伯克希尔·哈撒韦 2014 年股东信

# company:berkshire-hathaway（伯克希尔·哈撒韦） # company:bnsf（伯灵顿北方圣塔菲铁路） # company:geico（政府雇员保险公司） # company:general-re（通用再保险） # company:iscar（伊斯卡） # company:marmon（玛蒙集团） # company:midamerican-energy（中美能源） # concept:book-value（账面价值） # concept:capital-allocation（资本配置） # concept:compounding（复利） # concept:diversification（分散投资） # concept:goodwill（商誉） # concept:insurance-float（保险浮存金） # concept:integrity（诚信） # concept:intrinsic-value（内在价值） # concept:management（管理层） # concept:market-forecasting（市场预测） # concept:underwriting-discipline（承保纪律） # person:ajit-jain（阿吉特·贾因） # person:charlie-munger（查理·芒格） # person:jorge-paulo-lemann（豪尔赫·保罗·莱曼） # person:warren-buffett（沃伦·巴菲特）
Jason Tsai
Published date:

Table of contents

Open Table of contents

2014年致股东信 第三部分

201420132012
(单位：百万美元)
Berkadia（我们占50%份额）$122$80$35
Clayton558416255
CORT364042
Marmon – 集装箱与起重机238226246
Marmon – 铁路货车442353299
XTRA147125106
净金融收益*296324410
$1,839$1,564$1,393
* 不含资本利得或亏损
原文
201420132012
(in millions)
Berkadia (our 50% share)$ 122$ 80$ 35
Clayton558416255
CORT364042
Marmon – Containers and Cranes238226246
Marmon – Railcars442353299
XTRA147125106
Net financial income*296324410
$ 1,839$ 1,564$ 1,393
* Excludes capital gains or losses

投资

下表列出我们在年底市值最大的十五只普通股投资。

2014年12月31日
持股数量公司持股比例成本*市值
(单位：百万美元)
151,610,700美国运通公司14.8%$1,287$14,106
400,000,000可口可乐公司9.2%1,29916,888
18,513,482DaVita医疗保健合伙公司8.6%8431,402
15,430,586迪尔公司4.5%1,2531,365
24,617,939直播电视集团4.9%1,4542,134
13,062,594高盛集团3.0%7502,532
76,971,817国际商业机器公司7.8%13,15712,349
24,669,778穆迪公司12.1%2482,364
20,060,390慕尼黑再保险11.8%2,9904,023
52,477,678宝洁公司1.9%3364,683 ***
22,169,930赛诺菲1.7%1,7212,032
96,890,665美国合众银行5.4%3,0334,355
43,387,980USG公司30.0%8361,214
67,707,544沃尔玛公司2.1%3,7985,815
483,470,853富国银行9.4%11,87126,504
其他10,18015,704
按市值计价的普通股合计$55,056$117,470
原文

Investments

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.

12/31/1**4
Shares****CompanyPercentage**of Company**OwnedCost***Market
(in**millions)
151,610,700American Express Company14.8$ 1,287$ 14,106
400,000,000The Coca-Cola Company9.21,29916,888
18,513,482DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc.8.68431,402
15,430,586Deere & Company4.51,2531,365
24,617,939DIRECTV4.91,4542,134
13,062,594The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.3.07502,532
76,971,817International Business Machines Corp.7.813,15712,349
24,669,778Moody’s Corporation12.12482,364
20,060,390Munich Re11.82,9904,023
52,477,678The Procter & Gamble Company1.93364,683 ***
22,169,930Sanofi1.71,7212,032
96,890,665U.S. Bancorp5.43,0334,355
43,387,980USG Corporation30.08361,214
67,707,544Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.2.13,7985,815
483,470,853Wells Fargo & Company9.411,87126,504
Others10,18015,704
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market$55,056$ 117,470

伯克希尔有一项重要的股权投资未在上表中列出：我们可以在2021年9月之前的任何时候以50亿美元购买7亿股美国银行股票。年底时这些股票价值125亿美元。我们很可能在期权到期前夕才行使购买权。在此期间，重要的是你要认识到，美国银行实际上是我们第四大股权投资——而且我们对其高度重视。

原文

Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment — and one we value highly.

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细心的读者会注意到，去年出现在我们最大普通股投资列表中的乐购现在已不见踪影。令我惭愧的是，一个细心的投资者本该更早卖出乐购的股票。我在这项投资上犯了大错——因为拖延。

原文

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Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor, I’m embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.

2012年底我们持有4.15亿股乐购股票，该公司当时和现在都是英国领先的食品零售商，在其他国家也是重要的杂货商。这项投资的成本是23亿美元，市值也大致相当。

原文

At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.

2013年，我对该公司当时的管理层有些不满，卖出了1.14亿股，实现了4300万美元的利润。我这种慢悠悠的卖出节奏最终代价高昂。查理称这种行为为”嘬手指”。（考虑到我的拖延给我们造成的损失，他已经很客气了。）

原文

In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)

2014年期间，乐购的问题逐月恶化。公司的市场份额下降，利润率收缩，会计问题也浮出水面。在商业世界里，坏消息往往接踵而至：你在厨房里看到一只蟑螂；随着日子一天天过去，你会遇到它的亲戚们。

原文

During 2014, Tesco’s problems worsened by the month. The company’s market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.

我们在全年陆续卖出了乐购的股票，现在已经清仓。（值得一提的是，该公司已经聘请了新的管理层，我们祝愿他们顺利。）这项投资的税后亏损为4.44亿美元，约占伯克希尔净值的1/5的1%。在过去的50年里，我们只有一次在出售时实现的投资损失达到净值的2%。有两次我们遭受了1%的损失。这三笔亏损都发生在1974-1975年期间，当时我们卖出了非常便宜的股票，以便买入我们认为更便宜的股票。

原文

We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire’s net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper.

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我们的投资业绩受益于一股强劲的顺风。在1964年至2014年期间，标普500指数从84点上涨至2059点，若将股息再投资，则产生了第2页所示的总回报11,196%。与此同时，美元的购买力惊人地下降了87%。这意味着现在需要1美元才能买到1965年只需13美分就能买到的东西（以消费者价格指数衡量）。

原文

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Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind. During the 1964-2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to 2,059, which, with reinvested dividends, generated the overall return of 11,196% shown on page 2. Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now takes $1 to buy what could be bought for 13¢ in 1965 (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).

股票与美元之间的这种迥异表现给投资者带来了一个重要信息。回想一下我们在2011年年报中的定义：投资是”现在将购买力转移给他人，并合理预期在未来——在名义收益纳税之后——能获得更多的购买力。”

原文

There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as “the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power — after taxes have been paid on nominal gains — in the future.”

从过去五十年中得出的一个反传统但不可避免的结论是：投资于一个多元化的美国企业组合，远比投资于价值与美元挂钩的证券（例如国债）要安全得多。在之前的半个世纪——包括大萧条和两次世界大战——也是如此。投资者应当注意这段历史。在下一个世纪里，这种情况几乎肯定会以某种程度重演。

原文

The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities — Treasuries, for example — whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century.

股票价格的波动性总是远远大于现金等价物持有。然而，从长期来看，以货币计价的工具是风险更高的投资——风险高得多的投资——远高于那些长期分期买入、且持有方式只需支付象征性费用和佣金的广泛多元化股票组合。这一教训通常不在商学院讲授，在那里波动性几乎被普遍用作风险的代理指标。虽然这种教学假设便于教学，但它大错特错：波动性远非风险的代名词。将两者等同的流行公式会误导学生、投资者和CEO。

原文

Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term, however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments — far riskier investments — than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray.

当然，持有股票一天、一周或一年，在名义和购买力方面都比持有现金等价物风险高得多。这对某些投资者——比如投资银行——是相关的，因为它们的生存可能受到资产价格下跌的威胁，并可能被迫在低迷市场中出售证券。此外，任何有切实近期资金需求的机构，都应在国债或受保存款中保留适当金额。

原文

It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors — say, investment banks — whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits.

然而，对于绝大多数能够——而且应该——以数十年为周期进行投资的投资者来说，报价的下跌并不重要。他们的焦点应始终放在在其投资生命周期内实现购买力的显著增长上。对他们来说，一个长期分期买入的多元化股票组合，将比美元为基础的证券风险小得多。

原文

For the great majority of investors, however, who can — and should — invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time, will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities.

如果投资者反而害怕价格波动，错误地将其视为风险指标，那么讽刺的是，他最终可能会做一些非常危险的事情。回想一下六年前那些哀叹股票下跌、建议投资”安全”国库券或银行定期存单的专家们。听从这一说教的人，如今在他们原本期望用来资助舒适退休生活的资金上，只能获得微薄的收益。（那时标普500指数低于700点；现在大约是2100点。）如果不是因为他们对毫无意义的价格波动感到恐惧，这些投资者本可以通过简单地购买一只费用极低的指数基金来确保终身稳定的收入，该基金的股息会逐年上升，本金也会增长（当然，会有许多起伏）。

原文

If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in “safe” Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).

当然，投资者可以通过自身的行为使股票持有变得高度危险。许多人正是这样做的。频繁交易、试图”择时”市场、分散化不足、向管理人和顾问支付高额且不必要的费用、以及使用借来的资金，都可能毁灭一个终身持股者本应享有的体面回报。事实上，借来的钱在投资者的工具箱中毫无位置：市场中随时可能发生任何事情。没有哪个顾问、经济学家或电视评论员——当然查理和我也不例外——能告诉你混乱何时会发生。市场预测者会让你的耳朵塞满，但永远填不满你的钱包。

原文

Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator — and definitely not Charlie nor I — can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.

