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2022年年度股东大会

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2022年年度股东大会

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1. 当所有者真的很老了，当面见到他们总是好的

沃伦·巴菲特：（掌声）谢谢。我没听到指数基金那边的动静。他们在哪儿？（笑声）能回来和大家面对面，感觉真好。已经三年了。亲眼见到真正的股东、所有者、合伙人感觉好得多。（掌声）我们——查理和我现在加起来——（听不清）零零碎碎——我们俩加起来190岁了。（笑声）我真的觉得，如果你是一家公司的所有者，而管理公司的是两个98岁和91岁的老家伙，你完全有权利亲眼见到他们本人，我是说。（笑声）这要求真不算过分。我是说，举个例子，假如我们在某个地方有个98岁的经理，我可能偶尔会想派个人去看看他是不是在剪纸娃娃（笑声）之类的。所以，我们做的事情可能比剪纸娃娃更蠢，但我们做得很开心。

当你们来看我们的时候，我们真的非常开心。实际上，我们有过——如果你往回看几年——我们有过几位患有老年痴呆症的经理。可能更多，但我是说，实际上知道的就几位。（笑声）有一个伙计，查理和我都非常喜欢他。他为我们经营一家企业。查理——那是在加州——查理偶尔会看到他，我没见过。但一切看起来都很好。后来我们发现他其实痴呆已经很长时间了。他真的是我们俩的好朋友。但生意做得很好，所以这就成了我们的测试标准，真的，（笑声）对新生意而言。我们实际上是在努力找那种就算得了老年痴呆症的人也能经营的企业。（笑声）这种生意的竞争也没那么激烈。（笑声）那个坐那儿剪纸娃娃的家伙，你知道，那就是我们要找的人。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: (Applause) Thank you. I don’t hear anything from the index funds. Where are they? (Laughter) It really feels good to get back and be doing this in person. It’s been three years. And it’s a lot better seeing actual shareholders, owners, partners. (Applause) We — Charlie and I are now, combined, (unintelligible) round for fractions — the two of us are 190 years old. (Laughter) And I really think you’re entitled, if you’re the owner of a company, and if you’ve got two guys, 98 and 91 running the company, you’re entitled to actually see them in person, I mean. (Laughter) It really shouldn’t be too much to ask. I mean, for example, if we had a manager someplace that was 98, I might want to send somebody by occasionally to see whether he was cutting paper (Laughter) dolls or something. So, we probably do things that are a lot more foolish than cutting out paper dolls, but we’re having a lot of fun doing it.

And we really have a lot of fun when you come visit us. Actually, we had — if you go back a few years — we’ve had a couple of managers that suffered from dementia. Probably many more but, I mean, just a couple of known ones, actually. (Laughter) And there was one fellow that Charlie and I really loved. And he ran a business for us. Charlie — it was out in California — Charlie would see him occasionally, and I didn’t see him. But everything seemed fine. And then we found out that he’d really been suffering from dementia for quite a while. And he really was a wonderful friend of both of ours. But the business had done fine, so that’s become our test really, (Laughter) for new businesses. We try to find something that a guy with Alzheimer’s can run, actually. (Laughter) And you don’t have as much competition for businesses like that. (Laughter) The guy sitting there cutting out paper dolls and, you know, that’s our man. (Laughter)

2. 介绍格雷格·阿贝尔和阿吉特·贾因

沃伦·巴菲特：我想介绍两位真正在伯克希尔工作的伙计。在查理的左边，格雷格·阿贝尔，他负责所有除保险以外的运营——（掌声）——是的。他旁边的是——我曾经不成功地负责保险业务大概15年。然后幸运的是，坐在最左边的那位有一天来了——我写过这件事——他在一个周六来了。我正在拆邮件，他说他很乐意负责我们的保险业务。我说：“你经营过保险业务吗？“他说：“没有。“正如我之前提过的，我对他说：“嗯，你知道，我也从来没经营过，所以我干得也不怎么样，那么（笑声）试试吧。“然后，你知道，他彻底改变了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。阿吉特·贾恩今天和我们在一起。（掌声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to introduce two fellows who really work at Berkshire. On Charlie’s left, Greg Abel, who runs all the operations outside — (Applause) — yeah. And next to him is — I ran the insurance business for about 15 years unsuccessfully. And then fortunately, the fellow on the far left came in one day — and I’ve written about it — but he came in on a Saturday. And I was opening the mail, and he said that he’d be happy to run our insurance business. I said, “Have you ever run an insurance business?” And he said, “No.” And as I’ve mentioned, I said to him, “Well, you know, I’ve never run one either, so I’m not doing so hot, so (Laughter) give it a try.” And, you know, he transformed Berkshire Hathaway. And Ajit Jain is here with us. (Applause)

3. 今天的日程安排

沃伦·巴菲特：我们今天要做的——我得时不时提醒自己，在座的各位当然都看过那个电影之类的，但当然，我们正在做网络直播。所以我可能会提到一些电影里的内容或者会让（笑声）外面数百万观众感到困惑的东西，但你们会懂的，所以——（笑声）我们会先聊一会儿上个季度发生的事情，再提一些你们可能感兴趣的其他事情。然后，等这些都讲完了，我们就开始回答问题。我们会一直回答问题到中午，休息一个小时——对于其他时区正在观看的人来说，这是美国中部时间——我们会进行到中午。然后休息一个小时。之后查理和我会回来，继续回答问题到下午3:30。

然后在3:45召开股东大会——我们会休息15分钟——然后进行股东大会。等这些都结束了，我们就各走各的路了。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: What we’ll do today — and I have to remind myself from time to time that the people here, of course, saw that movie and everything, but, of course, we’re webcasting this. So, I’ll probably make some references to the movie or something that’ll puzzle (Laughter) millions of people out there, but you’ll get it, so — (Laughter) We’re going to talk for a little while about what’s happened in the last quarter and bring up a few other things that you might be interested in. And we will then, whenever that’s finished, we’ll go on to questions. And we will take the questions until noon, break for an hour — that’s Midwest time for those of you who are watching in other time zones — we’ll go on until noon. And we’ll break for an hour. And then Charlie and I will come back, and we’ll take more questions until 3:30.

And then we’ll convene the shareholders meeting at 3:45 — we’ll take a break for 15 minutes — and then we’ll do the shareholders meeting. And when that’s done, we’ll all go our various ways.

4. 喜诗带来了11吨糖果出售

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便提一下，我想报告一下，你们已经尽了自己的本分。在我们这个场地旁边的房间里——昨天从中午到下午5点，有12,000名股东前来，在我们能想到的一切东西上花钱。（笑声）我们带来了11吨喜诗糖果。如果卖不完，剩下的归我和查理，所以。（笑声）但你们已经尽了自己的本分。喜诗卖了——他们昨天在周五下午的活动中创下了纪录。这（欢呼）相当鼓舞人心。（掌声）是的。顺便说一句，我这里有一盒喜诗糖果，它非常——这有点意思。在这个封面上，希望你们能看到，有一位生于1854年的女士的画像。今天，就商业产品之类的东西而言，她的画像被看到的频率可能比美国几乎任何一位女性都高。

所以，我们在超过200家门店以及每个糖果盒上都有她的画像。那是玛丽·喜诗，生于1854年。很多人以为这是我男扮女装，但这可不是真的。（笑声）我是说——确实有些相似之处，但（笑声）就是不是。这些谣言是我们的竞争对手散布的。别理他们。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I do want to report, incidentally, that you’ve been doing your part, in terms of the room we have adjacent to this location, where we’ve been — yesterday for five hours, from noon to 5, we had 12,000 shareholders come, and just spend money on everything we could think of to sell them. (Laughter) We brought in 11 tons of See’s Candy. And if we don’t sell out, Charlie and I get the rest, so. (Laughter) But you did your part. See’s sold — they set a record yesterday for the Friday afternoon meeting. And it’s (Cheering) pretty heartening. (Applause) Yeah. Incidentally, I’ve got a box of See’s Candy here, and it’s very — it’s sort of interesting. On this cover, which I hope you can see, there’s a picture of a woman who was born in 1854. And today, she probably gets her picture seen more often than just about any woman in America, in terms of a commercial product or something of the sort.

So, we’ve got her picture up in over 200 stores, and on every box of candy. That’s Mary See, born in 1854. A lot of people think this is me in drag, but that is not true. (Laughter) I mean — There’s a certain resemblance, but (Laughter) it’s just not. These rumors are started by our competitors. Don’t pay any attention to them. (Laughter)

5. 我们喜欢在同一时间向所有人提供财务信息

沃伦·巴菲特：所以，我们会——这就是今天的日程安排。我们要做的——我们喜欢给所有——我们喜欢给股东——所有者——合伙人——我们喜欢在同一时间给所有人相同的信息，最好是在股市不开盘的时候这么做。在我们看来，这——所有人都应该在同一个竞技场上。很有意思——我们不知道我们有多少股东。随着时间的推移，关于注册持有人和获取股票凭证等等的规则已经改变了。所以我们不能像50或75年前那样跟踪了，那时我们有一份实际的股东名单。但据告诉我们的人说——据为我们邮寄信息的人说——是一家公司，我想在新泽西——让我想想——Broadridge——他们为很大比例的美国公司做这件事。所以，他们实际上为我们邮寄这些东西。他们向我们收取350万个账户的费用。我相信他们的话。

我是说，他们向我们收取的账户越多——我们按账户付费——所以，你知道，有些时候，我想数一数——但那是一个——（笑声）——那是很多信任我们的人。而且他们——在我看来，正确地——绝大多数——觉得他们是我们的合伙人。其中一些人会喜欢阅读他们给我们的——我们给你们的——财务信息。但大多数人——非常多的人只是说，你知道，“我们存了这些钱。我们信任你和查理。“而这种信任是巨大的动力。“你知道，照顾好它，我不会去学会计，也不会试图去读那些报表之类的东西。“但我们确实相信，对于那些使用我们发布的信息的人来说，他们都应该在同一时间获得。

我们有一些机构，尽管在我每年的信的第三段中，我提到我们希望所有人都能得到相同的信息，我们不认为任何人有权获得特别会议——我们无法与我们的300万合伙人举行300万次特别会议——但我们喜欢这样一个事实：每个人都得到同样的待遇，每个人都得到相同的信息。今天早上，我们在互联网上发布了本季度的10-Q报表。我想带你们简单看一下这方面的内容和其他一些内容，然后我们进入问答环节。在问答环节，我们将交替回答股东邮寄来的问题和现场的问题。邮寄来的问题由CNBC的贝基·奎克和帮助她的人进行了整理，挑选出他们认为最有趣的股东问题。不是来自CNBC本身，而是来自股东，所有者。我们会交替回答邮寄来的问题和现场的问题。我们不会提前知道问题。而且我们很喜欢被几乎所有问题惊喜到。

（笑）我们会一直这样做，就像我说的，午休时间除外，直到3:30，然后我们召开股东大会，所以——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: So, we will — that’s our schedule for the day. And what we will do — we like to give all — we like to give shareholders — owners — partners — we like to give everybody the same information at the same time, and preferably do it when stock markets aren’t open. It seems to us that that’s — everybody ought to be on the same playing field. It’s very interesting — we don’t know how many shareholders we’ve got. They’ve changed the rules over time as to registered holders and getting stock certificates and all that sort of thing. So, we can’t keep track of it like 50 or 75 years ago, where we had an actual shareholders list. But we’re told — we’re told by the people who mail out our information — it’s a firm in, I think, New Jersey — let’s see — Broadridge — and they pretty well do this for a very significant percentage of American corporations. So, they actually mail things out for us. And they bill us for 3 1/2 million accounts. And I’ll take their word for it.

I mean, the more accounts they bill us for — we pay them by the account — so, you know, somedays, I feel like I’d like to count — but that is a — (Laughter) — that is a lot of people that trust us. And they’ve — rightly in my view — overwhelmingly — feel that they’re our partners. And some of them will like reading the financial information they’ve given us — that we give you. But most — a great many of them just say, you know, “We’ve saved this money. And we trust you and Charlie.” And that’s a great motivator, this trust. “And, you know, take care of it and I’m not going to learn accounting and try to read all those statements or anything of the sort.” But we do believe that, for those who do use the information we release, they should all get it at the same time.

And we have a few institutions that, even though in the third paragraph of my letter every year I refer to the fact that we want to have everybody get the same information, and that we don’t feel that anybody’s entitled to special meetings — we can’t hold 3 million special meetings with our partners —but we like the fact that everybody gets the same deal, everybody gets the same information. This morning, on the internet, we put up our 10-Q for the quarter. And I’d like to take you through a few comments on that and a few other comments, and then we’ll get to the questions. When we get to the questions, we will alternate between those mailed in by shareholders, which Becky Quick at CNBC and people who’ve helped her, sort of curated, to get what they think are the most interesting questions from shareholders. They’re not from CNBC itself, but they are from shareholders, owners. And we’ll alternate the ones sent in versus the ones that come here. And we don’t get the questions ahead of time. And we enjoy getting surprised by, I’d say, almost all questions.

