• 1999年股东大会
  • 上午场
    • 1. 正式会议开始
• 1999 Annual Meeting
  • Morning Session
    • 1. Formal business meeting begins
    • 2. 通用再保险CEO罗恩·弗格森拒绝加入董事会
    • 2. General Re CEO Ron Ferguson declined to join board
    • 3. 担任公司董事的不利之处
    • 3. Disadvantages of being a corporate director
    • 4. 伯克希尔董事当选
    • 4. Berkshire directors elected
    • 5. 正式会议休会
    • 5. Formal business meeting adjourns
    • 6. 我们收购企业，不预测股价走势
    • 6. We buy businesses and don’t predict stock moves
    • 7. 预计通用再保险浮存金短期增长缓慢
    • 7. Expecting slow short-term growth of Gen Re’s float
    • 8. 伯克希尔对长期资本管理公司的巨额收购要约为何失败
    • 8. How Berkshire’s enormous bid for Long-Term Capital Management failed
    • 9. 真正的第一只对冲基金
    • 9. The true first hedge fund
    • 10. 长期资本管理公司：聪明人用衍生品冒的愚蠢风险
    • 10. LTCM: Smart people’s dumb risks with derivatives
    • 11. 估算伯克希尔内在价值的”正确方法”
    • 11. “Right approach” to estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value
    • 12. 互联网将产生巨大影响，但难以预测赢家
    • 12. Internet will have a huge impact, but hard to predict winners
    • 13. 巴菲特赞扬分析师爱丽丝·施罗德
    • 13. Buffett praises analyst Alice Schroeder
    • 14. 目标相同但不同的薪酬计划
    • 1999年度股东大会
    • 第2部分，共6部分
    • 18. 公司对“腐败的”股票期权会计上瘾
    • 19. 巴菲特为何在1969年解散了他的合伙公司
    • 20. 巴菲特音乐之家
    • 21. 发现一个伟大的行业并不能保证你赚钱
    • 22. 感谢股东们
    • 23. 你是否曾厌倦过成为沃伦·巴菲特？
    • 24. 商誉成本应保留在账面上
    • 25. “我们不是做白衣骑士生意的”
    • 26. 中国提供了机会，但难以挑选赢家
    • 27. 我们更倾向于收购公司，但股票提供更多便宜货
    • 28. 没有很多钱也能“富有”
    • 29. “我们搞砸了” 医药股
    • 30. 芒格为制药公司“近乎离谱的金钱”辩护
    • 31. 巴菲特为何购买少量某些股票
    • 32. 为什么一些股东能更早收到年报
    • 33. 许多公司的“欺骗性会计”
    • 34. 我们保险公司的财务实力是一个巨大优势
    • 35. GEICO和Executive Jet提升了内在价值
    • 35. GEICO and Executive Jet boosted intrinsic value
    • 36. 无需“培养”潜在的巴菲特接班人
    • 36. No need to “groom” potential Buffett successors
    • 37. 一种在不干扰市场的情况下将伯克希尔加入标普500的方法
    • 37. One way to add Berkshire to S&P 500 without market disruption
    • 38. 进行国际收购需要什么条件
    • 38. What we’d need to make an international acquisition
    • 39. 尽管市盈率高和美元走强，仍看好可口可乐
    • 39. Bullish on Coca-Cola despite high P/E and dollar strength
    • 40. 对伯克希尔投资白银无话可说
    • 40. Nothing to say about Berkshire’s investment in silver
    • 41. 2000年电脑问题不会成为“大问题”
    • 41. Year 2000 computer problem won’t be a “big deal”
    • 42. 日本的经济低迷不影响伯克希尔
    • 42. Japan’s economic slump doesn’t affect Berkshire
    • 43. 芒格关于不容忍会计“马虎”的教训
    • 43. Munger’s lesson on not allowing accounting “slop”
    • 44. 分析师覆盖不会影响伯克希尔的股价
    • 44. Analyst coverage won’t affect Berkshire’s stock
    • 45. Executive Jet的优势
    • 45. Executive Jet’s advantage
  • 下午场
    • 1. 通用再保险的好处需要几年才能显现
  • Afternoon Session
    • 1. General Re benefits won’t be felt for several years
    • 4. “最佳贡献”是低成本的商品和服务
    • 5. 对石油或白银没有“洞察”
    • 6. 有线电视系统：到目前为止，前景多于成果
    • 7. 巴菲特和芒格在继承财富的影响上存在分歧
    • 8. 避开科技股：“我们愿意用一个大的回报去换取一个确定的回报”
    • 9. 不要“在真正心仪的公司之间跳进跳出”
    • 10. 通缩可能性不大，但如果发生，对债券持有人有利
    • 11. 市场是“相当”有效的，但有效市场理论是“愚蠢的”
    • 12. 我们努力快速增加低成本的浮存金
    • 13. 伯克希尔不销售人寿保险的两个原因
    • 14. A股和B股之间的价格差异
    • 15. 投资建议：早开始，独立思考
    • 标题：1999年年度股东大会
    • 第5/6部分
    • 16. 巴菲特如何学习保险业务
    • 17. Unicover损失是通用再保险的“罕见失误”
    • 18. 伯克希尔回购可能性不大
    • 19. 强大的声誉将有助于我们开展互联网商务
    • 20. 管理层、护城河以及未来收益的确定性
    • 21. 伯克希尔B股可能相对A股折价交易
    • 22. “普通保险公司将继续保持非常普通”
    • 23. 中国：可口可乐和吉列的巨大增长潜力
    • 24. 芒格推荐一本关于巴菲特的书
    • 25. 烟草面临的威胁远大于制药
    • 26. 巴菲特的书籍推荐
    • 27. 预期互联网将产生“巨大影响”，但难以挑选赢家
    • 16. How Buffett learned the insurance business
    • 17. Unicover losses are “rare lapse” for General Re
    • 18. Berkshire buyback unlikely
    • 19. Strong reputation will help us with internet commerce
    • 20. Management, moats, and the certainty of future earnings
    • 21. Berkshire B can sell at a discount to the A shares
    • 28. “我们绝不会把钱交给别人打理”
    • 29. 卖出麦当劳是错误；事后剖析是好的
    • 30. “稍微”关注过医疗保险合作伙伴
    • 31. “新闻调查过程”有助于了解公司
    • 32. 通过不加干预为子公司创造价值
    • 33. 有价证券的内在价值
    • 34. 必须“非常仔细地”审视衍生品会计
    • 35. “我们不粉饰太平”

Title: 1999 Annual Meeting

Part 1/6

1999 Annual Meeting

Morning Session

1. Formal business meeting begins

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. Really delighted we can have this many people come out for a meeting. It says something, I think, about the way you regard yourself as owners. We’re going to hustle through the business meeting. And then Charlie and I will be here for six hours or until our candy runs out — (laughter) — to answer any questions you have. We have people in a number of remote locations. And we have ways of bringing them into the questions as well. Incidentally, if you hadn’t figured it out already, this hyperkinetic bundle of energy here on my left is Charlie Munger — (laughter) — our vice-chairman. (Applause) And we will now run through the business of the meeting. The meeting will now come to order. I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of the company. I welcome you to this 1999 annual meeting of shareholders. I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present, in addition to myself. And if you’ll stand up. It’s a little hard for me to see — there, right down here in the front row. We have Susan T. Buffett.

You stand and remain standing, please. (Applause) If you encourage her, she’ll sing another song. (Laughter) Howard G. Buffett. Don’t encourage him to sing a song. (Laughter and applause) Malcolm G. Chace. (Applause) Charlie, you’ve already met. Ronald L. Olson. Ron? (Applause) And Walter Scott Jr. (Applause) Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors. They’re available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire. Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting. She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday, representing 1,133,684 Class A Berkshire shares and 3,485,885 Class B Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders, as indicated on the cards.

That number of shares represents a quorum. And we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have. Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting, that was sent by first-class mail to all shareholders of record on March 5, 1999, being the record date of this meeting, there were 1,343,592 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. And 5,266,338 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 1,133,684 Class A shares and 3,485,885 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, thank you Forrest. The one item of business of this meeting is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them.

2. General Re CEO Ron Ferguson declined to join board

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to make one comment before we proceed to the election of directors. And that’s that in the General Re proxy material, material relating to the General Re merger, it was stated that the intention was to have Ron Ferguson, the CEO of General Re, join the board of Berkshire Hathaway. And that offer was extended, and still remains open, and will remain open for his lifetime and mine, at least, for Ron to join the board. After thinking about it, he decided that he preferred not to be on the board. And in that judgment, he concurs with my feelings, generally, about boards, in that they can restrict your — it can restrict your activities in purchase and sale of a stock. For example, if you do it in a six-month period, then you’re automatically in trouble with the — and you have to return any profit, as calculated in a rather peculiar way, to the company. It means that your compensation system is laid out for the world to see. There may be some tax restrictions, in terms of the deductibility of salary paid.

And so, Ron notified me a little bit before the proxy material went out that he preferred, at least, to defer any decision on joining the board.

3. Disadvantages of being a corporate director

WARREN BUFFETT: I can tell you that it has cost Berkshire significant money by the fact that Charlie and I have been on various boards, because your hands are tied, in many respects, even if you don’t have any knowledge of anything that might be of material, plus or minus — the very fact that it might be imputed to you, can restrict actions significantly. So, we make a point of not trying to be on very many boards. Charlie and I have only gone on boards where we have very significant investments by Berkshire. And sometimes those have caused us to take on a job that we didn’t intend originally, as that Salomon movie showed. So, Ron — the offer is a hundred percent open to Ron at any time. And if he changes his mind in any way, he will be on the board. But that explains the discrepancy between the actions that are being taken this morning and what was described as likely to happen in the proxy material.

4. Berkshire directors elected

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, with that explanation, I would like to recognize Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors. Walter? WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? Somebody should second it.

VOICE: I second the —

WARREN BUFFETT: We got a second out there, Susan?

VOICE: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, good. OK. It has been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? Long enough. Is there any discussion? Long enough. The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. Will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of election, a ballot on the election of directors, voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received? Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report.

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Friday, cast not less than 1,145,271 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds the majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors.

5. Formal business meeting adjourns

WARREN BUFFETT: After adjournment of the business meeting, I will respond to questions that you may have that relate to the business of Berkshire, but do not call for any action at this meeting. Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting. WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that this meeting be adjourned.

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

VOICES: I second the motion.

WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say “aye.”

AUDIENCE: Aye.

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed say, “I’m leaving.” No, say, “No,” I’m sorry. (Laughter) OK, the meeting is adjourned.

6. We buy businesses and don’t predict stock moves

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, we’ll move forward. (Applause) Thank you. I ask you, was Joe Stalin ever any better, I mean? (Laughter) We will — we have this room broken into eight zones, and then we have five more zones from various off-site locations. And we will move in order. We have microphones that you can go to, and we have a monitor at each microphone that will line people up. We will rotate around the 13 zones. There’s just one question per person. I’d ask that you identify yourself and state where you’re from. Now, you have to be a little careful on that because a lot of people will say that — who really aren’t — will say that they’re from Nebraska for status reasons. But — (laughter) — if you get beyond that, we will try to identify where everybody is from. And we’ll start off in zone 1, which is on the right here at the front.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Tim Spear (PH). And I’m from Hertfordshire, England. I was thinking in Ben Graham’s book, “The Intelligent Investor,” he spends the first couple of chapters discussing the level of the market and whether it was safe for investment. I was wondering what you think of the market today?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don’t — Charlie and I don’t think about the market. And Ben didn’t very much. I think he made a mistake to occasionally try and place a value on it. We look at individual businesses. And we don’t think of stocks as little items that wiggle around on the paper and that have charts attached to them. We think of them as parts of businesses. And it is true that, currently, we have great trouble finding businesses that we both like and where we like the management and that they — and find them at an attractive price. So, we do not find bargains in this market among the larger companies that are our universe. That is not a stock market forecast in any way, shape, or form. We have no idea whether the market is going to go up today, or next week, or next month, or next year. We do know that we will only buy things that we think make sense, in terms of the value that we receive for Berkshire. And when we can’t find things, the money piles up. And when we find — when we do find things, we pile in.

But the stock market — I know of no one that has been successful at — and really made a lot of money predicting the actions of the market itself. I know a lot of people who have done well picking businesses and buying them at sensible prices. And that’s what we’re hoping to do. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: How could you say it any better? (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but the question is whether you can say it better, Charlie. (Laughter)

7. Expecting slow short-term growth of Gen Re’s float

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll go to zone 2. That may be all you hear from him today. (Laughter) Get used to it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Could you give us a few hints about the incremental value of Gen Re’s float under the Berkshire Hathaway umbrella and the potential for the growth of Gen Re’s float over the long term?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Gen Re’s float, which is now available to Berkshire — it’s a hundred percent-owned subsidiary, although part of that float is attributable to Cologne, which is only an 83 percent-owned subsidiary of Gen Re and also Berkshire. But that, I would say, the incremental value today, because it’s under the Berkshire umbrella, is zero. Because we are bringing nothing to the party that Gen Re’s own investment people would not have brought to the party. We obviously think that there will be important incremental value over a long period of time. We — but when that value will appear or how much of it develops, is a matter that’s out of our hands. We, right now, have close to 24 billion in total invested assets at Gen Re and Cologne. Like I say, 83 percent of the Cologne part is ours and 17 percent is — belongs to somebody else. But we are bringing nothing to that party right now, in terms of any managerial skill that is going to add value. I would hope that over time, we would.

The second question, as to the growth of float, the growth of float at General Re and Cologne will certainly be very slow in the short term. The growth of float at GEICO will be significant, percentage-wise. The reinsurance business does not have the same potential for growth as we have at GEICO. And growth is much slower to come about, because there are longer-term contractual commitments — that people are reluctant to change reinsurers. And they should be. We agree with that. So you — at a level of 6 billion or so of premium volume and already 14 billion of float, you won’t have growth of float unless premium volume is — becomes significantly higher in the future. I think that will happen over time. It will not happen in the short term. Charlie? If I may interrupt your breakfast? (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter)

8. How Berkshire’s enormous bid for Long-Term Capital Management failed

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3. (Laughs) You could always direct your questions to Charlie, incidentally. (Laughs)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. Thank you for hosting another wonderful weekend. My name is Che Wai Woo (PH). I’m a proud shareholder from right here in Omaha. One of the most interesting financial news developments this previous year was the near collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital. I’d like to get your thoughts and Mr. Munger’s thoughts about how these private partnerships operate, what your thoughts about the Long-Term Capital deal, and also the Fed’s intervention to save it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, in that movie you saw, the time when Yellowstone was — when Old Faithful was performing in the background and Bill was trying to get me to watch that while I was on the phone — A lot of that trip was spent talking to New York about making a bid for, what we’ll call LTCM, Long-Term Capital Management. And the caption on that photo, incidentally, is known as the geezer and the geyser. (Laughter) And we were up in — we started in Alaska. And we were going down these canyons in a boat. And the captain saying, you know, “Let’s go over there and look at the sea lions.” And I say, “Let’s stay right where we are, where we got a satellite channel,” because I was trying to talk on the phone all the time. Charlie was in Hawaii. And we never did get a chance to talk during that whole period. I didn’t want to bother him with a little thing like a bid for 100 billion-plus of securities, and I couldn’t find him.

So it was — we were in an awkward place to pursue that. I think it’s possible that if I’d been in New York or Charlie had been in New York during that period, that our bid might have been accepted. There was just a report published within the last three or four days by a special committee representing the SEC, the Fed, I think, the Treasury and the CFTC — I think I’m right on those four. And it describes just a tiny bit of the events leading to the bid. It referred, on page 14, I remember, it talked about our transaction unraveling. It didn’t unravel from our side. I mean, we made a firm bid for 100 billion-plus of balance sheet assets and many hundreds of billions, in fact, over a trillion, of derivative contracts. And, you know, this was in a market where prices were moving around very dramatically. And with that bulk of assets there, we thought we made a fairly good bid for a 45-minute or hour period. I don’t think anybody else would’ve made the bid. But in any event, the people at LTCM took the position that they could not accept that bid.

And therefore, the New York Fed in — had a group, largely investment banks there at the Fed. And that afternoon, faced with the prospect that LTCM could not or would not accept our bid, they arranged another takeover arrangement where additional money was put in.

9. The true first hedge fund

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting. If you read that report, which is put together by these four very imminent bodies, I think on the first page, it says that the first so-called hedge fund — which is a term generally applied to entities like LTCM — first hedge fund was set up in 1949. And I probably read that or heard that 50 times in the last — particularly in the last year. And of course, that’s not true at all, and I’ve even pointed this out once or twice before. But Ben Graham had — and Jerry Newman — had a classical hedge fund back in the ’20s. And I worked for — I worked dually for a company called Graham-Newman Corp, which was a regulated investment company and Newman and Graham, which was an investment partnership with, I think, a 20 percent participation in profits and exactly the sort of entity that, today, is called a hedge fund. So, if you read anyplace that the hedge fund concept originated in 1949, presumably with A.W. Jones, it’s a — it’s not an accurate history.