上述投资罪行的实施并不仅限于”小人物”。大型机构投资者作为一个群体，长期以来一直跑输那些只是简单持有数十年、毫不复杂的指数基金投资者。一个主要原因是费用：许多机构向顾问支付大笔费用，这些顾问又推荐高收费的经理。这是一个傻瓜的游戏。

原文

The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to “the little guy.” Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool’s game.

当然，确实有一些非常优秀的投资经理——尽管短期内很难判断一个出色的记录是出于运气还是天赋。然而，大多数顾问在创造高额费用方面的能力远强于创造高回报。事实上，他们的核心能力是销售。投资者——无论大小——与其听从他们迷人的歌声，不如阅读杰克·博格尔的《常识投资小书》。

原文

There are a few investment managers, of course, who are very good — though in the short run, it’s difficult to determine whether a great record is due to luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far better at generating high fees than they are at generating high returns. In truth, their core competence is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their siren songs, investors — large and small — should instead read Jack Bogle’s The Little Book of Common Sense Investing.

数十年前，本·格雷厄姆用莎士比亚的一句名言指出了投资失败的根源：“亲爱的布鲁图斯，错不在我们的命运，而在我们自己。”

原文

Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for investment failure, using a quote from Shakespeare: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”

年度股东大会

年度股东大会将于5月2日星期六在世纪互联中心举行。去年的参会人数达到创纪录的39,000人，我们预计今年人数将进一步增加，因为我们将庆祝金禧纪念日。请在早上7点开门时到场。

原文

The Annual Meeting

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 2nd at the CenturyLink Center. Last year’s attendance of 39,000 set a record, and we expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our Golden Anniversary. Be there when the doors open at 7 a.m.

伯克希尔才华横溢的Carrie Sova将再次负责组织工作。Carrie六年前24岁时加入我们，担任秘书。四年前，我请她负责会议组织——这是一项需要多种技能的艰巨任务——她欣然接受了。Carrie沉着冷静、足智多谋，擅长激发与她共事的数百人发挥最佳水平。她得到了我们整个总部团队的支持，他们乐于参与其中，让这个周末对股东们来说既有趣又富有信息。

原文

Berkshire’s talented Carrie Sova will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked her to take charge of the meeting — a huge undertaking, requiring a multitude of skills — and she jumped at the chance. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in the hundreds who work with her. She is aided by our entire home office crew who enjoy pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.

是的，我们也试图在股东们到来时向他们销售我们的产品。事实上，今年我们将大幅增加购物时间，除了会议日通常的早上7点到下午4点外，还将在5月1日星期五中午至下午5点在世纪互联中心开门营业。所以，给查理一个微笑，认真购物吧。

原文

And, yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our products while they’re here. In fact, this year we will substantially increase the hours available for purchases, opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st, from noon to 5 p.m. as well as the usual 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie’s face and do some serious shopping.

周六早上早点起床。早上6点20分，Norman和Jake——两头各重约一吨的得克萨斯长角牛——将沿着第十街走向世纪互联中心。它们背上坐着我们Justin Boot公司的两位高管，他们兼任牛仔。公牛后面将有四匹马拉着一辆富国银行的驿站马车。伯克希尔已经销售飞机、火车和汽车。将公牛和驿站马车加入我们的组合，应该能巩固我们作为美国全能运输公司的声誉。

原文

Get up early on Saturday morning. At 6:20 a.m., Norman and Jake, two Texas longhorns each weighing about a ton, will proceed down 10th Street to the CenturyLink. Aboard them will be a couple of our Justin Boot executives, who do double duty as cowboys. Following the steers will be four horses pulling a Wells Fargo stagecoach. Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles. Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our reputation as America’s all-purpose transportation company.

周六早上7点30分左右，我们将举办第四届国际掷报纸挑战赛。我们的目标再次是距离投掷线精确35英尺的Clayton Home门廊。当我十几岁的时候——在我唯一一段短暂的诚实劳动经历中——我投掷了大约50万份报纸。所以我觉得自己很厉害。挑战我吧！羞辱我吧！把我打趴下！任何人只要把报纸扔得比我更靠近门口台阶，我就请他们吃一个Dilly Bar冰淇淋。报纸将有36到42页，你必须自己折叠（不允许使用橡皮筋）。我将为12岁及以下的参赛者中投掷最好的人颁发特别奖。Deb Bosanek将担任裁判。

原文

At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, we will have our fourth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target again will be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager

— in my one brief flirtation with honest labor — I tossed about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). I’ll present a special prize to the 12-or-under contestant who makes the best toss. Deb Bosanek will be the judge.

上午8点30分，将放映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一小时后，我们将开始问答环节，该环节（中间在世纪互联中心的小卖部休息吃午餐）将持续到下午3点30分。短暂休息后，查理和我会在下午3点45分召开年度股东大会。这个业务会议通常只持续大约半小时。

原文

At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so.

您的购物场所将是与会议室相邻的194,300平方英尺的大厅，伯克希尔数十家子公司的产品将在那里出售。如果您周五没有完成购物，可以在周六查理讲话时溜出去，尽情抢购我们的便宜货。也去看看那令人惊叹的BNSF铁路模型。即使我已经84岁了，它仍然让我兴奋。

原文

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. If you don’t get your shopping done on Friday, slip out while Charlie’s talking on Saturday and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad layout also. Even though I’m 84, it still excites me.

去年你们作为购物者尽了本分，我们大多数企业的销售额都创下了记录。在周六的九个小时内，我们卖出了1,385双Justin靴子（平均每23秒一双）、13,440磅See’s糖果、7,276双Wells Lamont工作手套和10,000瓶亨氏番茄酱。亨氏新推出了一款芥末产品，所以今年芥末和番茄酱都将有售。（两种都买！）既然我们周五也营业，我们预计在每个区域都会创下新纪录。

原文

Last year you did your part as a shopper, and most of our businesses racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period on Saturday, we sold 1,385 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 23 seconds), 13,440 pounds of See’s candy, 7,276 pairs of Wells Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup. Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will be available this year. (Buy both!) Now that we are open for business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every precinct.

Brooks——我们的跑鞋公司——将再次在会议上提供一款特别纪念鞋。购买一双后，第二天穿着它参加我们第三届年度”伯克希尔5公里”比赛，这是一场早上8点从世纪互联中心开始的跑步比赛。参加比赛的详细信息将包含在访客指南中，该指南将与您的会议证件一同寄出。参赛者将会发现自己在与许多伯克希尔的管理层、董事和同事一起跑步。（不过查理和我会睡懒觉。）

原文

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our third annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your credentials for the meeting. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.)

购物区将设有一个GEICO展位，由公司来自全国各地的多位顶级顾问值守。请过来获取报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO可以给您提供股东折扣（通常为8%）。这项特别优惠在我们运营的51个司法管辖区中的44个是允许的。（补充一点：如果您符合其他折扣条件，例如某些团体可享受的折扣，则此折扣不能叠加。）请带上您现有保险的详细信息，并查看我们的价格。我们可以为你们中的许多人节省真金白银。

原文

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money.

一定要光顾Bookworm。它将陈列约35本书籍和DVD，其中包括几本新书。去年，许多股东购买了Max Olson汇编的伯克希尔自1965年以来的信件合集，他为这次会议制作了更新版。我们还预计将出售一本纪念我们五十周年的廉价书籍。目前这项工作正在进行中，但我预计它将包含各种各样的历史资料，包括19世纪的文件。

原文

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Last year, many shareholders purchased Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for the meeting. We also expect to be selling an inexpensive book commemorating our fifty years. It’s currently a work in process, but I expect it to contain a wide variety of historical material, including documents from the 19th Century.

随本报告附上的代理材料附件说明了如何获取参加会议和其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在伯克希尔周末期间抬高价格。如果您是从远方来的，比较一下飞往堪萨斯城与奥马哈的费用。两地之间的车程约为2.5小时，也许飞往堪萨斯城可以为您节省可观的费用，特别是如果您原本计划在奥马哈租车的话。一对夫妇可以节省1,000美元或更多。把这些钱花在我们这里。

原文

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

在内布拉斯加家具城（位于72街Dodge和Pacific之间77英亩的地块上），我们将再次提供”伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年在会议前后的一周内，该店创下了40,481,817美元的销售记录。（NFM奥马哈店的周平均销售额约为900万美元。）

原文

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did a record $40,481,817 of business. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store is about $9 million.)

要获得NFM的伯克希尔折扣，您必须在4月28日（星期二）至5月4日（星期一）期间购物，并出示您的会议证件。此期间的特别定价甚至适用于几个知名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有严格的不打折规定，但本着我们股东周末的精神，为您破例了。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM的营业时间为周一至周五上午10点至晚上9点，周六上午10点至晚上9点30分，周日上午10点至晚上8点。周六下午5点30分至晚上8点，NFM将举办野餐会，欢迎您参加。

原文

To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 28th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月1日星期五下午6点至9点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场主庆典将于5月3日星期日上午9点至下午4点举行。周六我们将营业至下午6点。近年来，我们三天的销售额已远远超过整个十二月（通常是珠宝商的最佳月份）的销售额。

原文

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded our sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.

整个周末Borsheims都将人头攒动。为了方便您，股东价格将从4月27日（星期一）到5月9日（星期六）有效。在此期间，请出示您的会议证件或显示您是伯克希尔持有人的券商对账单来表明您的股东身份。

原文

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

周日，在Borsheims外的商场里，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师Norman Beck将令旁观者眼花缭乱。此外，世界顶级桥牌高手Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg将在周日下午与我们的股东打桥牌。不要和他们赌钱。

原文

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.

我的朋友Ariel Hsing也将在周日来到商场，在乒乓球桌上接受挑战。我认识Ariel时她才九岁，那时我就无法从她身上拿下一分。现在她是普林斯顿大学的二年级学生，曾代表美国参加2012年奥运会。如果你不怕丢脸，下午1点开始测试一下你的球技吧。比尔·盖茨和我将率先上阵，试图消耗她的体力。

原文

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a sophomore at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.

