinary that we had to enlarge the chart delineating the possible payouts. The new configuration didn’t make it through 1997: We enlarged the chart’s boundaries again and awarded our 10,500 associates a profit-sharing contribution amounting to 26.9% of their base compensation, or $71 million. In addition, the same two variables—policy growth and profitability of seasoned business—determined the cash bonuses that we paid to dozens of top executives, starting with Tony.

At GEICO, we are paying in a way that makes sense for both our owners and our managers. We distribute merit badges, not lottery tickets: In none of Berkshire’s subsidiaries do we relate compensation to our stock price, which our associates cannot affect in any meaningful way. Instead, we tie bonuses to each unit’s business performance, which is the direct product of the unit’s people. When that performance is terrific—as it has been at GEICO—there is nothing Charlie and I enjoy more than writing a big check.

GEICO’s underwriting profitability will probably fall in 1998, but the company’s growth could accelerate. We’re planning to step on the gas: GEICO’s marketing expenditures this year will top $100 million, up 50% from 1997. Our market share today is only 3%, a level of penetration that should increase dramatically in the next decade. The auto insurance industry is huge—it does about $115 billion of volume annually—and there are tens of millions of drivers who would save substantial money by switching to us.

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In the 1995 report, I described the enormous debt that you and I owe to Lorimer Davidson. On a Saturday early in 1951, he patiently explained the ins and outs of both GEICO and its industry to me—a 20-year-old stranger who’d arrived at GEICO’s headquarters uninvited and unannounced. Davy later became the company’s CEO and has remained my friend and teacher for 47 years. The huge rewards that GEICO has heaped on Berkshire would not have materialized had it not been for his generosity and wisdom. Indeed, had I not met Davy, I might never have grown to understand the whole field of insurance, which over the years has played such a key part in Berkshire’s success.

Davy turned 95 last year, and it’s difficult for him to travel. Nevertheless, Tony and I hope that we can persuade him to attend our annual meeting, so that our shareholders can properly thank him for his important contributions to Berkshire. Wish us luck.

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Though they are, of course, far smaller than GEICO, our other primary insurance operations turned in results last year that, in aggregate, were fully as stunning. National Indemnity’s traditional business had an underwriting profit of 32.9% and, as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had a profit of 24.3%. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded an underwriting profit of 14.1% even though it continued to absorb the expenses of geographical expansion. Rod’s three-year record is an amazing 15.1%. Berkshire’s workers’ compensation business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, had a modest underwriting loss in a difficult environment; its three-year underwriting record is a positive 1.5%. John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set a new volume record while generating good underwriting earnings. At Kansas Bankers Surety, Don Towle more than lived up to the high expectations we had when we purchased the company in 1996.

In aggregate, these five operations recorded an underwriting profit of 15.0%. The two Dons, along with Rod, Brad and John, have created significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 69 and 70, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

标题：1997年致股东信

第二部分

我们在年内进行的净卖出金额约占期初投资组合的5%。通过这些操作，我们显著减少了几项低于7.5亿美元列报门槛的持仓，同时也适度缩减了几项我们详细披露的大型持仓。1997年进行的一些出售旨在适度调整我们的债券与股票比例，以响应我们在两个市场中看到的相对价值，这一调整在1998年得到了延续。

需要补充的是，我们披露的持仓有时反映了GEICO的卢·辛普森的投资决策。卢独立管理着一个近20亿美元的股票投资组合，该组合有时会与我管理的组合重叠，并且偶尔他会做出与我不一致的操作。

尽管我们不试图预测股票市场的走势，但我们确实尝试以一种非常粗略的方式对其进行估值。在去年的股东大会上，当时道琼斯指数为7071点，长期国债收益率为6.89%，查理和我曾表示，如果（1）利率维持在当前水平或下降，且（2）美国企业继续实现近年来所录得的惊人股本回报率，那么我们认为市场并未被高估。到目前为止，利率已经下降——第一个条件已满足——股本回报率仍然异常高。如果它们保持在这个水平——并且如果利率维持在近期水平附近——就没有理由认为股票总体上被高估。另一方面，股本回报率能否维持在当前甚至接近当前的水平，并非确定无疑。