There are now — I ran something that would generally be called a hedge fund. I didn’t like to think of it that way. I called it an investment partnership. But it would’ve been termed a hedge fund. Charlie ran one from about, what, 1963 to mid ’70s or thereabouts. And they have proliferated in a big way. Did he blink? (Laughter) There are now hundreds of them. And of course, it’s very enticing to any money manager to run, because if you do well, or even if you don’t do so well but the market does well, you can make a lot of money running one. This report that just came out has really nothing particularly harsh to say about the operation. So, I think you will see hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hedge funds. I think the current issue of Barron’s may have a recap of how a large group did in the first quarter. And there’s a lot of money in those funds. And there’s a huge incentive to form them. And there’s a huge incentive to go out and attract more money if you run one.

And when that condition exists in Wall Street, you can be sure that they won’t wither away. Charlie?

10. LTCM: Smart people’s dumb risks with derivatives

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what was interesting about that one is how talented the people were. And yet, they got in so much trouble. I think it also demonstrates that — I’d say, the general system of finance in America involving derivatives is irresponsible. There’s way too much risk in all these trillions of notational value sloshing around the world. There’s no clearing system, as there is in a commodities market. And I don’t think it’s the last convulsion we’re going to see in the derivatives game.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s fascinating, in that you had 16 extremely bright — I mean, extremely bright — people at the top of that. The average IQ would probably be as high or higher than organization you could find, among their top 16 people. They individually had decades of experience and collectively had centuries of experience in operating in these sort of securities in which the LTCM was invested. And they had a huge amount of money of their own, up. And probably a very high percentage of their net worth in almost every case, up. So here you had superbright, extremely experienced people operating with their own money. And, in effect, on that day in September, they were broke. And to me, that is absolutely fascinating. There was book written,“You Only Have to Get Rich Once.” It’s a great title. It’s not a very good book. Walter Gutman wrote it, but it — many years ago. But the title is right, you only have to get rich once. And why do people, very bright people, risk losing something that’s very important to them, to gain something that’s totally unimportant?

The added money has no utility whatsoever. And the money that was lost had enormous utility. And on top of that, reputation is tarnished and all of that sort of thing. So that the gain/loss ratio, in any real sense, is just incredible. I mean, it’s like playing Russian roulette. I mean, if you hand me a revolver with six bullets — or six chambers — and one bullet and you say, “Pull it once for a million dollars,” and I say, “No.” And then you say, “What is your price?” The answer is there is no price. And there shouldn’t be any price on taking the risk when you’re already rich, particularly, of failure and embarrassment and all of that sort of thing. But people repeatedly do it. And they do it — Whenever a bright person, a really bright person, goes broke that has a lot of money, it’s because of leverage. It — you simply — you basically can’t — it would be almost impossible to go broke without borrowed money being in the equation.

And as you know, at Berkshire, we’ve never used any real amount of borrowed money. Now, if we’d used somewhat more, you know, we’d be really rich. But if we’d used a whole lot more, we might have gotten in trouble some times. And there’s just no upside to it, you know? What’s two percentage points more, you know, on a given year, that year? And run the risk of real failure. But very bright people do it, and they do it consistently, and they will continue to do it. And as long as explosive-type instruments are out there, they will gravitate toward them. And particularly, people will gravitate toward them who have very little to lose, but who are operating with other people’s money. One of the things, for example, in the LTCM case — and Charlie mentioned it in terms of derivatives — in effect, there were ways found to get around the — and they were legal, obviously — to get around the margin requirements. Because risk arbitrage is a business that Charlie and I have been in for 40 years in one form or another.

And normally, that means putting up the money to buy the stock on the long side and then shorting something against it where you expect a merger or something to happen. But through derivatives, people have found out how to do that, essentially putting up no money, just by writing a derivative contract on both sides. And there are margin requirements, as you know, that the Fed promulgates that, I believe, still call for 50 percent equity on stock purchases. But those requirements do not apply if you arrange the transaction in derivative form. So that these billions of dollars of positions in equities, essentially, were being financed a hundred percent by the people who wrote the derivative contracts. And that leads to trouble. You know, 99 percent of the time it works. But, you know, 83 and a thirds percent of the time, it works to play Russian roulette with one bullet in there and six chambers. But neither 83 1/3 percent or 99 percent is good enough when there is no gain to offset the risk of loss. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would argue that there is a second factor that makes the situation dangerous. And that is that the accounting for being actively engaged in derivatives, interest rate swaps, et cetera is very weak. I think the Morgan Bank was the last holdout. And they finally flipped to a lenient standard of accounting that’s favored by people who are sharing in the profits from trading derivatives. And that’s why they like liberal accounting. So, you get an irresponsible clearing system, irresponsible accounting — this is not a good combination.

WARREN BUFFETT: JP Morgan shifted their accounting — I think — I’m not sure exactly when — around 1990. But Charlie and I, we probably became more familiar with that when we were back at Salomon. And this is absolutely standard. You know, it’s GAAP accounting. But it front-ends profits. And if you front-end profits and you pay people a percentage of the profits, you’re going to get some very interesting results, sometimes.

11. “Right approach” to estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Dan Kurs (PH) from Bonita Springs, Florida. You’ve given many clues to investors to help them calculate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I’ve attempted to calculate the intrinsic value of Berkshire using the discount of present value of its total look-through earnings. I’ve taken Berkshire’s total look-through earnings and adjusted them for normalized earnings at GEICO, the super-cat business, and General Re. Then I’ve assumed that Berkshire’s total look-through earnings will grow at 15 percent per annum on average for 10 years, 10 years per annum for years 11 through 20. And that earnings stop growing after year 20, resulting in a coupon equaling year 20 earnings from the 21st year onward. Lastly, I’ve discounted those estimated earnings stream at 10 percent to get an estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. My question is, is this a sound method? Is there a risk-free interest rate, such as a 30-year Treasury, which might be the more appropriate rate to use here, given the predictable nature of your consolidated income stream? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that is a very good question. Because that is the sort of way we think in terms of looking at other businesses. Investment is the process of putting out money today to get more money back at some point in the future. And the question is, how far in the future, how much money, and what is the appropriate discount rate to take it back to the present day and determine how much you pay? And I would say you’ve stated the approach — I couldn’t state it better myself. The exact figures you want to use, whether you want to use 15 percent gains in earnings or 10 percent gains in the second decade, I would — you know, I have no comment on those particular numbers. But you have the right approach. We would probably, in terms — we would probably use a lower discount factor in evaluating any business now, under present-day interest rates. Now, that doesn’t mean we would pay that figure once we use that discount number. But we would use that to establish comparability across investment alternatives.

So, if we were looking at 50 companies and making the sort of calculation that you just talked about, we would use a — we would probably use the long-term government rate to discount it back. But we wouldn’t pay that number after we discounted it back. We would look for appropriate discounts from that figure. But it doesn’t really make any difference whether you use a higher figure and then look across them or use our figure and look for the biggest discount. You’ve got the right approach. And then all you have to do is stick in the right numbers. And you mentioned, in terms of our clues, we try to give you all of information that we would find useful, ourselves, in evaluating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In our reports, you know, I can’t think of anything we leave out that, if Charlie and I had been away for a year and we were trying to figure out — look at the situation fresh, evaluate things — there’s, you know, there’s nothing, in my view, left out of our published materials.

Now, one important element in Berkshire, which is a secondary factor that gets into what you’re talking about there, is that because we retain all earnings and because we have a growth of float over time, we have a considerable amount of money to invest. And it really is the success with which we invest those retained earnings and growth and float that will have an important fact — that will be an important factor — in how fast our intrinsic value grows. And to an important extent, the — what happens there is out of our control. I mean, it does depend on the markets in which we operate. So, if our earnings, plus float, growth equals $3 billion, or something like that, in a current year — whether that $3 billion gets put to terrific use, satisfactory use, or no use at all, virtually, really depends, to a big extent, on external factors. It also depends, to some extent, on our energy and insights and so on. But the external world makes a big difference in the reinvestment rate. And, you know, your guess is as good as ours on that.

But if we run into favorable external circumstances, your calculation of intrinsic value should — would — result in a higher number than if we run into the kind of circumstances that we’ve had the last 12 months. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. For many decades around here, we’ve had roughly a hundred percent — more than a hundred percent — of book net worth in marketable securities and had a lot of wonderful wholly-owned subsidiaries, to boot. And then we’ve always had a very attractive place to put new money in as we generate it. Well, we still got the wonderful businesses. But we’re having trouble with the new money. But it’s not trouble, really, to have a pile of lovely money. (Laughter) This is not — I don’t think there should be tears in the house. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Have you ever run into any unlovely money, Charlie? (Laughter)

12. Internet will have a huge impact, but hard to predict winners

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Ronald Towell (PH). I’m from Brooklyn, New York, and very appreciative of your graciousness as a host for this wonderful weekend. My question has to do with the — (Applause) My question has to do with the retailing industry, particularly the department stores and mass merchants. My question has two parts. Without resorting to comments about specific companies, may I ask your opinion as to the long-term prospects for growth and profitability of this industry group? The second part of my question is, given the fact that it is difficult to pick up a newspaper or to be an investor without being bombarded by what is purported to be the potential for exponential growth in the internet e-business, particularly directly to consumers, which could possibly eat into the revenues of these retailers — And even if we assume a relatively low impact of, say, 5 to 10 percent revenue reductions, and given the fact that top-line growth is critical to any business, especially the bricks and mortar retailers, with their high proportions of fixed overhead, what advice could you give to a CEO of such a company?

And in turn, based on the proceeding scenario, what would be your opinion of the medium and long-term prospects for this industry?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question, too. And obviously, the internet is going to have an important impact on retailing. It will have a huge impact on some forms of retailing. Change them and maybe revolutionize them. I think there’s some other areas where it’ll — the impact will be less. But anytime we buy into a business, and anytime that we’ve bought in for some time, we have tried to think of what that business is going to look like in five, or 10, or 15 years. And we recognize that the internet, in many forms of retailing, is likely to pose such a threat that we simply wouldn’t want to get into the business. I mean, it — not that we can measure it perfectly. But there are a number of retailing operations that we think are threatened. And we do not think that’s the case in furniture retailing. And we have three very important operations there. We could be wrong. But so far, that, you know, that would be my judgment, that furniture retailing will not be hurt.

You’ve seen other forms of retailing where you’re already starting to see some inroads being made. But it’s just started. The internet is going to be a huge force in many arenas. But it’ll certainly be a huge force in retailing. Now, it may benefit us in certain areas. I would expect the internet to benefit Borsheims in a very big way. And you noticed in the movie that we talked about borsheims.com coming online in May. There’s something up there now. But you’ll see a new format within a month or so. Now, you might say in jewelry retailing, you know, with millions of things that you can click onto, 10 years from now, you know, who is going to be important in terms of online retailing of jewelry? I would argue that two firms have an enormous advantage going in. I would argue that Tiffany has such an advantage. We don’t own any Tiffany. But I would say that because of their name — brand names are going to mean very, very much when you have literally, you know, thousands and thousands of choices.

People can’t — they have to trust somebody. And I think that Tiffany has a name that people would trust. And I think Borsheims has a name that people would trust. And Borsheims sells jewelry a whole lot cheaper than Tiffany’s. So I would say that people who are price conscious, but also want to deal with a jeweler that they trust implicitly, will find their way to Borsheims in increasing numbers, over the internet. And I would say that people that like the blue box, you know, are going to find their way to Tiffany’s, over time. And they’ll pay more money. But I don’t see them going for Brand X and buying fine jewelry over the internet. So, I think that, with the brand that Borsheims has, and with careful nurturing of that brand, I would say that the internet offers Borsheims a chance to have the advantage in cost that comes from a huge one store location. And yet, also go into the homes of people in every part of the world. And that kind of a company should prosper. There are other of our companies, I worry about.

You know, I can worry about them being hurt in various ways. GEICO is going to be a big beneficiary of the internet. We already are developing substantial business through it. But I — if I were to buy into any retailing business, whether I was buying a stock of it or buying a whole business, I would think very hard about what people are going to be trying to do to that business through the internet. And you know, it affects real estate that is dedicated to retailing. If you substitute 5 percent of the retail volume via the internet, where real estate is essentially free, you know, you can have a store in every town in the world through the internet without having any rental expense. So, I would be — I would give a lot of thought to that if I were owning a lot of retail rental space. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it is tricky predicting the technological change. Either it will or won’t destroy some business. When I was young, the department stores had a bunch of, sort of, monopolistic advantages. A, they were downtown where the streetcar lines met. B, they had sort of a monopoly on extending revolving credit. And D, they had one-stop shopping in all kinds of weather. And nobody else did. And they lost all three of those advantages. And yet, they’ve done well, a lot of them, for many decades since. At other times, you get a change and you just get destroyed. Our trading stamp business was destroyed by changes in the economic world. And our World Book business has been seriously hurt by the personal computer, and the CD-ROM, and so forth.

WARREN BUFFETT: I —

CHARLIE MUNGER: We agree, it’s a big risk. But it’s not easy to make predictions in which you have great confidence.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if you go down to 16th and Farnam, where the streetcar tracks used to cross, that was the best real estate in town. And people signed 100-year, 50-year leases on it. And it looked like there was nothing more safe, because they weren’t going to move the streetcar lines. The only thing was that they moved the streetcars. They just took and converted them into junk. And it seemed very permanent. The advantage of the big department store, the Marshall Field in Chicago or the Macy’s in New York, was this incredible breadth of merchandise. You could go and you could find 300 different types of spools of thread, or 500 — you could see 500 different wedding dresses, or whatever. And you had these million square-foot, and even two million square-foot, downtown stores. And they were these huge emporiums. And then the shopping center came along. And of course, the shopping center created, in effect, a store of many stores. And so, you had millions of square feet now, but you still had this incredible variety being offered.

The internet becomes a store in your, you know, computer, and it has an incredible variety of offerings, too. Some of them don’t lend themselves very well, it seems to me, to the retailing. And, you know, and others do. But Charlie’s right. It’s hard to predict exactly how it will turn out. I would expect, you know, automobile retailing to change in some important ways. And in part — in very significant part, influenced by the internet. But, I wouldn’t — you know, I can’t predict exactly how that’ll happen. But I don’t think it’ll look the same 10 or 15 years from now.

13. Buffett praises analyst Alice Schroeder

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ben Knoll, and I’m from Minneapolis. Although I’d like to enhance my status by noting that I was born and raised in Lincoln. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: You just moved up. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Like, many others, I read Alice Schroeder’s analysis of Berkshire Hathaway with great interest this last year. And she described her analysis as a toolkit for investors. And I’m wondering if you see any substantial flaws in any of her toolkit. And in particular, the float-based valuation model that she put together. What are your views on that?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t want to comment on valuation. But I can tell you that Alice is a first-class and serious analyst who spent a lot of time on Berkshire, and probably produced the first comprehensive report, at least that’s been widely circulated, in the history of Berkshire. It’s kind of interesting that we got to a hundred billion dollars of market value before anybody really published a report about the company, but — Alice understands the insurance business very well. She’s an accountant, by background. So, she understands numbers. And she did a lot of work on the report. And I do recommend it to you as a toolkit. I make no comment at all about valuation. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

35. GEICO and Executive Jet boosted intrinsic value

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 11.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning.

WARREN BUFFETT: Morning.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Richard Corry (PH) from England. Could you please say what was the main factor which produced the very substantial gain in intrinsic value mentioned in your report? I ask this because per share gains in portfolio and operating profits were modest. And you said that there was no (inaudible) gain from issuing shares for acquisitions.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we did increase the float per share very significantly last year, I mean, invested assets per share. And I would say that, in the — GEICO’s business was worth far more at the end of the year than at the start of the year. And that was our largest subsidiary at the start of the year. And if anything, GEICO’s competitive position continues to improve. I would say that Executive Jet is a natural fit into Berkshire. And we paid a significant sum for it. But that it will be a very, very big company 10 or 15 years from now. And perhaps — well, I’m almost sure it’ll get there sooner as part of Berkshire, than it wouldn’t gotten there otherwise. And its dominance may be even greater over the years as part of the Berkshire family than it would have independently. Although it would’ve done very well independently. I mean, it had a terrific management. It had — it started early, and they had the most serviceoriented company you could imagine. So, it would’ve done fine without us, but I think it will do even considerably better and get there faster with us.

So, I think there — I think in the aviation field, certainly in the primary insurance field, we had large gains in intrinsic value. And I think that, additionally, we had a significantly greater amount of invested asset per share to work with. So, I feel good about what happened with intrinsic value last year. The problem is doing it year after year after year. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Just basically, we have a wonderful bunch of businesses. And we have a float that keeps increasing and a pretty good record of doing pretty well in marketable securities. None of that has gone away.