(Laughs) And we will keep doing that, like I say, with a break for lunch, until 3:30, when we’ll have the meeting, so —

6. 我们对亏损你们的钱有”极端的厌恶”

沃伦·巴菲特：我想先放第一张幻灯片，关于第一季度。就是这个。这是我们今天早上发布的。这个季度并没有什么大的意外。我是说，总有一些公司做得非常好，也有一些公司因为这样那样的原因做得不好。最终，如你们所见，我们更倾向于使用一种叫做”营业利润”的东西。这是在扣除折旧、利息和税收之后的数字，不像其他公司更愿意告诉你们除了实际盈利之外的任何东西。但我们确实把资本利得分开了。随着时间的推移，正如我说过的，在接下来的20年里，我预计我们总体上会有更多的资本利得而不是亏损。但是，谁知道呢？我希望你们——你知道，我20年后会向你们报告是否（笑声）真的发生了。但是，正如你们所见，我们在第一季度赚了大约70亿美元。那是实实在在的70亿。

我是说，当季度结束时，我们基本上有这笔现金收入。并非每个季度都完全如此，但我们说的是实实在在的70亿。那些在电影里被这里的人们看到的经理们，就是那些用你们的钱工作的人，他们实现了查理和我从未想过——从未真正计划过或期望会发生的事情——但它就这样发生了，一步一步走出来的。显然，在过去的两年里，特别是包括第一季度，我们的各项业务中发生了各种不寻常的事情。我是说，当我们在2020年5月——大概是2020年5月初——举行会议时，我们不知道疫情会发生什么。我们不知道经济会发生什么。所有自认为知道答案的人，此后都经历了各种意外。但现在是2022年，伯克希尔，就像我说的，有70亿美元的营业利润。而且我们有很多很多很多的公司。

我们有36万人，在那里拿着你们的储蓄，每天去上班。他们有工作。我们交付产品。你们投入了资金，你们理应——你们承担了风险，我们对事情的结果感到非常满意。我们想继续保持这种好感觉。我们有一种——我们有——对使用你们的资金造成任何永久性损失有着极端的厌恶。你知道，如果我破产了，那其实没什么区别。我会继续做我做的事。我会想办法读报纸、看会儿电视（笑声）、思考事情、和查理聊聊。但是，造成永久性损失的想法——损失别人的钱——那些信任我们的人的钱——真的，真的——那是一个我不想要的未来。就像查理说的：“我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。”——（笑声）——这听起来很有道理。（笑声）

查理·芒格：到目前为止还挺管用。

沃伦·巴菲特：以防你们没听到，查理说到目前为止还挺管用。（笑声）如果我们亏了很多别人的钱，我们在心理上会”死掉”的。我们一开始就不会拿别人的钱。拿别人的钱然后亏掉，如果你会因此感到非常糟糕，那简直是疯了。所以，关于伯克希尔，我能告诉你们的一件事是——虽然我无法预测我们的盈利会是多少，无法预测股价会怎样，我也不——我们不知道。我们不知道经济会怎样，诸如此类。但我们知道，我们每天早上醒来，都希望你们的最终投资变得更安全。至于你们是否能赚到最多的钱之类的，我们只希望你们不会因为决定成为我们的合伙人而得到一个糟糕的结果。这是你们可以信赖的承诺。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to start by putting up the first slide, which is Q1. And there we have it. That’s what we published this morning. And there are really no great surprises in terms of the quarter. I mean, there are always some companies that are doing very well, and there are some companies that aren’t for one reason or another. And in the end, as you can see, we prefer to use something called operating earnings. Now, that is after depreciation and interest and taxes, unlike other companies that prefer to tell you anything but what they earned. But we do separate out capital gains. Now, over time, as I’ve said, over the next 20 years, I would expect us, net, to have more capital gains than not. But, you know, who knows? I hope you’ll — you know, I’ll report to you in 20 years whether that’s (Laughter) happened or not. But, as you can see, we made about $7 billion in the first quarter. And that’s a real 7 billion.

I mean, we basically have that income in cash when the quarter’s over. That isn’t true every quarter, exactly, but we are talking about 7 billion of real money in that. And those managers who the people here saw in the movie, they’re the people that work with your money to accomplish what Charlie and I never thought would — never really planned or anything to happen — but it just, sort of, came about just, sort of, putting one foot in front of the other. Now obviously, the last two years in particular, including the first quarter, all kinds of unusual things happened in our various businesses. I mean, when we had the meeting two years ago in May of — roughly the start of May of 2020 — we didn’t know what was going to happen with the pandemic. We didn’t know what was going to happen with the economy. And everybody that thought they did has gotten all kinds of surprises since. But here we are in 2022 and Berkshire, like I say, had 7 billion of operating earnings. And we’ve got lots, and lots, and lots of companies.

We’ve got 360,000 people out there that have taken your savings and go to work every day. And they have jobs. We deliver products. And you put up the money for it and you deserve to — you took the risks, and we feel very good about how things have turned out. And we want to keep feeling good. And we have a — we have a — extreme aversion to incurring any permanent loss with your funds. You know, if I went broke, it wouldn’t really make any difference. It’d keep doing what I do. I’d figure out a way to read a paper and watch a little TV (Laughter) and think about things and talk to Charlie. But the idea of losing, permanently, other people’s money — people who trust us — really, really — that’s just a future I don’t want to have. And as Charlie says, “All I want to know is where I’ll die so I’ll never go there.” And — (Laughter) — that seems pretty sound. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s worked so far.

WARREN BUFFETT: In case you missed it, Charlie says it’s worked so far. (Laughter) And we would die, psychologically, if we lost a lot of other people’s money. We wouldn’t take it in the first place. It’d be crazy to take people’s money and lose it if you’re going to feel terrible about doing it. So, the one thing I can tell you about Berkshire — although I can’t predict what our earnings will be, and I can’t predict what the stock will do, and I can’t — we don’t know. We don’t know what the economy will do and all of that sort of thing. But we do know that we wake up every morning and we want to be safer, in terms of your eventual investment. Now, whether you make the most money or anything, we do not want you to get a terrible result because you’ve decided to become our partner. And that’s a pledge you can live by.

7. “我们在那三周里迅速花掉了400亿”

沃伦·巴菲特：现在，让我们看看这里有什么。在幻灯片Q-2中，这给了我们一些提示，因为——这还挺有意思的。我写了一封——我写了一封给所有者的信。日期是2月26日。那是个周六——发布的。但我一整年都在脑子里写这封信。我是说——我不——你知道，我们并没有人专门坐在那里把信写出来之类的。我是说，这是合伙人之间的信。我全年都在脑子里写这封信。我正在写明年的信。我没有写下文字，但我想告诉我的合伙人一些事情。我妹妹是合伙人。我实际上是在脑子里给她写信。我姐姐不久前去世了，但我以前实际上是同时给她们俩写的。想告诉她，你知道，我的想法，关于生意的事，以及我认为她应该怎么想，等等。

所以，这封信的日期是2月26日。我当时说：“没什么大事发生。“实际上，我们可能跳到幻灯片Q-3，如果可以的话。所以，我在2月26日寄出了一封信。但那不是在2月26日写的。我基本上说：“这里没什么事发生。“我还说：“我们回购了一些股票。我们就是没看到什么。“在1月1日到2月18日之间，如你们所见，我们花了22亿美元，那是半个季度，你知道，大概30个交易日。我们卖出了——所以基本上，我们什么也没做。然后在接下来的三周左右，我们花了400亿。顺便说一句，当我说我们花了400亿时，办公室里只有一个人在做这件事。我是说，他买所有的股票。他买政府债券。他没有助理之类的。但他花了410亿美元。（笑声）是的。

他真的是——我是说——他还为我做其他事情。他，你知道，汇总数据。他只是做他需要做的事。他很久以前在伯克希尔的其他岗位工作过。但他喜欢他现在做的事。他做得非常好，我们没有为此设立一个部门。正如你们所见，之后就没有了。我们在第一季度还——在第一季度，我们花了大约31亿或32亿——大概在这个范围——用于回购股票。而且——我们——你知道，我们在年报中讨论过这个。就像查理会说的，这让我们不去泡酒吧。我是说，你知道，这给了我们一些事做。而且——我们从来不做我们认为不会增加伯克希尔·哈撒韦价值的事情。所以我们只在回购股票是最有吸引力的事情时才这么做。我们在四月份完全没有回购任何股票。

所以，那些寻找所有这些踪迹的人，你知道，在树林里的脚印之类的——那不是我们在做的事。我们只是日复一日地做，顺势而为。我认为这个表格有点说明了这一点，我们在那三周里迅速花掉了400亿。现在我们又回到了有点懒散的状态。但在伯克希尔，任何事情都可能改变。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, let’s see what we have here. In [slide] Q-2, it gives some indication of that, because we — and this is kind of interesting. I wrote — I wrote a letter to our owners. And it was dated February 26th. And that was a Saturday — released. But I write the letter all through the year in my mind. I mean — I don’t — you know, we don’t have anybody that sits out and writes out the letter or anything like that. I mean, this is a letter between partners. And I write the letter all year in my head. I’m writing next year’s letter. I don’t write out the words, but I have things I want to tell my partners. My sister’s a partner. And I’m writing to her in my head. My older sister died not too long ago, but I used to be writing to both of them, in effect. And want to tell her, you know, what I think and about the business and what I think she ought to think about it, and so on.

So, the letter’s dated February 26th. And I said, “Not much is going on.” And actually, we might jump over to [slide] Q-3, if we will. So, I sent out a letter on February 26th. But that wasn’t written on February 26th. And I said basically, “Nothing much is happening around here.” And I said, “We’ve repurchased some shares. And we just aren’t seeing anything.” And between January 1st and February 18th, as you can see, we spent $2.2 billion, which is half the quarter, you know, so probably 30 trading days in there. And we sold — So basically, we didn’t do anything. And then in the next three weeks or thereabouts, we spent 40 billion. And incidentally, when I say we spent 40 billion, there’s one fellow in the office that does this all. I mean, he buys all the stocks. He buys the government bonds. He doesn’t have an assistant or anything. But he spent $41 billion. (Laughter) Yeah.

He literally — I mean — and he does other things for me, too. He, you know, puts together totals. He just does what he needs to do. And he’s worked in other jobs at Berkshire long ago. But he likes doing what he does. And he does it very well, and we don’t have a department for it. And as you can see, it fell off after that. And we did also in the first — in the first quarter, we spent about 3.1 or 3.2 billion — somewhere in that — for repurchasing shares. And — We didn’t — you know, we talked about that in the annual report. And as Charlie would say, it’s keeping us out of bars. I mean, you know, it gave us something to do. And it — we never do anything that we don’t think adds to the value of Berkshire Hathaway, though. So we only repurchase the shares when that is the most attractive thing. We haven’t repurchased any shares at all in April.

So, it’s — People who are looking for all these, you know, footprints in the woods and all — that isn’t what we’re doing. We’re just doing it day by day as it comes along. And I think this table kind of illustrates that, that we spent 40 billion in a hurry there between — in three weeks. And now we’re back, somewhat, in our more lethargic mood. But that — anything could change at Berkshire.

8. 现金就像”氧气”

沃伦·巴菲特：但有一点不会改变——回到幻灯片Q-2，如果你愿意的话——那就是我们总是会手头持有大量现金。当我说现金时，我不是指商业票据。当2008年和2009年——全国恐慌来临时——我们不持有任何人的商业票据。你知道，我们没有货币市场基金。我们持有国库券。我可能会稍后深入谈谈，我会向你们解释原因。我们——我们相信持有现金。历史上曾有过几次，未来还会有更多次，如果你没有现金，你知道，你就无法参与第二天的游戏。我是说，这就像氧气，你知道吗？它一直就在那里。但如果消失几分钟，一切就都完了。

所以——我们在3月31日的现金减少了，因为正如你们所见，我们在季度内的那短短一段时期花了那一大笔钱，400亿。我们承诺以110多亿美元收购Alleghany Corp。但我们会一直持有大量现金。我们不会——我们不——我们的一些公司有银行信贷额度。我不知道他们为什么要有银行信贷额度。我们比银行好，如果他们需要钱，我们会给他们（笑）。但是，你知道，当地的银行家一直在拜访他们，他们需要找点事做。其他所有人都有银行信贷额度，所以这没什么坏处。但我们的任何子公司都没有理由——（听不清）。伯克希尔比银行更强大，但是——（听众中有人喊叫）我没听清他说什么——我不知道那是不是一个银行家在尖叫，或者——（笑声）我不——我真的不喜欢折磨——我是说，我不喜欢折磨任何人。

（笑）但是——我完全支持银行，我们稍后会谈到这个。事实上，我们现在可能就可以简单谈一分钟。金钱是件很有趣的事。人们似乎喜欢和我谈论它。我是说，他们不会问我怎么跳舞之类的事，但他们确实会问关于钱的事。所以——如果我们放上幻灯片20-1——那是一张20美元钞票的照片。上面写着”联邦储备券”。现在——联邦储备券——在这个国家，我们用钱做了各种各样的事情。令人惊奇的是，在一个只有几百年历史的国家里，我们在银行和各方面做了多少次不同的实验。但我们最终决定让美联储来发行货币。在左下角——顺便说一句，我认为[前美国财政部长]罗茜·里奥斯——她在钞票上签名——我认为她签署的美国货币比历史上任何其他人都多。

