• 2006年致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东信
  • 第一部分/第二部分
    • • 致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
      • To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
      • 衡量标准
      • Yardsticks
      • 收购
      • Acquisitions
      • 保险业
      • Insurance
      • 劳合社、Equitas与追溯性再保险
      • Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance
      • 制造、服务和零售业务
      • Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
      • 伯克希尔董事会的若干变动
      • Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board
      • 杂项
      • This and That
      • 年会
      • The Annual Meeting

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 2006 was $16.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 18.4%. Over the last 42 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,281, a rate of 21.4% compounded annually.*

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A.

We believe that $16.9 billion is a record for a one-year gain in net worth — more than has ever been booked by any American business, leaving aside boosts that have occurred because of mergers (e.g., AOL’s purchase of Time Warner). Of course, Exxon Mobil and other companies earn far more than Berkshire, but their earnings largely go to dividends and/or repurchases, rather than to building net worth.

All that said, a confession about our 2006 gain is in order. Our most important business, insurance, benefited from a large dose of luck: Mother Nature, bless her heart, went on vacation. After hammering us with hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 — storms that caused us to lose a bundle on super-cat insurance — she just vanished. Last year, the red ink from this activity turned black — very black.

In addition, the great majority of our 73 businesses did outstandingly well in 2006. Let me focus for a moment on one of our largest operations, GEICO. What management accomplished there was simply extraordinary.

As I’ve told you before, Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, went to work at the company 45 years ago, two months after turning 18. He became CEO in 1992, and from then on the company’s growth exploded. In addition, Tony has delivered staggering productivity gains in recent years. Between yearend 2003 and yearend 2006, the number of GEICO policies increased from 5.7 million to 8.1 million, a jump of 42%. Yet during that same period, the company’s employees (measured on a fulltime-equivalent basis) fell 3.5%. So productivity grew 47%. And GEICO didn’t start fat.

That remarkable gain has allowed GEICO to maintain its all-important position as a low-cost producer, even though it has dramatically increased advertising expenditures. Last year GEICO spent $631 million on ads, up from $238 million in 2003 (and up from $31 million in 1995, when Berkshire took control). Today, GEICO spends far more on ads than any of its competitors, even those much larger. We will continue to raise the bar.

Last year I told you that if you had a new son or grandson to be sure to name him Tony. But Don Keough, a Berkshire director, recently had a better idea. After reviewing GEICO’s performance in 2006, he wrote me, “Forget births. Tell the shareholders to immediately change the names of their present children to Tony or Antoinette.” Don signed his letter “Tony.”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie Munger — my partner and Berkshire’s vice chairman — and I run what has turned out to be a big business, one with 217,000 employees and annual revenues approaching $100 billion. We certainly didn’t plan it that way. Charlie began as a lawyer, and I thought of myself as a security analyst. Sitting in those seats, we both grew skeptical about the ability of big entities of any type to function well. Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug. In Churchill’s words: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Here’s a telling fact: Of the ten non-oil companies having the largest market capitalization in 1965 — titans such as General Motors, Sears, DuPont and Eastman Kodak — only one made the 2006 list.

In fairness, we’ve seen plenty of successes as well, some truly outstanding. There are many giant-company managers whom I greatly admire; Ken Chenault of American Express, Jeff Immelt of G.E. and Dick Kovacevich of Wells Fargo come quickly to mind. But I don’t think I could do the management job they do. And I know I wouldn’t enjoy many of the duties that come with their positions — meetings, speeches, foreign travel, the charity circuit and governmental relations. For me, Ronald Reagan had it right: “It’s probably true that hard work never killed anyone — but why take the chance?”

So I’ve taken the easy route, just sitting back and working through great managers who run their own shows. My only tasks are to cheer them on, sculpt and harden our corporate culture, and make major capital-allocation decisions. Our managers have returned this trust by working hard and effectively.

For their performance over the last 42 years — and particularly for 2006 — Charlie and I thank them.

Yardsticks

Charlie and I measure Berkshire’s progress and evaluate its intrinsic value in a number of ways. No single criterion is effective in doing these jobs, and even an avalanche of statistics will not capture some factors that are important. For example, it’s essential that we have managers much younger than I available to succeed me. Berkshire has never been in better shape in this regard — but I can’t prove it to you with numbers.

There are two statistics, however, that are of real importance. The first is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) that we own on a per-share basis. Arriving at this figure, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings. Here’s the record since present management acquired control of Berkshire:

In our early years we put most of our retained earnings and insurance float into investments in marketable securities. Because of this emphasis, and because the securities we purchased generally did well, our growth rate in investments was for a long time quite high.

Over the years, however, we have focused more and more on the acquisition of operating businesses. Using our funds for these purchases has both slowed our growth in investments and accelerated our gains in pre-tax earnings from non-insurance businesses, the second yardstick we use. Here’s how those earnings have looked:

Last year we had a good increase in non-insurance earnings — 38%. Large gains from here on in, though, will come only if we are able to make major, and sensible, acquisitions. That will not be easy. We do, however, have one advantage: More and more, Berkshire has become “the buyer of choice” for business owners and managers. Initially, we were viewed that way only in the U.S. (and more often than not by private companies). We’ve long wanted, nonetheless, to extend Berkshire’s appeal beyond U.S. borders. And last year, our globe-trotting finally got underway.

Acquisitions

We began 2006 by completing the three acquisitions pending at yearend 2005, spending about $6 billion for PacifiCorp, Business Wire and Applied Underwriters. All are performing very well.

The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1¼-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cutting-tool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”

Overall, Eitan’s letter made the quality of the company and the character of its management leap off the page. It also made me want to learn more, and in November, Eitan, Jacob and ISCAR’s CFO, Danny Goldman, came to Omaha. A few hours with them convinced me that if we were to make a deal, we would be teaming up with extraordinarily talented managers who could be trusted to run the business after a sale with all of the energy and dedication that they had exhibited previously. However, having never bought a business based outside of the U.S. (though I had bought a number of foreign stocks), I needed to get educated on some tax and jurisdictional matters. With that task completed, Berkshire purchased 80% of ISCAR for $4 billion. The remaining 20% stays in the hands of the Wertheimer family, making it our valued partner.

ISCAR’s products are small, consumable cutting tools that are used in conjunction with large and expensive machine tools. It’s a business without magic except for that imparted by the people who run it. But Eitan, Jacob and their associates are true managerial magicians who constantly develop tools that make their customers’ machines more productive. The result: ISCAR makes money because it enables its customers to make more money. There is no better recipe for continued success.