Gorat’s和Piccolo’s将在5月3日（周日）再次对伯克希尔股东专属开放。两家餐厅都将营业至晚上10点，Gorat’s下午1点开门，Piccolo’s下午4点开门。这些是我最喜欢的餐厅，我周日晚餐会在两家都吃。记住：要预订Gorat’s，请在4月1日（但不要提前）致电402-551-3733；预订Piccolo’s请致电402-346-2865。在Piccolo’s，点一份巨型麦根沙士冰淇淋作为甜点。只有怯懦者才点小份的。

原文

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before); for Piccolo’s, call 402-346-2865. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.

我们将再次邀请同样的三位金融记者负责会议中的问答环节，向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件提交给记者的问题。这三位记者及其电子邮件地址是：Carol Loomis，她在《财富》杂志工作六十年后于去年退休，但仍然是商业和金融事务的专家，可发送邮件至loomisbrk@gmail.com；CNBC的Becky Quick，邮箱为BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及《纽约时报》的Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱为arsorkin@nytimes.com。

原文

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, who retired last year after sixty years at Fortune, but remains the expert on business and financial matters, and who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

从提交的问题中，每位记者将选择他们认为最有趣和最重要的六个问题。记者们告诉我，您的问题被选中的最佳机会是：保持简洁，避免在最后一刻才发送，与伯克希尔相关，并且在每封电子邮件中不超过两个问题。（在您的电子邮件中，请告知记者如果问题被问到，您是否希望被提名字。）

原文

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

我们还将有一个由三位关注伯克希尔的分析师组成的小组。今年的保险专家将是Dowling & Partners的Gary Ransom。涉及我们非保险业务的问题将由Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb的Jonathan Brandt和Morningstar的Gregg Warren提出。我们希望分析师和记者提出的问题能够增加股东对他们投资的理解和知识。

原文

We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

查理和我对即将到来的问题一无所知。有些问题肯定会很难，而这正是我们喜欢的。总的来说，我们预计至少有54个问题，这将允许每位分析师和记者各提六个问题，以及来自听众的18个问题。（去年我们总共有62个问题。）来自听众的提问者将在年度股东大会当天上午8点15分进行的11次抽签中选出。安装在场馆和主要溢出会议室的11个麦克风将各自进行一次抽签。

原文

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 62 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

既然我谈到了股东获取知识的话题，让我提醒您，查理和我认为所有股东都应该同时获得伯克希尔发布的新信息，并且应该有足够的时间进行分析。这就是为什么我们试图在周五晚间或周六早间发布财务数据，以及为什么我们的年度股东大会总是在周六举行。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交谈，而是像对待所有其他股东一样对待他们。

原文

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.

************

在会议期间，我们从成千上万的奥马哈居民和企业那里得到了巨大的帮助，他们都希望您能过得愉快。今年，由于我们预计与会人数将创纪录，我们担心酒店房间短缺。为解决这一潜在问题，Airbnb正在努力获取会议期间的房源信息，并且可能会提供各种各样的住宿选择。Airbnb的服务可能对那些只打算在奥马哈住一晚的股东特别有帮助，因为他们知道去年有些酒店要求客人至少住三晚。这很昂贵。预算紧张的人可以查看Airbnb网站。

原文

************

We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy yourselves. This year, because we expect record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of hotel rooms. To deal with that possible problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to have a wide array of accommodations to offer. Airbnb’s services may be especially helpful to shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive. Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.

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我有充分的理由经常赞扬我们运营经理们的成就。他们确实是全明星，经营自己的企业就像那是他们家庭拥有的唯一资产一样。我相信我们经理的心态是大型上市公司中最为股东着想的。我们的大多数经理没有财务上的需要去工作。打出商业”本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说和薪水一样重要。

原文

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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers also to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

同样重要的是与我一起在公司总部工作的24位男女员工。这个团队高效地处理大量的SEC和其他监管要求，提交一份24,100页的联邦所得税申报表并监督3,400份州税申报表的提交，回应无数的股东和媒体询问，编制年度报告，筹备全国最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会活动——这个名单还可以继续列下去。

原文

Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 24,100-page Federal income tax return and oversees the filing of 3,400 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities — and the list goes on and on.

他们愉快地处理所有这些业务任务，效率令人难以置信，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力不仅仅局限于严格与伯克希尔相关的活动：去年他们处理了40所大学（从200名申请者中选出）派学生来奥马哈与我进行问答日活动。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买汉堡和炸薯条（当然要淋上亨氏番茄酱）当午餐。没有哪个CEO比我过得更好了；我真的觉得每天都是跳着舞去上班。

原文

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

去年，在年报中，我们放弃了实行了48年的”无照片”政策——谁说我不会变通？——并刊登了一张我们出色的总部团队在圣诞午餐时拍摄的照片。我没有警告大家他们将受到公众关注，所以他们并没有穿上最好的衣服。今年情况不同了：在对面一页上，您会看到我们的团队在知道有人会注意到他们时的样子。然而无论如何着装，他们的表现都令人难以置信。

原文

Last year, for the annual report, we dropped our 48-year-old “no pictures” policy — who says I’m not flexible? — and ran a photo of our remarkable home-office crew that was taken at our Christmas lunch. I didn’t warn the gang of the public exposure they were to receive, so they didn’t have on their Sunday best. This year was a different story: On the facing page you will see what our group looks like when they think someone will be noticing. However they dress, their performance is mind-boggling.

5月2日来见见他们，享受我们的”资本家伍德斯托克音乐节”吧。

原文

Come meet them on May 2nd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.

2015年2月27日

沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席

原文

February 27, 2015

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司

收购标准

我们热切希望听取来自企业主或其代表的、符合以下所有条件的业务信息：

  1. 大规模收购（税前利润至少7500万美元，除非该业务适合我们现有的某个部门）；
  2. 经过验证的持续盈利能力（未来预测和我们无关，也不感兴趣”扭亏为盈”的情况）；
  3. 在很少或没有债务的情况下获得良好股本回报率的企业；
  4. 现有管理层（我们无法提供管理层）；
  5. 简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们无法理解）；
  6. 报价（如果价格未知，我们不想浪费时间——即使是初步讨论——来谈交易）。

公司越大，我们的兴趣就越大：我们希望在50亿至200亿美元的范围内进行收购。然而，我们不感兴趣接收关于我们可能进行的一般股票市场购买的建议。

原文

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

ACQUISITION CRITERIA

We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the following criteria:

  1. Large purchases (at least $75 million of pre-tax earnings unless the business will fit into one of our existing units),

  2. Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),

  3. Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

  4. Management in place (we can’t supply it),

  5. Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

  6. An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

The larger the company, the greater will be our interest: We would like to make an acquisition in the $5-20 billion range. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.

我们不会进行恶意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密和非常快速的答复——通常在五分钟内——表明我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于用现金购买，但当我们获得与付出的内在商业价值相等时，也会考虑发行股票。我们不参与拍卖。

原文

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer — customarily within five minutes — as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We don’t participate in auctions.

查理和我经常收到一些完全不符合我们标准的收购建议：我们发现，如果你广告想买柯利牧羊犬，很多人会打电话想卖给你他们的可卡犬。一句乡村歌曲的歌词表达了我们对新企业、扭亏为盈或拍卖式销售的感受：“当电话不响时，你就会知道是我。”

原文

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”

伯克希尔——过去、现在与未来

缘起

1964年5月6日，当时由一位名叫Seabury Stanton的人经营的伯克希尔哈撒韦，向其股东发出一封信，提出以每股11.375美元收购225,000股自己的股票。我预料到了这封信；但价格让我意外。

原文

In the Beginning

On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for $11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.

伯克希尔当时有1,583,680股流通股。其中约7%由巴菲特合伙有限公司（“BPL”）持有，这是我管理的一个投资实体，我几乎全部净资产都在里面。在收购要约寄出前不久，Stanton问BPL愿意以什么价格出售其持股。我回答11.50美元，他说：“好，成交。“然后伯克希尔的信来了，出价少了八分之一美分。我对Stanton的行为感到恼怒，没有接受要约。

原文

Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.

那是一个极其愚蠢的决定。

原文

That was a monumentally stupid decision.

伯克希尔当时是一家陷入糟糕业务的北方纺织品制造商。它所处的行业正在走下坡路，无论是比喻意义还是地理意义上。而且由于各种原因，伯克希尔无法改变方向。

原文

Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.

即使该行业的问题长期以来广为人知，情况也是如此。伯克希尔自己的董事会会议记录——1954年7月29日——列出了严峻的事实：“新英格兰的纺织业四十年前就开始消亡了。战争期间这一趋势停止了。这种趋势必须持续下去，直到供求达到平衡。”

原文

That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”

那次董事会会议大约一年后，伯克希尔精细纺纱联营公司和哈撒韦制造公司——两者都源于19世纪——合并，采用了我们今天使用的名称。合并后的公司拥有14家工厂和10,000名员工，成为新英格兰纺织业的巨头。然而，两家管理层视为合并协议的安排，很快就变成了一份自杀协议。在合并后的七年里，伯克希尔整体亏损，净资产缩水了37%。

原文

About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing — both with roots in the 19th Century — joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.

与此同时，公司关闭了九家工厂，有时用清算所得来回购股票。这种模式引起了我的注意。

原文

Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.

我在1962年12月购买了BPL持有的第一批伯克希尔股票，预期会有更多关闭和更多回购。当时股价为7.50美元，远低于每股10.25美元的营运资本和20.20美元的账面价值。以这个价格买股票就像捡起一支只剩一口可吸的雪茄烟头。尽管烟蒂可能又丑又湿，但那一口是免费的。然而，一旦享受了那一瞬间的快感，就不能再期待更多了。

原文

I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.