所以，如果你看到罗茜，你知道，去和她套近乎。我是说，这是一个（笑）发行了大量货币的女人。但上面写着：“这张钞票是偿还所有公私债务的法币。“这使得它成为钱。你可以去我们的糖果店，如果你给我们足够多的几蒲式耳小麦，我们可能给你一盒糖果。但钱是唯一一种国税局会从你这里拿走的东西。你可以给他们各种各样的东西——你可以给他们画作——你可以给他们——所有——不管什么——但这是在美国用来清偿债务的东西。我认为——你会听到各种关于各种货币的说法——在我看来，这是你在有生之年，甚至在查理的有生之年，唯一会看到的货币。这是——非常有趣，因为它只是说清偿——所有公私债务的法币，除此之外没有别的东西有这样的说法，除了，我想你们可能有兴趣看到另一张20美元钞票。这张是我拥有的。

在那张上——它还是同一个人的画像——安德鲁·杰克逊——等等。那是一张20美元钞票。那张20美元钞票是在我生前发行的。是由一家伯克希尔最终拥有的银行发行的。所以你们会看到罗克福德的伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司。我们是在1969年收购那家银行的。如果你看那张钞票的底部，上面有一个叫尤金·阿贝格的家伙的签名。我们是从尤金·阿贝格那里买下的。所以我们还有一些成张的20美元钞票。我们可以像剪纸娃娃一样把它们剪开。那是我们的钱。伊利诺伊国民银行发行过钱。但请记住，美国政府实际上说，这可以兑换成美国的法定货币。这就是钱的含义。它可能在购买力方面变得大大贬值。它可能会变得几乎像纸币一样，就像在许多国家发生的那样。但这就是全部——当人们告诉你他们在发行新形式的货币时，这是唯一能在某些情况下支付账单的东西。

曾经有些日子——2008年的几天——我们在2020年3月也差点重演——但我们在2020年3月20日有充足的资金——但我们距离可能重演2008年甚至更糟的情况并不太远。我们这里有一家书店：The Bookworm。在另一个房间。他们有一本书叫《万亿美元的三方干预》。对于那些真正喜欢读这类东西的人来说，这是对美联储和财政部每天所采取行动的绝妙描述。请相信我，如果美联储没有做他们所做的，至少在我看来，在非常非常非常短的时间内，事情可能会停止。几年前，我向[美联储主席]杰伊·鲍威尔脱帽致敬，因为他采取了他所做的行动。他必须迅速行动。我是说，在过去，19世纪当银行发生挤兑时，你知道，人们排起了队，然后银行就会倒闭。

但银行会尽量慢地支付，你知道，希望发生点什么——一辆富国银行的卡车或驿马车会带着一堆金子之类的东西出现，然后你可以用甜言蜜语让排队的人散去。在奥马哈，1931年8月，四家州立银行——所谓的州立银行——那时还有这种银行——它们关闭了，国民银行没有关闭。但它们在当天都破产了。没有一家银行可以在一天内还清所有负债。但只有美联储在当时站了出来。但我要告诉你们这一点。伯克希尔·哈撒韦将会（笑）在那个时候站在那里。我们经营的基础是，如果事情只是稍微——非常——如果[前美国财政部长]汉克·保尔森、乔治·H·W·布什——不，是乔治·W·布什，抱歉——和[前美联储主席]本·伯南克以及少数几个人没有采取行动，我们就到了那个排队的时刻，只不过现在是通过电子资金——他们按下按钮——如果银行发生挤兑，一切都会非常快地结束。如果你曾经收购一家银行，而镇上还有另一家银行，就多雇几个人，让他们去另一家银行门口排队。（笑声）只有一个问题。一段时间后，也会有人站在你的银行门口，你知道，然后你们两个都完了。但美联储不会完。在美国，美联储可以做任何必要的事情。他们有很多规则——他们可以做这个或那个等等。1980年代的某个时候，[前美联储主席]保罗·沃尔克，一个非常诚实的人，对我说——我说，你知道，“你能做的事情的界限是什么？”

他说——他是个非常不寻常的家伙——身材魁梧——低头看着我说——“我们可以做任何我们需要做的事。“（笑）这是真的。这就是2008年和2009年发生的事情，也是2020年发生的事情。你希望下次还会发生。但你想——我们希望伯克希尔·哈撒韦在那里，并且能够——在经济停顿时继续运营。那是随时可能发生的。那是随时可能发生的。所以，带着这些愉快的话——（笑声）——让我们看看——我想——也许我们可以——开始回答一些问题可能是个好主意。正如我所说，我们将交替回答CNBC——贝基·奎克——的问题，这些都是来自股东的问题。它们可以指向我们四个人中的任何一个。然后我们将轮流在场内提问。我们把礼堂分成了十到十一个区域。

查理和我有一次，我们拿到一张表格，上面写着：“公司高管按年龄细分”，我们只是把我们都放在（笑）那个问题的答案里了。但我们会按类别在这里细分。我们会继续交替。我们中午休息吃午饭，下午1:00重新开始。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: But the one thing that won’t change — going back to [slide] Q-2, if you’ll — is we will always have a lot of cash on hand. And when I say cash, I don’t mean commercial paper. When 2008 and 2009 — the national panic came along — we didn’t own anybody’s commercial paper. You know, we didn’t have money market funds. We have Treasury bills. And, as I may get into it a little later, I’ll explain to you why. We would — we believe in having cash. And there have been a few times in history, and there will be more times in history, where if you don’t have it, you know, you don’t get to play the next day. I mean, it’s just — It’s like oxygen, you know? It’s there all the time. But if it disappears for a few minutes, it’s all over.

So — Our cash was down on March 31st because, as you saw, we spent that large sum there in that brief period during the quarter, 40 billion. We’ve committed to buy Alleghany Corp for something over 11 billion. But we will always have a lot of cash. We won’t — we don’t — Some of our companies have bank lines. I don’t know why they have the bank lines. We’re better than the banks, and we’ll give them the money if they (laughs) need it. But, you know, the local bankers have been calling on them and they need something to do. Everybody else has bank lines, so it’s harmless. But there’s no reason for any of our subsidiaries — (UNINTEL). Berkshire is stronger than the banks, but — (Yell from audience) I didn’t hear exactly what he had — I don’t know whether that was a banker screaming, or — (Laughter) I don’t — I don’t really like to torture — I don’t like to torture anybody, I mean.

(Laughs) But — and I’m all for banks, and we’ll talk about that a little later. In fact, we might even talk about it right now just for a minute. Money’s kind of an interesting thing. People seem to like to talk to me about it. I mean, they don’t ask me how to dance or anything like that, but they do ask about money. And so — if we’ll put up [slide] 20-dash-1 — it’s a photo of a $20 bill. And it says at the top, “Federal Reserve Notes.” Now — Federal Reserve Note — we’ve done all kinds of things with money in this country. It’s amazing, in a country only a couple of hundred years old, the number of different experiments we’ve made with banks and everything. But we finally just decided to let the Federal Reserve do the issuing of money. And — Down in the lower left-hand corner — incidentally, I think [former U.S. Treasury Secretary] Rosie Rios — who signed this note — I think she signed more U.S. currency than any other person in history.

So, if you see Rosie, you know, you cozy up to her. I mean, this is a woman who (laughs) has issued a lot of currency. But it says, “This note is legal tender for all debts public and private.” And that makes it money. You can go into our candy store, and if you offer us enough bushels of wheat, we’ll probably give you a box of candy. But money is the only thing that the IRS is going to take from you. You can offer them all kinds of — you can offer them paintings — you can offer them — all — whatever — but this is what settles debts in the United States. And I thought that — you’ll hear a lot about various kinds of money — this is the only kind of money you’re going to see, in my opinion, throughout your lifetime or even throughout Charlie’s lifetime. This is — And it’s very interesting because it just says that settle — legal tender for all debts, public and private, and nothing else says that, except, I thought you might be interested in seeing another $20 bill. And this one I own.

And on that — it’s got the same guy’s picture — Andrew Jackson — and everything. And that’s a $20 bill. And that $20 bill was issued during my lifetime. And it was done by a bank that Berkshire ended up owning. So, you’ll see the Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford. And we bought that bank back in 1969. And if you look down in the bottom of that one, it’s signed by a fellow named Eugene Abegg. And we bought it from Eugene Abegg. So, we still have some $20 bills that came in sheets. And we can cut them out like paper dolls. And they’re our money. The Illinois National Bank issued money. But just remember, the United States government, in effect, said that this became exchangeable for lawful money in the United States. That’s what money is. It may turn out that it becomes worth dramatically less in purchasing power. It can become almost like paper money, as it has in many countries. But that is all — when people tell you that they’re issuing new forms of money, this is the only thing that will pay bills, under some circumstances.

And there were days — a few days in 2008 — and we came very close to having a repeat in March, 2020 — and we had plenty of money on March 20th — but we were not very, very far away from having something that might have been a repeat of 2008 or even worse. And we have a bookstore here: The Bookworm. It’s in the other room. And they’ve got a book called Trillion Dollar Triage. And for those of you who actually like to read about this sort of thing, it’s a marvelous account of what took place day by day with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. And believe me, if the Federal Reserve hadn’t done what they did, at least in my view, in a very, very, very short period of time, things could have stopped. And I tipped my hat a couple years ago to [Federal Reserve Chairman] Jay Powell for acting as he did. He has to act with speed. I mean, in the old days when you had runs on banks back in the 19th century, you know, a line formed, you know, and a bank would go broke.

But the fellow would pay out as slowly as possible, you know, hoping something would happen — a Wells Fargo truck or a stagecoach would pull up with a bunch of gold or something and you’d sweet-talk the people in the line dispersing. In Omaha, in August of 1931, four state banks — so-called state banks — they had those in that day — they closed and the national banks didn’t. But they were all broke as of that day. No bank can pay off in one day all of its liabilities. But the Federal Reserve is the only one that stood at that time. But I will tell you this. Berkshire Hathaway will be there (laughs) at that time. We run it on the basis that if things had just behaved slightly — very — if [former U.S. Treasury Secretary] Hank Paulson, George H. W. Bush — or no, George W.

Bush, I’m sorry — and [former Federal Reserve Chairman] Ben Bernanke and a few people hadn’t taken action, we were at that point where the line was formed, except it comes in electronic funds — they push buttons — and it’s all over very fast if there’s a run on a bank. If you ever buy a bank, and there are two banks in town, hire a few extras, and have them go over and start standing in line at the other guy’s bank. (Laughter) And there’s only one problem with that. After a while, somebody will stand in front of your bank, you know, and then both of you are gone. But the Federal Reserve is not gone. And the Federal Reserve in the United States can do whatever is necessary. They’ve got all kinds of rules about — they can do this or that, and this and that. And at one time in the 1980s, [former Federal Reserve Chairman] Paul Volcker, who was a very honest man, said to me — I said, you know, “What are the limits of what you can do?”

And he said — he was a very unusual guy — and huge — looked down at me — and said, “We can do whatever we need to do.” (Laughs) And that’s true. And that’s what happened in 2008 and ‘09, and that’s what happened in 2020. And you hope it happens again next time. But you want to be — we want Berkshire Hathaway to be there and in a position to operate when — if the economy stops. And that can always happen. That can always happen. So, with those cheery words — (laughter) — let’s see if we — I think — maybe if we can actually — it might be a good idea to start with some questions. As I said, we will have the questions alternate between CNBC — Becky Quick — and those are questions that have come in from shareholders. And they can be directed to any of the four of us up here. And then we will alternate and go around the room here. And we’ve got the auditorium broken into ten or 11 sections.

Charlie and I one time, we got out a form and it said, “Officers of the company broken down by age,” and we just put all of us (laughs) as an answer to that question. But we’ll have it broken down by categories around here. And we’ll keep alternating. And we will break for lunch at noon and reconvene at 1:00.