1979年夏天，当股票在我看来很便宜时，我为《福布斯》写了一篇文章，题为“在股市中，你为乐观共识付出了非常高昂的代价”。当时，怀疑主义和失望情绪盛行，我的观点是投资者应该对此感到高兴，因为悲观情绪会将价格压低到真正有吸引力的水平。然而，现在我们却拥有一个非常乐观的共识。这并不一定意味着现在不是买入股票的好时机：美国企业界的盈利能力远高于几年前，并且在利率较低的环境下，每一美元的盈利都变得更有价值。不过，当前的价格水平已经严重侵蚀了本·格雷厄姆所认定的、作为明智投资基石的“安全边际”。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

在去年的年报中，我讨论了我们的最大持仓——可口可乐。可口可乐在全球的市场主导地位持续增强，但令人痛心的是，它失去了那位为其卓越业绩负责的领导者。自1981年起担任可口可乐CEO的罗伯托·戈伊苏埃塔于十月去世。在他去世后，我阅读了过去九年间他写给我的每一封信和便条，超过100封。这些信息堪称商业和生活成功的指南。

在这些通信中，罗伯托展现出了卓越而清晰的战略愿景，始终致力于提升可口可乐股东的利益。罗伯托清楚他将把公司带向何方，知道如何实现目标，并明白为何这条道路对其所有者最为有利——同样重要的是，他对于实现目标怀有强烈的紧迫感。他写给我的一封手写信中的摘录说明了这一点：“顺便说一句，我告诉奥尔吉塔，她所谓的痴迷，你称之为专注。我非常喜欢你的说法。” 像所有认识罗伯托的人一样，我会深深地思念他。

出于对公司利益的关心，罗伯托在远未到必要之时就为无缝交接做好了准备。罗伯托知道道格·伊维斯特是接替他的合适人选，并多年来与道格共同努力，确保换届时公司的发展势头不会丧失。可口可乐公司在道格的领导下，将如同在罗伯托领导下一样，是一台势不可挡的碾压机。

可转换优先股

两年前，我向大家介绍了我们在1987年至1991年间通过私募购买的五只可转换优先股的最新情况。在那次报告时，我们出售所持的冠军国际已实现小额利润。剩余的四项优先股投资包括：我们已转换为普通股且持有大量未实现收益的吉列和第一帝国银行，以及另外两只问题频发的全美航空和所罗门。有时，后两者让我想起一句乡村歌曲的歌词：“如果你不走开，我怎么会想念你？”

自从我上次报告以来，所有四项持仓的价值都显著增长。吉列和第一帝国的普通股随着公司卓越的业绩表现而大幅上涨。截至年底，我们1989年投入吉列的6亿美元已增值至48亿美元，而1991年投入第一帝国的4000万美元已增至2.36亿美元。

与此同时，我们的两只落后股也以非常显著的方式焕发了生机。所罗门最近与旅行者集团合并，这笔交易终于回报了其长期受苦的股东。伯克希尔的所有股东——包括我个人在内——都深深感谢德里克·莫恩和鲍勃·德纳姆，首先，他们在1991年丑闻后拯救所罗门免于灭亡发挥了关键作用；其次，他们将公司的活力恢复到足以使其成为旅行者有吸引力的收购目标。我常说我愿意与我喜欢、信任和钦佩的管理者共事。没有比德里克和鲍勃更符合这一描述的人了。

伯克希尔在本次所罗门投资上的最终结果尚需时日才能清算，但可以肯定地说，结果将远比我两年前预期的要好。回顾过去，我认为我在所罗门的经历既迷人又有启发性，尽管在1991-92年间有一段时间，我感觉自己就像那位写剧评的评论家：“我本会享受这部剧，只可惜我的座位不佳——它正对着舞台。”

全美航空的复苏堪称奇迹。那些关注我在此次投资中行动的人知道，我留下了一段毫无成功可言的记录。最初购买股票是错误的，之后不断试图以50美分兑1美元的价格抛售我们的持股也是错误的。

公司的两项变化与其显著的反弹同时发生：1）查理和我离开了董事会；2）斯蒂芬·沃尔夫成为首席执行官。幸运的是，对我们的自尊心而言，第二个事件是关键：斯蒂芬·沃尔夫在航空公司的成就是非凡的。

