• 2015年致股东信
  • • • 致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
      • To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
      • 伯克希尔这一年
      • The Year at Berkshire
      • 内在商业价值
      • Intrinsic Business Value
      • 保险
      • Insurance
      • 金融与金融产品
      • Finance and Financial Products
      • 投资
      • Investments
      • 生产力与繁荣
      • Productivity and Prosperity
      • 重要风险
      • Important Risks
      • 年会
      • The Annual Meeting

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*

During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”

By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.

We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners — a few of them very big — but have not written those up by a penny.

Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large — and growing — unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.

The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate market- value gain — tabulated on the facing page — materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

The Year at Berkshire

Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:

• The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.

  BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.

  For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.

  • Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.

• BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies — our five most profitable non-insurance businesses — earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.

  Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.

• Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.

  Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.

  PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.

  A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers — they each handle about $9 billion for us — both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.

• With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 10¼ companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the ¼.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.

• Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.

* When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.

I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.

Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.

We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.

• Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 — that makes 13 years in a row — and increased its float. During those years, our float — money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit — grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.

  Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.

• While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.

  Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.

• Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting — bring your kids.)

  Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.

  Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.

  Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.

  Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then — very promptly — to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour — that’s the measure of productivity gains — an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.

  At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs — and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded — can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)

  We will continue to operate with extreme — indeed, almost unheard of — decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.

  Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.

• Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments — American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.

  These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

  If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us — about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.

  The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock — a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.

  Our flexibility in capital allocation — our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses — gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner — well, not exactly like manner — our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.

That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that — in real terms — is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.

Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP — and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.

America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.

Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is — to name just a few — transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.

Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us — and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.

The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy — as they should — far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want — nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)

For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

Intrinsic Business Value

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements — one of them qualitative — that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses — including insurance underwriting income — increased 2.1% to $12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax*.*

I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.

Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed $1,118 per share to the $12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)

Insurance

Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual — at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised.

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.

As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses — a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 — and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises — because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute — is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill — what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it — to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason — a huge reason — why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe — a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced — Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.

It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators — and me as well, briefly — to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him, his every action has made great sense.

When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.

No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them — and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading — right now! — and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.

GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat — an enduring one — that competitors are unable to cross.

All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned $4 billion from underwriting — about 13% of its premium volume — while increasing its float from $943 million to $9.9 billion.

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.

Here’s a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:

将此群体视为一个整体，这些公司是卓越的业务。2015年，它们平均运用了256亿美元的净有形资产，尽管持有大量超额现金且仅使用少量杠杆，但仍获得了18.4%的税后资本回报率。

当然，一项经济前景极佳的业务，如果买入价过高，也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务支付了远超净有形资产的价格，这一成本体现在我们账面上庞大的商誉和其他无形资产中。然而，总体而言，我们在该领域投入的资本获得了可观的回报。随着金霸王和精密铸件公司的加入，该集团2016年的盈利应会大幅增长。

这个群体里的公司数量太多，无法逐一评论。此外，它们的竞争对手——无论是现有的还是潜在的——都会阅读这份报告。在我们的一些业务中，如果他人知道我们的数据，我们可能会处于不利地位。因此，对于某些规模不足以影响对伯克希尔整体评估的运营子公司，我们仅披露必要的信息。不过，你仍然可以在第88-91页找到关于我们许多业务的详细信息。

金融与金融产品

我们的三家租赁和运营业务由CORT（家具）、XTRA（半挂车）和Marmon（主要是油罐车，也包括货车、多式联运罐式集装箱和起重机）运营。这些公司都是行业领导者，随着美国经济走强，它们的盈利大幅增长。在这三家公司，我们在新设备上的投资都超过了许多竞争对手，而这已经得到了回报。在实力雄厚的基础上进行交易是伯克希尔持久的优势之一。