9. 一封偶然的电子邮件如何促成了Alleghany保险交易

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，让我们开始吧，贝基，你带个头？

贝基·奎克：谢谢，沃伦。第一个问题来自杰克·苏塞莱斯基（音）。他说：“在您2月26日写的年报中，您提到查理和您’在市场上几乎看不到令我们兴奋的东西’。然而大约在3月10日，Alleghany的交易宣布了，然后是西方石油的公告，接着是惠普投资的披露。“他的问题是：“从您写这封信的日期到这些投资宣布的日期之间，发生了什么变化，使得这些名字在一个半月或半个月的时间里突然变得有趣了？”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理，你想说你的版本吗？我说我的版本。

查理·芒格：嗯，我的版本是，我们找到了一些我们更愿意拥有、而不是持有国库券的东西。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：和往常一样，查理给出了完整的答案，但我会说得更长，内容却更少。（笑声）实际上，这封信的日期是2月26日，当时我们坦白说找不到任何东西，那是个周六。但在那之前一天，2月25日，我收到了一封电子邮件。实际上，是我的助理黛比·博萨内克收到的，因为我实在搞不懂怎么操作那个机器。所以她拿进来给我。实际上，她把一堆东西放在她办公桌边上，我偶尔会去收。里面有一张便条，只有几行字，来自一个朋友，他很多年前为伯克希尔工作过。这是在2月25日，写那封信的前一天。他说他现在成了Alleghany Corp的首席执行官。我已经关注Alleghany Corp 60年了。我读过他们的年报。我有四大抽屉满满的年报，因为这是一家有趣的公司。所有公司都让我感兴趣。

沃伦·巴菲特：所以我对Alleghany Corp了解很多。（笑）乔[布兰登]说，你知道，“这是我作为CEO的第一份年报，我想把它发给你。就像你为你妹妹写的一样，“他说，“我写这份报告就像在写给你一样。“我给乔回了一张便条。我说，你知道，“我会在这个周末读它，“或者类似的话，这是真的。我是说，我很期待读它。我说：“顺便说一句，我3月7日会在纽约。我们能见个面吗？我想见你。“而且，我想我可能说过，“我有个想法。“好吧，在那前一天我并没有那个想法。（笑）这件事正好在26号星期五来了。我知道我会以某个价格收购Alleghany。

如果他没有给我发那个便条，我永远不会想到要给他写信说：“我们为什么不在3月7日见个面？“之类的话。这件事根本不会发生，只是因为乔想把他刚写好的这份年报发给我看看。这就是有序的决策过程。我没有打电话给投行说，你知道：“你能给我准备一份关于这个的报告吗？你的建议是什么？“等等。我知道我们会以我们提出的价格收购Alleghany。如果Alleghany有兴趣，那很好。如果没有——但除此之外，如果那封电子邮件没有发，我们不会对Alleghany提出收购要约。

所以，这要归功于乔写了这份年报，如果他早一周寄出，那么——你知道，我不会特意去纽约，但我想坐下来和他谈谈伯克希尔会做什么。这就解释了那110亿。（笑）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: So, let’s start off and Becky, will you lead the way?

BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. The first question comes from Jack Suselesky (PH). And he says, “In the annual letter that you wrote on February 26th, you mentioned that Charlie and you saw ‘little that excites us in the market.’ Yet around March 10th, the deal for Alleghany was announced, and then later the Occidental announcement, then the disclosure of the HP investment.” His question is, “What changed from the time you dated the letter to the time the investments were announced that the names suddenly become interesting in the space of a month and a half, or half a month?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie, you want to give your version? I’ll give my version.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my version would be we found some things we preferred owning to Treasury bills. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: And as usual, Charlie’s given the total answer, but I’ll talk longer and say less. (Laughter) Actually, the letter’s dated February 26th, when we were confessing our inability to find anything, which was a Saturday. But the day before that, February 25th, I got an email. Actually, my assistant, Debbie Bosanek, gets it because I can’t figure out quite how to handle the machinery. So, she brought it in. Actually, she puts a bunch on the edge of her desk, and I collect them occasionally. And there was a note, just a few lines long, from a fellow that is a friend of mine and that worked for Berkshire many years ago. And this was on February 25th, the day before the thing. And he said he’d now become CEO of Alleghany Corp. I’ve been following Alleghany Corp for 60 years. Now, I’d read their annual reports. I had four big file drawers full of them because it was an interesting company. And all companies interested me.

WARREN BUFFETT: So, I knew a lot about Alleghany Corp. (Laughs) And Joe [Brandon] said, you know, “This is my first annual report as CEO, and I just wanted to send it along to you. Just like you write for your sisters,” he says, “I write this report as if I’m writing to you.” And I sent a note back to Joe. And I said, you know, “I’m going to read it over the weekend,” or whatever I said to him on it, which was true. I mean, I looked forward to reading it. And I said, “By the way, I’m going to be in New York on March 7th. And can we get together? I’d like to see you.” And, I think I may have said, “I’ve got an idea.” Well, I didn’t have that idea the day before. (Laughs) This thing happened to come in on Friday the 26th. And I knew I’d buy Alleghany at a price.

And if he hadn’t sent me the note, it never would’ve occurred to me to write him and say, “Why don’t we get together on March 7th?” or anything of the sort. It just wouldn’t have happened, except for the fact that Joe wanted to send me along this annual report that he’d just written. So that’s the orderly decision-making process. I didn’t call up investment bankers and say, you know, “Will you prepare me a report on this? And, you know, what’s your advice?” and all that stuff. I knew we’d buy Alleghany at the price we offered. And if it was of interest to Alleghany, fine. If it wasn’t — But otherwise, if that email hadn’t been sent, we would not have made an offer for Alleghany.

So, give credit to the fact that Joe had written the annual report, and if he’d sent it a week earlier, well — you know, I wasn’t going to make a special trip to New York, but I wanted to sit down with him and tell him what Berkshire would do. But that explains the 11 billion. (Laughs)

10. 人们在股票上赌博使得大量买入西方石油股票成为可能

沃伦·巴菲特：发生的事情是，有几只股票对我们来说变得非常有趣。我们也花了很多钱。发生的事情——市场——理解这一点非常重要——在过去的几年里，股市可能——它一直是赌场和——当我说华尔街时，我指的是整个资本形成市场——但——以及交易市场等等。但市场一直是非同寻常的。有时它相当投资导向。它不总是像你在书上读到的那样——资本市场应该做什么，你在学校里学习等等。其他时候，它几乎完全是一个赌场，一个赌博场所。这种情况在过去的几年里达到了非同寻常的程度——受到华尔街的鼓励，因为钱在于周转股票。我是说，人们说如果你在1965年之类的时候买了伯克希尔并持有，那做得多么好。但你的经纪人会饿死的。

华尔街赚钱的方式——不管怎样——是抓住资本主义餐桌和令人难以置信的经济体掉下来的面包屑，这在几百年前是没人能梦想的。但除非人们做交易（笑）并且他们从中分一杯羹，否则他们赚不到钱。当人们赌博时，他们赚的钱比人们投资时多得多。有一个一天交易20次、兴奋得像拉老虎机手柄一样的人，那可是好得多。你知道，那才是你——你知道——你可能不会说你想要那样的人。你可能也想要另一种人，但那是你赚钱的地方。（笑）市场被那种情况主导的程度，在某个幻灯片上显示出来了——我在这里有。是的。这是——幻灯片Oxy-one——请放Oxy-one。

那显示了我们如何买下了最终成为——我们在两周左右的时间里买下了西方石油公司14%的股份。你会说：“嗯，你怎么能在两周内买下一家公司14%的股份？“这比那更极端，因为如果你看西方石油的股东委托书，你会看到——标准名字——贝莱德指数基金、道富指数基金，基本上，还有先锋领航指数基金，然后还有另一家公司，Dodge & Cox。如果你把这四个实体算上——他们不会买卖股票——他们可能自己有一点点——所以他们大概拥有公司40%的股份，这四个公司。他们在这段时间里什么都没做。所以现在只剩下60%的西方石油公司股份可以出售了。西方石油已经存在了很多很多年。大公司，各种各样的情况。

在60%的流通股中，我进去告诉马克·米勒德，这个离我大约30英尺的伙计，我早上对他说，你知道，“买20%，分批买，或者其他什么方式。“在两周内，他从60%中买下了14%。那不是投资。（笑声）我是说，你不是从——我觉得这简直不可思议。你在伯克希尔做不到这一点。我是说，你真的买不到。你可以说你想买公司14%的股份。那需要很长很长时间。但美国的大公司——嗯，所有公司——都变成了扑克筹码。人们在买卖，就像三天期权或两天期权一样。人们拉机器手柄的次数越多，机器赚的钱就越多。我是说，非常清楚。而且——我是说，人们都去哪了？

投资者只是坐在那里，没有多少，而赚钱的，本质上，是一群在赌博的人。这使我们能够在两周内买下一家已经存在了几十年的公司14%的股份。想象一下，试图在两周内买下这个国家14%的农场，14%的公寓楼，或者14%的汽车经销商，或者任何东西，而已经有40%被锁定在其他地方。这——这超出了查理和我见过的任何事情，我们见过很多。但我从未见过这么大比例的美国公众——本质上，这是一个赌博场所。赚钱的人是那些与赌徒打交道的人。（笑）然后几周前这种情况大幅下降。如果你身处其中，你能感觉到。所以当有人问一个很好的问题，“为什么你在2月20日什么都没做，而在2月28日（以西方石油为例）开始了？”

——你知道，这是因为事情以某种方式发展了——具体到西方石油，他们做了一个分析师演示——我不知道是季度性的还是什么——我是在一个周末读到的——那正好是年报出来的那个周末——我周末读了它。[CEO]维基·霍鲁布说的完全有道理。我决定这是一个放置伯克希尔资金的好地方。然后在接下来的两周里我发现——白纸黑字写在那里——没什么神秘的——但维基在说公司经历了什么，现在处于什么位置，他们计划用这笔钱做什么。她会做她所说的——她说她不知道明年的油价。没人知道。但我们认为这有意义。两周后，我们拥有了公司14%的股份。我们已经拥有优先股和认股权证。

关于优先股的故事是，我们支付了100亿——优先股和认股权证——我们支付了100亿——在2020年3月季度末，我们那100亿的估值——在我们的10-Q报表中——我们估值55亿。所以，我们有45亿的亏损。而且它会——你知道——世界变了。石油有一天卖到负37美元一桶（笑），现在——很明显，我认为，我们想要——我们非常高兴——我们应该非常高兴——我们每天能生产1100万桶左右的石油，而不是根本无法生产，不得不在世界其他地方（笑）寻找每天1100万桶来维持美国工业机器的运转。查理，你有什么看法吗，为什么这么疯狂的事情会发生？

查理·芒格：嗯，它发生了——这几乎是我们现在所拥有的投机狂潮。我们有计算机带着算法与其他计算机交易。我们有对股票一无所知的人，被更不了解的股票经纪人建议着。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们懂佣金。

查理·芒格：这真是一个令人难以置信的疯狂局面。我们竟然形成了一个系统，所有这些等同于赌场活动的行为，与大量合法的长期投资混杂在一起，这真是太奇怪了。我认为任何明智的国家都不会想要这样的结果。你为什么希望你们国家的股票以赌场的方式交易给那些就像在赌场里玩骰子和轮盘赌的人呢？我认为这很疯狂。但它发生了。而且它很”体面”。不是对我而言，而是对其他人而言。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的——嗯——看看——看看这个国家——我是说，他们在1792年在梧桐树下成立了纽约证券交易所。那似乎并不是美国的”尤里卡时刻”。但看看发生了什么，用这个系统，不到——你知道——嗯——三个我的有生之年。我是说，（笑）真是难以置信。所以——它起作用了。现在，也许它是在违背自身的情况下起作用的——也许这个国家——但不管怎样，美国以令人难以置信的方式起作用了。没人能梦想到。没有人。你知道，如果你说——在三个有生之年内——你知道——我们开会的这个地方——我是说——它在1867年成为一个州。但在1789年，如果你问本·富兰克林或某个走出制宪会议的人：“你认为内布拉斯加州的前景如何？”

（笑）所取得的成就真是令人难以置信。这些成就是在——那些鼓励赌博的人——他们喜欢说这些成就是因为我们有这些流动的市场和所有美妙的东西。查理可能会说这是尽管有这些。谁知道呢？（笑声）但答案是——嗯，没有答案。（笑声）我的妻子——当我们1952年4月19日结婚时——我们上了我姑妈的车，开始向西开。我们最终走遍了西部——但有一晚我们在拉斯维加斯停了下来。那里有三个人。埃迪·巴里克、萨姆·齐格曼和杰基·高恩。这三个人都来自奥马哈。他们买了弗拉明戈酒店的一小部分股份。巴格西·西格尔的职业生涯在几年前相当突然地结束了——（笑）——

查理·芒格：被一颗子弹。

沃伦·巴菲特：但那无疑是一颗流弹。（笑声）事实上，大概有五六颗流弹。但无论如何，巴格西没了。一群人，包括来自奥马哈的三个人，参与了。萨姆·齐格曼住的地方离我现在住的地方大约两个街区。他是斯坦·利普西的叔叔。斯坦·利普西经营——对于关注伯克希尔的你们来说——经营《布法罗新闻》，后来是我们40或50年的合伙人。所以，各种各样的事情交织在一起。但我走进这个赌场，当时21岁——弗拉明戈——有点像汽车旅馆式的布局——我的新娘19岁。我看了一圈房间，所有这些人——他们那时穿得更讲究——是一个比现在可能更体面的群体——但他们有些人飞了几千英里——你知道——乘坐的飞机不如现在的快，可能按每英里计算更贵，经通胀调整后也是。

他们不辞辛苦地来做一些数学上不明智的事情，而且他们知道这是不明智的。我是说，他们恨不得赶紧掷骰子，你知道吗，试图判断自己手气好不好之类的。我看着那一群人。那里的每个人都明白他们正在做的事情数学上是很愚蠢的，他们不远千里来干这个，他们——我对我妻子说，你知道，我会发大财的。（笑）我是说，你怎么可能错过？（笑）如果人们愿意这样做，你知道，这是一个充满机遇的土地。嗯，现在仍然是这样，你知道。弗拉明戈变得大多了。在奥马哈，我们为杰基和他所做的事感到非常自豪。他也就一两年前才去世。他成了某种领袖——精神领袖——维加斯的。