伯克希尔此后按部就班：它很快又关闭了两家工厂，并在1964年5月的行动中，着手用关闭所得进行股票回购。Stanton给出的价格比我们最初购买成本高出50%。就在那里——我那免费的烟，正等着我，之后我可以去别处寻找其他丢弃的烟蒂。

原文

Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was — my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.

然而，我对Stanton的克扣感到恼火，无视了他的要约，并开始积极收购更多伯克希尔的股票。

原文

Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares.

到1965年4月，BPL拥有392,633股（当时流通股为1,017,547股），在5月初的董事会会议上，我们正式控制了公司。由于Seabury和我的幼稚行为——毕竟，对我们两人来说，八分之一美分算什么？——他失去了工作，而我发现自己将BPL超过25%的资本投入了一个我知之甚少的糟糕业务中。我成了那只追上了汽车却不知所措的狗。

原文

By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish behavior — after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? — he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.

由于伯克希尔的经营亏损和股票回购，其1964财年末的净资产从1955年合并时的5500万美元下降到了2200万美元。这2200万美元全部被纺织业务占用：公司没有多余现金，还欠银行250万美元。（伯克希尔1964年的年报在第130-142页复制。）

原文

Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)

有一段时间我很幸运：伯克希尔立即享受了两年良好的经营状况。更妙的是，那些年的收益无需缴纳所得税，因为公司拥有早年灾难性结果产生的大量亏损结转。

原文

For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.

然后蜜月结束了。在1966年之后的18年里，我们在纺织业务上无休止地挣扎，徒劳无功。但固执——还是愚蠢？——有其限度。1985年，我终于认输，关闭了该业务。

原文

Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness — stupidity? — has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.

************

我犯的第一个错误是将BPL的大量资源投入一家垂死的企业，但这并未让我气馁，我很快就加重了错误。事实上，我的第二个错误比第一个严重得多，最终成为我职业生涯中代价最高的错误。

原文

************

Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.

1967年初，我让伯克希尔以860万美元购买了国民赔偿公司（“NICO”），这是一家小型但前途光明的奥马哈保险公司。（交易中还包括一家规模很小的姐妹公司。）保险是我的强项：我理解并喜欢这个行业。

原文

Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.

NICO的所有者Jack Ringwalt是位老朋友，他想把公司卖给我——我个人。他的出价绝不是给伯克希尔的。那么，我为什么要为伯克希尔而不是BPL购买NICO呢？48年来我一直在思考这个问题，但至今仍未找到好的答案。我只是犯了一个巨大的错误。

原文

Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me — me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake.

如果BPL是购买方，我和我的合伙人将百分之百拥有一家优秀的企业，它注定要成为构建今日伯克希尔公司的基础。而且，我们的增长不会因为被囚禁在纺织业务中的无生产力资金而受阻近二十年。最后，我们后续的收购将完全由我和我的合伙人拥有，而不是由伯克希尔的遗留股东拥有39%——而我们对他们没有任何义务。尽管这些事实就摆在我面前，我选择将100%的优秀企业（NICO）与61%控股的糟糕企业（伯克希尔哈撒韦）联姻，这个决定最终将大约1000亿美元从BPL的合伙人转移给了一群陌生人。

原文

If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.

************

再坦白一件事，然后我会转到更愉快的话题：你能相信吗，1975年我收购了Waumbec Mills，另一家新英格兰纺织公司。当然，基于我们获得的资产以及与伯克希尔现有纺织业务的预估协同效应，收购价格是”便宜货”。然而——意想不到吧——Waumbec是一场灾难，那家工厂没几年就不得不关闭。

原文

************

One more confession and then I’ll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain” based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless — surprise, surprise — Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.

现在有些好消息：北方纺织行业终于灭绝了。如果你听说我在新英格兰地区闲逛，你不再需要惊慌了。

原文

And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I’ve been spotted wandering around New England.

查理纠正了我

我的烟蒂策略在我管理小规模资金时效果很好。事实上，我在1950年代获得的几十次免费烟，使那个十年成为我投资生涯中无论从相对还是绝对表现来看都是最好的一段时期。

原文

Charlie Straightens Me Out

My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.

即便如此，我那时对烟蒂策略也做了一些例外，其中最重要的是GEICO。感谢1951年我与Lorimer Davidson的一次谈话——他后来成为该公司的CEO，是一位很棒的人——我了解到GEICO是一家出色的企业，并迅速将我9,800美元净资产的65%投入了它的股票。然而，在那些早期年份，我的大部分收益来自于投资于以 bargain 价格交易的平庸公司。本·格雷厄姆教会了我那项技术，而且它确实有效。

原文

Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.

但这种方法的一个主要弱点逐渐显现：烟蒂投资只有在一定规模内才可扩展。对于大资金，它永远不会运作良好。

原文

But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.

此外，虽然以廉价价格购买的边缘企业作为短期投资可能具有吸引力，但它们不是建立大型持久企业的正确基础。选择婚姻伴侣显然需要比约会更严格的标准。（应该指出，伯克希尔本来会是一个令人高度满意的”约会对象”：如果我们接受了Seabury Stanton每股11.375美元的要约，BPL在伯克希尔投资上的加权年化回报率大约会是40%。）

原文

In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)

************

是查理·芒格打破了我的烟蒂习惯，并设定了建立一家能够将巨大规模与令人满意的利润相结合的企业之路。查理在距离我现在的住处几百英尺的地方长大，年轻的时候——和我一样——在我祖父的杂货店里工作过。然而，直到1959年我才见到查理，那时他早已离开奥马哈，在洛杉矶安家。我当时28岁，他35岁。介绍我们认识的那位奥马哈医生说我们会合得来——事实确实如此。

原文

************

It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off — and we did.

如果你参加过我们的年度股东大会，你就知道查理具有广博的才智、惊人的记忆力，以及一些坚定的观点。我自己也不是优柔寡断的人，有时我们意见不一致。然而，在56年里，我们从未争吵过。当我们有分歧时，查理通常会这样结束谈话：“沃伦，再想想，你会同意我的，因为你很聪明，而我是对的。”

原文

If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”

你们大多数人不知道的是，建筑是查理的爱好之一。虽然他职业生涯始于执业律师（按每小时15美元收费），但查理在30多岁时通过设计并在洛杉矶附近建造了五个公寓项目，赚到了第一笔真正的钱。同时，他设计了自己至今仍然居住的房子——那是55年前的事了。（像我一样，如果查理在环境中感到快乐，就无法被挪动。）近年来，查理在斯坦福大学和密歇根大学设计了大型宿舍综合体，如今，91岁高龄的他仍在进行另一个重大项目。

原文

What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today — some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.

然而，在我看来，查理最重要的建筑成就是设计了今天的伯克希尔。他给我的蓝图很简单：忘掉你所知道的关于以极好价格购买公平企业的知识；相反，要以公平价格购买极好的企业。

原文

From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most

拥有成功企业的家族在考虑出售时，有多种选择。通常，最好的选择是什么也不做。生活中，有些事比拥有一家自己非常了解的成功企业更糟糕。但按兵不动很少得到华尔街的推荐。（别问理发师你是否需要理发。）

原文

Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)

当家族中一方想卖而另一方想继续经营时，公开上市通常是有意义的。但是，当所有者希望完全套现时，他们通常会考虑两条路径中的一条。

原文

When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.

第一条是出售给一个竞争对手，对方正垂涎于从两家公司合并中榨取“协同效应”的可能性。这种买家 invariably 考虑的是解雇卖家的大量员工，正是这些人帮助所有者建立了他的企业。然而，一位有心的所有者——这样的所有者大有人在——通常不想让他长期共事的伙伴们悲伤地唱起那首古老的乡村歌曲：“她得到了金矿，我得到了 shaft。”

原文

The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however — and there are plenty of them — usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “She got the goldmine, I got the shaft.”

对卖家而言的第二个选择是华尔街买家。多年来，这些买家准确地自称“杠杆收购公司”。当这个术语在1990年代早期名声变臭时——还记得RJR和《门口的野蛮人》吗？——这些买家匆忙地将自己重新贴上“私募股权”的标签。

原文

The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s — remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? — these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”

名字可能变了，但仅此而已：在几乎所有私募股权收购中，股权被戏剧性地减少，债务则层层堆积。事实上，私募股权买家向卖家提供的价格，部分取决于买家评估能在被收购公司身上放置的最大债务金额。

原文

The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.

后来，如果事情顺利，股权开始积累，杠杆收购公司通常会寻求通过新的借款再次加杠杆。然后，他们通常会用部分收益支付一笔巨额股息，这会使股权急剧下降，有时甚至变为负值。

原文

Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.

事实上，“股权”对许多私募股权买家来说是个脏话；他们热爱的是债务。而且，因为目前债务如此便宜，这些买家常常能支付高价。之后，这笔生意会被转售，通常卖给另一个杠杆买家。实际上，这家企业变成了一件商品。

原文

In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.

对于那些希望出售的企业主，伯克希尔提供了第三种选择：一个永久的家，在这里公司的员工和文化将被保留（尽管偶尔会需要管理层变动）。除此之外，我们收购的任何企业都戏剧性地增强了其财务实力和增长能力。它与银行和华尔街分析师打交道的日子也永远的结束了。

原文

Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.

一些卖家不关心这些事情。但是，当卖家在意时，伯克希尔没有多少竞争对手。

原文

Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.

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有时专家们建议伯克希尔分拆其某些业务。这些建议毫无意义。我们的公司作为伯克希尔的一部分比作为独立实体更有价值。一个原因是我们能够即时、无需纳税地将资金在企业之间或新业务中转移。此外，如果业务被分离，某些成本会全部或部分地重复。这里是最明显的例子：伯克希尔为其单一董事会承担的名义成本很低；如果我们几十家子公司被分拆，董事会的总成本将飙升。监管和行政开支也会同样飙升。

原文

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Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.