全美航空仍有许多工作要做，但生存已不再是问题。因此，该公司在1997年补足了我们的优先股股息拖欠，并增加了额外支付以补偿我们遭受的延迟。此外，公司的普通股已从4美元的低点上涨至近期73美元的高点。

我们的优先股已接到通知将于3月15日赎回。但公司股票的上涨赋予了我们曾认为一文不值的转换权以巨大价值。现在几乎可以肯定，我们在全美航空的股份将产生可观的利润——也就是说，如果把购买胃药（Maalox）的费用排除在外的话——甚至收益可能相当可观。

下次我做出一个巨大而愚蠢的决定时，伯克希尔股东们就知道该怎么做了：给沃尔夫先生打电话。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

除了可转换优先股，我们在1991年还购买了一笔其他私募投资，即美国运通的3亿美元Percs。这种证券本质上是一种普通股，但在最初三年内有一个权衡：我们在那期间获得了额外的股息支付，但所能实现的股价升值也受到了上限限制。尽管有上限，但由于您的主席将运气和技巧——110%的运气，其余是技巧——相结合，这项持仓被证明异常有利可图。

我们的Percs原定于1994年8月转换为普通股，在转换前一个月，我一直在考虑是否在转换后卖出。持有的一个理由是，美国运通杰出的CEO哈维·戈卢布似乎有可能最大限度地发挥公司的潜力（自那以后，这一假设已被充分证明）。但这个潜力的大小存在疑问：美国运通面临着以Visa为首的众多发卡机构的激烈竞争。权衡各种论点，我倾向于出售。

这就是我走运的地方。在那个决策月里，我和赫兹公司的CEO弗兰克·奥尔森在缅因州普劳茨内克打高尔夫。弗兰克是一位杰出的管理者，对信用卡业务了如指掌。所以从第一洞发球台开始，我就向他请教行业情况。当我们打到第二洞果岭时，弗兰克已经说服我，美国运通的企业卡业务是一个非常出色的特许经营权，我也决定不卖出了。在后九洞，我变成了买家，在几个月内，伯克希尔拥有了该公司10%的股份。

我们现在在美国运通股票上获得了30亿美元的收益，我自然对弗兰克充满感激。但我们的共同朋友乔治·吉莱斯皮说，我对感激的对象搞错了。毕竟，他指出，是他安排了这场球局，并把我分配到了弗兰克那组。

致股东的季度报告

在去年的信中，我描述了我们在邮寄季度报告方面日益增长的成本，以及向“代理人名义”股东递送报告时遇到的问题。我征求了大家对是否继续印刷报告的意见，因为我们现在已经在互联网上发布季度和年度通讯，网址是www.berkshirehathaway.com。回应的股东相对较少，但很明显，至少有一小部分需要季度信息的股东没有兴趣从互联网上获取。作为长期患有科技恐惧症的人，我对此感同身受。

然而，出版季报的成本持续膨胀，因此我们决定只向提出要求的股东发送印刷版本。如果您希望收到季报，请填写本报告内附的回函卡。同时，请放心，所有股东将继续收到印刷版的年度报告。

喜欢使用电脑的各位可以查看我们的主页。它包含大量关于伯克希尔的当前信息以及自1977年以来所有的年度致股东信。此外，我们的网站还包含指向许多伯克希尔子公司主页的链接。在这些网站上，您可以了解更多关于我们子公司产品的信息，并且——是的——还可以直接下单购买。

我们被要求在每季度结束后45天内向SEC提交季度信息。我们在互联网上发布通讯的目标之一，是使这些重要信息——完整详细且未经媒体过滤的形式——能在市场关闭时同时提供给所有相关方。因此，我们计划于1998年5月15日、8月14日和11月13日这三个星期五向SEC提交季度信息，并在当天晚上将这些信息发布在互联网上。这一程序将使我们所有的股东，无论是直接持有还是“代理人名义”持有，都处于平等地位。同样，我们将在1999年3月13日（星期六）将1998年年报发布在互联网上，并大致在同一时间邮寄印刷版。