就像我说的，萨姆·齐格曼的侄子后来拯救了我和查理在蓝筹印花公司和《布法罗新闻》的投资。（笑）这是一个非常偶然的社会。但在金融领域发生的事情，没有比这更奇怪的了。另一方面，如果你往回看，也许关于市场运作，特别是股市，写得最精彩的一章，是在一本书里，可能是经济史上最著名的书之一，《就业、利息和货币通论》，由约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所著。我想是1936年。我不知道是不是第12章——但我认为是——不管怎样，他在1936年描述了市场是什么样子。他用优美的散文描述了一些东西，解释了为什么今年3月整个国家都在以一种疯狂的方式交易西方石油，使得我们能够买下其他四个不打算出售的机构所不拥有的那部分的四分之一。但我们能买下它的四分之一。而且我们可以买更多。我是说——你只是好奇是否真的有人在想投资。

如果你回到投资，我是说，投资就是现在把钱拿出来，希望以后能拿回更多。它实际上是现在拿出购买力，希望以后能拿回更多的购买力。这就是你——你知道，你在教科书中学到，现在推迟消费，以便以后能消费更多，这样你就能照顾你的家人——所有这些关于投资如何发生的东西。这就是农场发生的情况。我是说，如果某人买了一个农场，他们通常最终会留给他们的孩子，或者是从父母那里得到的。我是说，他们不会每天坐在那里，一天看15次报价，说，你知道，我想买一个看涨期权——我想在我邻居家的农场上卖一个看跌期权。然后你可以对我的农场有一个看涨期权。然后我会有一种叫跨式期权或勒式期权的东西，或者别的什么。

你知道，他们只是——他们致力于让农场值更多的钱。如果他们有一个汽车经销商，他们也会这样做。如果他们有一栋公寓楼，他们也会这样做，你知道。他们寻求改善它，吸引租户，所有这些事情。而——40万亿——会是多少？——至少40万亿，你知道，所有美国企业的所有权——人们把它当作扑克筹码或拉手柄。他们建立了系统，这样如果你想买一只股票的三天看涨期权，你可以做到。他们卖看涨期权给你赚的钱比卖股票给你更多。所以他们教你关于看涨期权的知识。（笑）没有人在兜售农场或其他东西的看涨期权。但这就是市场做疯狂事情的原因。偶尔，伯克希尔会得到一个做点什么的机会。这——这不是因为我们聪明。

这是因为我们——我唯一能说的我们有资格的——有时我也怀疑这一点——但我觉得我们是理智的。你知道，我是说，这是这个行业的主要要求。查理？

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为我们从未有过像现在这样的情况，就每天发生的交易量和纯粹的赌博活动而言，以及那些给赌徒打气以便欺骗他们的人。这不好看。我认为这并不为资本主义增添光彩，就像一群人在桌子旁掷骰子一样。这对世界的其他人有什么好处？

沃伦·巴菲特：不过，这是致富的好方法，想办法把自己插入系统某个地方就行。而且，你知道，工作在一定程度上是自我选择的。很多年前——我在华尔街有很多朋友——不如我开始这样说话前一小时那么多了，但真的还是有的。我知道——人们——人们在生活中做出很多决定。事实是，总体而言，美国系统运行得非常好。可能在很多方面非常不公平。但它在我和我祖父所能获得的商品和服务之间产生了令人难以置信的差异，你知道。我可不想回到没有空调的时代，人们在我钻牙时往我嘴里倒威士忌之类的。我是说，这个世界好多了。而且——

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为因为疯狂的赌博，我们赚得更多了。我认为在我们运营的几十年里，它总体上让我们更容易了。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我是说，我们依赖于它。

查理·芒格：是的。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我是说，我们依赖于错误定价的企业，通过一个我们不对其错误定价负责的机制。总的来说，我们很久以前学到了一些东西，它不需要高智商。它不需要任何东西。只需要正确的态度。我们可能稍后会谈到更多，但我认为我们应该证明这里有观众，转到第一部分。（笑）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And what happened was that a few stocks got very interesting to us. And we also spent a lot of money. What happened — the market — and this is really important to understand — in the last couple years, the stock market has probably — it’s always been a combination of a casino and a — and when I talk about Wall Street, I’m talking about the whole capital formation market — but the — and trading market, et cetera. But the market has been extraordinary. Sometimes it’s quite investment oriented. It’s not like it — it’s always what you’ve read about in the books and everything — what capital markets are supposed to do, and you study it in school and all that. And other times, it’s almost totally a casino, and it’s a gambling parlor. And that existed to an extraordinary degree in the last couple of years — encouraged by Wall Street because the money is in turning over stocks. I mean, people say how wonderfully you’ve done if you bought Berkshire in, you know, 1965 or something and held it. But your broker would’ve starved to death.

Wall Street makes money on — one way or another — catching the crumbs that fall off a table of capitalism and an incredible economy that, you know, nobody could’ve ever dreamed of a couple hundred years ago. But they don’t make money unless people do things (laughs) and if they get a piece of them. And they make a lot more money when people are gambling than when they’re investing. It’s much better to have somebody that’s going to trade 20 times a day and get all excited about it, just like pulling the handle on a slot machine. You know, that’s who you — you know — You may not say that you want that person. You’d like the other kind of person, too, maybe, but that’s where you make the money. (Laughs) And the degree to which the market got dominated by that is shown on a slide some — I have it here somewhere. Yeah. Here’s — on [slide] Oxy-one — if you’ll put up the Oxy-one.

That shows how we bought what became — well, we bought in two weeks, or thereabouts, 14% of Occidental Petroleum. And you’ll say, “Well, how can you buy 14% of a company in two weeks?” And it’s more extreme than that, because if you look at the Occidental proxy, you’ll see that — the standard names — BlackRock index funds, State Street index funds, basically, Vanguard index funds, and then one other firm, Dodge & Cox. If you take those four entities — and they’re not going to buy and sell stock — they may get their own little — so they own 40% of the company, roughly, those four firms. And they didn’t do anything during this period. So now you’re down to 60% of the Occidental Petroleum Company that’s even available for sale. Occidental’s been around for years, and years, and years. Big company, all kinds of things.

And with 60% of the stock outstanding, I go in and tell Mark Millard, this fellow that is 30 feet away from me or so, and I say in the morning to him, you know, “Buy 20% and take blocks, or whatever it may be.” And in two weeks, he buys 14% out of 60%. That’s not investment. (Laughter) I mean, you’re not buying from — I find it just incredible. You wouldn’t be able to do that with Berkshire. I mean, you can’t — literally buy it. You can say you want to buy 14% of the company. It’s going to take you a long, long time. But, overwhelmingly, large companies in America — well, all of them — they became poker chips. And people were buying and selling like three-day calls or two-day calls. And the more people — times people pull the handle on the machine, the more money the machine makes. I mean, it’s very clear. And overwhelmingly — I mean, where did the people go?

The investors just were sitting around and there weren’t very many, and the money was being made, essentially, by a bunch of people gambling on things. And that enabled us, in a two-week period, to buy 14% of a business that’s been around for decades. Imagine trying to buy 14% of the farms in two weeks in this country, 14% of the apartment houses, or 14% of the auto dealerships, or just anything, when already 40% were locked up some other place. It is — it defies anything that Charlie and I have seen, and we’ve seen a lot. But I’ve never seen that percentage of the American public — essentially, it was a gambling parlor. And the people that were making money were people that worked with gamblers. (Laughs) And then it declined very significantly a few weeks ago. You can feel it if you’re around it. So, when somebody asks a very good question, this, “Why weren’t you doing anything on February 20th, and why were you doing it on — starting, well, in the case of Occidental, on February 28th?”

— you know, it’s because things developed in a way — And in the case of Occidental specifically, they’d had an analyst presentation of some — I don’t know whether it was a quarterly one or what it was exactly — but I read it over a weekend — and that was the weekend when the annual report came out — I read it over a weekend. And what [CEO] Vicki Hollub was saying made nothing but sense. And I decided that it was a good place to put Berkshire’s money. And then I found out in the ensuing two weeks — it was there in black and white — there was nothing mysterious about it — but Vicki was saying what the company had gone through and where it was now and what they planned to do with the money. And she’ll do what — she says she doesn’t know the price of oil next year. Nobody does. But we decided it made sense. And two weeks later, we had 14% of the company. And we also already had a preferred stock and warrants.

And the story of the preferred stock is we paid 10 billion — preferred stock and warrants — we paid 10 billion for it — and at the end of the March quarter of 2020, we valued that 10 billion — for our 10-Q — we valued it at 5 1/2 billion. So, we had a 4 1/2 billion loss. And it would have — you know — The world changed. Oil sold for minus $37 a barrel (laughs) one day, and — Now it’s quite apparent, I think, that we want — we’re very happy — we should be very happy — that we can produce 11 million barrels a day, or something of the sort, in the United States, rather than being able to produce none and having to find 11 million barrels a day somewhere else (laughs) in the world to take care of keeping the American industrial machine working. Charlie, have you got any comments on that as to how something this crazy could’ve happened?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it happened — it’s almost a mania of speculation that we now

标题：2022年股东大会

第2部分，共5部分

我想我们最后一次买入美国运通股票是在1998年左右。当时我们持有美国运通公司11.2%的股份——一家非常优秀的公司。从那以后，每个季度他们都会给我们寄来一张股息支票。所以，随着他们逐步发展，我们也获得了一些现金。而现在，我们持有美国运通20%的股份。之所以会这样，是因为他们回购了股票。结果证明这非常有利。即使他们为股票支付了过高的价格等等——这并不能解决所有问题——但如果你拥有一项你喜欢的资产，而他们又提高了你的持股比例，那无疑是一件好事。就像我说的，我们的持股比例从11.2%增加到了20%。如果你在使用美国运通卡——或者其他任何情况——那么20%的收益（曾经是11.2%）都会为我们贡献一点利润，而我们是没再投入任何资金做到的。

现在，想象一下——想象你拥有一座农场，有640英亩土地，你每年耕种，从中赚一点钱，并且享受农耕生活。不知怎的，大约20年后，它变成了1100或1200英亩。我是说，你会说，这到底是怎么回事？这可能吗？——你知道，这是否违背美国精神？——或其他什么。我的意思是，这是否是资本成本的合理运用？等等等等。如果你以合适的价格进行回购，没有什么比回购自家公司股票更好的了。我们拥有——我提到过苹果公司，并将其作为例子，说明我们在苹果的权益是如何增加的——你知道——每当一家年赚千亿美元的公司——你知道——这意味着我们的权益增加了十分之一百分点。你知道，我们又增加了1亿美元的收益。嗯，我的意思是，这需要做很多工作（笑声）——1亿美元的收益。

而且，你知道，他们在第一季度刚公布了业绩——他们按财年计算——但他们刚公布了3月份的季度业绩——你知道，他们赚了更多的钱，而流通股却更少了。我们在第一季度左右也确实又买了一点苹果。我们决定想持有更多的权益。除此之外，我们知道，如果他们继续回购股票，我们将持有更多权益——虽然我们没有任何内幕消息——但这当然看起来是必然的趋势。而且，你知道，我们感觉更好，因为我们在市场上买了我们想买的股票。并且（笑声）我们也同样高兴——因为——他们用现金买断了其他人的股份。这是世界上最简单的事情，然后我却读到了所有这些乱七八糟的东西。

真是难以置信，人们竟然不能理解一些事情，比如，如果你拥有一座农场，你旁边的家伙也有一座农场，而不知怎的，在你耕种自己农场的同时，你却能不断地、毫不费力地获得他农场的一部分——至少，你是用部分收益来做到这一点的——你会对此感觉非常好。查理会对此有什么解释吗？

13. 必须将董事长和CEO角色分开是“荒谬的”

查理·芒格：嗯，在当前形势下，我还有另一件感兴趣的事。我们从指数基金那里收到各种建议，一封信说，我们——董事长和首席执行官是同一个人，而且他们某处有个教授认为，如果有一个独立的——如果沃伦能一分为二——我们可以把他分成两半，各干各的。对我来说，这是我听过的最荒谬的批评。这就好比——这就好比——奥德修斯在特洛伊战争中获胜归来等等，然后有人说，我不喜欢你赢得那场战斗时握矛的方式。（笑声）而说这话的是个从未经营过任何企业、什么都不懂的家伙。我不太看好这种行为。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，让我们看看。这封信里某个地方——我可能会找到。啊，在这里。我们在年报里——在一份九页报告的第三段——我们写道：“我们将平等对待每一个人。”这也许是我们一个疯狂的理念，但我们真的觉得，那些在1960年、1970年或1980年把积蓄交给我们，一直放在我们这里，并且信任我们的人，他们理应得到与那些疯狂积累管理资产、根据管理资产获得报酬、只知道需要制定在华盛顿流行政策的家伙同样的尊重和关注。那些家伙唯一的念头就是，华盛顿有时会说，你变得太大了，我们要对你采取点措施。所以，他们极力确保自己在做人们会欢呼的事情。所以无论如何，我说：“嗯，我们将一视同仁。”我们外面有三百万股东。