Kevin Clayton再次为Clayton Homes（美国第二大房屋建筑商）带来了行业领先的业绩。去年，该公司售出了34,397套房屋，约占美国人购买的预制房屋的45%。相比之下，2003年伯克希尔收购该公司时，它在该领域排名第三，市场份额为14%。

预制房屋使得较低收入的公民能够实现拥有住房的美国梦：在售价15万美元或以下的新房中，约70%来自我们行业。Clayton约46%的房屋通过我们自有并运营的331家门店销售。Clayton剩余的大部分销售面向1,395家独立零售商。

Clayton运营的关键是其128亿美元的抵押贷款组合。我们发起了所有预制房屋抵押贷款的大约35%。我们抵押贷款组合中约37%来自我们的零售业务，其余主要来自独立零售商，其中一些销售我们的房屋，而另一些则只销售竞争对手的房屋。

除了Clayton，其他贷款机构来了又走。然而，凭借着伯克希尔的支持，Clayton在2008-2009年的恐慌时期，始终坚定地为购房者提供融资。事实上，在那段时期，Clayton动用了宝贵的资本，为那些不销售我们房屋的经销商提供融资。我们当时向高盛和通用电气提供的资金登上了头条；而伯克希尔悄然提供给Clayton的资金，既使成千上万的家庭得以拥有住房，也使许多非Clayton的经销商得以生存。

我们的零售门店，使用简单的语言和大号字体，持续告知购房者其他融资渠道——其中大部分来自当地银行——并始终确保获得客户已收到并阅读这些信息的确认。（我们使用的表格实际大小见第119页。）

抵押贷款的发放实践对借款人和整个社会都至关重要。毫无疑问，不负责任的住房贷款行为是导致2008年金融恐慌的主要原因，进而引发了“大衰退”。在危机爆发前的几年里，一种破坏性且常常腐败的抵押贷款创造模式盛行，其流程是：（1）某个地方的贷款发放者（例如加州）发放贷款，然后（2）迅速将其出售给某个地方的投行或商业银行（例如纽约），后者将众多抵押贷款打包，作为一系列令人眼花缭乱的复杂抵押贷款支持证券的抵押品，以便（3）出售给世界各地不知情的机构。

似乎这些罪孽还不足以造成一场混乱，富有想象力的投行有时还会炮制第二层分割融资，其价值取决于初级产品中最垃圾的部分。（当华尔街“创新”时，要小心！）在此过程中，我将这种“加倍”操作描述为要求投资者阅读数万页令人头脑麻木的文字，才能评估所提供的一只证券。

这些融资的发起人和打包商都没有承担任何风险，他们只受交易量和加价的驱动。许多住房借款人也加入了这场派对，在贷款申请上公然撒谎，而抵押贷款发放者则视而不见。自然，风险最高的信贷产生了最大的利润。圆滑的华尔街销售人员通过制造客户无法理解的产品，年复一年地赚取数百万美元。（主要评级机构是否有能力评估更复杂的结构也值得怀疑。但它们还是给这些结构评了级。）

巴尼·弗兰克，或许是恐慌期间国会中最具金融头脑的成员，最近评估了2010年的《多德-弗兰克法案》，他说：“我在实施过程中看到的一个主要弱点是，监管机构决定不对所有住宅抵押贷款实施风险自留。”如今，一些立法者和评论员继续主张贷款发放者自留1%至5%的风险，以使其利益与最终贷款人或抵押贷款担保人的利益保持一致。

在Clayton，我们的风险自留过去是，现在仍然是100%。当我们发放一笔抵押贷款时，我们会将其保留（除了少数有政府担保的贷款）。因此，当我们在授信方面犯错时，我们会付出代价——一笔巨大的代价，它远远超过了我们最初销售房屋所获得的任何利润。去年，我们不得不对8,444笔预制房屋抵押贷款进行止赎，这花费了我们1.57亿美元。

我们在2015年发放的平均贷款仅为59,942美元，这对传统的抵押贷款机构来说是微不足道的，但对我们许多低收入借款人来说却是一项艰巨的承诺。我们的买家获得了一栋体面的房屋——看看我们将在年会上展示的房屋——每月平均需要支付522美元的本金和利息。