36. No need to “groom” potential Buffett successors

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Elias Kanner (PH). And I am from New York City. Mr. Buffett, thank you for this entire weekend. I met you at the ballgame on Saturday and at Gorat’s yesterday. It was a great honor for me each time.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is this: Mr. Buffett, will you groom a younger man or woman as your heir apparent? If so, when might you do this? When I say younger, I mean a person 15 to 20 years younger than yourself. Of course, I’m not complaining. You’re the best in the world.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, 15 or 20 years younger is a lot easier to do than it used to be. (Laughter) A large percentage of the world’s population is now eligible. The — we have, today, the people to take over Berkshire. There’s no problem about that at all. They have been named in letters that the directors have. And they are in place. Exactly who will be the two people will of course — or it could be one person — will depend on when Charlie and I are out of the picture. I mean, if we’d written the letter 10 years ago, it might have been different than today. It might be different 15 years from now. So, our death or incapacity, the timing of it, will determine exactly who will be the current person in that letter. But we have those people in place. They don’t need to be groomed from this point forward. They exist. They’re ready. They’d be ready to run Berkshire tomorrow morning. And I think you’d be quite pleased with the job they did.

And that’s why I don’t worry about having — I’ve got 99 3/4 percent of my net worth in Berkshire. And, you know, I don’t want any of it sold. If I knew I was going to die next week, I would not want it sold in the coming week. And I don’t want it sold after I die. I feel comfortable with the businesses and the managers and the successor top management that we have at Berkshire. But I just don’t want them to take over too early. (Laughter) Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I actually think that the prospects for continuity of corporate culture, to the extent we have one at Berkshire, is higher than prospects for continuity of corporate culture at most other large public companies. I don’t see Berkshire changing its way of operating, even if Warren were to expire tonight. And I think that the capital, the fresh cash, would be allocated less well. But as I’ve said at past shareholder meetings, well, that’s too damn bad. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s why we don’t have a public relations department.

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way — (Laughter) I don’t think the job would be ill done, I just don’t think it would be done quite as well as Warren does it.

37. One way to add Berkshire to S&P 500 without market disruption

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Zone 13. (Laughter and applause)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Cary Flecker (PH) from Wellington, Florida. Thank you for stopping by the convention center before, Mr. Buffett. It’s nice to see you again.

WARREN BUFFETT: My pleasure.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Recently, much has been made of the fact that Berkshire is the largest company to not be included in the S&P 500. Do you gentleman have an opinion as — or what is your opinion — as to whether Berkshire should be included and why? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that’s a question we’ve gotten asked quite often since the General Re deal was announced. Berkshire, if you talk to the S&P people, I think they would say — I think they’ve even said it publicly, or at least a representative has — that we certainly qualify in every way that — except from what they might term the liquidity standpoint. It’s probable that maybe it’s 6 percent, maybe 7 percent of the investment funds, the equity funds in the United States are indexed. And the number, or the amount, is going up somewhat as we go along. I saw an article to the contrary on that. But I think they had it wrong. The amount of index money is, in my view, rising month by month. So, if you were to put Berkshire into the index tomorrow, in effect, you’d have a market order to buy 6 to 7 percent of the company, or roughly 100,000 shares a day. That would not be good, you know, if the stock would obviously spike up dramatically as some stocks already have when they’ve been added.

I mean, there’ve been some — I’ve looked at the list of all the companies that have been added and some have moved up substantially. And we would have even — there’d be even more impact at Berkshire than the typical stock because our stock is fairly tightly held. Most people don’t want to sell it. There are two solutions to that. Three solutions, one of them being not to put us in the index. But we are the most — I think, probably the most significant in the United States that isn’t in the index, in terms of market value and a lot of other factors. So, if you want to put Berkshire or a company like it in the index and not have some crazy market aberration, you could have one of two things happen. And this would be true, I think, more and more of other companies, as well, as they add them to the index and there’s more money against index. One, you could have the company agree that at the time it was added to the index that simultaneously, the company, itself, would sell an amount of stock that was about equal to the index buying that would be generated.

In other words, if we were to offer 100,000 shares, roughly, of A stock at the same as being added to the index, that would neutralize the index buying. The only problem with that is we don’t want to sell 100,000 shares or 10,000 shares or 100 shares of A stock at Berkshire unless we had some very good use for the money. It isn’t going to happen. (Applause) So we are not going to do something like that just because we want to be in an index. The other possibility, and I believe this was used in Australia, when a very large mutual life company converted to stock. I think it was the largest company in Australia — AMP. And that would be to phase in the weighting of a stock like Berkshire. And I think later on, I think they may have to do it for all stocks. But phase in the weighting, say, over a 12-month period. So that I was 1/12th weighted the first month, 1/12th weighted the second month and so on. That means, in effect, there would have to be a market order once a month for a half of 1 percent, roughly, of Berkshire.

Well, I don’t think that would be very particularly disruptive. And I think there’d be a — once you knew that phase in was coming, there would be some anticipation so that you would not get big spikes in the stock and dips, subsequently. I think that would be a logical way, but Standard and Poor’s, to date, has not had to do that sort of thing. And they may have various reasons, and various good reasons for not wanting to do that. Now, if indexation continues to grow as it has and you get a situation where 15 percent of the money becomes indexed, you know, I think they’re going to have to come up with some approach similar to one of these two that I’ve named, or it will simply get too disruptive to the market. It would be interesting. I know America Online has behaved very well since it was introduced to the S&P some time back.

But I would think that it might get to be the case that, if you simply shorted the companies that got added to the S&P after the S&P effect had been felt, that that might — you might find that those stocks would tend to underperform, as that one artificial buy order, in effect, its impact wore off. So, I think something is going to happen. I think indexation has far exceeded what anybody anticipated, including S&P or including me or Charlie. And I think there’s been a good reason for it to develop. I think as it continues to develop it will have more and more impact on the market in ways that, probably, S&P is not that excited about, nor would the index funds be excited about. So, there’s likely to come a solution to the liquidity problem that might be particularly acute at Berkshire, but that prevails throughout the market, that occurs when stocks are added. And I would think if they adopt some solution, that certainly, if they adopt a solution of gradual weighting, that Berkshire would be a very logical candidate for the S&P. It really makes no difference to us what is done along that line.

We would not unhappy being in the S&P, as long as it didn’t have some huge market impact at the moment of putting it in. On the other hand, you know, we love the owners we’ve got. And I don’t see how we could improve on this group much by having the index funds. So, it — we’ll see what happens on it. It is not a big deal to us. And we want to be sure if we’re ever added, it isn’t too big a deal to the market. Because I would not like — you know, the people who sold that day, might like it — but I would not like the stock to jump up, you know, $20,000 a share on one day because there’s some market order for 100,000 shares, and then gradually work its way back down to where it should’ve been in the first place. No one benefits from that except the people who sell in the very short-term. And that is not the group that I primarily worry about. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: My guess is that Berkshire will eventually be in the S&P index. Somebody will figure out how to do that, sensibly. Maybe not soon. But someday.

38. What we’d need to make an international acquisition

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is James Claus (PH), and I’m here from New York City. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, today we’ve already heard you talk about a few countries outside of the U.S., here. And my question is, if you’re directly investing in equities outside the United States, what would be your requirements for the market as a whole? And by this, I mean things like the transparency of the accounting system, the breadth and liquidity in the market, the rights of shareholders, the stability of the currency. And it’d be nice if you’d mention a few of these countries. Kind of just a little addendum, there, is — for the companies in these countries, how relevant do you believe the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP contained in Form 20F really is?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is most of those points you mentioned would be of interest to us. We’d have to rule out anything where the markets aren’t big enough. I mean, we are looking to put hundreds of millions of dollars into any single investment, at a minimum. Certainly, we think in terms of 500 million as being a minimum. We make exceptions to that. And that’s going to rule out a great many companies. Transparency of accounting and accounting rules: we care about that but we can make adjustments mentally. In some respects, we may think, in certain countries, accounting is better than here. And so, as long as we understand the accounting system, we will be looking toward the same kind of a discount model in our mind of how much cash is this business going to generate over years and how much is going to have to be put into it. And it’s the same sort of calculation that goes into our thinking here. And here, we don’t follow strictly GAAP accounting in our thinking. So we don’t — the accounting differences would not bother us, as long as we understood those accounting differences.

The nuances of taxes, the corporate governance that you mentioned could make a difference. If we thought corporate governance was far inferior to here, we’d have to make an adjustment for that fact. But I would say that in most of the major countries, the countries that have stock markets that are big enough so we could take a real position, it’s a possibility that we would invest in any of them. We don’t — we wouldn’t rule out, you know, Japan, Germany, France, England, the major markets. Now, it’s important to recognize that in all the world’s stock markets, something like 53 percent of the value is in the U.S. market. I mean, here we have 4 1/2 percent of the world’s population. But 53 percent of the value of all publicly held companies in the world is represented in — with companies in the U.S. market. So, we are a big part of the pie. But we’re very willing to look at almost all of the rest of the pie as long as we’re talking about markets that are big enough to let us put real money into them. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, so far, we haven’t done much, as Warren has said. But we don’t have a rule against it. What more can we say? (Laughter)

39. Bullish on Coca-Cola despite high P/E and dollar strength

WARREN BUFFETT: We can say, “Zone 2.” (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett. My name is Jean-Philippe Cramers (PH), and I’m coming from London, England. I have a question regarding Coca-Cola. The first part is, are you worried that the earnings of Coca-Cola might continue to be affected by the weakness in the emerging markets and the strength of the dollar over the next few years? And the second part is on the P/E ratio of Coca-Cola at 35 times earnings. Are you worried about the potential rise in interest rates? And is it linked to your views on inflation that you are not worried about the rise in interest rate? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in relation to the strength of the dollar, which means that profits in foreign currencies don’t translate into as many dollars, we — I — we don’t have any big feeling on that. I mean, if I — if we had strong feelings about the dollar’s behavior, vis-à-vis the yen, or the euro, or the pound, or whatever it might be — you know, we could give vent to those views by actually buying or selling large amounts of foreign exchange. We don’t know what — which way the dollar’s going to go. So, I have no — I have nothing in my mind, in regard to any decision on buying or selling Coke, that would relate to any prediction in my mind about the course of the dollar. The earnings of Coke have been affected by the strength of the dollar in the last few years, particularly the strength against the yen when, you know, when it went from 80-odd to 140odd. That was a huge hit, in terms of what the — in terms of the yen translation into dollars from those profits. And the strength of the dollar generally would hurt.

But looking forward, I don’t have any prediction on that. It’s in Coke’s interest to have countries around the world prosperous. I mean, they will benefit from increased prosperity, increased standards of living, throughout the world. I think we’ll see that over any 10 or 20-year period. I think people’s preference for Coke will do nothing but grow Coca-Cola products. So, what I am concerned about is share of market and then, what I call share of mind. In other words, what do people think about Coca-Cola now, compared to 10 years ago or 20 years ago? What are they going to think about it 10 years from now? Coca-Cola has a marvelous share of mind around the world. Everybody in the world, almost, has something in their mind about Coca-Cola products and overwhelmingly, it’s favorable. You can’t — you know, try to think of three other companies like it. I can’t do it, in terms of that ubiquity of good feeling, essentially, about the product. We measure it by unit cases sold and by shares outstanding. And we want a lot more unit cases sold.

And we like the idea of fewer shares outstanding over time. I’ll give you — I’ll be giving that same answer 10, or 15, or 20 years from now. And I think they’ll be a lot more unit cases sold then. It is true that the case growth slowed starting in the second half of last year and continuing through the first quarter of this year. But that’s happened from time to time in the past. In my view, you know, that is not — it’s not an important item. It may be an important item in what the stock does, you know, in a six-month period or a one-year period. But we’ll be around 10 years from now, and Coca-Cola will be around 10 years from now. And right now, we own eight-point-one or two percent of Coca-Cola. And we’ll probably own a larger percentage 10 years from now, because they’ll have probably repurchased some stock. The P/E ratio of Coke, like virtually every other leading company in the world strikes us as, you know, they all strike us as being quite full.

That doesn’t mean they’re going to go down. But it does mean that our enthusiasm for buying more of these wonderful companies is less than it was when the P/E ratios were substantially less. Ideally, those are the kind of companies we want to buy more of over time. We understand their businesses. And my guess is that there’s a reasonable chance, at least, that sometime in the next 10 years, we buy more shares of either Coke or Gillette or American Express or some of those other wonderful companies we own. We do not like the P/E ratios, generally. But, again, I stress that does not mean they’re going down. It just means that we got spoiled in terms of how much we got for our money in the past. And we hope that we get spoiled again. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I — if what matters to you is what you think Coke is going to look like 10 years out or even further out, you don’t really pay much attention to short-term economic developments in this country or that, or currency rates, or any other such things. They don’t really help you in making the 10 or 15-year projection. And that’s the one we’re making. So, we have tuned out all this noise, as it’s called and what —

WARREN BUFFETT: Sometimes.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — communication networks — tune out the noise. And if you look at the big picture, we think Coke is fine.

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s hard to think of a better business in the world, among big businesses. You know, there’s obviously companies that are starting from much smaller bases that could grow faster. But it’s hard to think of a much more solid business.

40. Nothing to say about Berkshire’s investment in silver

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Newport Beach, California, Bruce Lindsay. And formerly from Omaha, Nebraska. And I have a question. Some time ago I read that you were buying silver. I never knew the reason why you were buying silver.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we covered silver purchase in the 1997 annual report for a special reason. A, it was part of a group of three unconventional investments we made. And one of those investments was of sufficient size so we felt people ought to know about it, specifically. And then we felt our shareholders ought to know that we sometimes do things that they might not have guessed that we would do, from reading past annual reports. So we named the three unconventional investments. But in this year’s report, we have stated we will not be naming those investments unless one of two things happened: one is that they become of a size that you should know about them specifically, in order to evaluate the kind of thing we do in Berkshire and the commitment of resources that has been made, or two, if regulatory authorities either — obviously, if they require us to report it, we’ll report it immediately. Or in the case of silver, a year-plus ago, an important regulatory authority indicated they would’ve — that they’d prefer if we report it. We weren’t required to do so. But — and our desire is to cooperate on that, anyway. So, we did report it.

But we stated in this year’s report that absent those factors, we will not be giving details on unconventional investments any more than we give any more details on our regular equity holdings, than we’re, more or less, required to do. We did say that we had changed certain of the unconventional investments that were described in the previous year’s report. And we stated that we’d entered into several new ones. So, we are in some things that most of you or maybe all of you don’t know about. But they aren’t of sufficient size so that they’re going to, in any material way at all, affect your investment. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.

41. Year 2000 computer problem won’t be a “big deal”

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Morning, Mr. Buffett. Wayne Lang (PH) from Toronto, Canada. Last year, when you were asked about the Year 2000 computer issue, you expressed some concerns about the cost overruns and the federal government readiness. Our two countries are in much better shape this year. But could you update us on your current thinking and what concerns you may have about the impact of the lesser readiness, internationally, on our company’s revenues, supply chain, or on the stock market?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, last year I think I also told you I didn’t really consider myself an expert on this. And what I tell you is just what I pick up from being on audit committees or talking to people who are a lot smarter than I am in this sort of area. But that doesn’t mean they’re right on it. Because they weren’t talking about it 15 years ago, when they should have been talking about it. So I — my general feeling — and all secondhand — my general feeling is that the part of the world that we have to worry about is in pretty good shape. It’s cost a lot of money in various places. It’s cost us a fair amount of money. But it’s — some companies, it’s cost a terrific amount of money. But I do not think it’s going to be a big deal. And, I — you know, I could be wrong. And I’m less worried about it being a big deal today than I was a year ago. You know, and Charlie, do you have anything to add?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

WARREN BUFFETT: Does that mean you think it’s going to be less of a big deal than you thought a year ago?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it means I have nothing to add.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Laughter) That’s probably what I should have said in the first place.

42. Japan’s economic slump doesn’t affect Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. (Laughter)

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Bob Brewer (PH). And I’m from down the road in Lincoln, Nebraska. I just wanted to ask you how you think the continuing economic turmoil in Japan is likely to affect the global economy and the U.S. stock market over the next five to 10 years?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I are no good on those macro questions. But I would say this: I mean, the Japan problem has been around, now — in financial markets and banking systems — has been around for some time now. So, I see no reason why it should have more impact on the rest of world now than it has had in the last few years. And I would say it’s had certainly very little effect on the U.S. in the last few years. It’s not — it’s no factor in our thinking at all, in terms of what we would buy or sell tomorrow morning. I mean, if we got offered a good business tomorrow — unless it was directly involved and its primary business was in Japan — but if it was a business in this country, that’s not something that we would be thinking about. We would be thinking about the specifics of that business. We don’t really get too concerned about the things that come and go. I mean, in the end, if we’re right about a business over a 10 or 20-year period — take See’s Candy. We bought it in 1972.

Look what happened in 1973 and 4, you know, and all the oil shocks and what this country was going through and inflation, all that sort of thing. For us to — and let’s say in 1972 somebody laid out a roadmap from 1972 to 1982, with the prime rate going to 21 1/2 percent, long-term rates going to 15 percent. And all of the things happening, the Dow going to 570 or what — or 560. That wasn’t the important thing. The important thing was that this peanut brittle tastes like it does, which is terrific. (Laughter) And that over time, we could get a little more money for it. So, you know. See’s made $4 million, pretax, in 1972, when we bought it. It made 62 million last year. It doesn’t — we don’t want to be thinking about the wrong things when we’re buying businesses. And that applies to marketable securities, just as much as it does as when we’re buying 100 percent of the business. If we’re right about the business, the macro factors aren’t going to make any difference, you know.