我们将一视同仁。在3月25日，我写那封信大约一个月后——信在第三段，你会以为他们能读到那里——他们拥有1.01亿股B股——我是说，现在，总该有人读到第三段吧。但无论如何，我们收到一封信，上面写着：“我们希望在伯克希尔·哈撒韦2022年股东大会之前与您会面，讨论伯克希尔·哈撒韦关于治理和可持续发展的看法。”嗯，我写的关于这方面的内容，可能比经营公司的那个家伙老实地写的还多。但为什么他们觉得我们应该与他们见面，而不是与你们这些亲自来这里的每个人见面呢？（笑声）（掌声）我在一个非常非常非常共和党的家庭长大，但我感觉，你知道，像个愤怒的民粹主义者之类的。但我就是无法想象——嗯，总之，你们听到了。

（笑声）而且，你知道，有人靠这个赚钱——嗯，我肯定有很多人在公关领域，他们雇佣顾问，因为如果有顾问告诉他们董事长和CEO是否应该是同一个人，这看起来更好，那些人也会因此得到报酬。然后他们在董事会上讨论，然后，你知道——最后，相信我，如果国会的90%出于某种原因认为董事长和CEO是同一个人更好，指数基金（笑声）就不会写那些信了，因为他们唯一担心的是，是否因为某种原因，人们开始质疑为什么某个机构应该在国家的每家主要公司拥有10%的投票权。我喜欢指数基金的想法。但观察激励机制、官僚主义以及任何其他东西如何引导人们，确实很有趣。给我写信的那个人可能是个非常好的人。那是他的工作。嗯，总之，他们没有获得特别会议。而你们在这里，我们非常感激你们的到来。（掌声）

14. BNSF的改进需要时间

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。回到贝基的问题。

贝基·奎克：这个问题是给阿吉特和格雷格的。它来自本·诺尔（音），一位持股30年的股东。他是内布拉斯加本地人，他说他今天会来参加股东大会。“BNSF和GEICO似乎正在输给他们的两个主要竞争对手：联合太平洋和Progressive。” “过去几年，联合太平洋的运营比率比BNSF好大约400个基点。” “而Progressive在保持比GEICO低综合成本率的同时，增长也更快。在运营基础上，联合太平洋的精准定时铁路运输和Progressive的远程信息处理技术似乎已经领先于伯克希尔旗下的业务。” 他想知道格雷格和阿吉特正在做什么来应对这些业务挑战。

格雷格·阿贝尔：我先来？好的。谢谢你，贝基。首先，当我们思考BNSF时，我们拥有一个非常出色的铁路专营权和一项伟大的业务。我们确实与其他铁路公司竞争，我们非常清楚他们如何运营，包括他们的运营比率、他们运营所依据的指标以及精准铁路运输。这些都是其中的一部分。但我想分享的是，当我思考BNSF时，我们的出发点是专注于我们的客户，理解我们如何最好地为他们服务，是的，我们希望以高效和有效的方式来做，为我们的股东带来出色的回报。这将继续是我们的重点。所以，是的，我们从他们报告的所有指标以及他们如何运营铁路中学习，我们观察它。但我会在任何运营日，把我们的团队和他们摆在一起比较。我们会像美国任何其他铁路公司一样高效地运营我们的车厢。我们会代表我们的客户做到这一点。

所以，我们非常自豪，但我们没有忽视这样一个事实：无论是对运营还是对我们的客户，我们还有更多工作要做。因此，我们将继续看到改进。我们在那里有一个出色的领导团队。我们在BNSF内部有一个出色的员工群体。我喜欢的是，我们将看到长期的改进。我们在西部拥有一个卓越的联运专营权。从长远来看，这对我们的股东和合作伙伴来说非常有价值。这就是我们团队专注的方向——打造那个专营权。所以，我为我们所处的位置感到无比自豪，但我们也知道前路漫漫。我们将继续变得越来越好。

查理·芒格：格雷格，如果有人给我们机会，你会用我们的业务交换他们的吗？

格雷格·阿贝尔：永远不会。永远不会。我们热爱我们的——

查理·芒格：他对此了解很多，菲尔。（笑声）

格雷格·阿贝尔：我们有一个伟大的特许经营权，有一个出色的领导团队在运营它。说得好，查理。谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们转到阿吉特的问题之前——格雷格，你知道，自从我们收购能源公司以来，他作为重要合作伙伴已经大约20年了，甚至更久一点。他的老板是大卫·索科尔。他们两个人，我是说，他们知道如何经营企业。并不是我们不阅读其他公司的数据等等。但我们有凯蒂·法默这个完美的人在运营BNSF。我们知道，她会做得很好。通过各种方式改造铁路，你知道——如果你拥有大约21000英里的自有轨道和各种其他设施——这还不包括侧线和双轨——而且你有很多事情要做，因为这是一条从大约200年前（虽然不是整整200年）就开始建造的铁路——你不能轻易改变事物（笑声）。城镇也随之发展。

你知道，当1862年铁路通到奥马哈时，嗯，甚至还没有跨过河，尽管我们已经成为西部的主要铁路枢纽，或者说通往西部的门户。一百年后我们还会在这里。我们将是这个国家一项重要、真正重要的资产。这将是伯克希尔一个非常大、非常重要的部分。我们将接管一个我认为是随着时间的推移由300多家铁路公司整合而成的令人难以置信的集合体。你知道，轨道是大约150年前铺设的，路线也是那时候规划的。世界在变化，但我们必须适应它。但你不能在几小时内就下令改变一千英里长的轨道，或改变它的运营方式等等。所以，我们运营它是为了伯克希尔的股东拥有这项资产，并且我们这样做也会惠及国家。无论谁运营它，它显然对国家都非常重要。联合太平洋到时候也会存在。

一百年后，它会是比现在更好的铁路。但我不能保证如果未来几个月发生洪水或其他情况会发生什么。你知道，它可能会破坏你的很多计划，扰乱很多人的生活，扰乱很多货运。铁路运营没有神奇的魔杖可以做出巨大改变。另一方面，你应该每天努力让它变得更好。我忘了我们有多少座桥梁，但几年前我们每年在资本支出上花费300或400亿美元。马特·罗斯（前BNSF首席执行官）说，嗯，我们还得花更多钱等等。我说，嗯，我说，这部分我能搞定。我不确定查理行不行。（笑声）我得向他解释这些数字。所以，他们买的下一座桥——他们建的——他们把它叫做查尔斯·T·芒格桥。

所以，你真的可以（笑声）去看看，我们的铁路上有查尔斯·T·芒格桥，因为查理大约10年前也问过类似的问题。

15. GEICO采用远程信息处理技术与Progressive竞争

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特？

阿吉特·贾因：好的。谢谢你，贝基。毫无疑问，个人汽车保险业务是一个竞争非常激烈的行业。话虽如此，GEICO和Progressive都是这个领域非常成功的参与者。它们各有优缺点。但话虽如此，毫无疑问，最近，正如你指出的，Progressive无论从利润率还是增长率来看，都比GEICO做得好得多。这有很多原因，但我认为对GEICO来说，最大的问题，你刚才也正确地指出了，是远程信息处理技术。Progressive涉足远程信息处理技术已经有，我不知道，超过10年了，可能接近20年。GEICO直到最近才涉足远程信息处理技术。只是在过去两年，他们才真正认真努力地使用远程信息处理技术进行细分，并试图匹配费率和风险。这是一段漫长的旅程。但旅程已经开始了，初步结果令人鼓舞。

这需要一些时间，但我的希望和期望是，希望在未来一两年内，GEICO能够在远程信息处理方面赶上Progressive。希望这能转化为增长率和利润率。

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，你有什么要说的吗？（掌声）

16. 国家农场的成功反驳了商学院教的东西

沃伦·巴菲特：这非常有趣。我是说，汽车保险行业是一个值得研究的迷人行业，因为现在最大的汽车保险公司——我们说的是2022年——你知道，亨利·福特——我的意思是，那是1903年，或者差不多，当时汽车真正开始发展。没过多少年，他每年就生产200万辆汽车。想象一下。一个人，每年200万辆汽车，那是很多车。因此，在人们考虑保险数百年之后，他们考虑的是海上船只和火灾，他们有保护协会，而汽车保险变得非常重要。保险是一种存在了很久的产品。但自1936年里奥·古德温创立GEICO以来，汽车保险几乎没变过。我们带着好主意出现，有很多大公司等等。但美国最大的汽车保险公司是在伊利诺伊州由一位对保险尤其不熟悉的人创立的。它是一家互助公司。按照资本主义，它本不该成功。

我是说，你知道，如果你去商学院，他们会教你，只有当你拥有激励和薪酬以及各种东西时，一家公司才能成功。嗯，没有人真正从国家农场发财。他们就在那里——而他们是最大的保险公司。而里奥·古德温在大约80多年前创办公司时，他可能想发财。在Progressive，人们可能也想发财。在Travelers和Aetna——你可以说出几十家公司。谁赢了？你知道，一家互助公司。就目前的规模而言，他们仍然是最大的公司。他们拥有——如果你排除伯克希尔——他们拥有最多的净资产，远远超过。我认为他们大约有1400亿或类似数量的净资产。你知道，Progressive在很长一段时间里由一位非常非常非常聪明的人运营。现在运营它的人也非常聪明。但他们的净资产只有伊利诺伊州那些没人知道名字的人（笑声）多年来积累的净资产的六分之一。

而且他们有时间销售同样的产品，他们疯狂地做广告。我们每年花20亿美元，告诉人们我们70或80年来一直告诉他们的同样事情，你知道。保单没有变化。但当我们做这一切之后，国家农场仍然比任何公司做的业务都多。按照资本主义，它本不该存在，你知道。如果你今天带着一个计划去创办一个国家农场，并让它与Progressive竞争，谁会提供资本呢？（笑声）我的意思是，一家互助公司，你从它那里得不到利润？这完全说不通，除非他们有1400亿或类似的净资产。而Progressive，我不知道他们的净资产是多少，但大概在200亿左右，我很久没看了。顺便提一下，我的意思是，他们在承保方面非常非常非常有纪律。

当然，在投资方面，他们的净资产在第一季度下降了，因为他们持有大量债券。他们会说，嗯——可能保险业的每个人都会说——嗯，我们持有债券，因为大家都这么做。（笑声）而一半的业务是，你随大流；另一半业务，你花费大量时间，试图分析每个县，用所有你能想到的方式来细分和合理定价风险等等。你知道，基本上，40年前——是的，40年前——彼得·刘易斯（前Progressive董事长）就坐在我的办公室里，他非常聪明。你知道，这家伙显然会成为伯克希尔的主要竞争对手。他对保险了如指掌，非常聪明。但他就是忽视了投资方面，而这与（笑声）承保方面同等重要。观察组织如何运作以及它们在某些方面存在所谓的盲点，确实很有趣。当然，查理和我知道我们自己也有各种各样的盲点。

所以，我们必须小心，不要批评别人有盲点。（笑声）这——汽车保险业务应该在商学院被研究，因为它基本上反驳了他们目前教授的许多东西。所以，这是我今天给商学院们的建议。好了。（笑声）谢谢你，阿吉特。你不能——阿吉特为伯克希尔增加的价值超过了Progressive的总净资产。这并非贬低Progressive，我只是说一个人。（掌声）

17. “我们从未把握过任何时机”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，二号站。

拉吉德·厄杜瓦尔：你好，沃伦和查理。很高兴见到你们两位以及出色的伯克希尔经理们。感谢你们所做的一切。我叫拉吉德·厄杜瓦尔（音），来自新泽西。我的问题是关于市场时机。你一直说不可能把握市场时机。然而，如果我们看看你们的记录，你们在一些关键决策上有着惊人的时机把握。你们在1969年和1970年退出股市。你们在1972年、1974年市场非常便宜时重新进场。你们在1987年、1999年、2000年也做了同样的事情。今天，当市场下跌时，我们坐拥大量现金。我的问题是，你们如何如此精准地把握大的市场波动时机？

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想先给你提供一个职位。（笑声）

拉吉德·厄杜瓦尔：我接受。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：有趣的是，你知道，显然我们完全不知道股票市场周一开盘时会发生什么。我们从来不知道。我们从未——查理和我——我不认为在我们合作的所有时间里——我稍后可能会告诉你一些关于学习是如何发生的——但我们从未——我不认为我们曾做过任何决定，其中任何一人说过或想过，我们应该根据市场将做什么来买入或卖出。

查理·芒格：没有。

沃伦·巴菲特：或者就此而言，根据经济会做什么。我们不知道。有趣的是，有时我因为某些事情获得了一些赞誉，比如，当2008年所有人都看跌股票等等的时候，我们充满乐观是多棒啊。你知道，我们在一个非常愚蠢的时候花掉了净资产的很大一部分。（笑声）我不应该说我，是我。我们花掉了大约150或160亿美元——当时对我们来说比现在大得多——我们在最后几周，大约三四周的时间里——在箭牌和高盛等公司之间——在一个糟糕的时机，结果证明是这样。我的意思是，我不知道这是好时机还是坏时机，但这确实是一个非常愚蠢的时机。我为《纽约时报》写了一篇文章，“买入美国”，以及所有这些事情。