当然，一些借款人会失业，也会发生离婚和死亡。其他人可能会因信用卡透支而陷入困境，并管理不善自己的财务。那时我们会亏钱，我们的借款人也会损失他的首付款（尽管他在居住期间的抵押贷款支付可能远低于类似住房的租金）。然而，尽管我们的借款人FICO评分和收入较低，但他们在“大衰退”期间的还款行为远优于许多由收入是我们典型借款人倍数的人组成的抵押贷款池。

我们的借款人对拥有自己住房的强烈渴望，是我们在抵押贷款组合上表现良好的原因之一。同样重要的是，我们的大部分组合是通过浮动利率债务或短期固定利率债务融资的。因此，近年来极低的短期利率为我们提供了不断扩大的利差，介于我们的利息成本和抵押贷款组合产生的收入之间（该组合为固定利率）。（顺便提一下，如果我们简单地购买长期债券并以某种短期方式为头寸融资，我们也会获得类似的利润。）

通常情况下，像我们在Clayton所做的那样，以固定利率长期放贷并以短期利率借款是危险的业务。多年来，一些重要的金融机构因此破产。然而，在伯克希尔，我们拥有一种自然的对冲，因为我们的业务始终保持着至少200亿美元的现金等价物，这些现金等价物赚取的是短期利率。更常见的是，我们的短期投资在400亿至600亿美元之间。如果我们有，比如说，600亿美元投资于0.25%或更低的利率，那么短期利率的急剧上升带来的好处将远远超过我们在为Clayton130亿美元抵押贷款组合融资时产生的更高融资成本。用银行术语来说，伯克希尔是——并且将永远是——高度资产敏感型的，因此将从利率上升中受益。

让我谈谈一个我特别引以为豪的话题，这与监管有关。大衰退导致抵押贷款发放者、服务商和打包商受到严格审查，并被处以数百亿美元的罚款和罚金。

这种审查当然也延伸到了Clayton，其抵押贷款实践在贷款发放、服务、催收、广告、合规和内部控制等方面持续受到审查和检查。在联邦层面，我们向联邦贸易委员会、住房和城市发展部以及消费者金融保护局负责。数十个州也对我们在监管。事实上，在过去两年中，各种联邦和州（来自25个州）机构对Clayton及其抵押贷款进行了65次检查和审查。结果呢？在此期间，我们的罚款总额为38,200美元，退还给客户的款项为704,678美元。此外，尽管去年我们不得不对我们2.64%的预制房屋抵押贷款进行止赎，但年底有95.4%的借款人按时还款，他们正朝着拥有一套无债务的住房迈进。

到年底，Marmon的铁路车队扩大到133,220辆，这一数字因公司于9月30日从通用电气购买了25,085节车厢而显著增加。如果我们的车队连接成一列火车，车头会在奥马哈，而守车会在缅因州的波特兰。

年底，我们97%的铁路车辆已出租，每年约有15-17%的车队需要续租。尽管“油罐车”听起来像是运载原油的容器，但我们车队中只有大约7%运输该产品；化学品和精炼石油产品是我们运输的主要物品。当火车驶过时，请注意识别我们油罐车上的UTLX或Procor标记。当你看到这个品牌时，请挺起胸膛；你拥有那辆车的一部分。

以下是该板块的盈利总结：

投资

下面列出我们年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们排除了卡夫亨氏的持仓，因为我们是控制集团的一部分，并按“权益”法核算。

*这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的计税基础；GAAP“成本”在少数情况下因GAAP规则要求的增记或减记而有所不同。 **不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。 ***根据出售合同按此金额持有。