In September, Charlie and I, along with five Berkshire associates, visited ISCAR in Israel. We — and I mean every one of us — have never been more impressed with any operation. At ISCAR, as throughout Israel, brains and energy are ubiquitous. Berkshire shareholders are lucky to have joined with Eitan, Jacob, Danny and their talented associates.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A few months later, Berkshire again became “the buyer of choice” in a deal brought to us by my friend, John Roach, of Fort Worth. John, many of you will remember, was Chairman of Justin Industries, which we bought in 2000. At that time John was helping John Justin, who was terminally ill, find a permanent home for his company. John Justin died soon after we bought Justin Industries, but it has since been run exactly as we promised him it would be.

Visiting me in November, John Roach brought along Paul Andrews, Jr., owner of about 80% of TTI, a Fort Worth distributor of electronic components. Over a 35-year period, Paul built TTI from $112,000 of sales to $1.3 billion. He is a remarkable entrepreneur and operator.

Paul, 64, loves running his business. But not long ago he happened to witness how disruptive the death of a founder can be both to a private company’s employees and the owner’s family. What starts out as disruptive, furthermore, often evolves into destructive. About a year ago, therefore, Paul began to think about selling TTI. His goal was to put his business in the hands of an owner he had carefully chosen, rather than allowing a trust officer or lawyer to conduct an auction after his death.

Paul rejected the idea of a “strategic” buyer, knowing that in the pursuit of “synergies,” an owner of that type would be apt to dismantle what he had so carefully built, a move that would uproot hundreds of his associates (and perhaps wound TTI’s business in the process). He also ruled out a private equity firm, which would very likely load the company with debt and then flip it as soon as possible.

That left Berkshire. Paul and I met on the morning of November 15th and made a deal before lunch. Later he wrote me: “After our meeting, I am confident that Berkshire is the right owner for TTI … I am proud of our past and excited about our future.” And so are Charlie and I.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We also made some “tuck-in” acquisitions during 2006 at Fruit of the Loom (“Fruit”), MiTek, CTB, Shaw and Clayton. Fruit made the largest purchases. First, it bought Russell Corp., a leading producer of athletic apparel and uniforms for about $1.2 billion (including assumed debt) and in December it agreed to buy the intimate apparel business of VF Corp. Together, these acquisitions add about $2.2 billion to Fruit’s sales and bring with them about 23,000 employees.

Charlie and I love it when we can acquire businesses that can be placed under managers, such as John Holland at Fruit, who have already shown their stuff at Berkshire. MiTek, for example, has made 14 acquisitions since we purchased it in 2001, and Gene Toombs has delivered results from these deals far in excess of what he had predicted. In effect, we leverage the managerial talent already with us by these tuck-in deals. We will make many more.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We continue, however, to need “elephants” in order for us to use Berkshire’s flood of incoming cash. Charlie and I must therefore ignore the pursuit of mice and focus our acquisition efforts on much bigger game.

Our exemplar is the older man who crashed his grocery cart into that of a much younger fellow while both were shopping. The elderly man explained apologetically that he had lost track of his wife and was preoccupied searching for her. His new acquaintance said that by coincidence his wife had also wandered off and suggested that it might be more efficient if they jointly looked for the two women. Agreeing, the older man asked his new companion what his wife looked like. “She’s a gorgeous blonde,” the fellow answered, “with a body that would cause a bishop to go through a stained glass window, and she’s wearing tight white shorts. How about yours?” The senior citizen wasted no words: “Forget her, we’ll look for yours.”

What we are looking for is described on page 25. If you have an acquisition candidate that fits, call me — day or night. And then watch me shatter a stained glass window.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Lumping their financial figures together impedes analysis. So we’ll look at them as four separate businesses, starting with the all— important insurance group.

Insurance

Next month marks the 40th anniversary of our entrance into the insurance business. It was on March 9, 1967, that Berkshire purchased National Indemnity and its companion company, National Fire & Marine, from Jack Ringwalt for $8.6 million.

Jack was a long-time friend of mine and an excellent, but somewhat eccentric, businessman. For about ten minutes every year he would get the urge to sell his company. But those moods — perhaps brought on by a tiff with regulators or an unfavorable jury verdict — quickly vanished.

In the mid-1960s, I asked investment banker Charlie Heider, a mutual friend of mine and Jack’s, to alert me the next time Jack was “in heat.” When Charlie’s call came, I sped to meet Jack. We made a deal in a few minutes, with me waiving an audit, “due diligence” or anything else that would give Jack an opportunity to reconsider. We just shook hands, and that was that.

When we were due to close the purchase at Charlie’s office, Jack was late. Finally arriving, he explained that he had been driving around looking for a parking meter with some unexpired time. That was a magic moment for me. I knew then that Jack was going to be my kind of manager.

When Berkshire purchased Jack’s two insurers, they had “float” of $17 million. We’ve regularly offered a long explanation of float in earlier reports, which you can read on our website. Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest.

At the end of 2006, our float had grown to $50.9 billion, and we have since written a huge retroactive reinsurance contract with Equitas — which I will describe in the next section — that boosts float by another $7 billion. Much of the gain we’ve made has come through our acquisition of other insurers, but we’ve also had outstanding internal growth, particularly at Ajit Jain’s amazing reinsurance operation. Naturally, I had no notion in 1967 that our float would develop as it has. There’s much to be said for just putting one foot in front of the other every day.

The float from retroactive reinsurance contracts, of which we have many, automatically drifts down over time. Therefore, it will be difficult for us to increase float in the future unless we make new acquisitions in the insurance field. Whatever its size, however, the all-important cost of Berkshire’s float over time is likely to be significantly below that of the industry, perhaps even falling to less than zero. Note the words “over time.” There will be bad years periodically. You can be sure of that.

In 2006, though, everything went right in insurance — really right. Our managers — Tony Nicely (GEICO), Ajit Jain (B-H Reinsurance), Joe Brandon and Tad Montross (General Re), Don Wurster (National Indemnity Primary), Tom Nerney (U.S. Liability), Tim Kenesey (Medical Protective), Rod Eldred (Homestate Companies and Cypress), Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies (Applied Underwriters), John Kizer (Central States) and Don Towle (Kansas Bankers Surety) — simply shot the lights out. When I recite their names, I feel as if I’m at Cooperstown, reading from the Hall of Fame roster. Of course, the overall insurance industry also had a terrific year in 2006. But our managers delivered results generally superior to those of their competitors.