最后，有时子公司A会因为拥有子公司B而享有重要的税收效率。例如，我们公用事业公司可获得的某些税收抵免目前之所以能够实现，只是因为我们从伯克希尔的其他业务中产生了巨额的应税收入。这给了伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司在开发风能和太阳能项目方面，相对于大多数公共事业公司一个主要的优势。

原文

Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.

投资银行家们，因为他们拿钱是为了促成交易，不断地敦促收购方为公开持有的企业支付高于市场价20%到50%的溢价。银行家告诉买方，溢价是合理的，因为“控制权价值”以及收购方CEO掌权后将发生的奇妙事情。（哪个渴望收购的经理会质疑那个说法呢？）

原文

Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge that assertion?)

几年后，银行家们——一脸严肃——再次出现，同样认真地敦促分拆早些时候收购的业务，以“释放股东价值”。当然，分拆使控股公司失去了其所谓的“控制权价值”，却没有得到任何补偿。银行家解释说，分拆后的公司将会蓬勃发展，因为它的管理层将更具创业精神，摆脱了母公司令人窒息的官僚机构。（对于之前我们看到的那位才华横溢的CEO来说，仅此而已。）

原文

A few years later, bankers — bearing straight faces — again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)

如果剥离公司后来希望重新收购被分拆的业务，它很可能再次被其银行家敦促为这个特权支付一笔高昂的“控制权”溢价。（银行界这种思维上的“灵活性”催生了一句谚语：往往是费用导致交易，而不是交易导致费用。）

原文

If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)

当然，有可能有一天，监管机构会要求伯克希尔进行分拆或出售。伯克希尔曾在1979年进行过一次这样的分拆，当时针对银行控股公司的新规迫使我们剥离了我们在伊利诺伊州罗克福德拥有的一家银行。

原文

It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.

然而，自愿分拆对我们来说毫无意义：我们会失去控制权价值、资本配置的灵活性，以及在某些情况下的重要税收优势。考虑到伯克希尔所有权带来的运营和财务优势，精妙地运营我们子公司的CEO们在运营一家分拆出来的公司时，很难保持同样的效率。此外，一旦分离，母公司和分拆出来的业务，其成本可能比合并时高出不少。

原文

Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire’s ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.

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在我离开分拆这个话题之前，让我们看看从前面提到的多元化公司LTV那里学到的一课。我在这里做个总结，但喜欢精彩金融故事的人应该去读一读1982年10月号《D杂志》上关于吉米·林的文章。请上网查查。

原文

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Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let’s look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I’ll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of D Magazine. Look it up on the Internet.

通过一系列眼花缭乱的企业操作，林在短短两年内将LTV的销售额从1965年的仅3600万美元提升到了《财富》500强的第14位。应该指出，林从未展示过任何管理技能。但查理很久以前告诉我，永远不要低估一个高估自己的人。而在这一方面，林无人能及。

原文

Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.

林的策略，他称之为“项目重新部署”，是收购一家大公司，然后部分分拆其各个部门。在LTV 1966年的年报中，他解释了随后会发生的奇迹：“最重要的是，收购必须满足2加2等于5（或6）的公式。”媒体、公众和华尔街都喜欢这种论调。

原文

Ling’s strategy, which he labeled “project redeployment,” was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: “Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.” The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.

1967年，林收购了Wilson & Co.，一家大型肉类加工企业，同时也涉足高尔夫设备和制药业。不久之后，他将母公司分拆成三家企业：Wilson & Co.（肉类加工）、Wilson Sporting Goods 和 Wilson Pharmaceuticals，每一家都将被部分分拆。这些公司很快在华尔街被称为“肉丸”、“高尔夫球”和“药丸”。

原文

In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.

此后不久，情况变得明朗，就像伊卡洛斯一样，林飞得太靠近太阳了。到1970年代初，林的帝国在融化，而他本人也被从LTV分拆出去……也就是说，被解雇了。

原文

Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling’s empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV … that is, fired.

金融市场会周期性地脱离现实——你可以指望这一点。会出现更多的吉米·林。他们看起来和听起来都很权威。媒体会关注他们的每一句话。银行家们会争夺他们的业务。他们说的话最近“奏效了”。他们的早期追随者会觉得自己非常聪明。我们的建议是：不管他们说什么，永远记住2+2总是等于4。当有人告诉你这个算术有多过时时——拉上钱包拉链，去度个假，几年后再回来以便宜的价格买股票。

原文

Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality — you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have “worked.” Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is ---zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.

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今天，伯克希尔拥有 (1) 一组无与伦比的企业，其中大部分目前享有有利的经济前景；(2) 一批杰出的管理者，他们中的绝大多数对其运营的子公司和伯克希尔都异常忠诚；(3) 非凡的盈利多样性、首屈一指的财务实力和充裕的流动性，我们将在所有情况下保持这些；(4) 在许多考虑出售其业务的企业主和管理者中，我们是首选对象；(5) 与前一点相关，我们拥有一种在诸多方面与大多数大公司不同的文化，这是我们花费50年时间建立起来的，现在已经坚如磐石。

原文

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Today Berkshire possesses (1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire; (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under all circumstances; (4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and (5) in a point related to the preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50 years to develop and that is now rock-solid.

这些优势为我们提供了一个继续发展的绝佳基础。

原文

These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.

伯克希尔的未来50年

现在让我们看看前方的道路。请记住，如果我50年前试图预测未来，我的一些预言会差之千里。有了这个警告，我将告诉你们，如果今天我的家人问我伯克希尔的未来，我会对他们说什么。

原文

The Next 50 Years at Berkshire

Now let’s take a look at the road ahead. Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far off the mark. With that warning, I will tell you what I would say to my family today if they asked me about Berkshire’s future.

  • 首先，也是绝对最重要的，我相信，对于耐心的伯克希尔股东来说，发生永久性资本损失的可能性，在所有单一公司投资中是最低的。这是因为我们的每股内在商业价值几乎肯定会随着时间的推移而增长。
原文
  • First and definitely foremost, I believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for patient Berkshire shareholders is as low as can be found among single-company investments. That’s because our per-share intrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over time.

然而，这个令人愉快的预测伴随着一个重要的警告：如果投资者买入伯克希尔股票的价格异常高——比如说，接近账面价值的两倍，伯克希尔的股票偶尔达到过这个水平——那么投资者可能需要很多年才能实现盈利。换句话说，如果以高价格买入，一项稳健的投资可能会变成一项轻率的投机。伯克希尔也不能免于这个真理。

原文

This cheery prediction comes, however, with an important caution: If an investor’s entry point into Berkshire stock is unusually high — at a price, say, approaching double book value, which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached — it may well be many years before the investor can realize a profit. In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash speculation if it is bought at an elevated price. Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.

然而，如果投资者以略高于公司回购股票的价格买入伯克希尔的股票，应在合理时间内产生收益。伯克希尔的董事们只会在他们认为价格远低于内在价值时授权回购。（在我们看来，这是回购的一个关键标准，但其他管理层经常忽视。）

原文

Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price modestly above the level at which the company would repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a reasonable period of time. Berkshire’s directors will only authorize repurchases at a price they believe to be well below intrinsic value. (In our view, that is an essential criterion for repurchases that is often ignored by other managements.)

对于那些计划在购买后一两年内出售的投资者，无论买入价格如何，我无法提供任何保证。在这样短的时间内，整体股票市场的波动对你的投资结果的影响，很可能远大于你持有的伯克希尔股票内在价值的同期变化。正如本·格雷厄姆几十年前所说：“短期来看，市场是一台投票机；长期来看，它是一台称重机。”偶尔，投资者的投票决定——无论是业余投资者还是专业人士——都近乎疯狂。

原文

For those investors who plan to sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no assurances, whatever the entry price. Movements of the general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely be far more important in determining your results than the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades ago: “In the short-term the market is a voting machine; in the long-run it acts as a weighing machine.” Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors — amateurs and professionals alike — border on lunacy.

由于我不知道如何可靠地预测市场走向，我建议你只有在预期持有至少五年的情况下才购买伯克希尔股票。寻求短期利润的人应该去别处看看。

原文

Since I know of no way to reliably predict market movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only if you expect to hold them for at least five years. Those who seek short-term profits should look elsewhere.

另一个警告：伯克希尔的股票不应使用借来的钱购买。自1965年以来，我们的股价曾有三次从高点下跌约50%。总有一天，类似这样的跌幅会再次发生，没人知道何时。伯克希尔几乎肯定是一个令人满意的长期持有物。但对于使用杠杆的投机者来说，它可能是一个灾难性的选择。

原文

Another warning: Berkshire shares should not be purchased with borrowed money. There have been three times since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high point. Someday, something close to this kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when. Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for investors. But it could well be a disastrous choice for speculators employing leverage.

  • 我相信，任何导致伯克希尔出现财务问题的可能性在本质上为零。我们将始终为千年一遇的洪水做好准备；事实上，如果它真的发生，我们将向毫无准备的人出售救生衣。在2008-2009年的金融危机中，伯克希尔扮演了重要的“第一响应者”角色，此后我们使资产负债表和盈利能力的强度翻了一番多。你们的公司是美国商业的直布罗陀，并将继续保持。
原文
  • I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is essentially zero. We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.

财务持久力要求一家公司在任何情况下都要保持三项优势：(1) 庞大而可靠的盈利流；(2) 大量的流动资产；(3) 没有重大的近期现金需求。忽视最后一项必要条件是导致公司遭遇意外问题的常见原因：盈利公司的CEO们往往认为，无论到期债务有多大，他们总能偿还。在2008-2009年，许多管理层才意识到这种心态有多么危险。

原文

Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.