伯克希尔有一项主要的股权投资未包含在上述表格中：我们可以在2021年9月之前的任何时候，以50亿美元购买7亿股美国银行股票。年末这些股票价值118亿美元。我们很可能在期权到期前购买它们，如果愿意，我们可以使用我们持有的50亿美元美国银行6%优先股来为这笔购买提供资金。与此同时，重要的是你要认识到，美国银行实际上是我们的第四大股权投资——并且是我们非常看好的一个。

生产力与繁荣

早些时候，我告诉过你们，我们的合作伙伴卡夫亨氏如何根除低效，从而提高每小时的产出。自1776年美国建国以来，这种进步一直是美国生活水平显著提高的秘密武器。不幸的是，“秘密”这个标签是恰当的：只有太少美国人充分理解生产力与繁荣之间的联系。为了看清这种联系，让我们首先看看美国最引人注目的例子——农业——然后再审视三个伯克希尔特有的领域。

1900年，美国的民用劳动力为2800万。其中，1100万人，占总数的40%，务农。当时的主要作物和现在一样，是玉米。约9000万英亩的土地用于玉米生产，每英亩产量为30蒲式耳，年总产量为27亿蒲式耳。

随后拖拉机出现，以及一项又一项创新，彻底改变了种植、收割、灌溉、施肥和种子质量等农业生产力的关键要素。今天，我们投入约8500万英亩用于种植玉米。然而，生产力已将每英亩产量提高到超过150蒲式耳，年产量达到130-140亿蒲式耳。农民在其他产品上也取得了类似的进展。

然而，产量的增加只是故事的一半：物质产出的大幅增加伴随着农业劳动力（“人力投入”）的急剧减少。如今大约有300万人在农场工作，仅占我们1.58亿劳动力的2%。因此，改进的农业方法使得数千万当代工人能够将他们的时间和才能用于其他努力，这种人力资源的重新配置使今天的美国人能够享受到他们在其他情况下所没有的大量非农产品和服务。

回顾这115年的跨度，很容易认识到农业创新是多么非凡的有益——不仅对农民，而且更广泛地说，对我们整个社会。如果我们扼杀了那些生产力进步，我们就不可能有接近我们今天所知道的美国。（幸运的是，马不能投票。）然而，在日常层面，那些因机器（能以远超人类效率完成常规任务）而失业的农业工人，听到关于“更大利益”的谈论，肯定觉得空洞。我们将在本节稍后探讨生产力提高的这一面。

然而，现在让我们先讲三个关于效率的故事，它们对伯克希尔的子公司产生了重大影响。类似的转型在美国商业中已司空见惯。

• 1947年，二战结束后不久，美国劳动力总计4400万。铁路行业雇用了约135万工人。当年I级铁路运输的货运吨英里总计6550亿。 到2014年，I级铁路运输了1.85万亿吨英里，增长了182%，而只雇用了18.7万名工人，自1947年以来减少了86%。（部分变化涉及客运相关员工，但大部分劳动力减少发生在货运方面）。由于生产力的惊人提高，自1947年以来，每吨英里运费经通胀调整后下降了55%，按当前美元计算，每年为托运人节省约900亿美元。 另一个惊人的数据：如果现在运输货运所需的人数与1947年相同，我们需要超过300万铁路工人来处理当前的运量。（当然，这种就业水平会大幅提高运费；因此，实际上不会有接近今天的运量被运输。）我们自己的BNSF成立于1995年，由伯灵顿北方铁路和圣塔菲铁路合并而成。1996年，合并后公司运营的第一个完整年度，由45,000名员工运输了4.11亿吨英里货物。去年，可比数据为7.02亿吨英里（增长71%）和47,000名员工（仅增长4%）。生产力的显著提高使所有者和托运人双方都受益。BNSF的安全记录也有所改善：1996年每20万工时报告受伤率为2.04，此后下降超过50%至0.95。