And if we’re wrong about the business, macro factors are not going to bail us out. Charlie?

43. Munger’s lesson on not allowing accounting “slop”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what I think is interesting in Japan is interesting to one, as a citizen. Here’s a major industrial country. And we understand all about Keynesian economics and everything else. And when it starts sliding down into a big recession, it just keeps going and going, and floundering, and staying down. And year follows year, and you take the interest rates down to practically zero, and you run a big budget deficit. The economy still stays down. I think this has been very interesting to the economists of the world. I don’t think any of them would’ve predicted that as modern a country as Japan could contract for as long as it did. And I think the cause is related to the extremeness of its booms in both land prices and security prices, and the corruption in its accounting practices and in its regulation of financial system, including banks. I think it’s an interesting lesson for the world, of how important it is not to let a lot of slop get into the accounting and regulatory systems. And how a lot of folly in markets doesn’t help, either.

WARREN BUFFETT: Sort of fascinating to, you know — people keep saying, “Why doesn’t Japan stimulate?” Well, they got short-term rates down to zero. And long-term rates at 2 percent. Well, that should stimulate me. But — (laughter) — it doesn’t — As Charlie says, it sort of defied, a little bit, some of the classical Keynesian theory on that. But in the ’30s, we had the same problem in this country. We drove interest rates way down towards the latter half of the ’30s, and —

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I would argue that probably the extreme prosperity in America is related to this so-called wealth effect, with stock markets going up and up. And I think people thought that was a smaller factor than maybe it is.

44. Analyst coverage won’t affect Berkshire’s stock

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Jeff Lilly (PH) from Denver, Colorado. My question is as follows: over the last couple of years, I’ve read both of you quoted as not following the stock price on a day-to-day basis, not being terribly concerned about whether Berkshire is up or down. You now have analyst coverage. Perhaps you requested it, or perhaps you acquiesced to it. But my question is whether this reflects any change in your attention paid to the stock price or your philosophy about investor relations, and whether you think the analyst coverage is going to have any impact on the stock price going forward?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, no. It reflects no change in our attitude toward stock price. I mean, we are concerned about building the intrinsic value per share of Berkshire at the highest rate we can, consistent with a couple of other principles that we’ve set forth. And we hope very much that the stock price stays in a zone that is not too wide around intrinsic value — that there’s is going to be some zone of some sort, because intrinsic value itself is not precisely calculable. And in addition, you wouldn’t expect it to track it penny for penny. But we don’t want it to go crazy in either direction in relation to intrinsic value. When we made the deal with General Re, that attracted more analyst attention and institutional investor attention because General Re’s shareholder base was overwhelmingly institutional. So, institutions had to decide whether they were going to continue with their investment or clean it out. And we knew we would end up with more institutional ownership, subsequently. Alice Schroeder asked me, prior to the merger meeting, she said there were a group of institutions that were coming to the meeting, which I liked.

I mean, the fact that they were serious enough about their investment to come and see what Berkshire was all about. And a few of them even had a requirement, I think, from their own boards that they, at least, have sat down with management. So, we spent — or I spent an hour or so with a group that she had put together and they came to Omaha. But that’s the last contact I’ve had with any institutional investor. And we will have no special meetings with institutional investors or anything. I mean, they are absolutely welcome to attend this meeting to get all of the information that’s dispensed. I think it’s very useful, frankly, to have an analyst or two that is well-versed in Berkshire and that thinks straight and does their homework. And that’s a plus, because it means we don’t have to do it. And in effect, that if institutions want to talk to somebody about it, they don’t call me. Because they’re not going to have much luck calling me. And they can call Alice or some other analyst that wants to do it. And that’s perfect.

We have a non-paid — it is not investor relations because that’s thought of somebody as sort of pumping your stock — but at least we have a information office now — a non-paid information office. And you know, that goes along the grain of my nature. (Laughter) And we — people say, “Do you want individual owners? You want institutional owners?” What we want are informed owners who are in sync with our objectives, our measurements, our time horizons, all of that sort of thing. I mean, we want people that are going to be comfortable owning Berkshire, and we don’t want people who are owning it for reasons different — in a way different — that are different from our reasons for owning. We don’t want people that are concerned about quarterly earnings. We don’t want people who are concerned about stock splits. We don’t, you know — we don’t want people that need to be pumped up about the stock, periodically. It’s just not of interest to us. Because it just means we have to keep living that way in the future.

And it’s not the way we want to live now, it’s not the way we want to live in the future. What we really want are a bunch of people, like we have in this audience, who sit down and read, and think and understand that they’re making an investment. It’s not just a little ticker symbol. They’re buying part of a business. They know what the business is all about. They know how we think, they know how we measure ourselves. They’re comfortable with that. And they can come in individual or institutional form. And when we get them, we like to keep them. So there’s no change in our attitude about that. There is a change in coverage, in that we — there is some limited amount of coverage in Wall Street, which I guess for a company with a 110 or 20 billion of market value, there should be.

45. Executive Jet’s advantage

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ll have one more question then we’ll break for lunch. We’ll go to zone 7. And after this question, we’ll break. We’ll come back in about 45 minutes or so, and those of you — as long as we see that everybody’s gotten served with food in that time — and we’ll — any of those who are offsite or over at the Holiday, I think, there are buses to bring you over, you can drive over, and there’ll be plenty of room here. You can also go out and tour the Boeing business jet. We’ll sell you as little as 50 hours a year, I believe, on it. So, take your wallets at lunch time. Yep?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name’s Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia. I was wondering if you could help us out with the flight operations, which are now a large part of Berkshire. I think we’re still putting a lot of capital into them. I was wondering, you’ve pooled both of them together in the annual report. And I was hoping, perhaps, you could help us out with what return on equity you’re expecting for each of those divisions.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the more capital intensive is the flight safety operation. Because every simulator costs real money. And we will add a number of simulators each year. So, flight safety — you can look at their figures before we acquired them, and it’s reasonable to extrapolate those numbers out on a larger basis — base as we go along. But flight safety’s return on equity is not going to move up or down by a dramatic amount. I mean, our simulator training prices are related to the cost of the simulator. And so, there’s not going to be way higher returns on equity, nor should there be way lower returns on equity. There is a growth on the equity employed in the business, because it is a growing business and we’re training more and more pilots every year. But that’ll be a fairly steady thing. The Executive Jet business is in an earlier part of its development, although it’s the leader in its field, by far. But we’re doing substantial investment spending in a place like Europe. And we’ll be doing that on an accelerated pace, if anything.

In the end, though, our customers end up owning the plane. So, we have an investment in a core fleet of planes, which supplements the customer’s planes. But by its nature, it’s not a capital-intensive business. We are moving around a lot of capital every day. We’ll have 140 or so customer planes now and an aggregate, you know, just to pick a figure, that those planes are certainly worth a billion and a half or more. And we’ve got 7 billion of planes on order, or some number like that. But we will sell those planes to our customers. So it could be, down the line, that it will be a business with a very good return on capital. We’ll still have an investment in the core fleet and we’ll have some facilities — hanger facilities and that sort of thing. But our customers will have the big capital investment. I should point out, they’ll have a whole lot less capital investment if they own their entire plane themselves. So, they will be getting a bargain as well. Let’s take off for lunch.

And I’ll see you back here in about 45 minutes, those of you who wish to rejoin us. Thank you. (Applause)

Afternoon Session

1. General Re benefits won’t be felt for several years

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’re going to be ready to go in just a minute if everybody gets their seats.

VOICE: Warren? Just want to double check something. We’re just going to stick in —

WARREN BUFFETT: One through eight.

VOICE: (Inaudible)

WARREN BUFFETT: One through eight.

VOICE: (inaudible)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve got 6 or 7000, anyway, sticking around, I think. OK. If anyone who has questions wants to go to the microphone, we’re going to start here in just a minute. And we will start — there will only be eight zones from this point forward, because we have everyone in attendance in the main hall. So we will rotate around eight zones. We’ll stay until about 3:30. And we’ll start in zone 1.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Charlie Sink (PH). I’m from Lexington, North Carolina, as you can tell by the accent. My question relates to the General Re purchase. I wondered — I’ve read your letters through the years and I’ve been trying to learn a little bit investing in insurance companies. Did you buy General Re, mostly because — I know mostly because of the float — because you think you can grow the float? I know it’s not growing significantly now. Or did you buy it because you felt like you could do better with the investments? I’ve read, also, that companies who seem to be trying to follow the Berkshire model are trying to get a certain amount of investments to equity — is that something that you focus on

标题：1999年年度股东大会

第四部分/共六部分

沃伦·巴菲特：没错，有过几次这样的例子——1974年《福布斯》上有过报道——1969年则是相反的情况。然后，我记得我为《福布斯》写过一篇文章——记不清具体什么时候了——说的是当时股票几乎必然比债券更有吸引力。而债券当时并不算没吸引力。我的意思是，时不时地，你可以说在股票上你的钱能获得很好的回报。或者有时你可以说在固定收益投资上你的钱能获得很好的回报。现在你不能这么说，那你怎么办呢？你知道？就新资金而言，我们发现自己只能坐着等待机会，并继续寻找。但我们被迫寻找更大的投资机会。所以如果我们管理的资金规模较小，我们就更有可能找到机会，而不是像现在这样。正如查理所说，我们真的没有什么万能的建议可以提供。我希望我们有。第四区——

查理·芒格：我——

沃伦·巴菲特：请讲。

查理·芒格：从美国近期的经验来看，特别是与股票相关的近期经验，储蓄和投资的实际长期回报率必然会下降。世界的财富不可能以人们在美国股票市场上习惯的那种速度增长。美国股票市场也不可能永远大幅跑赢世界财富的增长。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你——

查理·芒格：总的来说，我们应该降低对未来的预期。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，大幅降低预期，因为，你知道——我们之前提到过，全球股票市场价值的53%在美国。那么，如果美国GDP以每年4%、5%的速度增长，加上1%或2%的通胀，这将会是一个非常不错的结果——我认为企业利润以更快的速度增长是非常不可能的。企业利润占GDP的比重已经偏高了，你不可能让企业利润持续以快于GDP的速度增长。显然，最终，利润会超过GDP。这就像有人说纽约的律师比人还多一样。我是说（笑声）——有些东西——如果你说利润可以超过GDP，你就会在术语上遇到某些矛盾。

所以，如果你真的处于这样一种情况：在未来数年里，企业利润增长最好的期望也就是4%或5%，那么，认为作为企业利润资本化的股票能够以每年15%的速度增长，这怎么会合理呢？我的意思是，坦率地说，这完全是胡说八道。人们不可能在股票上获得15%的平均回报，或者任何类似的回报。我几乎可以挑战任何人，从数学上向我证明这是如何整体实现的。前几天我查看了《财富》500强。他们赚了3340亿美元——而年末的市值是9.9万亿美元，现在可能至少是10.5万亿美元。嗯，从长远来看，投资者能赚到的，只是企业赚到的钱。我是说，没有任何额外的部分。政府不会往里投钱。你知道，没有人往锅里加东西。人们要从锅里往外拿东西，比如摩擦成本、投资管理费、经纪佣金等等。但那3340亿就是全部——就是全部投资所得。

我的意思是，如果你想种地，农场产出的一切就是你从农场能得到的一切。如果它每亩地能产生50美元的净利润，你就能得到每亩50美元的净利润。没有任何东西会以某种神奇的形式转变它。如果你拥有全部美国公司——如果你拥有全部《财富》500强，百分之百拥有，你就能赚到3340亿美元。而如果你为此支付了10.5万亿美元，那可不是一笔好的投资回报。然后你对自己说：“这个数字能在5年内翻倍吗？”不可能——那3340亿美元——不可能在5年内翻倍，而GDP每年增长4%或类似数字。这会导致一些与美国经济运行经验完全不符的失衡现象。所以，每当你参与到这些事物中，如果顺着数学逻辑推演，你会碰到荒谬的结果，那你最好改变一下预期。查理？

查理·芒格：有两句名言。一句是：“如果一件事不能永远持续下去，它最终会停止。”（笑声）另一句是我从我的朋友弗雷德·斯坦巴克那里借来的，我想他今天也在座。“期望在一个有限的星球上实现真实财富的永续增长的人，要么是疯子，要么是经济学家。”（笑声）

4. “最佳贡献”是低成本的商品和服务

沃伦·巴菲特：请第四区提问。

参会者：晚上好。我叫沙鲁科·钦（音译），来自爱荷华州得梅因。我们一直在讨论一家公司在过去几年帮助我们获得了多少回报，以及未来的回报，但我相信很多人关心的是我们给了社会多少回报。先生们，你们能否分享一下你们的理念、公司政策，以及伯克希尔在慈善事业方面做了多少？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。年度报告中有相关数据。有一件事并不是完全自愿的，那就是去年我们向联邦政府缴纳了大约26亿美元的所得税——（笑声）——。（掌声）我不太确定。我查看了通用电气、微软以及其他几家大公司——我们缴纳的联邦所得税可能比任何其他美国公司都多。我不是——别把我的话当回事，因为沃尔玛可能缴得更多。如果沃尔玛缴得更多，我也不会感到惊讶。但是——我确实查了几家最大的公司，我们比通用电气或微软缴得多，这两家公司的市值都是我们的三倍。股东指定捐赠计划大约是1800万美元，我记得是这样，然后我们在报告中详细列出了其他公司的捐赠情况。

但是我想说的是，例如，如果GEICO提供个人汽车保险的方式比其竞争对手更高效——如果15%是一个合理的节省比例——那么，以40亿美元的保费收入计算，通过更高效的配送方式，消费者可以节省超过6亿美元。这种高效方式是GEICO管理层精心打磨出来的。我认为，以经济的方式提供人们想要的商品和服务，是任何公司对社会做出的贡献中非常重要的部分，这与它们缴纳的税款和实际的企业慈善捐款同等重要。我们并不热衷于把所有者——即伯克希尔作为他们的代表——的钱捐出去做慈善。我们认为股东应该——那是他们的钱。如果我们是一个十个人的合伙公司，如果我是管理合伙人，我不会觉得我应该为其他九个人做慈善决策。我会让他们自己做决定。

我们普遍认为，公司不应该把钱捐给CEO偏爱的慈善机构。我们在伯克希尔也不这么做。但我们让股东自己指定捐款去向。而且，正如我所说，我认为我们最主要的——（掌声）——谢谢。我认为我们实际上能做的最佳贡献，在10年或15年的时间里，就是找到方法，以比以往可替代方案更低的成本，向人们提供他们想要的商品和服务。查理？

查理·芒格：是的。嗯，我赞赏提问者渴望回答这样一个问题：“在这场游戏里，除了赚钱和积累财富，难道就没有别的了吗？”以及“我们难道不应该思考我们应回报什么，以及将会回报什么吗？”就芒格家族而言，我认为百分之百会回报社会，原因与巴菲特家族不同。你知道，有句老话：“老查理留下了多少？”答案是：“我相信他全留下了。”（笑声）本质上，所有财富最终都必须以某种方式回馈社会。你带不走，这是游戏规则中的铁律。我确实认为，思考你为他人做了什么，以及你在自己的一生或公司的经营中树立了什么榜样，这很重要。而且我确实认为伯克希尔在这方面做得相当不错。

而且，在适当的时候，当我们开始涉足以巴菲特名字命名的大型慈善事业时，我的猜测是，那也会做得相当好。这很可能是一段相当不错的历程。

5. 对石油或白银没有“洞察”

沃伦·巴菲特：第五区。（掌声）

参会者：嗨，我叫迈克尔，来自纽约。首先，我想对芒格先生说，能在这里见到您和巴菲特先生，真是无比荣幸。如果您能说声“嗨”——

查理·芒格：你把他们名字的顺序说对了。

参会者：——向我的——（笑声）——妻子说一声，她叫简。其次，我理解你们对非常规投资保持神秘。但巴菲特先生和芒格先生，你们能否告诉我你们对石油和白银市场状况的洞察？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：他问你了，查理。（笑声）

查理·芒格：但我们之前已经说过，我们不会对大宗商品投资发表评论。我会稍微作弊一下。最终，石油价格必然大幅上涨。（笑声）这不意味着你现在买入就能赚钱，还得算上利息因素。

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）第六区。（笑声）幸运的是，我不知道是否——我仔细听了他提问时的措辞。他说的是“洞察”——（笑）——我没有任何洞察，所以——

6. 有线电视系统：到目前为止，前景多于成果

沃伦·巴菲特：我们接下来到第六区。

参会者：我叫梅里特·贝利尔，来自得克萨斯州奥斯汀。公司对华盛顿邮报公司有大量投资，该公司拥有许多服务非主要大都市地区的有线电视系统，并且最近还投资了TCA有线电视。因此，我希望听到您对有线电视业务的一般看法。另一个问题是关于您对孩子处理金钱和继承金钱的理念。