以下是我们将如何始终坚守这三个要点。首先，我们的盈利流是巨大的，并且来自众多不同的企业。我们的股东现在拥有许多具有持久竞争优势的大公司，我们未来还会收购更多。我们的多元化保证了伯克希尔的持续盈利能力，即使一场灾难导致保险损失远超以往任何经验。

原文

Here’s how we will always stand on the three essentials. First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array of businesses. Our shareholders now own many large companies that have durable competitive advantages, and we will acquire more of those in the future. Our diversification assures Berkshire’s continued profitability, even if a catastrophe causes insurance losses that far exceed any previously experienced.

其次是现金。在健康的业务中，现金有时被视为需要最小化的东西——一种非生产性资产，拖累着股本回报率等指标。然而，现金之于企业，犹如氧气之于个人：平时从不被想起，一旦缺失，便成为唯一的牵挂。

原文

Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized — as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag on such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.

美国企业在2008年提供了一个案例研究。那年9月，许多长期繁荣的公司突然担心未来几天他们的支票会不会被退票。一夜之间，他们的财务氧气消失了。

原文

American business provided a case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many long-prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their checks would bounce in the days ahead. Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.

在伯克希尔，我们的“呼吸”从未中断。事实上，在9月底到10月初的三周时间里，我们向美国企业提供了156亿美元的新资金。

原文

At Berkshire, our “breathing” went uninterrupted. Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to American businesses.

我们能够这样做，是因为我们总是持有至少200亿美元——通常远多于这个数字——的现金等价物。我们指的就是美国国库券，而不是那些声称能提供流动性、也确实能在非危急时刻提供流动性，但在真正需要时却无法兑现的其他现金替代品。当国库券到期时，只有现金是法定货币。离家出行，别忘了带现金。

原文

We could do that because we always maintain at least $20 billion — and usually far more — in cash equivalents. And by that we mean U.S. Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so, except when it is truly needed. When bills come due, only cash is legal tender. Don’t leave home without it.

最后——回到第三点——我们永远不会从事可能导致突然需要大量资金的运营或投资行为。这意味着我们不会让伯克希尔暴露在大量的短期债务到期之下，也不会签订可能要求追加大量抵押品的衍生品合同或其他业务安排。

原文

Finally — getting to our third point — we will never engage in operating or investment practices that can result in sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose Berkshire to short-term debt maturities of size nor enter into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that could require large collateral calls.

几年前，我们参与了一些我们认为定价严重错误且只有少量抵押要求的衍生品合约。这些合约被证明利润丰厚。然而，最近，新签的衍生品合约要求全额抵押。这终止了我们对衍生品的兴趣，无论它们可能提供多大的利润潜力。我们已经好几年没有签订这些合约了，除了在我们的公用事业业务中为运营目的所需的少数合约。

原文

Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.

此外，我们不会签发允许保户自行选择退保获取现金价值的保险合同。许多人寿保险产品包含赎回条款，使其在极度恐慌时期容易遭受“挤兑”。然而，这类合同在我们所在的财产意外险领域并不存在。如果我们的保费规模收缩，我们的浮存金会减少——但速度会非常缓慢。

原文

Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline — but only at a very slow pace.

我们保持保守主义的原因——这在某些人看来可能极端——是因为人们偶尔会恐慌是完全可以预测的，但何时会发生这种恐慌则完全不可预测。尽管几乎所有的日子都相对平静，但明天总是充满不确定性。（我在1941年12月6日或2001年9月10日并没有感到特别的恐惧。）如果你无法预测明天会带来什么，你就必须为可能发生的一切做好准备。

原文

The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will happen. Though practically all days are relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain. (I felt no special apprehension on December 6, 1941 or September 10, 2001.) And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.

一位64岁并计划在65岁退休的CEO，在评估某一年发生可能性极小的风险时，可能有他自己特殊的考量。事实上，他可能在99%的情况下都是“对的”。但这些概率对我们没有吸引力。我们绝不会用你们托付给我们的资金去玩金融俄罗斯轮盘赌，即使那把隐喻性的枪有100个弹膛，只装一颗子弹。在我们看来，为了追求你想要的东西而冒险失去你需要的东西，是疯狂的。

原文

A CEO who is 64 and plans to retire at 65 may have his own special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny chance of happening in a given year. He may, in fact, be “right” 99% of the time. Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us. We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds you’ve entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100 chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to risk losing what you need in pursuing what you simply desire.

  • 尽管我们秉持保守主义，但我认为我们能够每年提升伯克希尔的基本每股盈利能力。这并不意味着营业利润每年都会增长——远非如此。美国经济会有潮起潮落——但总体上是上涨的——当经济疲软时，我们当前的盈利也会随之疲软。但我们将继续取得有机增长，进行补强收购，并进入新领域。因此，我相信伯克希尔每年都会增加其基础盈利能力。
原文
  • Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year to build the underlying per-share earning power of Berkshire. That does not mean operating earnings will increase each year — far from it. The U.S. economy will ebb and flow — though mostly flow — and, when it weakens, so will our current earnings. But we will continue to achieve organic gains, make bolt-on acquisitions and enter new fields. I believe, therefore, that Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.

在某些年份，增长会是显著的，而在其他年份则会较小。市场、竞争和机遇将决定我们何时遇到机会。在整个过程中，凭借我们现在拥有的稳固业务组合以及我们将要收购的新公司，伯克希尔将不断前进。此外，在大多数年份，我们国家的经济将为商业提供强大的顺风。我们很幸运能以美国为主场。

原文

In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, competition, and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are blessed to have the United States as our home field.

  • 坏消息是，伯克希尔的长期收益——以百分比衡量，而非以美元计——不可能引人注目，并且远不及过去50年所取得的成就。数字已经变得太大了。我认为伯克希尔的表现将超过美国公司的平均水平，但我们的优势（如果有的话）不会很大。
原文
  • The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains — measured by percentages, not by dollars — cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great.

最终——很可能在十年到二十年之后——伯克希尔的盈利和资本资源将达到一个水平，使得管理层无法明智地将所有公司盈利进行再投资。届时，我们的董事需要决定分配超额盈利的最佳方式是分红、股票回购还是两者兼用。如果伯克希尔股价低于其内在商业价值，大规模回购几乎肯定是最佳选择。你们可以放心，你们的董事们会做出正确的决定。

原文

Eventually — probably between ten and twenty years from now — Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings. At that time our directors will need to determine whether the best method to distribute the excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchases or both. If Berkshire shares are selling below intrinsic business value, massive repurchases will almost certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your directors will make the right decision.

  • 没有哪家公司会比伯克希尔更以股东为中心。30多年来，我们每年都会重申我们的股东原则（见第117页），总是从这一条开始：“虽然我们的组织形式是公司，但我们的态度是合伙关系。”这份与你们的契约坚如磐石。
原文
  • No company will be more shareholder-minded than Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have annually reaffirmed our Shareholder Principles (see page 117), always leading off with: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” This covenant with you is etched in stone.

我们拥有一个知识极其渊博、以商业为导向的董事会，随时准备履行这一合伙关系的承诺。没有人是为了钱而担任这份工作：在几乎其他任何地方都不存在的安排下，我们的董事只领取象征性的报酬。他们的回报来自于持有伯克希尔股票，以及作为一家重要企业的优秀管家所带来的满足感。

原文

We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise of partnership. None took the job for the money: In an arrangement almost non-existent elsewhere, our directors are paid only token fees. They receive their rewards instead through ownership of Berkshire shares and the satisfaction that comes from being good stewards of an important enterprise.

他们及其家族持有的股份——在许多情况下价值非常可观——都是在市场上购买的（而非通过期权或赠予获得）。此外，与几乎所有其他大型上市公司不同，我们不购买董事和高管责任保险。在伯克希尔，董事们与你们感同身受。

原文

The shares that they and their families own — which, in many cases, are worth very substantial sums — were purchased in the market (rather than their materializing through options or grants). In addition, unlike almost all other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. At Berkshire, directors walk in your shoes.

为了进一步确保我们文化的延续，我建议由我的儿子霍华德接替我担任非执行董事长。我这样做的唯一理由是，万一不幸聘用了错误的CEO，而董事长需要采取有力行动时，可以更容易地做出变动。我可以向你们保证，伯克希尔出现这个问题的概率非常低——可能和任何上市公司一样低。但在我曾担任董事的19家上市公司中，我看到了在一位平庸的CEO同时也是董事长的情况下，替换他有多么困难（这种事最终通常能办成，但几乎总是太晚了）。

原文

To further ensure continuation of our culture, I have suggested that my son, Howard, succeed me as a non-executive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is to make change easier if the wrong CEO should ever be employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move forcefully. I can assure you that this problem has a very low probability of arising at Berkshire — likely as low as at any public company. In my service on the boards of nineteen public companies, however, I’ve seen how hard it is to replace a mediocre CEO if that person is also Chairman. (The deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.)

如果当选，霍华德将不领取报酬，并且在工作中投入的时间不会超过所有董事所需的时间。他只是一个安全阀，任何董事如果对CEO有疑虑，并想了解其他董事是否也表达过类似担忧，都可以去找他。如果多位董事表示担忧，霍华德的董事长身份将使得此事能够得到迅速和恰当的处理。

原文

If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at the job other than that required of all directors. He will simply be a safety valve to whom any director can go if he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other directors are expressing doubts as well. Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard’s chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and properly addressed.

  • 选择合适的CEO至关重要，这也是伯克希尔董事会会议上花费大量时间的议题。管理伯克希尔主要是一项资本配置的工作，同时还要选择和留住杰出的经理人来领导我们的运营子公司。显然，这项工作还包括在需要时更换子公司的CEO。这些职责要求伯克希尔的CEO必须是一个理性、冷静、果断的人，对商业有广泛的理解，并对人类行为有深刻的洞察力。同样重要的是，他必须知道自己的极限。（正如IBM的老托马斯·沃森所说：“我不是天才，但我在某些方面很聪明，并且我待在这些方面。”）
原文
  • Choosing the right CEO is all-important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily a job of capital allocation, coupled with the selection and retention of outstanding managers to captain our operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires the replacement of a subsidiary’s CEO when that is called for. These duties require Berkshire’s CEO to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior. It’s important as well that he knows his limits. (As Tom Watson, Sr. of IBM said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.”)