股东指定捐款计划

约97.7%的合格股份参与了伯克希尔1997年的股东指定捐款计划。捐款总额为1540万美元，共有3830家慈善机构受益。该计划的完整描述见第52-53页。

在该计划实施的17年间，伯克希尔已根据股东的指示累计捐款1.131亿美元。伯克希尔其余部分的捐赠由我们的子公司进行，它们遵循被收购前的慈善模式（但其前所有者自身负责其个人慈善事宜）。总体而言，我们的子公司在1997年捐赠了810万美元，其中包括价值440万美元的实物捐赠。

每年都有少数股东错过我们的捐款计划，因为他们未能在规定的登记日以自己名义登记股份，或者未能在允许的60天内将指定表格寄回给我们。查理和我对此感到遗憾。但如果迟到的回复被接收，我们不得不拒绝，因为我们不能对某些股东破例而拒绝其他股东。

要参与未来的计划，您必须拥有以实际所有者名义登记的A类股票，而不是以经纪人、银行或存管机构的代名人名义登记。未在1998年8月31日如此登记的股份将无资格参与1998年的计划。当您从我们这里收到捐款表格时，请及时寄回，以免搁置一旁或被遗忘。

年会

伯克希尔的伍德斯托克周末将于今年5月2日至4日举行。压轴大戏将是年会，于5月4日星期一上午9:30开始。去年我们在Aksarben体育馆举行会议，我们的员工和参会者都对场地非常满意。只有一次危机：会议前一天晚上，我失声了，这正中了查理最疯狂的幻想。第二天早上我出现时嗓子恢复了，他失望极了。

去年约有7500人参加了会议。他们来自所有50个州以及16个国家，包括澳大利亚、巴西、以色列、沙特阿拉伯、新加坡和希腊。考虑到几个备用房间，我们相信可以容纳超过11000人，这应该足以应对今年，尽管我们的股东人数已显著增加。Aksarben的停车位充足，音响效果极佳，座位舒适。

会场大门将于周一上午7点开放，8点30分我们将再次放映由我们的首席财务官马克·汉伯格制作的电影史诗世界首映。会议将持续到下午3点30分，中午有短暂休息。这段时间可以让疲惫的人悄悄离开，也让铁杆股东有时间在Aksarben的售货亭吃午餐。查理和我喜欢回答股东的问题，所以请提出您心中的任何疑问。

伯克希尔的产品将再次在会议厅外的走廊里出售。去年——不是说我关注这类事情——我们再次创下了销售纪录，卖出了2500磅喜诗糖果、1350双戴克斯特鞋、价值75000美元的世界百科全书及相关出版物，以及888套奎库特刀具。我们还接受了一条新服装线的订单，上面印有我们的伯克希尔标志，并售出了约1000件马球衫、运动衫和T恤。在今年的会议上，我们将推出1998年系列。

GEICO将再次设立展位，由来自其地区办事处的明星员工提供服务。了解您是否可以通过将汽车保险转到GEICO来节省开支。大约40%查询的人发现有可能节省费用。比例不是100%，因为保险公司在承保判断上存在差异，有些保险公司比我们更偏爱生活在某些地理区域和从事某些职业的驾驶员。然而，我们相信，我们提供低价的可能性比任何其他面向所有投保人的全国性承运商都要频繁。在随附本报告一同寄送的GEICO信息资料中，您会看到在38个州，我们现在向股东提供高达8%的特别折扣。我们还在申请将此项折扣扩展到其他州的驾驶员。

随附本报告的代理材料附件说明了如何获取参加会议所需的入场卡。我们预计参会人数众多，请及时预订机票、酒店和租车服务。美国运通（800-799-6634）将乐意为您安排。像往常一样，我们将在较大的酒店安排大巴，接送您往返会场，并在会议结束后送您到内布拉斯加家具城、波仙珠宝店和机场。不过，您可能还是会觉得自己开车更方便。

NFM的主店位于距Aksarben约一英里处一个占地75英亩的地块上，工作日营业时间为上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至下午6点，周日中午12点至下午6点。在5月1日至5月5日期间，向NFM出示随会议门票附上的优惠券的股东，将有权获得通常仅限其员工享受的折扣。