沃伦·巴菲特：第一个关于有线电视的问题，华盛顿邮报公司确实有——我们拥有华盛顿邮报公司大约17%的股份，我相信他们有超过70万户家庭。正如你所说，他们主要分布在较小的地区。这是一门不错的生意。而且如你所知，股价在过去一年左右一直在飙升。从华盛顿邮报的角度来看，这是坏消息，因为邮报本来会是电视网络的净买家，而不会是卖家。这非常非常类似于我们对股票和股价的态度。当股价上涨时，对华盛顿邮报公司来说并不是好消息，因为华盛顿邮报公司将进行投资。随着时间的推移，它会成为一个资金产生者。如果它想把钱投入有线电视，股价下跌对它来说比上涨有利得多。TCA不是——卢·辛普森在GEICO管理一个独立的投资组合——股票投资组合——所以我从未读过TCA有线电视的年度报告。我对它一无所知。

如果他仍然持有它，那是卢在GEICO为GEICO做的投资，完全不在我的管理范围内。这是一个我应该提及的点，因为新闻界偶尔会报道说伯克希尔——或者有时说我在买入X、Y或Z。有时这是真的，但有时不是，因为代表与我们相关的其他实体提交了文件，而我对此一无所知。几周前我看到一个报道，说我在买入——我不知道是我个人还是伯克希尔——我以为是个人——买入了一家名为Omega的房地产投资信托基金。我从没听说过。但这个故事出现在多个地方。好吧，我可以向你保证，我没有向联邦政府提交任何表格说我在买入那只股票，尽管你可能从某些新闻报道中推断出这一点。

但是其他各种实体，我认为通用再保险的一个子公司，新英格兰资产管理公司，可能需要定期报告他们的操作。由于通用再保险归伯克希尔所有，而新英格兰资产管理公司是通用再保险的一部分，你知道，谁知道他们从那里得到了什么。所以我通常要提醒你，对那些关于我或伯克希尔哈撒韦买入或卖出什么的报道要稍微小心一点。现在，我记得还有一个我不太想回答的问题的第二个部分。（笑）查理，你想回答那个吗？

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为人们对有线电视的未来更感兴趣。（笑声）也就是说，我们在正确诊断有线电视未来方面表现出了明显的缺乏能力，以至于我们没能赚到很多钱。尽管事后看来，很多在当时似乎显而易见的东西就摆在那里，我们还是这样做了。

沃伦·巴菲特：今天的有线电视，我的意思是，有线电视已经存在了大约30年。有业电视根本没有在投入资本上获得非凡的回报。但它总是有获得更高回报的前景，而且有前景说你不需要像迄今为止那样不断地往里面投钱。但目前，人们认为有线电视会获得不寻常的回报，相对于投入资本而言，不是相对于购买价格，而是相对于物业本身的投入资本。而且，正如我所说，实际情况并非如此——这适用于电视网络节目。电视网络节目，相对于资本投资，人们赚了很多钱。但就实际投资于有线电视设施而言，资本投资如此之大，系统开发的支出如此之大，以至于迄今为止的回报并不大。但现在有线电视系统的价格表明，人们认为这些回报最终将开始大规模流入。

7. 巴菲特和芒格在继承财富的影响上存在分歧

沃伦·巴菲特：你那个问题的第二部分是什么？

声音：孩子和财富。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，继承财富和孩子——

参会者：是关于孩子继承金钱。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯——（笑声）——我们前排这里持有少数派观点。（笑声和掌声）我想我对这个问题的看法在我大约18岁时就改变了。（笑）在那之前，我认为这是一个好主意。不，我非常相信精英统治，我认为其中一部分是不让人们在生活中基于他们是否幸运地来自正确的子宫而远远领先于其他人。所以我从来都不太支持这样一种想法：即社会受益，或者在许多情况下，孩子受益——尽管我认为这更有问题——但巨额财富从一代人转移到下一代人。你知道，我更愿意看到个人所拥有的才能程度决定他们在世界上控制的资源，以及他们影响他人生活和指挥他人劳动的能力，而不是任何子宫的神圣权利。这就是我的看法——查理对此有稍微不同的看法。

查理·芒格：是的。我更愿意让世界自己去应对下一代人。这是——（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：他相信随它去——

查理·芒格：我认为他们不需要太多帮助。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：查理相信把财富传下去，只要你能确定他们会把它挥霍掉。（笑声）好了。下一区——

查理·芒格：如果你停下来想想——

沃伦·巴菲特：请讲。

查理·芒格：如果你停下来想想，沃伦，想想昔日的巨大财富——如果你回到1900年、1870年，你知道——给我举出一些因为处于那个家族的第四代而拥有巨大权力的人。他们中的一些人过得非常好，但他们并没有在管理世界。

沃伦·巴菲特：我会说洛克菲勒家族比如果他们姓普通的“罗克”要有影响力得多。（笑声）

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为确实如此，但你选择了可能是其中最强大的一个家族。而现在，财富分散在60或70或80个洛克菲勒家族成员手中，我认为确实有四五位兄弟在世间拥有不寻常的影响力。我必须说，在这种情况下，我认为他们处理得非常好。

8. 避开科技股：“我们愿意用一个大的回报去换取一个确定的回报”

沃伦·巴菲特：第七区。

参会者：我叫艾伦·尼根（音译），来自弗吉尼亚州雷斯顿。我知道你们喜欢投资成功的故事，但不喜欢高科技。在我看来，比如说微软，10年后他们还会做软件开发，就像10年后可口可乐还会卖糖水一样。我想知道的是，为什么当某些高科技公司似乎是可以预测的时候，你们却这样认为？而且似乎在90年代初——你们说过要收购一家制药公司，这对我来说也像是高科技。所以这是我的问题。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，我们——我想我们说过，对于制药公司，我们不知道如何挑选哪一家。我们会认为整个行业作为一个群体会表现良好。从1993年的水平来看，你无法以与1993年制药公司股价相称的任何水平买入高科技公司。你知道，我会——回到你问题的第一部分，我认为预测可口可乐在软饮料世界中会拥有的相对优势，比预测微软在软件世界中会拥有的优势——优势的大小——要容易得多。这绝不是要贬低微软。如果我必须押注于任何人，我当然会押注微软，如果必须押注，我会下重注。但我没有必须押注。我不像看待软饮料世界那样清楚地看待那个世界。

现在，一个对软件非常熟悉的人，很可能也会那样看待它，他们有权——如果他们确实拥有超常的知识并且据此行动，他们有权从这种超常知识中赚钱。这没什么不对。我知道自己没有那种知识，我只是——我确实认为，如果你拥有几十年的商业常识，你会认为他们所在的行业比软饮料行业的可预测性要低。也可能即使可预测性较低，但可赚到的钱要多得多，所以如果你是对的，回报要大得多。但我们非常愿意用一个大的回报去换取一个确定的回报。这就是我们的做事方式。这不等于否定其他人做出这些决定的能力。

我的意思是，我问过——1991年我第一次见到比尔·盖茨时，我说：“如果你要去一个荒岛呆10年，你只能在高科技行业选两只股票持有，你会选哪两只？”他说了两只非常好的股票。如果我当时都买了，我们会赚得比我们实际赚的多得多，即使买了可口可乐也是如此。但他同时也会说，如果他要离开，他宁愿买可口可乐，因为他会对结果感到确定。你知道，不同的人理解不同的行业。重要的是要知道你理解哪些行业，以及你什么时候在我所谓的“能力圈”内操作。软件行业不在我的能力圈内，我也不认为它在查理的能力圈内。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，我当然同意这一点。我认为还有一些有趣的问题，关于整个领域能走多远。以亚音速喷气式飞机旅行为例。技术在很长很长一段时间内基本保持不变。你知道，波音大型客机与20或30年前非常相似。我认为很多这样的行业非常依赖于技术的持续发展，为人们做越来越多的事情。以制药为例，如果他们再也没有发明任何新药，那将是一个可怕的行业。我不知道一旦你家里有了无限的带宽和更多的选项，会发生什么——超过某个点，我觉得这个领域可能会让人兴趣过剩。我不知道那个点在哪里，是20年后还是30年后，但这会对我有一些影响。

沃伦·巴菲特：迪利棒更确定——（笑声）

查理·芒格：是的。

沃伦·巴菲特：——10年后仍然存在，比我们所知的任何软件应用都要确定。但这也许是因为我们了解迪利棒，而不了解软件。在整个美国，这是迄今为止世界上最繁荣的国家——整个美国，大概有400家公司，总共400家，年税后利润达到2亿美元。在这400家中，你可以说出它们的名字。我的意思是，你可以开始——如果你说“银行”，你可以说花旗集团、大通银行和富国银行，你可以说出10到15家。如果你说消费品，你会说宝洁、可口可乐和吉列，你可以说出一大堆。在这400家中，你大概能说出350家。如果五年后，这个名单上不再是400家，可能会有450家，甚至475家。其中很多将是现在利润在1.5亿到2亿美元之间的公司。

所以可能会有大约20家——大概20家——可以说是从无名小卒变成的。现在，如果你看一下今天那些股价暗示其当前利润为2亿美元或更多的公司，你会在高科技领域发现几十甚至几十家。而且，你知道，很大比例的那些公司不会实现人们的期望。我不能告诉你哪些，但我知道不会有很多很多那种公司每年赚几亿美元。而且我知道它们现在正以需要它们赚那么多钱或更多的价格出售。这种情况不会经常发生。你知道，生物技术几年前风靡一时。那些公司中有多少家每年赚几亿美元？这种情况不会发生。在一个资本主义社会里，靠一门生意赚大钱并不那么容易。人们每天都在盯着你在做什么，试图找出更好的方法，你知道，降低你的价格或推出更好的产品，等等。

只有少数公司能成功。但在这里，在美国，经过了几十年几十年的辉煌经济发展之后，我们只有大约400家公司达到了这样的水平：它们需要达到的市值水平是30亿美元。而一些公司在上市当天就获得了30亿美元的市值，差不多是这样。所以——有些东西——你需要思考一下这背后的数学。

9. 不要“在真正心仪的公司之间跳进跳出”

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区。

参会者：你好。我叫拉里·惠特曼（音译），来自北达科他州迈诺特。您已经暗示过可口可乐和吉列目前的估值，以及它们未来的美好前景。但在过去一年里，这两只股票都从高点下跌了30%到50%。它们还需要下跌多少才能满足您的安全边际标准，并允许您买入更多股票？第二，迪士尼/大都会通讯的合并进行得如您所愿吗？迪斯尼的未来前景在您看来是否有所改变？

沃伦·巴菲特：第一个问题，关于可口可乐和吉列，这是个好问题，因为显然，我们考虑那些我们最熟悉、并且我们已投入的行业。但这两家公司都没有达到让我们愿意投入新资金的价格。但我们非常满意，非常高兴拥有这些企业，并且在未来很长一段时间里都会很高兴拥有它们。但它们——这有些证据表明市场过去和现在处于什么状态，即使当它们遇到一些比预期更艰难的经营状况时，它们的股价也没有下跌到让我们感到兴奋的价格。查理，你想就这个问题或第二部分发表评论吗？

查理·芒格：不。但我确实想提醒大家，迪利棒是冰雪皇后的产品。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：而且它们很好吃。我可以告诉你。（笑声）

查理·芒格：我不想让股东们认为这家企业的商业标准在动摇。（笑声）总的来说，试图在长期持有的、你真正心仪的公司之间跳进跳出，对大多数投资者来说不是个好主意。我们非常满足于持有我们最好的资产。

沃伦·巴菲特：多年来，人们一直试图对伯克希尔这样做。我有一些朋友，他们有时认为它有点超前了。他们想卖掉，然后在更便宜的时候再买回来，等等。这非常难做到。你必须做对两个决定。你知道，你必须先卖对，然后后来再买对。而且通常你还要在中间交一些税。如果你进入了一家出色的企业，最好的做法通常是持有它。可口可乐和吉列都遇到了让管理层失望的情况，低于他们一年或一年半前的预期，也低于我们的预期。但随着时间的推移，这种情况会发生的。在我们全资拥有的企业中，这种情况也会时不时发生。有时它们做得比我们预期的好。但事物的本质并非一切都沿着一条漂亮、笔直、平滑的线向上。你提到了大都会通讯。大都会通讯的部分业务做得非常好，例如。

但在网络业务方面，如果你回顾30年，看看哪个网络一直领先，你会发现没有人能永远保持领先或垫底。这是一个竞争激烈的世界，正如我之前提到的。有时你的竞争对手的正确举措、你自己的错误举措、世界环境——所有这些都会打断趋势线。过去一年里，我没有看到任何东西会改变吉列刀片和剃须刀业务（我称之为“不可避免”的业务）的长期趋势线。我的意思是，他们还有其他不属于刀片和剃须刀类别的业务。幸运的是，可口可乐几乎全部业务都在软饮料领域。所以它几乎占了整个业务的百分之百。但我没有看到任何东西会改变我对刀片或——刀片和剃须刀业务——或可口可乐在软饮料行业地位的长期未来的看法。

10. 通缩可能性不大，但如果发生，对债券持有人有利

沃伦·巴菲特：第一区。

参会者：史蒂夫·科恩（音译），来自伊利诺伊州皮奥里亚。首先，半小时前我刚吃了第一个迪利棒，谢谢你让我知道它。

沃伦·巴菲特：好。

参会者：您之前——

沃伦·巴菲特：我还可以卖给你第二个，如果——（笑声）

参会者：您之前谈到了变化的威胁。您能谈谈通缩的威胁吗？如果通缩发生，它可能会对经济、伯克希尔哈撒韦以及个人投资决策产生什么影响？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，现在，在什么方面有替代？我没有——

参会者：——通货膨胀。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，通货膨胀。

参会者和查理·芒格：通缩。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，通缩。

查理·芒格：通缩。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我快要——快弄明白了。（笑声）嗯，我认为这非常非常不可能，但我——在过去十年或更长时间里，我在关于通货膨胀至少在那段时间得到抑制的程度方面一直持续犯错。我本来会预期——如果你向我展示过去将要发生的所有其他事情——如果我10年或15年前早知道那些——我会认为我们会有更多的通胀，所以——我很难设想一个美国经历通缩的世界。但是，你知道，我的记录在这方面并不好。而且再说一次，我们不——我们不会花很多时间思考宏观因素。我的意思是，如果你遇到通缩，这意味着资本在升值，所以你需要低得多的名义资本回报率，才能在通缩情况下处于与通胀情况下相同的状态。

所以通缩，在其他条件相同的情况下——但实际上并不相同——对投资者有利，因为——你知道，货币的价值在升值。货币的购买力在升值。但它也会带来其他后果。我认为这不太可能。我在宏观预测方面根本没有什么好记录，如果它真的发生了，说实话，我不知道会有什么影响。查理。

查理·芒格：嗯，你已经看到通缩在日本正在做什么，对那里的人们来说相当不愉快。另一方面，它并不是一场灾难。我的意思是，完全不像美国30年代那样。

沃伦·巴菲特：不，实际上，在日本，如果你持有长期债券，你会从通缩中获得巨大的意外之财，因为你的——你的债券价值会随着利率下降而大幅上升。然后这些钱反过来又能买到更多的东西。所以——这是一个非常——如果你碰巧是多年前以较高票面利率发行长期债券的人，这对你有利。而且——大概这在美国也会起作用。如果我们真的遇到持续的通缩，我的猜测是，持有长期债券的人，即使是在5.5%的利率时买的，会发现他们的财务状况相对于持有大多数其他资产类别的人来说会有极大的改善。

11. 市场是“相当”有效的，但有效市场理论是“愚蠢的”

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区。

参会者：你好。我是默里·卡斯，来自安大略省万锦市。首先，巴菲特先生、芒格先生，我想感谢你们每年都在这些会议上如此慷慨地付出时间。巴菲特先生，学术界很多人称您为幸运者，或者是一个统计学的异常值。芒格先生，我不确定他们怎么称呼您。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你可以自由猜测他们怎么称呼他。（笑声）

参会者：我知道您不喜欢预测股票市场，但也许您敢大胆预测一下有效市场理论支持者与价值投资者之间辩论的演变。您认为会有和解的一天吗？我特别指的是商学院教授的那些东西。另外，您指定的继任者，他们也是异常值吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）嗯，我们愿意这么认为。然后，他们可能比我们更异常。市场通常是——你知道，对我来说，如果你在市场里待了一段时间，这几乎是显而易见的：市场通常是相当有效的。它在资产类别之间的定价上相当有效，在评估特定业务方面也相当有效。但是“相当有效”并不足以支持用有效市场理论的方法来进行投资，也不支持学术界由此衍生出的所有分支。所以，如果你相信有效市场理论，并在20或30年前，或10年前，被教授并采纳了它——我想它可能在20年前达到了顶峰——你知道，那将是一个非常非常严重的错误。那就像学习地球是平的一样。它只会——你的人生起点就会错。现在，它在学术界变得极其流行。它几乎成了保住教职的必要信仰。