• 一个多世纪前，汽车被发明出来，并围绕它形成了一个为汽车和司机提供保险的行业。最初，这种业务是通过传统的保险代理机构——那种处理火灾保险的机构——来承保的。这种以代理为中心的方法包括高额的佣金和其他承保费用，消耗了约40%的保费收入。强大的地方代理机构当时掌握着主动权，因为它们代表多家保险公司，可以在谈判佣金时让一家公司与另一家公司竞争。价格联盟盛行，所有参与者都过得很好——除了消费者。 然后，美国的创造力开始发挥作用：来自伊利诺伊州梅尔纳的农民G. J. Mecherle想出了一个主意，建立一个专属的销售团队，只销售一家公司的保险产品。他的宝贝被命名为State Farm Mutual。该公司削减了佣金和费用——这使得降低价格成为可能——并迅速成为一个巨头。几十年来，State Farm一直是汽车保险和房屋保险领域无可争议的销量领先者。同样采用直销模式运营的Allstate，长期以来一直是亚军。State Farm和Allstate的承保费用率都在25%左右。 在20世纪30年代早期，另一个竞争者，联合服务汽车协会（USAA），一家类似相互公司的机构，开始以直接面向客户的方式为军官提供汽车保险。这种营销创新源于军人需要有保险能够随着他们从一个基地搬到另一个基地的需求。这对当地保险代理机构来说没什么兴趣，它们希望从永久居民那里获得稳定的续保。 USAA的直接分销方法，碰巧产生了比State Farm和Allstate更低的成本，因此为客户提供了更大的实惠。这促使USAA的员工Leo和Lillian Goodwin梦想将直销模式的目标市场扩大到军官之外。1936年，他们以10万美元的资本起家，成立了政府雇员保险公司（后来将这一冗长的名字简化为GEICO）。 1937年，GEICO第一个完整年度，做了23.8万美元的汽车保险业务。去年，GEICO做了226亿美元的业务，是USAA的两倍多。（虽然早起的鸟儿有虫吃，但第二只老鼠有奶酪吃。）GEICO在2015年的承保费用率为保费的14.7%，只有USAA一家大公司的比例更低。（GEICO与USAA一样高效，但在旨在促进增长的广告上花费了更多。） 凭借GEICO低成本所带来的价格优势，几年前该公司从Allstate手中夺取了汽车保险第二的位置就不足为奇了。GEICO也在缩小与State Farm的差距，尽管State Farm在业务量上仍遥遥领先。在2030年8月30日——我100岁生日那天——我计划宣布GEICO已经占据榜首。请在你的日历上做个标记。 GEICO雇佣了大约34,000名员工来服务其1400万保单持有人。我只能猜测，在代理系统下，服务类似数量的保单持有人需要多少劳动力。然而，我相信，这个数字至少是60,000，包括保险公司直接雇佣的人员和支持代理机构所需的人员。

• 在其电力公用事业业务中，我们的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（“BHE”）在一个不断变化的经济模型中运营。历史上，当地电力公司的生存并不取决于其效率。事实上，一个“松懈”的运营在财务上也可能做得很好。 这是因为公用事业公司通常是某种必需品的唯一供应商，并获准以能够使其在所用资本上获得规定回报率的水平定价。业内的笑话是，公用事业公司是唯一一种通过重新装修老板办公室就能自动赚更多钱的业务。一些CEO也相应地经营着公司。 这一切都在改变。如今，社会已决定，由联邦补贴的风能和太阳能发电符合我们国家的长期利益。联邦税收抵免被用于实施这一政策，这种支持使可再生能源在某些地区具有价格竞争力。这些税收抵免，或其他政府对可再生能源的强制性支持，最终可能会侵蚀现有公用事业公司的经济基础，尤其是如果它是高成本运营者。BHE长期建立的效率优先原则——即使公司不需要它来实现允许的盈利——使我们在当今市场上（更重要的是，在明天的市场上）特别具有竞争力。 BHE于1999年收购了其爱荷华州的公用事业公司。收购前一年，该公用事业公司雇佣了3,700名员工，发电量为1900万兆瓦时。现在我们雇佣3,500名员工，发电量为2900万兆瓦时。效率的大幅提高使我们能够在16年内不提高电价，而同期行业电价上涨了44%。 我们爱荷华州公用事业公司的安全记录也非常出色。2015年，每100名员工受伤率为0.79，而我们收购该业务前一年，前所有者的这一比率为7.0。 2006年，BHE收购了主要在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的PacifiCorp。收购前一年，PacifiCorp雇佣了6,750名员工，发电量为5260万兆瓦时。去年，这些数字是5,700名员工和5630万兆瓦时。同样，安全状况显著改善，每100名员工事故率从2005年的3.4下降到2015年的0.85。在安全方面，BHE现在位列行业前十分之一。 这些出色的表现解释了为什么当BHE提议在其管辖范围内收购公用事业公司时，会受到监管机构的欢迎。监管机构知道，该公司将进行高效、安全和可靠的运营，并且还会带来无限的资本，用于资助任何有意义的项目。（自我们取得所有权以来，BHE从未向伯克希尔支付过股息。美国没有一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司在再投资热情方面能与BHE相提并论。）