嗯，如果我有任何时机感，再等六个月直到——我认为低点在3月份——事实上我想那天我可能上了CNBC，或者类似的事情。但我完全错过了那个机会。我完全错过了，你知道，2020年3月。我们不擅长把握时机。我们在判断自己是否得到了足够的回报方面还算不错。我们买入任何东西时都不知道——嗯，我们总是希望它会跌一段时间，这样我们可以买入更多，我们甚至希望在买入完毕、资金用完后，如果它很便宜，公司会继续回购，实际上是提高了我们的持股比例。我的意思是，这些你在四年级就能学到。但这并不是学校里教的东西。所以，永远不要归功于我们。嗯，实际上，把所有的功劳都给我们。我的意思是，出去告诉每个人我们有多聪明，但我们并不傻。（笑声）我们从未把握过任何时机。我们从未领悟过经济的洞察。

我的意思是，我11岁的时候，大概是1942年3月12日——或者3月11日——你知道，我买了股票，当时道指是90点——嗯，早上是101点——我想收盘时是99点——你知道，现在它是34,000点，或者可能比周四少了1000点。（笑声）但是，你知道，这是一个决定：持有美国企业是件好事。而且，你知道，如果哈佛捐赠基金在我11岁的时候来见我，（笑声）或者通用汽车的养老基金之类的，他们会说，嗯，不，但我们得保持平衡。我们可能得配置60%。然后我们每三个月就得坐下来听一堆经理唠叨。

如果他们就扔飞镖决定，然后说，我们50年后、100年后还会在美国，买股票会比买债券表现更好，那他们会做得更好。人们把如此简单的游戏搞得如此复杂，真是令人惊叹。但当然，如果他们告诉每个人这是一个多么简单的游戏，那么90%或更多的发言者的收入就会消失。所以，期待人们解释他们实际上并没有为你能自己做的东西增加任何价值，这有点苛求人性了。或者实际上，你是，你知道——我讨厌用这个例子——但你可以让猴子往报纸上扔飞镖。你知道，去掉管理费等等，我会押注猴子。但我不认为它们是更优越的物种。我也不希望它们搬到隔壁而不是我的隔壁邻居（笑声）或任何东西，但事情就是这样。

查理，你有什么令人振奋的话要说吗？（笑声）

18. “资本主义在分配回报方面非常奇特”

查理·芒格：嗯，在财富咨询行业，常常是这样，以前，你去找你的投资顾问，你说，我该怎么做才能保护自己的未来？他说，你为什么现在不给我5万美元的净资产呢？这是我对你未来的贡献。（笑声）这是一个奇特的行业。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这是一个伟大的游戏，因为你（听不清）变富。它仍然是——如果你有一个儿子或女儿真的想按智商点数和每尔格精力赚钱，嗯，告诉他们去华尔街。我的意思是，不要让他们进入神职或其他行业。我是说，如果那是他们想要的。这是自我选择。而且永远都会是这样。我的意思是，没有理由因为人们按自身利益行事而对人性感到绝望。随着时间的推移，他们可能实际上并非在按自身利益行事，但他们——你知道，他们更快乐吗？谁知道呢？但如果他们只是想赚钱——嗯，在座的各位在礼堂里看到了所罗门兄弟事件的一个小片段。杰里·科里根当时是纽约联储的主席，同一个委员会正在质问他。他们说，科里根先生——他们让他难堪——他们说，谁是去年所罗门公司薪酬最高的人？他说，嗯，他说出了名字——也许他说了——然后他说他去年——我忘了是2000万还是什么——我们说的是1991年——他说，他可能拿了2000万。那人问，他多大了？你知道，他说，嗯，我想他——科里根说——大概是，他26岁，或者类似。然后科里根忍不住说，他连橄榄球都扔不好。（笑声）事实是，你知道——现在，扔橄榄球赚的钱比以前多得多。你知道，泰德·威廉姆斯是我的英雄之一。你知道，我想他当时每年赚2万或2.5万美元。

你知道，想象一下今天，一个打击率0.230或0.240的家伙，你知道，如果他进入大联盟，我的意思是，钱就涌进来了。当然，那些人应该坐下来感谢这样一个事实：能容纳3万或4万人的体育场，是给他们发薪水的收入来源，这个体育场从3万人增加到4万人，因为有人首先发明了电视，然后出现了有线电视，然后出现了付费电视等等。没有人知道那些人的名字。但资本主义在分配回报方面非常非常非常奇特。有一段时间，在华尔街比在大联盟里当一个打击率0.220或0.230的击球手更好。你知道，现在由于电视的发展等等，情况反过来了。所以，这是一个疯狂的世界。回报似乎非常非常非常反复无常，它们确实如此。而且似乎没有任何神学家，甚至我和查理在空闲时也认为，整个事情看起来有点疯狂。但它运作得非常好。

即使是那些没有利用——被系统亏待的人——也比系统没有改变时过得好得多。这并不意味着你必然不应该努力改变，但你应该认识到你能对人性做些什么的局限性，就这么说吧。好了。查理，你想以某种方式结束这个布道吗？（笑声）

19. 你应当在人生的后半段成为更好的人

查理·芒格：嗯，我确实认为我们有一个非常有趣的现象——我会说，在许多财富咨询业务中，人们按技能收费，却提供伪装成主动投资的被动指数化策略。换句话说，没有人能忍受自己与大众和结果如此不同。他们害怕失去费用。所以，每个人都做同样的事情。这有点荒谬。世界有点荒谬。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但正如查理在电影中指出的——只有这里的人看到了——在我们结婚之前，你知道，我们试图说服几位年轻女性，我们实际上比我们看起来更有魅力。我是说——（笑声）你不能期望人们不按自己的利益行事。那非常重要，我们没在婚前披露所有缺点。所以——

查理·芒格：沃伦和我正努力变得更好一点。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，那是真的——

查理·芒格：我们可能有点失败。我不知道你怎么样，但我比自己17岁时稍微进步了一点。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯——（笑声）这真是一个有趣的观点，因为如果命运给你倾注了各种好东西，你应当在人生的后半段比前半段成为更好的人。我的意思是，这真的不应该是对人们过高的要求。如果他们中了卵巢彩票，出生在美国，各种好事都发生在了他们身上，并且你有机会看到自己过去有多愚蠢，以及做过的各种蠢事，你知道，为什么不让后半生比前半生更好呢？我会说——从一个非常低的起点开始——但是，我的意思是，我并不接近，你知道，根据任何智力测试或做任何事的能力，你知道，我什么也没学到。但你确实只有通过与人互动才能学到某些东西。

而且你不知道，当你两岁时，无论你从世界吸收了多少种知识，一个两岁孩子大脑中进行的学习机器是令人难以置信的。但这与拥有30或40年关于人类动物实际行为方式的经验不同，这真的是，你知道，你一直在学习。但这应该让你在人生的后半段比前半段成为更好的人。我会说，如果你说你是一个在后半段更好的人，并且有理由在前半段就这么说，你知道，忘记前半段吧。（笑声）享受后半段。查理和我都有幸，第一，活了很长时间，所以我们可以去玩那个我们认为是充满希望和受人尊敬的后半段。我们有足够的智慧去弄清楚——嗯，我们弄清楚了什么让我们快乐。我们对什么会让别人不快乐之类的事情也变得稍微敏感了一些。

我更愿意被后半生的我评判，而不是前半生，查理也一样。

查理·芒格：是的，当然。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

查理·芒格：我非常——我甚至不看年轻时做的事，因为那会让我尴尬。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好的。你们中任何人想就具体问题考考查理，可以稍后进行。（笑声）

20. 伯克希尔无法防范核武器风险

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

贝基·奎克：这个问题分为两部分。第一部分是给沃伦和阿吉特的，第二部分是给格雷格的。来自罗杰·克莱夫曼（音）。他说：“几年前，巴菲特先生曾表示，核攻击是伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险面临的最大风险。” “鉴于当前形势，如果人口密集地区发生核事件，伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险会面临怎样的后果？” “其次，对格雷格来说，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源是否遭受过物理或网络攻击？不管怎样，是否已经实施了任何特别的安全强化措施？”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，关于第一部分，自1945年8月以来，每一天——并且当第二个大国拥有了杀死数百万人的能力时，这种情况急剧加速——这已经通过这个因素被放大到了一个难以置信的程度，即每天都存在风险。这是一个非常非常小的风险。但正如阿吉特或这张桌子旁的任何人都可以告诉你的，如果你掷骰子——嗯，拉斯维加斯沙漠客栈赌场曾经有一对骰子放在玻璃罩下。某个家伙连续掷出了32次过关。我不知道，也许概率是八百万分之一或四百万分之一——四十亿分之一。但你知道，如果你一直掷骰子，你知道，什么事都可能发生。我的意思是，如果明天所有3.3亿美国人都出来，每个美国人猜硬币正反面，他们每天都这样做，10天后，你知道，有33万人连续猜对了10次。

如果再做10天，你仍然会有一堆人连续猜对了20次。他们真的认为他们学会了如何控制硬币翻转。嗯，答案是，世界每天都在抛硬币，看那些能够（如我们所知）毁灭这个星球的人是否会这么做。不幸的是，主要问题在于那些拥有大量核武器和洲际弹道导弹的人。当他们谈论使用战术核武器，因为有人会因为输掉战争而沮丧时，我的意思是，有人认为一个愿意用战术武器杀死数十万人的人，为什么会停下来？这是一个非常非常非常非常危险的世界。而且——

查理·芒格：但我们没有任何办法——

沃伦·巴菲特：不——

查理·芒格：——保护——

沃伦·巴菲特：没办法保护——

查理·芒格：——免受大规模核攻击。我认识一个人，他说，如果发生核战争，我知道我要做什么。我会爬到桌子底下，跟自己的屁股吻别。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，是的。查理在伯克希尔负责损失控制。（笑声）我们对此没有解决方案。

查理·芒格：不，我们没有。

沃伦·巴菲特：也没有任何解决方案。而且，你知道，想想看，在1939年8月——你知道，9月1日是希特勒进入波兰的日子——但这里的人对此知之甚少。我的意思是，你得到的新闻来自你去影院看的新闻片，因为剧院有空调，你知道，或者类似原因。所以如果我去看电影——夏天你想去电影院，因为1939年8月有空调——嗯，在军队实际进入波兰的情况下是9月1日——但你知道，屏幕上只有几个人，一个权威声音告诉你德国军队刚刚进入波兰，可能还有几张坦克照片。一分钟就结束了。现在当然，每一天每时每刻，你看到人们在死去，你非常同情他们，而且可能轮到的是你而不是他们。情况是如此不同。但在1939年8月，有一封信大约提前一个月寄给了罗斯福总统。他为什么收到那封信？

他收到信主要是因为希特勒太反犹太了。他把所有能预见即将到来的犹太人赶出了德国。其中有一些伟大的科学家。利奥·西拉德，显然来自匈牙利，不知怎么被赶了出来。爱因斯坦也被赶了出来。利奥·西拉德最终到了美国。他写了一封信告诉美国总统富兰克林·D·罗斯福，有一堆铀以不同方式移动或其他什么。我对物理一无所知，零基础。我不知道它的开关标志。但无论如何，我知道这封信的作用。因为他写了一封信说，你知道，物理领域可能发生大事，美国最好先下手。但他遇到了一个问题：如何把信送到罗斯福那里？你知道，利奥·西拉德，他对美国总统来说是谁？所以他想，如果让爱因斯坦联署，总统就会注意。他是对的。所以（笑声）他去找爱因斯坦，两人一起送了信。

他们把信送给了罗斯福。如果希特勒没有那种疯狂的关于犹太人的观点，他们可能根本不会在美国。所以不管怎样，那封信送去了，我们比任何人都先研制出了原子弹。利奥·西拉德和爱因斯坦最后到了美国而不是别的地方，这是一个非常非常幸运的发展。谁知道呢？但历史的偶然性——还会有更多与原子武器相关的偶然事件。你知道，我们多次接近过。我的意思是，我们有雁群飞过，你知道，北方的某个地方，北美防空司令部收到一个疯狂信号。我们在苏联那里有过被放错位置的训练磁带，或者类似情况，看起来好像有事发生。我们对此无能为力。这是一个伯克希尔绝对不感兴趣的风险，尽管你可以说世界上的每个人都应该感兴趣。但这对我们没有任何好处——你知道，感觉是，思考它对我们没好处。

但这并不能改变这样一个事实：世界上有两个大国，由于对对方意图的误判，由于各种原因，你知道，过去曾多次濒临险境。查理和我经历过古巴导弹危机。你知道，我们知道大规模杀伤性武器有被使用的可能性。相信我，还有更多坏事可能发生。人类并没有真正找到对抗技术的制衡力量。我的意思是，回到穴居人时代，如果你是一个反社会者，你会向隔壁洞穴的家伙扔石头。我的意思是，那是成比例的。我们不断发展，出现了技术完全超越人类的突破。我们将看到会发生什么。但到目前为止，一切顺利。不过，伯克希尔没有答案。有些保单我们不签发，因为我们无论如何也无法兑现。每个人都知道我们无法兑现。