所有高级课程都教这个。并且围绕它建立了一个涉及其他投资问题的数学理论，所以如果你击中它的核心并摧毁那一部分，这实际上意味着那些花了很多很多年获得博士学位的人会发现他们的整个世界都倒塌了。我会说，在过去一二十年里，它已经在相当程度上被证伪了。我的意思是，你不再听到人们像15或20年前那样谈论它了。但市场在大多数方面通常是相当有效的。我的意思是，很难找到定价低效的证券。有时相对容易。但现在，例如，就很困难。我不知道它是否仍然是商学院的圣经。我在与商学院交流时得到的印象是，它作为不容置疑的教条的地位远不如15或20年前了。佛罗里达大学现在有一些关于企业估值的课程。

密苏里大学也开设了一门。我认为有效市场理论的大祭司们现在在演讲邀请和研讨会等方面的需求不如一二十年前了。不过很难——这很有趣。很难消除一种成为某个金融系教条的信仰。这对他们来说是如此具有挑战性，你知道，他们必须在30或40岁时回去说：“我到现在学到的东西，以及我一直在教学生的东西，都是愚蠢的。”这对人们来说不容易。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，你知道，伟大的物理学家马克斯·普朗克说过，即使在物理学领域，老一代也不愿意接受新思想。新思想最终会占据上风，是因为老一代随着时间流逝而逐渐消失，他们紧紧抓住过去的愚蠢不放。这正是发生在硬核有效市场理论家身上的事。他们在这个舞台上是个尴尬的存在，并且很快就会消失。另一方面——（笑声）那些认为市场相当有效，或者大致有效的人，当然完全正确，并且这种观点会长期存在。

沃伦·巴菲特：然而，认为它大致有效对学术界来说毫无用处。你无法围绕它构建任何东西。我的意思是，那——人们想要的是他们所谓的优雅理论。但它就是行不通。你知道，投资就是关于评估企业价值。我的意思是，这就是投资的一切。你坐下来，试图弄清楚一家企业值多少钱。如果它的售价低于这个数字，你就买入。对我来说——你在这个国家几乎找不到一门关于如何评估企业价值的课程。你可以找到各种各样的课程，教你怎么计算贝塔值，或者诸如此类的东西，因为那是讲师知道怎么做的事情。但他不知道如何评估一家企业的价值。所以，重要的科目没有被教授。而且它很难教。我认为本·格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学教得很好，我非常幸运在很多年前遇到了他。但如果你拿一个普通的金融学博士，让他评估一家企业价值，他会遇到麻烦。如果他无法评估它，我不知道他怎么能投资它，所以因此，他——采取有效市场理论并说这没什么区别，因为反正每个人都知道关于它的一切，要容易得多。而且试图思考评估企业价值是没有意义的。如果市场是有效的，它已经完美地定价了所有东西。我从来都不知道那门课第二天该讲什么。我的意思是——（笑声）第一天——你走进去，你说，你知道，“一切都完美定价了，下课。”所以这让我很困惑。但我鼓励你去寻找那些定价低效的证券。

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区。顺便说一句，伯克希尔在很长一段时间里都是定价低效的。而且它不在——如果你问一个学者如何评估它，他们不会知道具体要看什么。是的。

12. 我们努力快速增加低成本的浮存金

参会者：我叫肯·舒文斯坦（音译），来自纽约市。首先，非常感谢你们提供这个极好的教育论坛。你们教会我们，伯克希尔的一个关键概念是它拥有的浮存金数量、浮存金的成本以及它增长的速度。您能帮助我们了解当前伯克希尔拥有多少浮存金，以及未来一二十年这类增长目标是什么吗？我理解这会是跳跃式前进。因为，回顾你们提供给我们的通用再保险和伯克希尔的历史数据，关于浮存金数量及其成本，它一直以很高的速度增长——百分之十几到二十几。如果你们能评论一下我们未来应该有的期望，那就太好了。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这是一个重要的问题。但我不知道如何给你一个好的答案。自1967年我们进入保险业以来，它的增长速度比我预想的要快得多。我的意思是，我没有——我没有预料到它会那样增长。我并不一定预料到我们会有机会购买GEICO。我并不一定知道我们会收购通用再保险——所以，这非常难以预测。我们试图做的是尽可能快地增加低成本的浮存金。有时这很容易，有时则不可能。但我不知道——如果你30年前问我这个问题，我给你的答案实际上后来并没有很好地实现。

而且我——所以，我不知道现在如何给你答案，除了告诉你：这是伯克希尔的一个目标，即尽可能快地增加那笔浮存金，同时保持其非常低的成本。而且，你再次提到它会跳跃式变化。嗯，成本会跳跃，增长率也会跳跃。但是，我的意思是，我们——这是我们一直在思考的事情，无论是在我们的运营决策中，还是可能在某个重大的资本承诺决策中。我们知道，如果我们能解决如何以相对较低的成本增长它的问题，我们就会在这个过程中使伯克希尔变得更有价值。而且人们，我的意思是——我们总是摆出我们在做什么的事实，但人们似乎基本上忽略了这一点。我们一直有这样的增长率，但数字太大了，我们无法维持。但这是查理和我一直在思考的事情。我们有一些很好的工具来增长它。

但我们没有任何工具能够以过去那样的总体速度来增长它。所以我们可能不得不——我们可能会得到一个机会来做一些事情，来增强我们这样做的能力。如果我们得到机会，而且价格合适，我们就会去做。如果没有，我们会在内部尽可能多地做。但你问的问题，伯克希尔内在价值在未来10年的增长，在很大程度上将取决于我们实际增长它的速度，并且还取决于我们获得那笔浮存金的成本。查理？

查理·芒格：是的。如果我们以过去30年同样的速度再增长30年这种低成本的浮存金，你可以对一件事充满信心：如果你仰望天空，东方会有一颗明星。（笑声和掌声）

13. 伯克希尔不销售人寿保险的两个原因

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区。（笑声）

参会者：我叫大卫·利维（音译），来自加利福尼亚州纽波特海滩。伯克希尔一直在投资财产和意外险以及再保险业务。我注意到，除了年金，你们一直避开人寿保险业务。您是否预期会投资人寿保险业务？另外，我还有第二个问题，是关于伯克希尔A股和B股的关系。去年B股相对于A股有轻微溢价。现在，B股大约以3%到4%的折价交易。我还注意到某些人在做空伯克希尔A股和B股。我想知道您能否对此发表评论。

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。关于寿险业务，我们对寿险业务没有偏见，我们只是——我们通过通用再保险在寿险再保险业务中占有相当重要的地位。正如你提到的，我们做了一点点年金业务。寿险业务的问题在于它并不是非常赚钱——你可以看看大型公司的记录——而且这个领域的很多活动在某种程度上都与股权相关。查理和我从来不想进入为他人管理股权的业务。我的意思是，我们希望在股权上的唯一权益就是伯克希尔哈撒韦本身。所以，我们不想戴两顶帽子。我们永远不会进入共同基金管理业务或任何类型的投资管理业务，因为，如果我们管理着200或300亿美元的投资管理业务，而我们有一个好主意，可以投入10亿美元，你知道，我们投谁的钱呢？所以，我们宁愿只戴一顶帽子。我们想要那顶帽子是伯克希尔哈撒韦。

而且我们不想向其他人承诺，比如，百分之零点五或百分之一的费用，他们就能得到我们最好的想法，因为这些想法属于伯克希尔，如果我们做出相反的承诺，我们就是在误导人们。所以，任何涉及股权成分的事情——这是现在寿险业务中很大的一部分——只是我们不会感到舒服参与的事情。如果你看一下定期寿险，我们研究过，考虑过放在互联网上。它——它的定价使得我们即使在没有佣金的情况下也很难觉得合理。但这是我们了解的行业。所以，我们是完全愿意进入寿险业务的，如果我们认为有——如果我们有一种方法，我们认为它能带来合理的盈利能力。查理，在我谈到A股与B股的问题之前，你想评论一下寿险业务吗，或者——

查理·芒格：不。我们做那些结构性结算。这有点像年金业务。我们做的寿险业务主要是年金，而且是基于非常低的成本基础。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。任何想购买非股权相关年金的人，都应该去我们的网站查看，就——考虑到产品的安全性权重等等，你会发现一个非常非常有竞争力的产品，因为我们——这是一个低成本运营。如果你购买它是为了在30年后获得付款，你肯定能从伯克希尔得到付款，而你从其他各种实体那里不一定能得到付款。所以，我们有一个非常有竞争力的产品，但它不是一个大的业务。

14. A股和B股之间的价格差异

沃伦·巴菲特：关于A股与B股的问题，我写了一些东西——我几个月前写的，并贴在了网站上——关于我自己的想法。显然，B股最多值A股的三十分之一，因为你总是可以将一股A股转换为30股B股。B股可能会在达到引发两者套利的水平之前，比三十分之一的价格高出一点点。所以，理论上它可以，并且将会，以高于A股价格三十分之一百分之零点几的价格交易。但如果它超过了那个价格，你知道，我会买入A股并卖给你B股。可以赚取套利利润，可能按照市场运作方式，大部分利润将被专家获得，因为他处于最佳位置来实施此类交易。但B股永远不会比A股的三十分之一更值钱，并且它永远不会以远高于A股三十分之一的价格出售。

另一方面，B股不能转换为A股，所以它可以折价交易。几个月前我在网上发表了我的看法——只是我的个人意见——但我认为，当B股以低于——高于——百分之二的折价交易时，我个人在这种情况下宁愿买B股而不是A股。如果它和A股价格相同——A股价格的三十分之一，但它是平价交易——而且我正在购买30股或更多的B股，我宁愿买A股，因为你总是可以往一个方向转换，而不能往另一个方向。我认为，如果你看看未来10年——我认为有很大百分比的时间，它会正好在A股价格的三十分之一附近交易，并且会有一些时期它会有适度的折价。我会说，当它达到3%到4%的范围时，我认为这是一个相当大的折价。

如果我自己不需要缴税，我可能会卖出A股并买入B股，如果我在B股上得到的经济等价物多出4%。对我来说做这个不实际。一些——我认识一些免税投资者，他们实际上做过类似的事情，并且——长期来看，我们将始终像我们在招股说明书中陈述的那样对待B股。A股和B股有两个区别。一个是相对投票权。另一个是股东指定捐赠计划。在其他所有方面，B股将与A股同等对待。我们没有——即使查理和我拥有大量A股，几乎没有任何B股，我们认为B股股东除了我们在发行时指出的那两个区别外，与A股股东百分之百平等。我们永远不会——反正伯克希尔永远不会进行任何交易——但如果有，我们总是会按1比30的比例对待A股和B股。

我们不会——我们遇到过别人没那样做的情况，我们对那些情况从不感到高兴。所以我们总是会按比例对待人们。查理。

查理·芒格：嗯，我当然同意所有这些。

沃伦·巴菲特：关于做空的问题，任何人做空任何股票实际上都没有区别。我的意思是，如果你在A股和B股之间进行套利，并且B股卖得比A股稍高，你可能会买入一些A股并做空一些B股，你可能会推迟转换，因为你可能认为B股会转为折价。然后你会平掉整个交易，而不是转换。我的意思是，有很多技巧，查理和我在过去几年里用过，以及其他适用于此类情况的证券。但做空不会以任何方式、形式或形态伤害我们。我的意思是，这没有任何区别。我不在乎A股的空头头寸是1000股还是10万股。你知道，有人在某个点卖出，有人在另一个点买入，你是否逆转买卖并不重要。重要的是伯克希尔的内在价值。

如果我们以合理的速度增加伯克希尔的价值，你知道，那些做空者就得想办法解决一日三餐的问题。（笑声）

15. 投资建议：早开始，独立思考

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。请第五区提问。

参会者：下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫格兰特·摩根（音译），来自纽约市。早些时候，您承认今天的投资和商业环境比您刚开始时要困难。我的问题是，如果您今天在30岁出头重新开始，在当今的环境下，您会做哪些不同或相同的事情来复制您的成功？简而言之，巴菲特先生，我怎样才能赚到300亿美元？（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：早开始。（笑声）查理总是说，最重要的是我们在一个非常长的山坡顶上开始滚这个小雪球。所以我们在非常年轻的时候就开始滚雪球了。而且，当然，雪球——复利的本质是它就像粘性雪的雪球。诀窍是要有一个非常长的山坡，这意味着要么很早就开始，要么活得很长——活到很老。你知道，如果我在投资界重来一次，我会完全一样地做。我的意思是，如果我今天离开学校，有1万美元可以投资，我会从“As”开始。我会开始挨个浏览公司。我可能会专注于小公司，因为那是用较少的资金运作，并且在那个领域更有机会发现被忽视的东西。而且，正如查理之前所说，不会像1951年那样，你随便翻翻就能找到各种跃然纸上的东西。但唯一的方法就是这样。

标题：1999年年度股东大会

第5/6部分

我的意思是，你必须购买企业——或者购买被称为股票的企业的一部分——并且你必须以有吸引力的价格购买它们，你还必须买入优质企业。就投资而言，这个建议即便再过一百年也不会改变。这就是投资的全部。而且你不能指望别人替你做这件事。我的意思是，人们不会告诉你——他们不会告诉你那些精彩的小投资机会。这——这不是投资行业的运作方式。当我1951年1月第一次拜访GEICO时，我回到了哥伦比亚。那年剩下的时间里，我随后去了Blyth公司，实际上还去了另一家领先的公司——Geyer & Co.——那是一家在保险领域领先的分析公司。你知道，我以为我发现了这个绝妙的东西，想看看这些专注于保险股的伟大投资机构会怎么说。他们说我根本不知道自己在说什么。你知道，他们对这个毫无兴趣。

你必须遵循自己的判断——你知道，你必须了解自己知道什么，不知道自己知道什么。在你了解的领域里，你只需要——你必须非常积极地追求它，并在发现时采取行动。你不能到处寻找同意你的人。你甚至不能到处寻找能理解你在说什么的人。你知道，你必须独立思考。如果你这样做了，你就会发现东西。查理？

查理·芒格：是的。对大多数人来说，过程中最难的部分是第一个10万美元。如果你从零开始起步，攒够10万美元对大多数人来说是一场漫长的斗争。我认为，那些相对较快达到这一目标的人，如果他们热衷于理性、非常渴望且善于抓住机遇，并且持续大幅削减支出、低于收入生活，这些因素会很有帮助。我认为这三个因素非常有益。

16. 巴菲特如何学习保险业务

沃伦·巴菲特：第六区。

股东：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，非常感谢你们的热情款待。打扰一下，我叫伊冯·埃德蒙兹，来自佛罗里达州圣彼得堡。也感谢你们如此慷慨地花这么多时间回答我们的问题。我有两个关于保险的问题。第一个是，我怀疑我们中很多人对保险的了解不如对股票的了解，我想知道你们能否在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的网站上放一些参考资料，帮助我们增加对保险的了解。第二个问题可能和第一个有关，我只是——我不太理解，但《华尔街日报》在3月19日发表了一篇文章，题为“当保险公司传递垃圾时，有些人最终背黑锅”。这个“有些人”中包括了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。文章重点提到，他们将从工伤赔偿保险中产生的“垃圾”业务传递给了科隆再保险公司等机构。

长话短说，通用再保险公司的助理总法律顾问（据我所知，通用再保险现在拥有科隆再保险的大部分股权）表示，这是一个经典的案例，一家保险公司为了在竞争激烈的市场中寻求增长，在其专业领域之外（即工伤赔偿保险业务）承保业务，而他们的专长是寿险再保险。格雷厄姆先生接着说，然后我就讲完了：“不要承保你不理解的业务。其次，适当的控制对保险业务至关重要。最后，如果一个商业机会好得令人难以置信，那它很可能就是假的。”如果这是真的，你能告诉我们这是怎么发生的吗？正在采取什么措施确保它不会再次发生？这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东最终可能造成多大成本？因为我的理解是——目前科隆再保险计提的损失可能只是冰山一角。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。这些问题问得很好。我们先谈第一个问题，关于网站以及列出一份参考文件清单，或者其他能帮助你了解保险的东西。听起来你已经很了解了。（笑声）我想不出我读过哪本关于这个主题的好书。我的保险知识是通过阅读获得的——嗯，我获得了巨大的先发优势，1951年1月的一个星期六早上，当时96岁的洛里默·戴维森花了大约四个小时向我解释GEICO是如何运作的。那是一次极好的教育，它不仅让我对GEICO的运作方式产生了浓厚兴趣，也让我对其竞争对手和整个行业产生了兴趣，于是我开始大量阅读其他报告。我从未——我想我在学校上过一门保险课程。我什么都不记得了。我不知道课本是什么，一无所知。那对我来说毫无价值。所以我实际上没有任何保险背景。你知道，我家里也没有人从事保险行业。