我刚才详细说明的生产力提升——以及美国取得的无数其他成就——为社会带来了巨大的好处。这就是为什么我们的公民，作为一个整体，已经并将继续享受他们所获得的商品和服务的重大进步。

对这个想法也有一些抵消因素。首先，近年来实现的生产力提升在很大程度上使富人受益。其次，生产力提升经常引起剧变：当创新或新效率颠覆了它们的世界时，资本和劳动力都可能付出可怕的代价。

我们无需为资本家流泪（无论是私人所有者还是公共股东大军）。照顾自己是他们的事。当好的决策能为投资者带来巨大回报时，他们也不应因错误的选择而免于损失。此外，进行广泛多元化投资并坚定持有的投资者肯定能够获利：在美国，成功投资的收益总是远远超过失败投资的损失。（在20世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数——一种指数基金——从66点飙升至11,497点，其成分公司在此期间一直支付不断增长的股息。）

长期受雇的工人面临的则是另一种情况。当创新和市场体系相互作用产生效率时，许多工人可能变得多余，他们的才能变得过时。有些人能在别处找到体面的工作；但对其他人来说，这并非选择。

当低成本竞争将鞋类生产推向亚洲时，我们曾经繁荣的Dexter业务倒闭了，导致缅因州一个小镇的1,600名员工失业。许多人已经到了无法学习另一门手艺的年纪。我们损失了全部投资，这是我们能承受的，但许多工人失去了他们无法替代的生计。同样的场景在我们最初的New England纺织业务中缓慢上演，该业务挣扎了20年后才消亡。举一个令人心酸的例子，我们New Bedford工厂的许多年长工人说葡萄牙语，几乎不懂英语。他们没有B计划。

面对这种破坏，答案不是限制或禁止提高生产力的行动。如果我们强制要求1,100万人永远务农，美国人的生活远不会像现在这样好。

相反，解决方案是各种安全网，旨在为那些愿意工作但因其特定才能因市场力量而被认为价值不高的人提供体面的生活。（我个人赞成改革和扩大劳动所得税抵免，试图确保美国为那些愿意工作的人服务。）为绝大多数美国人实现日益增长的繁荣，其代价不应是让不幸者陷入贫困。

重要风险

我们，像所有上市公司一样，被SEC要求每年在10-K中列出“风险因素”。然而，我不记得有哪次阅读10-K的“风险”部分帮助我评估了一项业务。这并不是说识别出的风险不真实。然而，真正重要的风险通常是众所周知的。除此之外，10-K的风险清单很少有助于评估：（1）威胁事件实际发生的概率；（2）如果发生，可能的损失范围；以及（3）潜在损失的时间点。一个只在50年后才会显现的威胁，对社会来说可能是问题，但对于今天的投资者来说，它不是财务问题。

伯克希尔在我所知的任何公司中涉足更多的行业。我们的每一项业务都有其自身的一系列可能的问题和机遇。这些很容易列出，但很难评估：查理、我和我们的各位CEO在计算这些可能性可能带来的可能性、时间点和成本（或收益）时，常常存在重大分歧。