Below is the tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance. Enjoy the view, because you won’t soon see another like it.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In 2007, our results from the bread-and-butter lines of insurance will deteriorate, though I think they will remain satisfactory. The big unknown is super-cat insurance. Were the terrible hurricane seasons of 2004-05 aberrations? Or were they our planet’s first warning that the climate of the 21st Century will differ materially from what we’ve seen in the past? If the answer to the second question is yes, 2006 will soon be perceived as a misleading period of calm preceding a series of devastating storms. These could rock the insurance industry. It’s naïve to think of Katrina as anything close to a worst-case event.

Neither Ajit Jain, who manages our super-cat operation, nor I know what lies ahead. We do know that it would be a huge mistake to bet that evolving atmospheric changes are benign in their implications for insurers.

Don’t think, however, that we have lost our taste for risk. We remain prepared to lose $6 billion in a single event, if we have been paid appropriately for assuming that risk. We are not willing, though, to take on even very small exposures at prices that don’t reflect our evaluation of loss probabilities. Appropriate prices don’t guarantee profits in any given year, but inappropriate prices most certainly guarantee eventual losses. Rates have recently fallen because a flood of capital has entered the super-cat field. We have therefore sharply reduced our wind exposures. Our behavior here parallels that which we employ in financial markets: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.

Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance

Last year — we are getting now to Equitas — Berkshire agreed to enter into a huge retroactive reinsurance contract, a policy that protects an insurer against losses that have already happened, but whose cost is not yet known. I’ll give you details of the agreement shortly. But let’s first take a journey through insurance history, following the route that led to our deal.

Our tale begins around 1688, when Edward Lloyd opened a small coffee house in London. Though no Starbucks, his shop was destined to achieve worldwide fame because of the commercial activities of its clientele — shipowners, merchants and venturesome British capitalists. As these parties sipped Edward’s brew, they began to write contracts transferring the risk of a disaster at sea from the owners of ships and their cargo to the capitalists, who wagered that a given voyage would be completed without incident. These capitalists eventually became known as “underwriters at Lloyd’s.”

Though many people believe Lloyd’s to be an insurance company, that is not the case. It is instead a place where many member-insurers transact business, just as they did centuries ago.

Over time, the underwriters solicited passive investors to join in syndicates. Additionally, the business broadened beyond marine risks into every imaginable form of insurance, including exotic coverages that spread the fame of Lloyd’s far and wide. The underwriters left the coffee house, found grander quarters and formalized some rules of association. And those persons who passively backed the underwriters became known as “names.”

Eventually, the names came to include many thousands of people from around the world, who joined expecting to pick up some extra change without effort or serious risk. True, prospective names were always solemnly told that they would have unlimited and everlasting liability for the consequences of their syndicate’s underwriting — “down to the last cufflink,” as the quaint description went. But that warning came to be viewed as perfunctory. Three hundred years of retained cufflinks acted as a powerful sedative to the names poised to sign up.

Then came asbestos. When its prospective costs were added to the tidal wave of environmental and product claims that surfaced in the 1980s, Lloyd’s began to implode. Policies written decades earlier — and largely forgotten about — were developing huge losses. No one could intelligently estimate their total, but it was certain to be many tens of billions of dollars. The specter of unending and unlimited losses terrified existing names and scared away prospects. Many names opted for bankruptcy; some even chose suicide.

From these shambles, there came a desperate effort to resuscitate Lloyd’s. In 1996, the powers that be at the institution allotted £11.1 billion to a new company, Equitas, and made it responsible for paying all claims on policies written before 1993. In effect, this plan pooled the misery of the many syndicates in trouble. Of course, the money allotted could prove to be insufficient — and if that happened, the names remained liable for the shortfall.

But the new plan, by concentrating all of the liabilities in one place, had the advantage of eliminating much of the costly intramural squabbling that went on among syndicates. Moreover, the pooling allowed claims evaluation, negotiation and litigation to be handled more intelligently than had been the case previously. Equitas embraced Ben Franklin’s thinking: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall hang separately.”

From the start, many people predicted Equitas would eventually fail. But as Ajit and I reviewed the facts in the spring of 2006 — 13 years after the last exposed policy had been written and after the payment of £11.3 billion in claims — we concluded that the patient was likely to survive. And so we decided to offer a huge reinsurance policy to Equitas.

Because plenty of imponderables continue to exist, Berkshire could not provide Equitas, and its 27,972 names, unlimited protection. But we said — and I’m simplifying — that if Equitas would give us $7.12 billion in cash and securities (this is the float I spoke about), we would pay all of its future claims and expenses up to $13.9 billion. That amount was $5.7 billion above what Equitas had recently guessed its ultimate liabilities to be. Thus the names received a huge — and almost certainly sufficient — amount of future protection against unpleasant surprises. Indeed the protection is so large that Equitas plans a cash payment to its thousands of names, an event few of them had ever dreamed possible.

And how will Berkshire fare? That depends on how much “known” claims will end up costing us, how many yet-to-be-presented claims will surface and what they will cost, how soon claim payments will be made and how much we earn on the cash we receive before it must be paid out. Ajit and I think the odds are in our favor. And should we be wrong, Berkshire can handle it.

Scott Moser, the CEO of Equitas, summarized the transaction neatly: “Names wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Warning: It’s time to eat your broccoli — I am now going to talk about accounting matters. I owe this to those Berkshire shareholders who love reading about debits and credits. I hope both of you find this discussion helpful. All others can skip this section; there will be no quiz.

Berkshire has done many retroactive transactions — in both number and amount a multiple of such policies entered into by any other insurer. We are the reinsurer of choice for these coverages because the obligations that are transferred to us — for example, lifetime indemnity and medical payments to be made to injured workers — may not be fully satisfied for 50 years or more. No other company can offer the certainty that Berkshire can, in terms of guaranteeing the full and fair settlement of these obligations. This fact is important to the original insurer, policyholders and regulators.

The accounting procedure for retroactive transactions is neither well known nor intuitive. The best way for shareholders to understand it, therefore, is for us to simply lay out the debits and credits. Charlie and I would like to see this done more often. We sometimes encounter accounting footnotes about important transactions that leave us baffled, and we go away suspicious that the reporting company wished it that way. (For example, try comprehending transactions “described” in the old 10-Ks of Enron, even after you know how the movie ended.)