品格至关重要：伯克希尔的CEO必须全心全意为公司，而不是为自己。（我这里使用男性代词是为了避免措辞尴尬，但性别绝不应决定谁成为CEO。）他不可避免地会赚到远超任何可能需要的金钱。但重要的是，既非自负也非贪婪驱使他去追求与那些薪酬最丰厚的同行看齐，即使他的成就远超他们。CEO的行为会对下属经理产生巨大影响：如果下属们清楚股东利益对他来说是至高无上的，那么他们几乎都会（除极少数例外）也接受这种思维方式。

原文

Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be “all in” for the company, not for himself. (I’m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can’t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it’s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO’s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it’s clear to them that shareholders’ interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking.

我的继任者还需要一种特殊的力量：能够抵御商业衰败的ABC——傲慢、官僚主义和自满。当这些企业癌症发生转移时，即使最强大的公司也可能动摇。证明这一点的例子不胜枚举，但为了维持友谊，我只回顾一下过去的案例。

原文

My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past.

在其辉煌岁月里，通用汽车、IBM、西尔斯·罗巴克和美国钢铁公司各自雄踞庞大的行业之巅。它们的力量看似不可动摇。但我上面谴责的破坏性行为最终导致它们都跌落到了其CEO和董事们不久前还认为不可能的深渊。它们昔日的财务实力和历史盈利水平证明毫无防御能力。

原文

In their glory days, General Motors, IBM, Sears Roebuck and U.S. Steel sat atop huge industries. Their strengths seemed unassailable. But the destructive behavior I deplored above eventually led each of them to fall to depths that their CEOs and directors had not long before thought impossible. Their one-time financial strength and their historical earning power proved no defense.

只有一位警惕而坚定的CEO才能在伯克希尔不断壮大的过程中抵御这些削弱性的力量。他必须永远记住查理的恳求：“告诉我我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不去那里。”如果我们非经济方面的价值观丢失了，伯克希尔的许多经济价值也会随之崩塌。“高层基调”将是维持伯克希尔特殊文化的关键。

原文

Only a vigilant and determined CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire grows ever larger. He must never forget Charlie’s plea: “Tell me where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” If our noneconomic values were to be lost, much of Berkshire’s economic value would collapse as well. “Tone at the top” will be key to maintaining Berkshire’s special culture.

幸运的是，我们未来CEO成功所需的结构已经牢固建立。伯克希尔目前存在的非凡授权是官僚主义的理想解药。在运营意义上，伯克希尔不是一家巨型公司，而是一系列大公司的集合。在总部，我们从来没有过委员会，也从未要求子公司提交预算（尽管许多子公司将其作为重要的内部工具）。我们没有法律部门，也没有其他公司视为理所当然的部门：人力资源、公共关系、投资者关系、战略、收购，等等。

原文

Fortunately, the structure our future CEOs will need to be successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire is not a giant company but rather a collection of large companies. At headquarters, we have never had a committee nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets (though many use them as an important internal tool). We don’t have a legal office nor departments that other companies take for granted: human relations, public relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name it.

当然，我们有一个活跃的审计职能；当个彻头彻尾的傻瓜可不行。然而，在非同寻常的程度上，我们信任我们的经理人以敏锐的管家精神来运营他们的业务。毕竟，在我们收购他们企业之前，他们恰恰就是这样做的。此外，除了极少数例外，我们的信任比一系列指令、无休止的审查和层层官僚机构能带来更好的结果。查理和我会尽量以我们希望被对待的方式来与我们的经理人互动，如果我们处在他们的位置上。

原文

We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a dammed fool. To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operations with a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired their businesses. With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed.

  • 我们的董事认为，我们未来的CEO应从伯克希尔董事会已熟知的内部候选人中选拔。我们的董事也认为，新任CEO应相对年轻，以便能长期任职。如果CEO的平均任期大大超过十年，伯克希尔的运营效果将最佳。（老狗学不会新把戏。）他们也不太可能在65岁退休（或者你注意到了吗？）。
原文
  • Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to know well. Our directors also believe that an incoming CEO should be relatively young, so that he or she can have a long run in the job. Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over ten years at the helm. (It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.) And they are not likely to retire at 65 either (or have you noticed?).

在伯克希尔的业务收购和大规模定制投资活动中，我们的交易对手熟悉并信任伯克希尔的CEO至关重要。建立这种信任并巩固关系需要时间。但其回报可能是巨大的。

原文

In both Berkshire’s business acquisitions and large, tailored investment moves, it is important that our counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with Berkshire’s CEO. Developing confidence of that sort and cementing relationships takes time. The payoff, though, can be huge.

董事会和我都相信，我们现在已经找到了接替我担任CEO的合适人选——一位准备在我去世或卸任后第二天就接手工作的继任者。在某些重要方面，这个人会做得比我更好。

原文

Both the board and I believe we now have the right person to succeed me as CEO — a successor ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down. In certain important respects, this person will do a better job than I am doing.

  • 投资将始终对伯克希尔至关重要，并将由几位专家负责。他们将向CEO汇报，因为他们的投资决策，在广义上，需要与伯克希尔的运营和收购计划相协调。但总体而言，我们的投资经理将享有极大的自主权。在这方面，我们在未来几十年也处于良好状态。托德·库姆斯和泰德·韦施勒，每人都已在伯克希尔的投资团队中工作了数年，他们在各方面都是一流的，并且能在评估收购时特别帮助到CEO。
原文
  • Investments will always be of great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several specialists. They will report to the CEO because their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment managers will enjoy great autonomy. In this area, too, we are in fine shape for decades to come. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, each of whom has spent several years on Berkshire’s investment team, are first-rate in all respects and can be of particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.

总而言之，在查理和我离开舞台之后，伯克希尔处于理想的位置。我们已有合适的人在位——合适的董事、经理以及这些经理的潜在继任者。此外，我们的文化已深深植根于他们之中。我们的体系也具有再生能力。在很大程度上，好的和坏的文化都会自我选择以延续自身。出于非常好的理由，具有与我们相似价值观的企业主和运营经理将继续被伯克希尔这个独一无二且永久的家园所吸引。

原文

All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right people in place — the right directors, managers and prospective successors to those managers. Our culture, furthermore, is embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative. To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves. For very good reasons, business owners and operating managers with values similar to ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a one-of-a-kind and permanent home.

  • 如果我不向另一个使伯克希尔与众不同的关键群体——我们的股东——致敬，那将是我的失职。伯克希尔真正拥有一个与任何其他巨头公司都不同的股东基础。去年年度会议上发生的事戏剧性地证明了这一点，当时股东们被提交了一份代理决议：

    决议：鉴于公司拥有超过其需要的资金，且鉴于所有者（不像沃伦）并非数十亿富翁，董事会应考虑就股份支付有意义的年度股息。

原文

  • I would be remiss if I didn’t salute another key constituency that makes Berkshire special: our shareholders. Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in spades at last year’s annual meeting, where the shareholders were offered a proxy resolution:

    RESOLVED: Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs and since the owners unlike Warren are not multi billionaires, the board shall consider paying a meaningful annual dividend on the shares.

提出该决议的股东从未出席年会，因此他的动议并未被正式提出。尽管如此，代理投票已经被统计出来，结果发人深省。

原文

The sponsoring shareholder of that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes had been tallied, and they were enlightening.

毫不意外，A类股——由相对较少的股东持有，每人拥有巨大的经济利益——以89比1的比率对股息问题投了“反对”票。

原文

Not surprisingly, the A shares — owned by relatively few shareholders, each with a large economic interest — voted “no” on the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.

引人注目的投票来自我们的B类股东。他们的人数达数十万——甚至可能接近一百万——他们投了660,759,855票“反对”，13,927,026票“赞成”，比率约为47比1。

原文

The remarkable vote was that of our B shareholders. They number in the hundreds of thousands — perhaps even totaling one million — and they voted 660,759,855 “no” and 13,927,026 “yes,” a ratio of about 47 to 1.

我们的董事建议投“反对”票，但公司并未以其他方式试图影响股东。尽管如此，98%的投票股份实际上在说：“不要给我们分红，而是将所有盈利进行再投资。”我们的合伙人——无论大小——如此认同我们的管理哲学，既令人瞩目，也令人欣慰。

原文

Our directors recommended a “no” vote but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares voting said, in effect, “Don’t send us a dividend but instead reinvest all of the earnings.” To have our fellow owners — large and small — be so in sync with our managerial philosophy is both remarkable and rewarding.

我是一个幸运的人，能有你们作为合伙人。

原文

I am a lucky fellow to have you as partners.