让我仅举几个例子。首先从一个明显的威胁开始，BNSF，与其他铁路公司一样，在未来十年内必定会失去大量的煤炭运量。在未来的某个时间点——尽管在我看来，不会是长期——GEICO的保费收入可能会因为无人驾驶汽车而减少。这种发展也可能损害我们的汽车经销业务。我们纸质报纸的发行量将继续下降，这是我们在收购时已经考虑到的确定性。迄今为止，可再生能源帮助了我们的公用事业运营，但这种情况可能会改变，特别是如果电力存储能力得到实质性改善的话。在线零售威胁到我们零售商和某些消费品牌商业模式。这些潜在可能性只是我们面临的少数负面可能性——但即使是最随意的商业新闻关注者也早已意识到它们。

然而，这些问题中没有一个是伯克希尔长期福祉的关键。当我们于1965年接管公司时，其风险可以用一句话概括：“我们所有资本所在的北方纺织业务注定要持续亏损，最终将消失。”然而，那种发展并非丧钟。我们只是适应了。并且我们将继续这样做。

每天，伯克希尔的经理们都在思考如何在不断变化的世界中更好地竞争。同样积极地，查理和我专注于如何部署源源不断的资金。在这方面，我们比那些选择范围更有限的单一行业公司拥有一个主要优势。我坚信，伯克希尔拥有资金、人才和文化，能够渡过我上面列出的那些逆境——以及更多——并以更强的盈利能力脱颖而出。

然而，有一个对伯克希尔清晰、存在且持久的危险，对此查理和我们都无能为力。对伯克希尔的这种威胁，也是我们公民面临的主要威胁：对美国的一次“成功的”（按侵略者的定义）网络、生物、核或化学攻击。这是伯克希尔与所有美国企业共同面临的风险。

这种大规模毁灭性事件在任何一年发生的概率可能非常小。自从我递送一份《华盛顿邮报》，其头条新闻是美国投下第一颗原子弹以来，已经过去70多年了。之后，我们有过几次侥幸逃脱，但避免了灾难性的毁灭。我们应该感谢我们的政府——以及运气！——带来了这个结果。

然而，在短期内的小概率事件，在长期内接近必然。（如果某事件在给定年份发生的概率是三十分之一，那么它在百年内至少发生一次的概率是96.6%。）另一个坏消息是，永远会有个人、组织、甚至国家想要对我们国家造成最大程度的伤害。在我有生之年，他们这样做的手段呈指数级增长。“创新”有其黑暗面。

美国公司或其投资者无法摆脱这种风险。如果美国发生导致大规模破坏的事件，所有股权投资的价值几乎肯定会毁灭。

没有人知道“第二天”会是什么样子。然而，我认为爱因斯坦1949年的评价仍然恰当：“我不知道第三次世界大战会用哪种武器作战，但第四次世界大战会用棍棒和石头。”

我写这一部分是因为我们今年年会上有一项关于气候变化的代理提案需要审议。提案发起人希望我们就气候变化可能给我们的保险业务带来的危险提供一份报告，并解释我们如何应对这些威胁。

在我看来，气候变化极有可能给地球带来重大问题。我说“极有可能”而不是“确定”，因为我没有科学天赋，并且清楚地记得大多数“专家”关于千年虫的可怕预言。然而，对我来说或任何人来说，如果某种结果似乎有可能发生，并且迅速采取行动即使只有很小的机会能阻止危险，却要求世界将遭受巨大破坏的100%证据，那是愚蠢的。

这个问题与帕斯卡关于上帝存在的赌注有相似之处。你可能记得，帕斯卡论证道，即使上帝真实存在的可能性微乎其微，表现得像他存在一样也是合理的，因为回报可能是无限的，而不信仰则冒着永恒痛苦的风险。同样，如果地球走向真正大灾难的可能性只有1%，而延误意味着越过不归点，那么现在不作为就是鲁莽的。称其为诺亚法则：如果一艘方舟对于生存可能是必不可少的，那么无论天空多么晴朗，今天就开始建造它。