So let us summarize our accounting for the Equitas transaction. The major debits will be to Cash and Investments, Reinsurance Recoverable, and Deferred Charges for Reinsurance Assumed (“DCRA”). The major credit will be to Reserve for Losses and Loss Adjustment Expense. No profit or loss will be recorded at the inception of the transaction, but underwriting losses will thereafter be incurred annually as the DCRA asset is amortized downward. The amount of the annual amortization charge will be primarily determined by how our end-of-the-year estimates as to the timing and amount of future loss payments compare to the estimates made at the beginning of the year. Eventually, when the last claim has been paid, the DCRA account will be reduced to zero. That day is 50 years or more away.

What’s important to remember is that retroactive insurance contracts always produce underwriting losses for us. Whether these losses are worth experiencing depends on whether the cash we have received produces investment income that exceeds the losses. Recently our DCRA charges have annually delivered $300 million or so of underwriting losses, which have been more than offset by the income we have realized through use of the cash we received as a premium. Absent new retroactive contracts, the amount of the annual charge would normally decline over time. After the Equitas transaction, however, the annual DCRA cost will initially increase to about $450 million a year. This means that our other insurance operations must generate at least that much underwriting gain for our overall float to be cost-free. That amount is quite a hurdle but one that I believe we will clear in many, if not most, years.

Aren’t you glad that I promised you there would be no quiz?

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 25% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.8%.

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:

• Bob Shaw, a remarkable entrepreneur who from a standing start built Shaw Industries into the country’s largest carpet producer, elected last year, at age 75, to retire. To succeed him, Bob recommended Vance Bell, a 31-year veteran at Shaw, and Bob, as usual, made the right call. Weakness in housing has caused the carpet business to slow. Shaw, however, remains a powerhouse and a major contributor to Berkshire’s earnings.

• MiTek, a manufacturer of connectors for roof trusses at the time we purchased it in 2001, is developing into a mini-conglomerate. At the rate it is growing, in fact, “mini” may soon be inappropriate. In purchasing MiTek for $420 million, we lent the company $200 million at 9% and bought $198 million of stock, priced at $10,000 per share. Additionally, 55 employees bought 2,200 shares for $22 million. Each employee paid exactly the same price that we did, in most cases borrowing money to do so.

And are they ever glad they did! Five years later, MiTek’s sales have tripled and the stock is valued at $71,699 per share. Despite its making 14 acquisitions, at a cost of $291 million, MiTek has paid off its debt to Berkshire and holds $35 million of cash. We celebrated the fifth anniversary of our purchase with a party in July. I told the group that it would be embarrassing if MiTek’s stock price soared beyond that of Berkshire “A” shares. Don’t be surprised, however, if that happens (though Charlie and I will try to make our shares a moving target).

• Not all of our businesses are destined to increase profits. When an industry’s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline. Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance. (As a wise friend told me long ago, “If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.”) And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry, a trend that has caused the profits of our Buffalo News to decline. The skid will almost certainly continue.

When Charlie and I were young, the newspaper business was as easy a way to make huge returns as existed in America. As one not-too-bright publisher famously said, “I owe my fortune to two great American institutions: monopoly and nepotism.” No paper in a one-paper city, however bad the product or however inept the management, could avoid gushing profits.

The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century, newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.

The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest.

Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually — and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly — and often in a disapproving way — reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm …)

As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was changing, writing that “the media businesses … will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties, moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses.

Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.

In Berkshire’s world, Stan Lipsey does a terrific job running the Buffalo News, and I am enormously proud of its editor, Margaret Sullivan. The News’ penetration of its market is the highest among that of this country’s large newspapers. We also do better financially than most metropolitan newspapers, even though Buffalo’s population and business trends are not good. Nevertheless, this operation faces unrelenting pressures that will cause profit margins to slide.

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然而，这些转移将产生后果。去年，我曾预测我们挥霍无度的开支会带来一个后果，而这个预测已经成真：我国自1915年以来每年都为正值的“投资收入”账户，在2006年转为负值。如今，外国人在他们美国投资上赚取的收入，超过了我们在海外投资上的收入。实际上，我们已经用光了银行存款，转而依赖信用卡。而且，就像所有负债累累的人一样，美国现在将经历“反向复利”效应，因为我们为利息支付着日益增加的利息。

我想强调，尽管我们的做法不明智，但美国人十年或二十年后的生活将比今天更好。人均财富将会增长。但我们的公民每年也将被迫将当前产出的很大一部分输送到国外，仅仅是为了偿还我们巨额债务的成本。每天有一部分时间要为你祖先的过度消费而工作，这可不是件愉快的事。我相信，在未来的某个时刻，美国工人和选民会觉得这种年度“贡品”过于沉重，以至于会引发强烈的政治反弹。这将如何影响市场，无法预测——但期待“软着陆”似乎是一厢情愿的想法。

我应该提到，我们实现的所有直接外汇利润都来自远期合约，这是一种衍生品；而且我们还签订了其他类型的衍生品合约。这看起来可能有些奇怪，因为你们知道我们在解除通用再保险的衍生品头寸时付出了高昂代价，也听过我谈论衍生品使用量巨大增长可能带来的系统性问题。你们可能会想，我们为什么还要碰这些潜在的有毒物质呢？

答案是，衍生品，就像股票和债券一样，有时会被严重错误定价。因此，多年来，我们选择性地签发了一些衍生品合约——数量不多，但有时金额巨大。我们目前有62份未平仓合约。我亲自管理这些合约，并且它们没有交易对手信用风险。到目前为止，这些衍生品合约对我们来说运作良好，产生了数亿美元的税前利润（这还不包括我已经列出的外汇远期合约收益）。尽管我们时不时会经历亏损，但我们很可能总体上继续从错误定价的衍生品中赚取可观的利润。

我已经告诉过你们，伯克希尔有三位杰出的候选人可以接替我担任CEO，董事会完全知道如果我今晚去世，应该由谁来接手。这三位都比我年轻得多。董事们认为，我的继任者应该能够长期任职，这一点非常重要。

坦率地说，我们在公司投资方面的准备工作没那么充分。这有其历史原因：曾经有一段时间，查理是我的潜在投资接替者，而最近则是卢·辛普森担任这个角色。卢是一位顶级投资者，在管理GEICO的股票投资组合方面有着出色的长期业绩。但他只比我小六岁。如果我不久后去世，他可以在短期内出色地接替。但长期来看，我们需要另寻人选。

在十月份的董事会会议上，我们充分讨论了这个话题。我们制定了一个计划，我将在查理和卢的帮助下实施。

根据这个计划，我打算聘请一位有潜力管理巨额投资组合的年轻人——无论男女，我们希望他或她能在需要时接替我担任伯克希尔的首席投资官。作为选拔过程的一部分，我们实际上可能会接触多个人选。