在和戴维交谈之前，我确实——这根本不是我考虑过的事情。我去那里的唯一原因是我心目中的英雄本·格雷厄姆在《名人录》中被列为政府雇员保险公司的董事长。如果他当时是，你知道——他也是旧金山市场街铁路公司的董事长。幸运的是，我去了GEICO，而不是去看市场街铁路公司。（笑声）它更近。但我——我对保险的了解正是来自于大量、大量地阅读报告。我的意思是，如果我今天从头开始，对保险行业几乎一无所知，并且想培养一些专业知识，我可能会阅读周围每一家财险公司的报告。我会回顾一段时间，阅读——我可能会拿到最好的手册并仔细研究。我会进行大量阅读。我曾经去林肯市的保险局，翻阅大会报告和检查报告。

我会——他们会给我某个地方的小桌子，我会不停地向他们要——（笑）——这些报告，他们得去州议会大厦的最底层帮我找出来。但他们没什么别的事可做，所以总是很乐意帮忙。我就是这样了解保险的。碰巧，通过这种方式学习这个领域是富有成效的。我真的认为现在最好的方法也与此类似。我想不出——你知道，你可以阅读一些分析师的报告。坦白说，我认为通过阅读伯克希尔·哈撒韦20年来的年报以及阅读保险部分，你可以学到一些东西。我认为这会让你了解保险的经济学。所以我会通过阅读来学习。如果你能找到一位非常了解这个行业、并且愿意花时间和你谈谈的人，他们可能会缩短你的学习过程并给你一些帮助。

17. Unicover损失是通用再保险的“罕见失误”

沃伦·巴菲特：第二个问题关于所谓的——Unicover事件，科隆再保险公司为此计提了2.75亿美元的储备金——准确地说，是科隆人寿计提了2.75亿美元的储备金。首先，我要说，对于这项业务产生的损失，2.75亿仍然是最佳估计。换句话说，对于行业整体损失而言，这可能只是冰山一角，因为还没有其他人承认有任何损失。这太令人惊讶了。我的意思是，相信我，外面还有很多其他损失。我们说过我们会损失2.75亿美元。我认为这是一个很好的估计。但我认为很多其他人将承受非常——他们必须承受重大损失。除了我们之外，肯定有人会在这件事上亏损巨额资金。所以我们报告的可能是行业损失的冰山一角。我不认为这是通用再保险或伯克希尔·哈撒韦损失的冰山一角。这是我们目前对这起损失的最佳估计。

如果这个估计发生变化，我会通过季度报告告知你们，或者如果影响非常大，我们会发布公告。但我不预期会发生这种情况。但我会忠实地向你们报告，我向你们保证，会汇报这笔损失随时间推移的发展情况。你读到的关于“当一件事好得令人难以置信时，它通常就是假的”之类的话，是很有道理的。Unicover事件造成的损失分配，可能在十年后也无法完全解决。我的意思是，我以前在保险业和其他领域都见过这种情况，尤其是在保险业，当涉及多方当事人时，会有关于愚蠢行为的指控、欺诈的指控、虚假陈述的指控以及各种指控。涉及的人太多，需要确定的事实问题也太多。将会产生大量诉讼。理清这些诉讼需要很长时间。最终，损失会由某人承担。我们提出的最佳估计是2.75亿。

但在未来几个月和几年里，随着其他各方的介入——我们可能会发现更多情况，我们可以发现很多事情，因为会有大量诉讼，不一定涉及我们，但即使作为旁观者——我们也会了解到当时发生了什么。不幸的是，保险业以前也发生过类似的事情。二十多年前，我们在国民 indemnity 公司也遇到过有些类似的情况。这对我们来说代价高昂。它并没有让我们损失那么多百万美元，但事情恰好发生在道琼斯指数在600点左右的时候，我们不知道损失会有多大。因此，它迫使我们不得不在股权投资上比原本更为保守，如果这件事没有悬在我们头上的话。传统的会计方法永远不会捕捉到我们在那次事件中遭受的损失。那被称为Omni事件。就像我说的，它肯定也有很多不同之处，但也有一些相似之处。

你知道，这样的事情会让人分心，它显然——包含一些错误和信息失真的混合体。所有这些都必须理清。我们目前最好的猜测是，当一切尘埃落定——十年后、十五年后——我们的损失将是2.75亿美元。这当然不会是精确的数字。但就像我说的，如果有任何理由需要上调这个数字，我们会及时通知你们。不时出现令人不快的意外正是保险业的本质。洛斯公司在20世纪70年代初收购了CNA。就在最近几年，有一项基于保险单的石棉板和解案，我相信那份保单是50年代末签发的。我记得，有一笔高达15亿美元的损失，而保费只有几千美元。我记得GEICO在20世纪80年代初承保的一单业务上损失了6000万美元，而总保费不到20万美元。

你知道，其中有多少是愚蠢、多少是欺诈，或者谁知道确切的数字？但保险业确实可能带来一些非常令人不快的意外。不幸的是，这不会是最后一次。它不会发生在同一个地方，也不会以完全相同的方式发生。但保险业的本质就是，意外往往是令人不快的。这不是你在承保个人汽车保险之类业务时会遇到的情况。但是，当你承保那些索赔会在10年、20年或30年后才出现的业务时——我想我们有一家小型工伤赔偿保险公司，有一项索赔可以追溯到二十多年前，大概25年左右，直到最近一两年才突然浮现。而且它花费了真金白银。所以这是一个可能出现大额且迟到意外的行业。即使是管理良好的公司也会发生这种情况。但是，管理良好的公司会少一些这样的意外。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，这个问题问得真好。想象一下，有人问如何受教育的问题——谁知道如何教育别人？就像通过让狗把鼻子蹭进去来教育它一样。（笑声）一般来说，那是一个愚蠢的错误。这是一个业余者犯的错误。这并不意味着通用再保险突然全是业余人员了。这是一个罕见的失误，就像在伯克希尔，我们认为Omni事件也是一个罕见的失误。我不认为我们之后重复过这个错误。对吧，沃伦？我想不出任何一个。

沃伦·巴菲特：但是同样，你知道，我们不知道我们是否重复了那个错误。

查理·芒格：嗯，但是——

沃伦·巴菲特：这些东西后来会冒出来。不，不，答案是我们没有重复那个错误。（笑声）

查理·芒格：所以是的，这是一个愚蠢的、业余的错误。这类事情确实会发生。我们不认为这反映了通用再保险智力水平的突然下降，它的智力水平可能是世界上最高的。这只是那种偶尔会发生的事情。这类事情有一个好处，它确实会让你更加小心。像这样被狠狠撞了一下鼻子，真的会让你重新集中注意力。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，而且这些成本最终会由谁承担还有待观察。因为关于承诺了什么之类的一整套事实，目前还没有完全解决。在Omni事件中，我们在一段时间内对事实存在重大争议，最终我们收回了相当大一笔钱，这在当时看来似乎不太可能收回。所以，你知道，这件事的最终篇章不会很快写下，但根据我们目前所知，计提2.75亿美元的储备金是合适的。这个数字可能上升，也可能下降，这取决于我们发现的事实。

18. 伯克希尔回购可能性不大

沃伦·巴菲特：第七区。

股东：我的名字是迈克·西利，来自新泽西州萨米特。你们能否重新审视一下伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股份回购问题？我们今天听到了你关于伯克希尔股价过去曾偶尔被无效率定价的评论。我们知道现在流通的股份更多了。我很好奇，现金的积累是否导致你们花更多时间寻找那些在十年展望上让你们更放心的投资机会？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：关于回购股票的问题——我当时评论说有时候价格是无效率的——在那些时候，我们总是觉得——而且我们在某些情况下是错误的——似乎总是有其他证券的价格更加无效率。当伯克希尔在1974年以每股50美元的价格交易时，我可能认为它便宜。但同时，我也在关注整个华盛顿邮报公司，它以8000万美元的价格出售，而我显然认为它值4亿美元。我当时并不认为伯克希尔像华盛顿邮报公司那样被低估了。这种情况在各个时期都有——有些时候我认为伯克希尔被低估了，甚至被严重低估，但同时我发现了其他我觉得更有吸引力的东西。就像我说的，很多时候我都错了。我们当时如果回购自己的股票，而不是购买我买下的那些东西，情况会更好。但是——如果我们手头有钱，并且认为伯克希尔被严重低估，而且找不到其他事情可做，那么回购伯克希尔股份显然是有意义的。

我认为在这个市场，对大多数公司来说，即使回购可能接近历史最高水平，如果不是的话，我认为现在大多数公司进行回购要产生很大意义是困难的。我的意思是，我不认为他们用这些钱能获得多少回报，因为我们自己都不想买那些股票。而且——我说的是美国各种公司的股票。然而，公司现在对回购股票的热情比20年前高得多，而当时他们从回购中获得的回报要远远高得多。我们总是——这是一个我们总会考虑的选项。我们不太可能这样做，除非我们认为其价格被相当戏剧性地低估了，因为简单来说——我们希望在做出这类决策时有巨大的安全边际——不想——我们不想用95美分、94美分或93美分去买一张1美元的钞票。

但是存在某个水平，如果我们没有其他资金用途，我们会开始感到兴奋。查理。

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。

19. 强大的声誉将有助于我们开展互联网商务

沃伦·巴菲特：第八区。

股东：下午好。韦斯·瑟曼，来自加利福尼亚州斯坦福。你之前提到了互联网上品牌的力量。我真的想不出比伯克希尔·哈撒韦这个品牌更好的品牌了，至少对我来说是这样。我想，展望未来，你们是否考虑过如何进一步利用伯克希尔·哈撒韦这个名字在互联网上，以利用你们过去几十年建立的声誉作为——

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这是一个非常好的观点，而且这可能具有真正的价值。对我们来说，与我们相关联的品牌可能已经具有一些价值。我的意思是，我确实认为与伯克希尔·哈撒韦相关联的Executive Jet或NetJets项目、与伯克希尔·哈撒韦相关联的Borsheims、与伯克希尔·哈撒韦相关联的伯克希尔·哈撒韦人寿——我认为这些品牌因与伯克希尔的关联而得到增强，其他一些品牌也是如此。但我认为这还有很长的路要走。我认为你说得非常对，互联网强化了与人交易时信任的必要性。我的意思是，你离面对面的交易越来越远，那种你可以第二天回店里、或者第二天看到卖东西给你的人并要求调整之类的情况。你真的需要越来越多地信任一个你永远不会见到的人。

我认为你说得对，伯克希尔·哈撒韦如果行为得当，可以建立起远超普通公司的信任声誉。当我们恰当地将这一点与我们的一些品牌关联起来时，这些品牌将因这种关联而得到增强。所以，不，我一直在思考你所说的，我们的经理们也是如此。这是我们打算在未来利用的东西。相当有趣的是，我的意思是，如果你看看那些与客户没有面对面互动的公司，无论是与公司本身还是像零售商这样的中介——你看，有戴尔电脑，现在有亚马逊网站。但GEICO现在与370万保单持有人开展业务，到今年年底前——它将接近450万，可能要做大概40亿到80亿美元的业务，这些业务来自从未见过GEICO任何人、只在电话里交谈过的人。

但我们是美国最大的公司之一，就开展直接面向消费者的业务而言。我们是在与那些平均每年付给我们大约1200美元以获得一个承诺的人打交道。所以，当人们谈论亚马逊这类世界时，人们在那里购买价值X美元的书，我们与之有更直接的联系，而这些人每年都会续保。这是基于信任。我的意思是，这不是基于隔壁邻居——如果他们有问题可以去找他。这是基于他们信任这家位于哥伦比亚特区华盛顿的公司将来会履行承诺。这是一笔巨大的资产。而且它每天都在增长。我的意思是，我们每天都在增加新的保单持有人，他们从未见过公司的任何人。这已经是——我的意思是，这是一笔非常大的资产。在我看来，十年后它会大很多倍。

像这样一家接一家与伯克希尔·哈撒韦这个保护伞关联起来、并赢得人们信任的公司，我们可以多年来进入非常多家庭。随着越来越多的业务以间接方式或直接面向消费者的方式完成，在我看来，这种力量应该会增长。我们只需非常聪明地思考如何最大化这种增长。查理？

查理·芒格：没什么要补充的。

20. 管理层、护城河以及未来收益的确定性

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第一区。

股东：你好。我叫大卫·泽尔克，目前住在华盛顿州雷德蒙德，在那里为你的一个好朋友工作。所以，如果我因为周一忙碌请假而惹上麻烦，也许我可以给你打个电话，你帮我说句话。

沃伦·巴菲特：如果是无薪假，我们不会有意见。（笑声）

股东：是休假，嗯。我的问题是关于你们两位如何评估某些无形资产的价值，我知道你们在评估公司时会关注这些。任何读过你们著作的人都知道，你们寻找优秀的管理层和经济护城河，这些护城河使公司能够提高价格和利润率。我希望你们能深入谈谈，告诉我们，对你们来说，优秀管理层和经济护城河的标志是什么？此外，当你们评估公司时，你们是否会尝试为这些管理层、护城河以及其他无形资产设定一个美元价值？如果是的话，能带我们了解一下你们的思路吗？最后，我对你们如何选择贴现率很感兴趣。我实际上是你们的商学院校友，我也学了一大堆关于贝塔的垃圾。我读到你们只是使用国债利率。我不确定这是否正确，但我很乐意听听你们谈谈贴现率。如果你们能尽可能详细地分享你们的想法，我将不胜感激。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们确实——我们考虑国债利率，但就像我之前说的，这并不意味着我们认为一旦我们用国债利率贴现了某样东西，那就是该支付的价格。我们使用国债利率只是为了跨时间和跨公司之间的可比性。但是，马蹄铁公司赚的一美元和互联网公司赚的一美元，在美元本身的价值上是一样的。所以，它并不因为来自某个叫做“.com”的公司或者叫做“老式马蹄铁公司”的公司而更有价值。美元是平等的。我们的贴现率反映了对未来收入流的不同的预期，但它们并不反映该收入是来自市场热衷的东西还是其他东西。护城河和管理层是估值过程的一部分，因为它们影响我们对未来预期收入流（实际上是现金流）的确定性程度以及数量的判断。

我的意思是，你知道，评估企业是一门艺术。最终的公式很简单。但是，如果你和我各自看口香糖生意——我们不拥有箭牌，所以我在课堂上经常用箭牌举例——选一个你预期未来10年或20年口香糖的单位增长率数字。告诉我你对定价灵活性的预期，以及箭牌市场份额急剧减少的风险有多大。你可以考虑所有这些。这就是我们经历的思考过程。那就是——在这种情况下，我们在评估护城河。我们在评估价格弹性，它在某种程度上与护城河相互作用。我们在评估未来单位需求变化的可能性。我们在评估管理层处理他们产生的现金是非常聪明还是非常愚蠢的可能性。所有这一切都进入了我们对未来这些年现金流状况的评估。

但是投资的——投资的结果将取决于未来10年或20年这个现金流如何发展。今天早些时候有人提出了一个问题，对伯克希尔可能发生的事情做了一些假设。公式是完全正确的。使用什么数字是另一个问题，但公式是对的。那个公式——护城河是其中的一部分。如果你有足够大的护城河，你就不需要那么多管理层。你知道，这回到了彼得·林奇的评论，他喜欢买一家好到连傻瓜都能经营的公司，因为迟早会有一个傻瓜来经营。嗯——（笑声）我是说，他说的是同一回事。我的意思是，他说他真正喜欢的是拥有一个绝佳护城河、护城河不会发生任何变化的生意。这样的生意并不多。但是——所以你需要参与评估所有这些细微差别。这个（一罐可口可乐），不是樱桃味的，而是常规版的——这个，围绕它有一条绝佳的护城河。

这里面甚至有一个护城河，你知道，在这个包装罐里。你知道，有一项研究调查了有多少人可以在蒙住眼睛的情况下，仅通过抓住容器就识别出他们拿的是什么产品。在这方面，很少有产品能像可口可乐那样得分高。所以，在这种情况下，这个产品拥有心智份额。如果世界上有60亿人——我不知道他们中有多少人脑子里对可口可乐有积极印象，但这个数字会非常大。问题是，十年后这个数字会不会更大，平均而言，那几十亿拥有这种印象的人，其印象是否只会稍微更积极一点？这就是生意的全部。如果事情朝着那个方向发展，你就拥有了一门伟大的生意。我认为它非常有可能朝那个方向发展，但这是我自己的判断。我认为可口可乐有一条巨大的护城河。我认为它在世界不同地区以及各方面会有所不同。

而且我认为，除此之外，它还有出色的管理层。但是——没有一个公式能精确地告诉你这些，你知道，能告诉你护城河有28英尺宽、16英尺深之类的东西。你必须了解这些生意。这正是让学术界抓狂的地方，因为他们知道如何计算标准差以及各种东西，但这些并不能告诉他们什么。真正能告诉你一些东西的是，你是否知道如何判断护城河有多宽，以及它是否会进一步扩大或缩小。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，你对学术方法的批评还不够充分。（笑声）投资组合管理、公司财务等等的学术方法非常有趣。它有点像长期资本管理公司。如此聪明的人怎么能做出这么愚蠢的事情？然而，事实就是如此。