沃伦·E·巴菲特

原文

Warren E. Buffett

副董事长寄语——过去与未来

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东们：

原文

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts — Past and Future

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

我密切观察了伯克希尔在沃伦·巴菲特领导下取得非凡成功的50年历史。现在，似乎应该由我独立地补充他可能做出的任何庆祝性评论。我将尝试做五件事。

原文

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

  1. 描述导致一家小型、无法修复且注定失败的纺织大宗商品企业，蜕变为现在强大伯克希尔的管理体系和政策，
  2. 解释这些管理体系和政策是如何产生的，
  3. 在一定程度上解释伯克希尔为何如此成功，
  4. 预测如果巴菲特不久后离任，异常良好的结果是否能够持续，
  5. 考虑伯克希尔过去50年的辉煌成就，是否具有可能在其他地方证明有用的启示。
原文
  1. Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,
  2. Explain how the management system and policies came into being,
  3. Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,
  4. Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and
  5. Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔的管理体系和政策（在此统称为“伯克希尔体系”）很早就已确立，描述如下：

原文

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

  1. 伯克希尔将是一个分散型的多元化企业，只回避那些它无法做出有用预测的活动。
  2. 其母公司将几乎完全通过单独注册的子公司开展业务，这些子公司的CEO将拥有非常极端的自主权。
  3. 集团公司总部几乎空无一物，只有一个包含董事长、CFO和几个主要协助CFO进行审计、内部控制等工作的助理的小型办公室。
  4. 伯克希尔的子公司将始终包括重要的意外险保险公司。作为一个整体，这些保险公司预计将在适当时候产生可靠的承保利润，同时为投资产生可观的“浮存金”（来自未付的保险负债）。
  5. 不会建立显著的、全公司范围的人事系统、股票期权系统、其他激励系统、退休系统等，因为各子公司将有自己的系统，通常各不相同。
  6. 伯克希尔的董事长将为自己保留少数活动。
    1. 他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，这些投资通常存放在伯克希尔的意外险保险公司中。
    2. 他将选择所有重要子公司的CEO，确定他们的薪酬，并从每人那里获得一份关于在突然需要时接任者的私人推荐。
    3. 在子公司增强了其竞争优势之后，他将部署这些子公司不需要的大部分现金，理想的部署是使用这些现金收购新的子公司。
    4. 他将使自己迅速可被任何子公司的CEO联系（几乎任何想要的联系），并且几乎不需要额外的联系。
    5. 他将撰写一封长而合乎逻辑且有用的信函，纳入他的年度报告中，设计成如果他只是一个被动股东所希望看到的样子，并将在年度股东大会上花费数小时回答问题。
    6. 他将努力成为某种文化中的典范，这种文化将长期为顾客、股东和其他相关人员良好服务，无论在他离开之前还是之后。
    7. 他的首要任务是留出大量时间进行安静的阅读和思考，特别是可能促进他决心学习的东西，无论他变得多老；以及
    8. 他还会花大量时间热情地欣赏他人所取得的成就。
  7. 新的子公司通常用现金购买，而不是新发行的股票。
  8. 只要每一美元留存收益能为股东创造超过一美元的市场价值，伯克希尔就不会支付股息。
  9. 在收购新的子公司时，伯克希尔会寻求为一个董事长能够相当好地理解的好企业支付一个公平的价格。伯克希尔还希望有一位优秀的CEO在位，期望他能长期留任，并在不需要总部帮助的情况下管理良好。
  10. 在选择子公司的CEO时，伯克希尔将努力确保其值得信赖、有技能、有精力、热爱其所处的业务和环境。
  11. 作为一项重要的优先行为准则，伯克希尔几乎从不出售子公司。
  12. 伯克希尔几乎从不将一家子公司的CEO调动到另一家不相关的子公司。
  13. 伯克希尔永远不会仅仅因为年龄而强迫子公司的CEO退休。
  14. 伯克希尔将保持较少的未偿债务，因为它试图保持 (i) 在所有条件下几乎完美的信用评级，以及 (ii) 在出现不寻常机会时，易于获得的现金和信贷以进行部署。
  15. 伯克希尔将始终对潜在的大企业卖家保持用户友好。此类业务的要约将得到迅速关注。如果要约未导致交易，除了董事长和伯克希尔的一两个人之外，没有人会知道此事。他们绝不会向外界透露。
原文
  1. Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.
  2. Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.
  3. There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.
  4. Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.
  5. There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.
  6. Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.
    1. He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.
    2. He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.
    3. He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.
    4. He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.
    5. He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.
    6. He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.
    7. His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and
    8. He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.
  7. New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.
  8. Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.
  9. In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.
  10. In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.
  11. As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.
  12. Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.
  13. Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.
  14. Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.
  15. Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

伯克希尔体系的要素及其总体规模都相当不寻常。我所知的任何其他大型公司都没有实施此类要素的一半。

原文

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.

伯克希尔是如何形成如此与众不同的企业个性的呢？

原文

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?

嗯，巴菲特即使在年仅34岁时，就控制了伯克希尔大约45%的股份，并受到所有其他大股东的完全信任。他可以安装任何他想要的体系。他确实这么做了，创建了伯克希尔体系。

原文

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.

几乎每个要素都是因为巴菲特相信，在他领导下，这将有助于最大化伯克希尔的成就。他并不是要创建一个适用于其他所有公司的一体化系统。事实上，伯克希尔的子公司并不被要求在其自身运营中使用伯克希尔体系。其中一些在使用不同系统时蓬勃发展。

原文

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.

巴菲特在设计伯克希尔体系时目标是什么？

原文

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

嗯，多年来，我诊断出几个重要的主题：

原文

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

  1. 他特别希望持续最大化体系中最重要人物的理性、技能和奉献精神，从他自己开始。
  2. 他希望在各方面都实现双赢——例如，通过给予忠诚来赢得忠诚。
  3. 他希望做出能够最大化长期结果的决策，并从那些通常能长期留任并承担决策后果的决策者那里寻求这些决策。
  4. 他希望最小化总部庞大官僚机构几乎不可避免带来的负面影响。
  5. 他希望能像本·格雷厄姆教授那样，为传播所获得的智慧做出个人贡献。
原文
  1. He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.
  2. He wanted win/win results everywhere—in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.
  3. He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.
  4. He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.
  5. He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

当巴菲特发展伯克希尔体系时，他预见到了之后所有的好处吗？没有。巴菲特通过实践进化偶然发现了一些好处。但是，当他看到有用的结果时，他就加强了它们的成因。

原文

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔为何如此成功？我想到的只有四个主要因素：

原文

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well? Only four large factors occur to me:

  1. 巴菲特的建设性特质，
  2. 伯克希尔体系的建设性特质，
  3. 好运气，以及
  4. 一些股东和其他崇拜者（包括一些媒体人士）那种奇怪的、强烈的、富有感染力的忠诚。
原文
  1. The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,
  2. The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,
  3. Good luck, and
  4. The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.

我相信所有四个因素都存在并起到了作用。但重担是由建设性的特质、那种奇怪的忠诚以及它们的相互作用承担的。

原文

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

特别是，巴菲特决定将自己的活动限制在少数几种，并最大化他对这些活动的关注，并且持续这样做50年，这是一个了不得的成就。巴菲特成功的原因和罗杰·费德勒擅长网球的原因是一样的。

原文

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

实际上，巴菲特使用的是著名篮球教练约翰·伍登的致胜方法。伍登在学会将几乎所有的上场时间分配给其七名最好的球员后，赢得了最频繁的胜利。这样，对手总是面对他最好的球员，而不是第二好的。而且，通过额外的上场时间，最好的球员进步得比正常情况下更快。

原文

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

而且巴菲特比伍登更胜一筹，因为在他的情况下，技能的运用集中在一个人身上，而不是七个人，并且在50年的时间里，随着他年纪越来越大，他的技能不断提高，而不是像篮球运动员那样衰退。

原文

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

此外，通过将如此多的权力和权威集中于长期任职的重要子公司CEO手中，巴菲特也在那里创造了强大的伍登式效应。这些效应增强了CEO的技能和子公司的成就。

原文

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

然后，随着伯克希尔体系将许多经理人渴望的自主权授予众多子公司及其CEO，并且伯克希尔变得成功和知名，这些成果吸引了更多更好的子公司进入伯克希尔，也吸引了更好的CEO。

原文

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

而更好的子公司和CEO需要总部更少的关注，创造了通常所说的“良性循环”。

原文

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

伯克希尔始终将意外险公司作为重要子公司，这一做法效果如何？

原文

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

效果极佳。伯克希尔的雄心大得离谱，即便如此，它也得到了它想要的。

原文

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

意外险保险公司通常投资于普通股，其价值大致相当于其股东权益，伯克希尔的保险子公司也是如此。在过去的50年里，标普500指数产生了大约每年10%的税前回报，创造了显著的顺风。

原文

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

在巴菲特时代的早期几十年，伯克希尔保险子公司内的普通股大大跑赢了指数，正如巴菲特所预期的那样。后来，当伯克希尔股票持有量的大规模和所得税方面的考虑导致跑赢指数的部分收益逐渐变得微不足道（也许并非永远）时，其他更好的优势出现了。阿吉特·贾因从无到有创建了一个庞大的再保险业务，既产生了巨额的“浮存金”，又产生了大量的承保利润。而且，GEICO完全进入了伯克希尔，随后其市场份额翻了四倍。伯克希尔其余保险业务也大大改善，主要得益于声誉优势、承保纪律、找到并固守于良好的利基市场，以及招募和留住杰出人才。

原文

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

随后，随着伯克希尔几乎独一无二且相当可靠的企业个性及其庞大规模为人所知，其保险子公司获得并抓住了许多其他公司无法获得的、具有吸引力的购买私募发行证券的机会。这些证券中的大多数有固定期限，并产生了出色的结果。

原文

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

伯克希尔在保险领域的奇妙成果并非自然结果。通常，即使在管理得非常出色的情况下，意外险业务也是平庸业绩的制造者。这种结果用处不大。伯克希尔的更好成果是如此惊人地巨大，以至于我相信，如果巴菲特重返一个小规模起点，同时保留他的智慧并重获青春，他现在也无法重现它。

原文

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔是否因为成为一个分散的多元化企业而遭受损失？没有。运作领域的扩大使其机会有效地增加了。而且，在其他地方常见的负面影响，通过巴菲特的技能得以避免。

原文

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

为什么伯克希尔更喜欢用现金而不是自己的股票收购公司？嗯，很难用伯克希尔的股票换到和放弃的东西一样有价值的东西。

原文

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

为什么伯克希尔收购保险业务以外的公司，对伯克希尔股东而言结果如此之好，而这种收购的正常结果通常对收购方的股东不利？

原文
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