挑选合适的人选并非易事。当然，找到聪明人，包括那些有着令人印象深刻投资记录的人，并不难。但成功的长期投资需要的远不止是聪明才智和近期表现良好。

随着时间的推移，市场会做出非同寻常、甚至怪诞的事情。一个重大错误就可能抹去一连串的成功。因此，我们需要一个被基因设定好能够识别并避免严重风险的人，包括那些从未遇到过的风险。投资策略中潜伏的某些危险，无法通过金融机构如今常用的模型来发现。

性格同样重要。独立思考、情绪稳定，以及对人类和机构行为有深刻理解，对长期投资成功至关重要。我见过很多非常聪明的人缺乏这些品质。

最后，我们还有一个特殊问题需要考虑：我们能否留住我们雇用的人。能在简历上列出伯克希尔，将极大地提升一位投资经理的市场价值。因此，我们需要确保能够留住我们选择的人，即使他或她离开后可以在别处赚更多的钱。

肯定有人才符合我们的需要，但可能很难找到。1979年，杰克·伯恩和我认为我们找到了一个这样的人——卢·辛普森。我们随后与他达成了一项安排，如果他持续取得优异表现，将获得优厚报酬。根据这项协议，他赚了很多钱。然而，卢本可以很久以前就离开我们，去管理更大的资金规模，并获得更有利的条件。如果只是为了钱，他早就那么做了。但卢从未考虑过这样做。我们需要找到一两个同样品质的年轻人。

好消息是：76岁的我感觉棒极了，而且根据所有可测量的指标来看，我的健康状况非常良好。樱桃可乐和汉堡包对一个家伙的作用真是神奇。

伯克希尔董事会的若干变动

今年春天，我们董事会的构成将发生两处变动。其中一项变动与蔡斯家族有关，这个家族与伯克希尔及其前身公司的联系已超过一个世纪。1929年，第一代马尔科姆·G·蔡斯在将四家新英格兰纺织企业合并为伯克希尔精纺联合公司（Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates）的过程中发挥了重要作用。这家公司于1955年与哈撒韦制造公司合并，成立了伯克希尔·哈撒韦，小马尔科姆·G·蔡斯成为其董事长。

1965年初，马尔科姆安排巴菲特合伙有限公司收购了伯克希尔的关键股份，并欢迎我们成为公司的新控股股东。马尔科姆继续担任非执行董事长直到1969年。他既是一位出色的绅士，也是一位得力的合伙人。

这个描述也适用于他的儿子，马尔科姆“金”·蔡斯，他于1992年接替父亲进入伯克希尔董事会。但去年，金——他目前正积极且成功地经营着一家他于1996年创立的社区银行——建议我们找一位更年轻的人来接替他进入董事会。我们已经这样做了，金将在年会上辞去董事职务。我非常感激蔡斯家族，并感谢金多年来对伯克希尔的贡献。

在选择新董事时，我们遵循了长期以来的标准，即董事会成员必须具有主人翁意识、精通商业、有参与热情且真正独立。我说“真正”是因为，现在许多被各种机构和观察家视为独立的董事，远非如此，他们在很大程度上依赖董事费来维持生活水平。这些费用形式多样，通常在每年15万到25万美元之间，这笔报酬可能接近甚至超过这位“独立”董事的所有其他收入。而且——令人惊讶吧——近年来董事薪酬飙升，这是由美国企业界最青睐的咨询公司“棘轮、棘轮与宾果”（Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo）推动的。（这个名字可能是假的，但它所代表的行为是真的。）

查理和我认为，我们的四项标准对于董事履行其职责——根据法律，是忠实地代表所有者——至关重要。然而，这些标准常被忽视。相反，顾问和CEO在寻找董事会候选人时经常说：“我们在找一位女性”，或“一位西班牙裔”，或“一位来自国外的人”，等等。有时听起来就像是为了装满诺亚方舟。多年来，我多次被问及潜在的董事人选，但从未听任何人问过：“他思考问题像一位明智的所有者吗？”

我转而听到的问题，对于寻找比如说足球队、仲裁小组或军事指挥官候选人的人来说，会显得很荒谬。在这些情况下，选拔者会寻找具备特定工作所需技能和态度的人。在伯克希尔，我们从事的是经营好一家企业的专门活动，因此我们寻求的是商业判断力。

这正是我们在苏珊·德克尔身上发现的，她是雅虎的CFO，她将在年会上加入我们的董事会。我们有幸得到她：她在我们的四项标准上得分非常高，而且，你可能已经注意到了，44岁的她还很年轻——这是你们的董事长长期以来所缺乏的一个特质。未来我们会寻找更多年轻的董事，但绝不会以忽视我们坚持的四项品质为代价。

杂项

伯克希尔将为其2006年的盈利支付约44亿美元的联邦所得税。在其上一个财年，美国政府的支出为2.6万亿美元，大约每天70亿美元。因此，在超过半天的时间里，伯克希尔承担了全部联邦支出的账单，从社会保障和医疗保险支付到军费开支。如果只有600个像伯克希尔这样的纳税人，那么美国其他任何人都不需要缴纳任何联邦所得税或工资税。

我们应该补充一点，我们去年的联邦纳税申报表长达9,386页。为了处理这份申报、州和外国税务申报、大量的SEC要求以及运营伯克希尔涉及的所有其他事务，我们全球总部总共只有19名员工。

这支队伍占用9,708平方英尺的空间，而查理——在洛杉矶的全球总部西部分部——则使用另外655平方英尺。我们总部的工资总额，包括福利，两个地点合计，去年为3,531,978美元。我们花你们的钱很谨慎。

企业高管们经常抱怨政府支出，批评那些据他们说花纳税人钱时，不像花自己钱那么谨慎的官僚。但有时，高管们自己的财务行为也会根据谁的钱包在变瘪而有所不同。这里有一个我在所罗门公司时的轶事。在20世纪80年代，公司有一位名叫吉米的理发师，每周来给高层免费理发。还有一位美甲师待命。后来，因为一项成本削减运动，顾客被告知要自掏腰包。一位之前每周都找吉米的高管（不是CEO）立即将理发频率改成了每三周一次。

查理和我偶尔会早早抓住一种像潮水般的趋势，这种趋势充满了商业前景。例如，虽然美国航空（凭借其“里程”）和美国运通（凭借信用卡积分）被认为是在向客户提供“奖励”方面的先驱，但查理和我远在他们之前就意识到了这个强大概念的吸引力。被我们的洞察力所激动，我俩早在1970年就通过收购一家印花公司的控股权——蓝筹印花公司——跳入了奖励行业。那一年，蓝筹印花的销售额为1.26亿美元，其印花遍布加州。