可以理解的是，该代理提案的发起人认为伯克希尔尤其受到气候变化的威胁，因为我们是一家大型保险公司，涵盖各种风险。发起人可能担心财产损失会因天气变化而飙升。如果我们承保的是十年或二十年期的固定价格保单，这种担忧可能确实有道理。但保险单通常每年续签一次，并且每年根据风险变化重新定价。损失可能性增加会迅速转化为保费增加。

回想一下1951年，那时我刚对GEICO产生热情。当时公司每份保单的平均损失成本约为每年30美元。想象一下，如果我当时预测到2015年损失成本将增加到每份保单约1,000美元，你会作何反应。你可能会问，这种急剧增加的损失不会是灾难性的吗？嗯，不是。

多年来，通货膨胀导致维修事故中涉及的汽车和人的成本大幅增加。但这些增加的成本迅速被增加的保费所抵消。所以，矛盾的是，损失成本的上扬使保险公司变得更有价值。如果成本保持不变，伯克希尔现在将拥有一家年业务量6亿美元的汽车保险公司，而不是拥有年业务量230亿美元的一家。

到目前为止，气候变化并没有导致飓风或其他与天气相关的保险事件更加频繁或更加昂贵。因此，美国的超级巨灾保险费率近年来稳步下降，这也是我们退出该业务的原因。如果超级巨灾变得更加昂贵和频繁，对伯克希尔保险业务可能——尽管远非确定——产生的影响将是使其更大、更盈利。

作为公民，气候变化让你夜不能寐是可以理解的。作为低洼地区的房主，你可能会考虑搬家。但是，当你仅仅作为一家大型保险公司的股东来思考时，气候变化不应该出现在你的担忧清单上。

年会

查理和我终于决定进入21世纪。我们今年的年会将通过网络向全球进行全程直播。要观看会议，只需在4月30日星期六中部夏令时上午9点访问 https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。Yahoo!网络直播将首先进行半小时的经理、董事和股东采访。然后，在9:30，查理和我将开始回答问题。

这种新的安排有两个目的。首先，它可能会使会议出席人数趋于平稳或略有减少。去年超过40,000名与会者的记录让我们的接待能力捉襟见肘。除了迅速填满CenturyLink中心的主竞技场外，我们还挤满了其溢出房间，然后波及到相邻Omaha Hilton的两个大型会议室。尽管Airbnb的参与度有所提高，但所有主要酒店都已售罄。Airbnb对那些预算有限的游客尤其有帮助。

我们发起网络直播的第二个原因更为重要。查理92岁，我85岁。如果我们和你们是一家小公司的合伙人，并负责经营它，你们应该偶尔过来看看，确保我们没有昏昏欲睡，进入幻想世界。相比之下，股东们不应该需要亲自来奥马哈监督我们的状态和声音。（在做评估时，请仁慈一点：考虑到即使在我们最好的时候，我们看起来也没那么令人印象深刻。）

观众们还可以观察到我们的延年益寿饮食。在会议期间，查理和我每个人会摄入足够多的可乐、See’s软糖和See’s花生脆片，以满足NFL进攻线锋一周的热量需求。很久以前我们才发现一个基本事实：当你真正饿了——并且想保持那种状态——没有什么比吃胡萝卜和西兰花更好了。

计划参加年会的股东应在早上7点CenturyLink中心开门时到达，并开始购物。Carrie Sova将再次负责庆典活动。她上个月下旬生了第二个孩子，但这并没有拖慢她的脚步。Carrie沉着冷静，足智多谋，擅长激发与她共事者的最佳表现。她得到了来自全国各地的数百名伯克希尔员工以及我们整个总部团队的协助，他们都齐心协力，让这个周末对我们的股东来说既有趣又有信息量。