沃伦·巴菲特：这真的是需要写的一本好书，你知道，就是为什么聪明人会做蠢事？这非常重要，因为我们身边有很多聪明人在工作，你知道，如果我们能消除所有愚蠢的事情，你知道，发生的事情将会令人惊讶。在某种程度上，伯克希尔的记录，就其所取得的成绩而言，是因为我们——不是因为我们做了多么聪明的事情，而是我们可能比大多数人做的蠢事更少。但是为什么聪明人会做违背自身利益的事情，这真的很令人费解。查理，告诉我为什么。（笑）

查理·芒格：嗯，你可以说，最糟糕的学术荒谬性存在于伟大大学的人文院系。在那里，如果你问一个问题，哪种心态最可能对个人的幸福、对他人的贡献造成最大的损害——哪种心态最糟糕？答案会是某种偏执的自怜。无法想象更有破坏性的心态了。现在有整个院系想让每个人都觉得自己是受害者。你花钱送孩子去那些地方，他们教的就是这些东西。这些非理性的角落是如何渗透到这些著名机构中去的，真是令人惊讶。我喜欢伯克希尔会议的原因之一是，我发现那里很少有那种愚蠢的人。（笑声和掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：他把主席台排除在外了（听不清）。（笑）

21. 伯克希尔B股可能相对A股折价交易

沃伦·巴菲特：第二区。

股东：我的名字是盖洛德·汉森。我来自加利福尼亚州圣巴巴拉。作为伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资者，我还是个新手，因为我去年11月才开始投资。如果这是一个典型的年度会议，那么我余生都会在每年五月的第一个星期一来到这里。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很高兴有你。谢谢。（掌声）

股东：现在我非常自豪终于发现了伯克希尔·哈撒韦并成为投资者。但我可能在购买哪种股票，A股还是B股方面犯了一个小错误。我密切关注我的投资，我确实相信买入并持有。我完全不买也不交易。我买了些10年、15年前的东西，现在还持有，赚了很多钱。但我会在每年12月31日对我的投资组合进行一次分析。我在1月1日和4月23日分别看了哈撒韦A股和哈撒韦B股。自1月1日以来，哈撒韦A股上涨了10%。哈撒韦B股上涨了5.3%。我不喜欢这样。现在，我必须承认，我不倾向于购买一只7.7万美元的股票，然后只买你5股或10股。但在这种情况下，因为我买的数量相当多，我买了B股，而我的每股价值增长比A股少了4.7%。

我必须请巴菲特先生给我解释一下——（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

股东：还有另外一个——一个补充评论。（笑声）你提到B股的30倍相当于A股的价值。嗯，如果我把4月23日B股每股2474美元乘以30，我得到74,220美元，但A股的价格是77,000美元。现在我想知道是我愚蠢，还是巴菲特先生能给我一个明智的答案。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。——（笑声）如果你读过我们关于B股最初发行时的说明，以及网站上的解释，所有的信息都表明，A股总是可以转换为30股B股。所以，A股的售价不可能比30股B股的价格少太多。如果低于这个水平，套利就会发生。但反过来则不能转换。所以毫无疑问，虽然一股B股的价值永远不会超过1/30股A股太多，但它可以更低，因为转换不能反向进行。在年底，我没看价格，但显然A股和B股几乎平价，或者根据你所说可能是平价。在那个水平上，我们说过，如果你至少购买30股B股，你最好买A股，因为你总是可以——你总是可以把它转换成30股B股。

在没有任何溢价的情况下，你不会亏钱，如果B股出现折价，你还能赚钱。B股会周期性地相对于A股出现折价。这取决于两种证券的供需情况。B股不会相对于A股出现显著的溢价，因为那样会发生转换。我们已经发生了很多转换。我本人曾在网站上说，例如，我认为当B股的折价超过2%时，如果是我，我宁愿买B股。但如果折价低于2%，我可能会买A股，因为我只是认为你总是有权单向转换，而无权反向转换。我可以预测，就像我刚才想的那样，如果看未来10年，你会发现有很多个月份两只股票以平价交易，即30:1的关系，也会有很多月份B股折价交易。

当购买较小数量的投资者是更激进的股票买家时，他们会把B股推高到一定程度，导致A股转换为B股。这意味着B股的售价相对于A股会有微小、非常微小的溢价。当你发现人们总的来说更喜欢大买家，也许是机构买家时，那么A股往往会有些溢价。我认为——你可能选在了4月23日。我猜现在这个折价已经缩小了一点，因为我认为目前大约是3点几个百分点的折价。但我会大致使用我在网站上贴出的那个指导原则，尽管它没有什么神奇之处。那些是普遍情况。我的意思是，如果B股售价2500美元，A股售价75,000美元，是30:1的关系，而你至少购买价值75,000美元的股票，我会建议你买A股，因为第二天，如果你愿意，你可以把它转换成30股B股。

但是——你不能买30股B股把它转换成1股A股。所以我不确定你实际买入的那天——如果你买的B股，听起来你是这样做的——在你实际买入B股的那天，我不知道你是否是折价买入的。去年大部分时间它并没有折价交易。今年大部分时间它是折价交易的。会有一些时候它平价交易，也有一些时候它折价交易。查理？

查理·芒格：是的。当你最初决定购买两只股票中价格较低的那只时，你犯了一个错误。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，如果他至少买了30股——

查理·芒格：是的。是的。如果你至少买了30股。而现在，B股相对于A股已经跌到这么大的折价，沃伦说他会持有B股。还有什么比这更简单的呢？（掌声和笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会尽力让A股和B股都表现良好。（笑）但是——你应该了解两者的关系。我们在提出这一点时试图说得极其清楚——我们有一个页面——专门针对这个问题。我还在网站上放了这个东西，因为我收到了一些信件质疑这个问题。人们显然不明白，所以我把它放到了网站上。如果你点击我们的——我们的主页，你会看到一些可以点击的参考，显示A股和B股的相对情况。我希望这很清楚。

22. “普通保险公司将继续保持非常普通”

沃伦·巴菲特：第三区。

股东：嗨，我的名字是约翰·卢，来自纽约市。首先，让我感谢你们两位通过你们的年报以及你们在公开场合和出版物中做的各种演讲，为我提供的不可思议的教育。上周我正要给你们寄学费支票，但后来我决定多买一些你们公司的股票。希望你们能原谅我。

沃伦·巴菲特：不，你学得很好。（笑声）

股东：我的问题主要围绕当前的保险业。现在，产能过剩，通常来说这种情况时有时无。但似乎有一种国际整合的趋势。而且，似乎美国的人寿保险公司也有一种去相互化的趋势。我想知道你们能否谈谈对未来保险业格局的看法。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我——你提到的这两种趋势确实存在。我不认为整合通常能解决多少问题。我的意思是，如果你有两个糟糕的企业，把它们放在一起，你通常会得到一个大的、糟糕的企业。（笑声）我并不热衷于那种理论认为你将——你确实有两个非常平庸的企业，然后你要从中挤出成本。根据我的经验，这行不通。但是整合将继续下去，人寿保险公司的去相互化也将继续下去。我们以某种方式在其中扮演某种角色也并非不可想象，尽管这不是我们的首要任务。但在这个行业我学会了永远不要说永不，因为确实会发生一些事情让我想收回以前的一些言论。赢家将是那些拥有基于专业技能、出色分销系统、管理诀窍乃至有效利用浮存金能力的特许经营权的公司。

而像GEICO这样的公司，在优越的——它结合了特许经营权——一个优越的分销系统。我们拥有以低成本向所有人群分销个人汽车保险的方法。USAA在向特定群体提供低成本保险方面做得非常出色。GEICO实际上——在某种意义上——脱胎于USAA。1936年创立该公司的利奥·古德温和他的妻子莉莲，都曾是USAA的员工。我记得利奥是该公司的一位官员。所以GEICO的想法来源于USAA，但他们将它限制在特定阶层。我们向全国所有人提供服务，除了我们无法在新泽西或马萨诸塞州提供服务，因为我们找不到任何方法在那里赚钱。Twentieth Century在特定城市地区（大洛杉矶地区）成为低成本运营商方面做得非常出色。但是，就面向所有人、覆盖所有地区、所有职业的运营模式而言，在我看来，GEICO是美国最好的运营公司。

更好的是，全球的消费者——全国的消费者——都同意这个观点。去年，GEICO的保单持有人增长了20.8%。今年，截至3月31日的12个月内，保单持有人增长了22.5%。这些都是大数字。基数在增长，而且增速还在加快。所以那种——那种优势会随着时间的推移创造出一个好的保险业务——一个非常好的保险业务。我认为一般的保险公司将继续保持非常一般，而且正如你指出的，行业内有大量资本。行业内的资本比明智地利用这些资本的机会要多。尽管如此，资本不会消失。你没有看到整合能消耗行业的大量资本，你也没有看到大规模回购或类似情况。所以资本就在那里。它正在寻找保费量的出口。这实际上在某种程度上伤害了通用再保险，因为这意味着原保险公司希望保留更多自己产生的保费，只是为了在资本基础上显示某种增长。

我认为总的来说，我们在行业中的定位非常好。我认为未来几年行业将在个人汽车业务方面明显更加艰难。但坦白说，我对此充满期待，因为我认为我们——这可能会给我们提供更快增长的机会。我们——你知道，我们拥有一个非常非常庞大的行业——汽车保险行业——中最好的工具。我们有非常出色的管理层来利用这一点。而且当你离开门口时，可以获得我们的保险单。（笑声）查理？

查理·芒格：没什么要补充的。

23. 中国：可口可乐和吉列的巨大增长潜力

沃伦·巴菲特：第四区。

股东：下午好，谢谢。我叫保罗·沃斯，来自堪萨斯州威奇托。我的问题如下。对于伯克希尔拥有的消费者特许经营公司，特别是可口可乐和吉列，在哪些新兴市场你认为未来10年单位销售额增长潜力最大？是什么经济、政治或社会变化在推动这种增长？其次，你是否认为美国市值占全球53%的份额接近其顶峰？你认为哪些国家可能会显示出总市值最大的百分比增长？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我希望我知道答案。不过第一个问题——显然，当你处理像可口可乐这样的东西时，是看原始数字。我的意思是，在一个国家有巨大的潜力，你知道——世界上人口最多的国家，在中国，人均消费量非常低，但增长非常快。所以我很容易预测，而且很可能正确，除非出现巨大的动荡或真正的意外，否则中国将是可口可乐在这一水平上所有规模较大的国家中增长最快的市场。但这基于这样一个事实：你有很多显然喜欢这个产品的人，他们起点非常低，而且需要更多的瓶装基础设施，这些基础设施将会被提供以促进增长。对于吉列，情况略有不同。人们已经在刮胡子了。你要做的是提升他们的刮胡体验。所以在世界各地可用的刀片质量上存在巨大差异。当你进入更先进的阶段时，他们称之为刮胡系统。

发生的情况是，随着人们可支配收入的增长，他们会——升级。他们会获得更愉快的刮胡体验，并且比他们被迫依赖最低价产品时刮得更干净。随着全球繁荣水平——生活水平的提高，这两家公司都有巨大的机会。而且我毫不怀疑，对于吉列的刀片和剃须刀业务（这只占其业务的三分之一），以及对于可口可乐的软饮料业务，他们将分享这一增长。增长的过程会是不平衡的，诸如此类。但我几乎可以向你们保证，十年或二十年后，这两家公司在——在我所提到的那些领域——的业务将比目前多得多。你知道，我们不会更精细地调整这个预期了。我的意思是，我不会坐下来试图计算——逐一国家地计算——吉列或可口可乐会发生什么。那是浪费时间。

反正我也不会知道答案。但我非常确信结论是，它们两者都会蓬勃发展——而且我不愿意与其中任何一家竞争——在这里或世界任何其他地方。我的意思是，它们拥有必胜的牌。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，我同意你说的每一句话。我想补充一点，如果我确切知道美国占全球市值的份额将从53%下降到40%，我不知道如何通过到处购买外国证券从这种洞察中赚钱。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会基于那个进行运作。我的意思是，你知道，几年前新兴市场风靡一时。这个国家的每个机构都被某些人推销，“我要管理一只新兴市场基金”。他们觉得必须参与其中，他们的顾问也告诉他们必须参与。我们认为这都是胡扯。你知道，最终，你只需独立思考，了解你知道什么和不知道什么，并跟随其引导。你不能通过购买带有标签的东西、或者行业基金、或者国家基金之类的来做到这一点。你知道，那些是为向人们推销而设计的商品，通常是在错误的时间出售给人们的。

查理·芒格：是的。我们的游戏是找到一些聪明的事情去做。而不是去了解整个世界正在发生的每一件该死的事。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

24. 芒格推荐一本关于巴菲特的书

沃伦·巴菲特：第五区。（掌声）

股东：你好，我叫埃弗雷特·普里。我来自佐治亚州亚特兰大，我有两个问题。一个是给芒格先生的，在我们永不停止的努力中，我们希望芒格读书俱乐部能超越奥普拉读书俱乐部。我想知道你能否做一些推荐。

查理·芒格：是的。

股东：第二个问题是，似乎之前在制药行业，政府监管或政府占用这些现金流的威胁导致了合理的市场机会，Sallie Mae也是如此。我想知道你是否认为这种情况现在正在烟草行业发生，或者这是对该行业更大、更永久的威胁。

查理·芒格：嗯，第一，书籍。[罗伯特]哈格斯特龙寄给我他关于沃伦·巴菲特的最新书稿，叫做《巴菲特的投资组合》。我没有读，因为我认为他的第一本书是一本可敬的书，但对人类知识贡献不大——（笑声）（听不清）他把第二本书的全版寄给我，我读了，我惊讶地发现它不仅写得非常好，而且对投资过程的人类思想综合做出了相当大的贡献。我建议你们所有人都买一本哈格斯特龙的第二本巴菲特书。我注意到机场正在大力推销它。书名是《沃伦·巴菲特的投资组合》。它不会为你挑选任何股票，但它确实阐明了如果你理性思考，投资过程真正是如何运作的。我今年非常喜欢的另一本书是《泰坦》，关于原始约翰·D·洛克菲勒的传记。这是我读过的最好的商业传记之一。

而且它也是一个非常有趣的家庭故事。那是一本非常非常精彩的书。我不知道有谁读了它而不喜欢的。所以我当然推荐那本最新的关于第一代约翰·D·洛克菲勒的传记。第三本书是对一两年我推荐过的书《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》主题的重新审视，那是一本生理学家关于人类经济史的观点。那也是一本精彩的书。同一领域的大部分内容现在被哈佛一位名誉历史教授覆盖了，他比一般历史教授懂得更多的经济学和科学。这给了他更好的洞察力。他的书在标题上借鉴了亚当·斯密，书名是《国富国穷》。那家伙的名字是[大卫]兰德斯。所以我衷心推荐这三本书。

25. 烟草面临的威胁远大于制药

查理·芒格：现在第三个问题是什么？

沃伦·巴菲特：另一个问题是关于烟草和制药——

查理·芒格：哦，烟草。我不知道沃伦怎么想，但我认为烟草面临的立法威胁是严重的，而且我一点也不知道如何预测它。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想说，目前烟草面临的威胁与1993年制药业面临的威胁没有可比性——烟草公司的问题与制药公司的问题性质完全不同。没有人反对制药公司。他们只是对定价、分销等等可能有不同看法。但烟草是另一回事。我的意思是，烟草公司——嗯，你可以自己想想。

26. 巴菲特的书籍推荐

沃伦·巴菲特：至于书籍，我会推荐——你们很多人可能已经读过了，但这本书是一年多前的了，但如果你还没读过凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆的自传《个人历史》，那真是一本很棒的书。这是一本极其诚实的书。而且是一个引人入胜的故事。我的意思是，这是一个见证了政治、商业和政府中各种事情的人生。所以，这是一本很好的读物。在投资领域，最近几个月出版了一本我肯定会推荐给大家的书，就是杰克·博格尔的《共同基金常识》。杰克是个诚实的人，他懂这一行。如果共同基金投资者听他的，他们每年可以节省数十亿美元。他直截了当地告诉了我们事实。所以，他让我为这本书写推荐语，我很乐意提供。

27. 预期互联网将产生“巨大影响”，但难以挑选赢家

沃伦·巴菲特：我们请第六区。

股东：下午好，巴菲特先生，下午好，芒格先生。我的名字是莫尼什·帕伯莱，来自芝加哥地区。巴菲特先生，感谢你多年来分享的见解。我特别惊讶于你回复我信件的速度，而且是逐点回复。我有一个关于能力圈的问题。我认为芒格先生和您都非常了解Kleiner Perkins的早期风险投资模式，以及他们目前在互联网领域的专注。我的看法是，我认为完全在你们的能力圈之内，可以理解他们的做法，就像你们理解See’s Candy或Executive Jets的经理们一样。所以问题是，对于互联网，我认为我们正在看到人类过去500年未见的变革。我们还没有看到如此戏剧性、如此深刻的东西即将降临到我们身上。

如果，假设说，Kleiner Perkins的约翰·杜尔找到你，说他们要启动一个，假设说，10亿美元的早期或晚期互联网投资基金，由Kleiner管理，你会考虑——如果它以有吸引力的条款提供，你会认为参与这项投资在你们的能力圈之内吗？