事实上，在1970年，大约有600亿张我们的印花被储户舔过，贴进集印花册，然后拿到蓝筹印花的兑换商店。我们的奖励目录有116页厚，充满了诱人的物品。当我被告知，甚至连某些妓院和殡仪馆都给顾客发我们的印花时，我觉得我终于找到了一个稳赚不赔的生意。

嗯，不完全是。从查理和我进入蓝筹印花的那天起，业务就一路下滑。到1980年，销售额已降至1940万美元。到1990年，销售额更是徘徊在150万美元。我不是个轻言放弃的人，于是加倍努力进行管理。

然后销售额又下降了98%。去年，在伯克希尔980亿美元的收入中，只有25,920美元（没有省略任何零）来自蓝筹印花。尽管充满希望，查理和我仍在坚持奋斗。

去年我提到过，在我担任董事的19家公司（不包括伯克希尔或其他控股公司）的董事会中，我是薪酬委员会的“伤寒玛丽”。只有在一家公司，我被指派到薪酬委员会任职，然后在我遇到的最关键决定上，我立即被投票否决。我被排斥有些奇怪，考虑到我确实不乏设定CEO薪酬的经验。毕竟，在伯克希尔，我是一个人的薪酬委员会，负责确定大约40家重要运营企业CEO的薪资和激励措施。

这部分工作占用了多少时间？几乎没有。在我们42年的历史中，有多少CEO自愿离开我们去其他公司工作？确切地说是零。

伯克希尔采用许多不同的激励安排，其条款取决于诸如CEO所负责业务的经济潜力和资本密集度等因素。无论薪酬安排如何，我都努力使其既简单又公平。

当我们使用激励措施时——这些可能很丰厚——它们总是与特定CEO职权范围内的经营业绩挂钩。我们不发行与业务表现无关的彩票。如果一位CEO打出了.300的打击率，他就得到.300击球手的报酬，即使他无法控制的外部环境导致伯克希尔表现不佳。而如果他打出了.150的打击率，他就不会仅仅因为其他人的成功使伯克希尔繁荣昌盛而获得报酬。例如：我们现在在伯克希尔持有价值610亿美元的股票，其价值在一年内轻易波动10%是常有的事。为什么我们运营高管的薪酬要受到这种60亿美元波动的影响，无论这种盈亏对股东来说多么重要？

你们读过大量关于CEO因平庸业绩而获得天文数字薪酬的报道。不太为人所知的事实是，美国的CEO们通常也过着优越的生活。需要强调的是，许多CEO才华横溢，几乎所有人都每周工作远超40小时。但在此过程中，他们通常被当作皇室成员对待。（在伯克希尔，我们当然会继续这样做。虽然查理仍然偏爱粗布麻衣，但我更喜欢被宠得无可救药。伯克希尔拥有The Pampered Chef；我们出色的办公室团队把我变成了The Pampered Chief。）

一家公司的CEO福利很快会被其他公司模仿。“其他孩子都有”这个想法在董事会会议室里听起来可能太幼稚，不配作为理由。但顾问们在向薪酬委员会提出建议时，正是使用这个论点，当然措辞更优雅些。

非理性和过度的薪酬实践不会通过披露或由“独立”的薪酬委员会成员来实质性地改变。事实上，我认为我在这么多薪酬委员会中被拒之门外，很可能是因为我被认为过于独立了。薪酬改革只有在最大的机构股东——只需少数几个——要求对整个体系进行全新审视时才会发生。顾问们目前娴熟地选择“同行”公司与其客户进行比较的做法，只会延续当前的过度行为。

去年，我安排将我持有的大部分伯克希尔股票捐给五个慈善基金会，从而实现了我的终生计划的一部分，即最终将我所有的股份用于慈善目的。我所做承诺的细节以及其基本原理，都发布在我们的网站上，www.berkshirehathaway.com。我应该指出，税收与我做此决定或其时机无关。我在2006年的联邦和州所得税，与我在去年夏天没有进行首笔捐赠时完全相同，同样的道理也适用于我2007年的捐赠。

在我的遗嘱中，我规定我去世时仍拥有的所有伯克希尔股份的收益，必须在遗产结清后的十年内用于慈善目的。由于我的事务不复杂，遗产结清最多需要三年。将这个13年期限加上我预计的约12年剩余寿命（当然，我希望活得更长）意味着，所有我的伯克希尔股份的收益可能会在未来25年左右用于社会目的。

我设定这个时间表，是因为我希望这笔钱能相对迅速地由我知道有能力、有活力、有动力的人来花。当机构——特别是那些免受市场力量影响的机构——老化时，这些管理特质有时会减弱。如今，这五个基金会的负责人都是出色的人。那么，在我去世后，他们为什么不迅速行动，审慎地花掉剩余的钱呢？

那些支持永续基金会的人认为，未来必然会出现巨大而重要的社会问题，需要慈善事业来应对。我同意。但那时也会有许多超级富有的个人和家族，他们的财富将超过今天的美国人，慈善组织可以向他们陈述理由以争取资金。这些资助者届时可以直接判断哪些机构既有活力又有重点，能够最好地应对那时存在的重大社会问题。通过这种方式，可以对想法和有效性进行市场检验。一些机构值得大力支持，而另一些则可能已经过时了。即使地面上的人所做的决定并非完美，他们分配资金也应该比六英尺下的人在几十年前就做出的规定更为合理。当然，遗嘱总是可以重写，但我的想法发生重大改变的可能性非常小。

一些股东担心，接受股份的基金会出售伯克希尔股票会压低股价。这些担忧是没有根据的。许多股票的年交易量超过流通股的100%，但这些股票通常仍能以接近其内在价值的价格出售。伯克希尔也倾向于以合适的价格交易，但其年交易量仅为流通股的15%。接受我股份的基金会最多会使年度交易量增加三个百分点，即便如此，伯克希尔的换手率仍将是最低的之一。

总的来说，伯克希尔的业务表现将决定我们股票的价格，并且在大多数时候它会在一个合理的区间内交易。重要的是，基金会在定期出售伯克希尔股票时能获得合适的价格，但同样重要的是，新入股的股东不要支付过高的价格。（参见第77页的经济原则14。）通过我们的政策和与股东沟通，查理和我会尽最大努力确保伯克希尔的股票既不会大幅折价也不会大幅溢价于其内在价值。