波仙珠宝店通常周日休息，但将在5月3日上午10点至下午6点专为股东开放。去年是我们第二好的股东日，仅次于1996年。我认为这种下滑是反常现象，希望今年你们能证明我是对的。查理将到场为大家签名。不过，只有在他签名的纸是波仙珠宝店的销售小票时，他才会微笑。希望在周六（上午10点至下午5点30分）或周一（上午10点至晚上8点）光顾的股东，请务必表明自己是伯克希尔的所有者，以便波仙珠宝店的CEO苏珊·雅克能特别欢迎您。我还要补充一点，苏珊在1997年取得了非凡的业绩。作为管理者，她正是所有者所期望的一切。

周日下午，我们还将在波仙珠宝店外的商场里为桥牌爱好者准备一份特别的惊喜。在那里，鲍勃·哈曼——三十多年来桥牌界的传奇人物——将接受所有挑战者的挑战。加入进来，用您的牌技让鲍勃眼花缭乱吧。

我最喜欢的牛排馆Gorat’s一年只在一个周日营业——那就是为伯克希尔股东在年会前夜开放。去年，餐厅从下午4点开始供应，一直持续到凌晨1点30分左右，这场耐力考验是由于接受了1100份预订，而其座位容量仅为235个。如果您预订了座位但无法出席，请务必及时告知Gorat’s，因为他们为帮助我们付出了巨大努力，我们希望予以回报。您可以从4月1日起（但不得早于）拨打402-551-3733进行预订。去年因为嗓子问题，我不得不提前离开Gorat’s，但今年我计划悠闲地品尝每一口五分熟的丁骨牛排和双份薯饼。

这场热身之后，查理和我将前往114街的冰雪皇后，就在道奇街南面。奥马哈市区有12家很棒的冰雪皇后，但114街的那家最适合接待我们预期的大批人群。店铺南边的街道两边有数百个停车位。此外，这家冰雪皇后将把周日的营业时间延长至晚上11点，以满足我们股东的需求。

114街的这家店现在由两姐妹康妮·伯奇和黛布·诺沃特尼经营，她们的祖父在1962年建起了这栋楼，当时那里还是城市的边缘地带。她们的母亲简·诺布尔在1972年接手，现在康妮和黛布是第三代所有者兼经营者。简、康妮和黛布周日晚都会在场，我希望大家能见见她们。如果进不了Gorat’s，就尝尝她们的一个汉堡吧。然后，大约八点钟，和我一起点一份“尘埃圣代”作为甜点。这是本人的特色推荐——冰雪皇后会提供我的食谱——仅在股东周日提供。

奥马哈皇家队和阿尔伯克基公爵队将于5月2日周六晚上在罗森布拉特体育场进行棒球比赛。和往常一样，您的主席将无耻地利用他拥有该队25%所有权的事实，登上投手丘。但今年你们会看到一些新花样。

在过去的比赛中，令观众大惑不解的是，我总是拒绝接球手的第一次叫停。他总是要求我投出我的大弧度曲线球，而我总是回绝。相反，我投出的是一记可怜的直球，在我状态最好的时候，球速也只有每小时8英里（顺风时）。

我不愿意投曲线球是有故事的。你们有些人可能知道，坎迪·卡明斯在1867年发明了曲线球，并在全国协会中取得了巨大成功，在那个赛季他至少赢得了28场比赛。然而，这种投球方式立即受到了最高当局的批评，即当时的哈佛大学校长查尔斯·艾略特，他宣称：“我听说今年我们哈佛赢得了棒球冠军，因为我们有一位能投漂亮曲线球的投手。我还被告知，曲线球的目的是故意欺骗击球手。哈佛不从事教导欺骗的勾当。”（我不是在编造这个故事。）

自从我了解到艾略特校长在这个问题上的道德教诲后，我一直严格约束自己，避免使用我的曲线球，不管它可能对可怜的击球手产生多么毁灭性的影响。然而，现在是时候让我的业力碾压艾略特的教条，让我不再克制了。周六晚上来球场吧，惊叹于我投出的曲线球那雄伟的弧线吧。

我们的代理声明中包含了获取比赛门票的信息。我们还将提供一份信息包，介绍当地的热门景点，当然也包括那12家冰雪皇后。

五月来奥马哈吧——这个资本主义的摇篮——享受快乐时光。

1998年2月27日

沃伦·E·巴菲特 董事会主席