基金会持股的存在绝不会影响我们董事会关于股息、回购或发行股票的决定。我们将完全遵循过去指导我们的相同规则：什么行动最有可能为股东带来长期的最佳结果？

在去年的报告中，我用比喻描述了戈特罗克斯家族——一个拥有美国所有企业的家族，却通过支付越来越多的佣金和费用给“帮手”来试图增加其投资回报，结果适得其反。可悲的是，在2006年，这个“家族”继续着自我毁灭的方式。

家族之所以坚持这种愚蠢行为，部分原因在于他们对可获得的回报抱有不可实际的期望。有时这些错觉是出于私利。例如，私人养老金计划可以通过使用可能无法实现的投资假设，暂时夸大其收益；而公共养老金计划则可以推迟增加税收的需要。精算师和审计师默许了这些策略，可能要过几十年问题才会暴露出来（到那时，误导世人的CEO或公职人员很可能已经离职了）。

与此同时，华尔街那些吹嘘业绩的“魔笛手”们则会助长家族的徒劳希望。不幸的戈特罗克斯家族会被保证，他们都能获得高于平均水平的投资业绩——但前提是支付更高的费用。可以把这个承诺称为成年版的“乌比冈湖效应”。

2006年，承诺和费用都创下了新高。大量资金从机构投资者流向“2-20”群体。对于不了解这种安排的人，让我解释一下：这是一个不平衡的系统，每年你本金的2%要支付给经理，即使他毫无建树——或者，更糟的是，让你损失惨重；此外，如果他成功了，还要支付给他利润的20%，即使他的成功仅仅是因为水涨船高。例如，一位经理当年实现了10%的总回报，他将保留3.6个百分点——首先扣掉2个百分点，再加上剩余8个百分点的20%——只留给他的投资者6.4个百分点。对于一个30亿美元的基金，这6.4%的净“业绩”将为经理带来高达1.08亿美元的收入。即使在同一时期，一只指数基金可能为投资者带来了15%的回报，并且只收取象征性的费用，他仍将获得这笔意外之财。

这种畸形安排所带来的必然数学结果，随着时间的推移，肯定会让戈特罗克斯家族比他们从未听说过这些“超级帮手”时更加贫穷。即便如此，2-20的玩法仍在蔓延。其影响让人想起一句古老的格言：当有经验的人与有钱的人达成交易时，有钱的人常常会得到经验，而有经验的人则得到钱。

让我以向你们介绍一位华尔街的好人来结束这一部分，我的老朋友沃尔特·施洛斯，他去年满90岁了。从1956年到2002年，沃尔特管理着一个非常成功的投资合伙公司，除非他的投资者赚钱，否则他一分钱也不拿。应该指出的是，我对沃尔特的钦佩并非后见之明。整整50年前，沃尔特是我向圣路易斯一个想要一位诚实且有能力的投资经理的家庭所做的唯一推荐。

沃尔特没有上过商学院，甚至没有上过大学。1956年，他的办公室里只有一个文件柜；到2002年，数量也才增加到四个。沃尔特没有秘书、文员或簿记员，他唯一的伙伴是他的儿子埃德温，北卡罗来纳艺术学院的毕业生。沃尔特和埃德温从未与内幕信息沾边。事实上，他们也只是有限地使用“外部”信息，通常根据沃尔特为本·格雷厄姆工作时学到的一些简单的统计方法来选择证券。1989年，当《杰出投资者文摘》问沃尔特和埃德温：“你们如何总结你们的方法？”埃德温回答说：“我们试图买便宜的股票。”现代投资组合理论、技术分析、宏观经济思考和复杂算法，概莫如是。

遵循一种不涉及真正风险——定义为资本的永久损失——的策略，沃尔特在他47年的合伙生涯中取得了远远超过标普500指数的业绩。尤其值得注意的是，他通过投资于大约1000只股票（其中大部分是乏善可陈的类型）建立了这一记录。几个大赢家并不能解释他的成功。可以安全地说，如果有数百万投资经理通过以下方式交易：a) 从帽子里抽取股票名称；b) 在沃尔特买入时以类似数量购买这些股票；然后c) 在沃尔特卖出他的选择时也跟着卖出，那么最幸运的那个人也不可能接近他的记录。沃尔特在47年间所取得的成就，根本不可能是由于运气。

我在1984年首次公开讨论沃尔特的卓越记录。当时，“有效市场理论”（EMT）是大多数主要商学院投资教学的核心。这个理论当时最普遍的解释是：任何股票在任何时刻的价格都没有明显的错误定价，这意味着没有投资者可以预期仅使用公开信息就能超越股市平均表现（尽管有些人会因运气好而做到）。23年前我谈论沃尔特时，他的记录有力地反驳了这一教条。

当学术界人士接触到这个新颖且重要的证据时，他们做了什么？不幸的是，他们以极其人性化的方式做出了反应：不是敞开心扉，而是闭上了眼睛。据我所知，没有一所教授EMT的商学院试图研究沃尔特的业绩及其对该校珍视理论的意义。

相反，这些学院的教职员工继续兴高采烈地宣扬EMT，仿佛它具有圣经般的确定性。通常，一位敢于质疑EMT的金融学讲师，其获得重大晋升的机会，不亚于伽利略被任命为教皇。

因此，成千上万的学生在进入社会时被灌输了这样的观念：每一天每只股票的价格都是“正确的”（或者更准确地说，没有被证明是错误的），并且评估企业（即股票）的努力是徒劳的。与此同时，沃尔特继续取得超越市场的表现，而那些被灌输给年轻头脑的错误指导让他的工作更加轻松。毕竟，如果你从事航运业，让你的所有潜在竞争对手都相信地球是平的，对你是有好处的。

也许对沃尔特的投资者来说，他没上过大学是件好事。

年会

今年的年会将于5月5日星期六举行。和往常一样，Qwest中心的大门将在早上7点打开，一部新的伯克希尔电影将在8:30放映。在9:30，我们将直接进入问答环节，该环节（中间在Qwest中心的看台休息吃午饭）将持续到下午3:00。然后，在短暂休息后，查理和我会在下午3:15召开年会。如果你决定在当天的提问环节中离开，请在查理发言时离场。

当然，离场的最佳理由是去购物。为了帮助你们购物，我们将在毗邻会议区的194,300平方英尺的大厅里摆满伯克希尔子公司的产品。去年，来参加会议的24,000人尽了自己的力，几乎每个展位都创下了销售记录。但记录就是用来打破的，我知道你们能做得更好。

今年，我们将再次展出一套克莱顿房屋（采用阿克米砖、萧氏地毯、佳殿绝缘材料、MiTek紧固件、无忧遮阳篷和NFM家具）。你会发现这套定价139,900美元的房屋物超所值。去年，在我们向股东开放大门之前，Qwest的一位工作人员就买走了展出的两套房屋中的一套。今年在展厅里，克莱顿房屋旁边将是一辆来自Forest River的房车和浮筒船。

GEICO将设立一个展位，由来自全国各地的多位顶级顾问组成，他们随时准备为您提供车险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO可以为股东提供一个特别折扣（通常为8%）。这项特别优惠在我们运营的50个州中的45个州是允许的。（补充一点：如果您有资格获得其他折扣，例如某些团体的折扣，则此折扣不可叠加。）请带上您现有保险的详细信息，看看我们能否为您省钱。我相信，你们中至少有50%的人，我们能帮您省钱。同时，也请申请新的GEICO信用卡。这是我目前使用的卡（当然，是适当地）。

周六，在奥马哈机场，我们将像往常一样展示一系列NetJets的飞机供您参观。请到Qwest的NetJets展位了解如何参观这些飞机。坐大巴来奥马哈，坐新飞机离开。而且您想带多少发胶上机都行。

在我们大卖场的Bookworm角落，将有大约25种书籍和DVD——全部打折——首当其冲的还是《穷查理宝典》。（去年有个倒霉蛋问查理，如果他不喜欢这本书怎么办。芒格式的回答来了：“没问题——把它送给更聪明的人就行了。”）今年我们增加了几本新书。其中包括伯克希尔瑞典长期股东彼得·贝弗林的《从达尔文到芒格：寻求智慧》，以及弗雷德·施韦德的经典著作《客户的游艇在哪里？》这本书首次出版于1940年，现在已是第4版。这是有史以来关于投资的最有趣的书，它轻松地传达了许多关于该主题的非常重要的信息。

随本报告附上的委托书材料中有一个附件，说明了如何获得参加会议及其他活动所需的凭证。至于飞机、酒店和汽车预订，我们再次与美国运通（800-799-6634）签约，为您提供特别帮助。负责这些事宜的卡罗尔·佩德森每年都为我们做得非常出色，我对此表示感谢。酒店房间可能很难找，但和卡罗尔合作，您肯定能订到。

在内布拉斯加家具城（位于72街，道奇街和太平洋街之间，占地77英亩），我们将再次举办“伯克希尔周末”折扣价活动。我们十年前在NFM发起了这项特别活动，“周末”期间的销售额从1997年的530万美元增长到了2006年的3000万美元。一想到这个销量，我就激动得起鸡皮疙瘩。

要获得伯克希尔折扣，您必须在5月3日星期四至5月8日星期一（含首尾两天）期间购物，并出示您的会议凭证。这一期间的特别价格甚至适用于几个著名制造商的产品，他们通常有禁止折扣的铁律，但本着我们股东周末的精神，为您破例了。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM周一至周六的营业时间是上午10点到晚上9点，周日是上午10点到下午6点。今年周六下午5:30到晚上8:00，NFM将为股东举办一个特别的野餐会，提供鸡肉和牛肉玉米卷（以及像我这样的传统主义者喜欢的汉堡包）。

在翻新扩建后的波仙珠宝店，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月4日星期五下午6点到10点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场是主要盛会，将于5月6日星期日上午9点到下午4点举行。周六，我们将营业到下午6点。

整个周末，波仙珠宝店都会人山人海。因此，为了您的方便，股东价格将从4月30日星期一持续到5月12日星期六。在此期间，请出示您的会议凭证或显示您是伯克希尔股东的经纪账户对账单来表明您的股东身份。

周日下午，在波仙珠宝店外的帐篷里，蒙住双眼的帕特里克·沃尔夫——两次美国国际象棋冠军——将睁大眼睛迎战所有挑战者，每场六人。去年，当帕特里克以这种方式下棋时，我与他进行了交谈。在旁边，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师诺曼·贝克将让旁观者着迷。此外，我们还有鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格，两位世界顶尖桥牌专家，将在周日下午与我们的股东打桥牌。

为了增加周日在波仙珠宝店的乐趣，艾瑞尔·邢将从下午1点到4点打乒乓球，迎战任何有勇气挑战她的人。艾瑞尔虽然只有11岁，但在美国16岁以下女子选手中排名第一（在12岁以下男女选手中也排名第一）。在我75岁生日那一周，我和当时9岁、刚刚够高能看见桌对面的艾瑞尔打球，我以为我会对她手下留情，以免打击她幼小的心灵。结果她把我打趴下了。此后，我设计了一个计划，让我有希望和她一较高下。周日下午1点，我将以2分的比分开始与艾瑞尔的比赛。如果我侥幸赢了第一分，我就假装受伤，宣布获胜。在这番激烈的交锋耗费了艾瑞尔的体力后，我们的股东们就可以碰碰运气和她过招了。

Gorat’s牛排馆将于5月6日星期日再次专门为伯克希尔股东营业，服务时间从下午4点到晚上10点。请记住，那天要去Gorat’s，您必须预订。请在4月1日（但不要在此之前）致电402-551-3733进行预订。

在2006-2007学年，将有35个大学班级（包括来自巴西IBMEC的一个班级）来奥马哈与我交流。我几乎带所有人——总共超过2000名学生——去Gorat’s吃午饭。他们很喜欢。想知道为什么，周日和我们一起来吧。

我们将在周六下午4点再次为非北美地区来的股东举办招待会。每年，我们的会议都会吸引来自全球各地的许多人，查理和我希望确保我们亲自问候那些远道而来的人。去年，我们很高兴见到了来自几十个国家的400多位股东。任何来自美国和加拿大以外地区的股东都将获得一份特殊凭证和参加此活动的说明。

查理和我是非常幸运的。我们出生在美国；有出色的父母确保我们接受了良好的教育；拥有美好的家庭和健康的身体；并且天生带有“商业”基因，使我们能够以远超其他对社会福祉贡献同样大甚至更多的人的方式繁荣发展。此外，我们长期从事我们热爱的工作，每天都有才华横溢、乐观积极的同事以无数方式帮助我们。难怪我们总是跳着舞去上班。但对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔年会上与我们的股东合伙人欢聚一堂更有趣的了。所以，请在5月5日来Qwest中心参加我们为资本家举办的伍德斯托克音乐节吧。我们到时见。

2007年2月28日

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席