你有那个风险，伯克希尔无法保护你。到目前为止我们非常幸运。阿吉特，你有没有收到过任何关于这方面的——

阿吉特·贾因：除了沃伦所说的一切之外，在发生此类事情的概率方面，另外一件让我担心核情况的事情是——我缺乏真正估计我们在核事件中实际风险敞口的能力。当你谈论其他大的风险敞口时：地震、飓风和网络攻击，我可以以合理的准确度，对风险敞口有多大以及损失可能有多大有一个看法。当涉及到核问题时，你知道，我有点投降了。你说，我们很难估计“坏”能坏到什么程度。很多不同的风险敞口都会受到影响。尽管在几乎所有我们的合同中，我们都试图排除核风险作为承保范围，但尽管如此，如果发生类似事件，我相当肯定监管机构和法院会追究保险公司的责任，他们会重写合同，我们将被要求赔付。

例如，有一件事已经在讨论中：我们签发所谓的“火灾保单”。这些火灾保单试图排除核风险作为承保范围。但有一些监管机构认为，哎呀，如果是火灾保单，如果核攻击引起火灾，你怎么能排除火灾呢？你最好包括火灾。所以，你知道，我们必须面对这样的争论，保险公司很难在承保范围问题上与监管机构和法院系统抗争。

沃伦·巴菲特：而且到时候也不会有监管机构或任何人了。所以——（笑声）我们将把重建工作留给一百万年之后。（笑声）爱因斯坦说过：“我不知道第三次世界大战用什么武器。但我知道第四次世界大战的武器将是棍棒和石头。” 你知道，有很多事情——我的意思是——如果你担心核攻击的影响，除了伯克希尔的价值之外，你还有别的事要担心，我就这么说吧。（笑声）还有什么令人振奋的事情吗？

21. 伯克希尔不断努力阻止网络攻击

格雷格·阿贝尔：沃伦，你想让我谈谈网络安全吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的，当然。

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，我稍微提一下网络安全，因为有人提到了。当你考虑伯克希尔，并以伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司为例时。但网络风险及其管理，在伯克希尔，实际上涉及我们所有的子公司。这是一个持续存在的风险。这是我们一直在评估并努力防御的最大风险之一。如果我们以伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司为例，我们每天会收到数十亿次针对我们各种操作系统的攻击。这就是我们团队存在的原因：既要强化资产来抵御攻击，又要每秒都评估我们遭受的潜在攻击。顺便说一下，我们有许多运营子公司都经历着这种情况。但显然，我们在铁路、能源和其他几个领域投入了大量时间、精力和资源。好消息是，到目前为止，我们的团队做得非常出色，我们真的没有发生过重大事件。

我们在一些小企业发生过一些轻微事件，但在我们的主要业务、主要运营系统中，我们有适当的安全协议来避免事件。但再次强调，这永远不会停止。我们的团队会告诉你，每天，他们都认识到这个风险，并在业务中解决它。所以，这是一个重大风险，也是我们所有运营团队的首要任务。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想补充一点。格雷格比我懂得多得多，但我的印象是，从我所看到的一切来看，你知道，总是有——历史上，私营行业总是说政府做不对任何事情，政府总是说私营行业只考虑自己，等等。事实是，从我所看到的一切来看，在努力最小化网络问题威胁方面，政府和企业之间的合作，我认为，基本上是出色的。

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，很好的观点。在网络安全方面，各种美国机构与我们各个业务之间的合作非常紧密。甚至包括某些机构，基本上每天都会提交我们的大量运营数据，他们帮助我们分析，以确定是否有坏人、有坏的个人可能渗透到我们的系统。所以，这是一种强有力的合作。沃伦，你说得完全正确，看到行业和政府如此紧密合作是非常独特的。但我认为我们都认识到这是一个如此重大的风险，我们必须保持方法上的高度一致。

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一种真正的伙伴关系。一种真正的伙伴关系。我们能够做得更好是因为政府帮助我们，政府能够做得更好是因为我们帮助他们，双方都不缺乏意愿。至于网络，我的意思是，它令人难以置信。核威胁是第一位的，但它的概率非常非常非常低，你知道？总有一天，太阳也会燃尽。但是，实际上，两个拥有大量洲际弹道导弹可能性的国家没有出路，谁知道还有什么——但我们还没有解决这个问题。你知道。到处说这个或那个是解决方案很容易。但是，你知道，如果两个人拿着上膛的枪互相指着——

查理·芒格：而且并非每个人都可能完全理性。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，我们看到了太多非理性——在涉及自身利益时，人们做各种事情来摧毁自己，比如他们的生活方式等等。你知道，这不会随着——（笑声）——你向上爬而停止。人们——有些人做可怕的事情。你只能非常希望他们不要处于一种能独自做到这一切、并把世界其他地方当作他们所谓奖品的境地。

22. 最好的投资：“在某方面做到出类拔萃”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果三号站能问些关于母爱和苹果派之类的问题就好了。（笑声）

达芙妮：亲爱的巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫达芙妮，来自纽约市，这是我第五次参加股东大会。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们感谢你的到来。真的。

达芙妮：如你们所知，过去连续四个月，我们经历着通货膨胀，通胀率自1982年以来首次超过7%。你们两位以前都经历过这种情况，从1970年到1975年，当时你们的投资组合遭受了账面损失，但你们却做出了人生中一些最好的投资选择。回想起来，我的问题是，如果你们必须选一只股票来押注——（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：你刚才有点出其不意地逼了我们一下。（笑声）

达芙妮：——并且要在通胀中保持韧性，你们会选择哪一只？具体是什么让那只股票在一个很可能艰难的市场中表现良好？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会告诉你一些比那只股票更好的东西。（笑声）也许我们最终会说到一只股票。但你能做的最好的事情是在某方面做到出类拔萃。如果你是城里最好的医生，最好的律师，或者最好的任何什么，无论人们是用一亿美元还是其他什么支付你——他们会给你一些他们生产的东西，来交换你提供的东西。如果你是他们选出来做任何特定活动的人，比如唱歌、打棒球、做他们的律师，无论是什么，你所拥有的任何能力都不能被别人夺走，它们实际上不会被通胀侵蚀。别人会给你一些他们生产的小麦、棉花，或者任何东西，他们会用那些来交换你的技能。因此，到目前为止最好的投资是任何发展你自己的东西。再说一次，它不征税。（掌声）所以这就是我会做的。

查理·芒格：我也有一些建议给你。（笑声）当你拥有自己的退休账户，而你友好的顾问建议你把所有的钱都投入比特币——（笑声）——就说“不”。（笑声）（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。没有人能夺走你拥有的才能。事实是，世界总是愿意。他们需要做某些事，有些人没有技能，他们从社会产品中获得的就会比有技能的人少。有时这和教育有关，但很多时候和教育无关。但是，只要想清楚你想成为什么样的人，然后想清楚——你想成为什么，你就可能擅长什么，你知道——世界总是需要有人在那根管子里告诉我们发生了什么。所以，你知道，研究贝基·奎克或其他人，（笑声）想清楚，是什么让她优秀。以及你自然而然带到游戏中来的东西。我的意思是，我本可以——那个说你必须花一万小时做这做那的人是谁？马尔科姆·格拉德威尔。

马尔科姆·格拉德威尔，你知道，会说，只要在一件事上花一万小时。嗯，我本可以花一万小时试图成为重量级拳击手，但（笑声）我不认为在一万小时结束时我会感觉很好。我的意思是——你知道，你会偶然发现你真正喜欢做的事，你擅长的事，对社会有用的事。然后，无论现在一美元的价值是1美分、半美分还是百分之一美分的购买力，都没什么区别。如果你是最好的医生，你知道——他们会给你带来鸡，无论他们做什么——但他们不能从你手中夺走。我猜——如果你已经来参加五次会议了，你知道，你有一个非常好的未来。

我的意思是，这表明——（笑声）这是自我选择——所以，如果你想把一部分自己卖掉，你知道，我们会把它作为我们能做的最好的投资。我们会拿走你未来收入的10%，现在付给你现金。（笑声）你知道，我们将拥有一项了不起的资产。而你可以拥有你未来收入的100%。如果你发展你的才能——也许你会成为一个伟大的舞者——人们花钱看伟大的舞者。我们有弗雷德·阿斯泰尔和他的妹妹阿黛尔，他们来自奥马哈，你知道。他们当时姓奥斯特利茨，但他们能跳舞。阿黛尔和他一起做了她所做的事，搬到了英国。弗雷德·阿斯泰尔后来做了很多其他的事。金吉·罗杰斯必须做所有同样的事，但却是向后跳、穿着高跟鞋，而且她作为女性没有得到同样多的报酬。但你会做得很好。我敢在你身上押很多钱。（笑声）

23. “伯克希尔是为永恒而建的。没有终点”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

2022年年度会议

第3/5部分

贝基·奎克：这个问题是给沃伦和阿吉特的。来自以色列一位名叫莫迪的人，他写道：“我的家人和我是伯克希尔的长期股东，我们计划永远持有。我们喜欢现任管理层着眼于长期、提升股东内在价值。但我们不确定，在管理层更替时，新的管理层是否会像你们一样行事。它可能在保险领域承担风险，而这些风险很难在资产负债表上发现，可能需要多年才能显现。我们想知道，在今天和未来，如何评估保险风险，或者在您和阿吉特不在了的时候，如何及时了解。”

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question is for Warren and Ajit. And it comes from someone named Modi, in Israel, who writes, “My family and I are long-term shareholders of Berkshire and we plan to hold it forever. We like that the current management thinks in the long term to increase shareholder intrinsic value. “But we aren’t sure that, at the time of the management change, the new management will act the same way you do. “It might take risks in the insurance field where it’s hard to find on the balance sheet, and that might take years to realize. “We would like to know how we can assess the insurance risk today and in the future, or to know in time, when you and Ajit are not here anymore.”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我要说，未来很长一段时间，伯克希尔的文化几乎和你能在世界上的任何保证一样确定。对于核问题或其他问题我们没有答案，但我们有一种文化，它：a)行之有效；b)拥有能够将这种文化传承很久的股票和股东。而且，你知道，第一年——假设我明天就死了——第一年，每个人都会说，你知道，会发生什么？他们会把它分拆吗？他们可以做所有这些事情。但我们的股票持有在一个让这种事情不可能发生的地方。我们有一个董事会，他们明白我们的文化占据了经营业务的99.9%。他们认为召开委员会会议、请外部专家或诸如此类的事情毫无意义。我的意思是，这是世界已经采用的一种过程，他们出于我们理解的原因这样做。但伯克希尔就是不一样，你知道。我们是一家因人们信任而存在的企业。

而要履行这种信任，我们只需要做相当简单的事情。我们有合适的人去做。我们有令人难以置信的资源去做。只要你有做这件事的自由，其实并不那么困难。一年之后，世界会写文章说，“一年过去了，伯克希尔发生了什么？“你知道，铁路会以同样的方式运营。当然，最大的担忧是，有人进来，认为他们可以赚数十亿美元，如果作为一个团体，或者那些出售企业的人说，最好是私有化，或者是变得更”纯粹”之类的。嗯，你知道，我们是一个纯粹的合伙关系，这才是我们纯粹的地方。(笑)我们确实与我们的所有者拥有一种我们认为特殊的关系。而且我不认为这种关系会改变，所有权结构也不会有太大变化。而且，确实，在很长很长一段时间内没有人能收购我们。

到那时，我们希望这种文化的优越性能被世界更好地理解。我们会在这里——如果我们保持同样的文化，100年后我们还会在这里——假设我们没有发生核交换之类的事情。但伯克希尔是为了永远而建立的。没有终点。没有人等着退休，或者等他们的期权归属，或者考虑——我们没有人会考虑，我该不该换份工作？你知道，他们正在做他们一生中想做的事情。这不是因为，你知道，我们出价高于别人，或者猎头过来说，我们想要这个人或那个人，要怎样才能得到他？他们得不到他。现在，我不知道我们能否再次建立这种文化，但我们已经有了。而且当我们接手时，我们并不知道我们正在建立它。你知道，我们有一个糟糕的纺织厂。

我的意思是，并不是查理和我坐下来——他当时碰巧不在伯克希尔，但他是我在所有事情上的合伙人，所以我们精神上是合伙人——我们并没有坐下来制定一个计划说，好吧，我们经营这家愚蠢的纺织企业20年，然后最终不得不关门，然后我们再做这个做那个。我们只是一步一步地往前走。但我们确实知道我们对于经营一家上市公司的感受。我们一直想做的一件事就是，我们希望身边的人是和我们步调一致的。我们不想要我在1952年在火烈鸟酒店看到的那群人。我们想要信任我们的人。就我而言，从合伙公司开始，我们只有七个人。查理也创立了一家合伙公司，但这是同样的道理。我们不找机构。我们也不付钱请人拉资金或做任何类似的事情。我们和人们坐下来谈。

就我而言，我递给他们一张小纸条，上面写着基本规则。我想确保我们意见一致。我说，你不必阅读合伙协议。我的意思是，我绝不可能占你便宜。如果你们认为我会占便宜，那我就不该在这里——但我确实希望我们意见一致，并且用和我衡量自己一样的标准来衡量我。那些人留在我身边，他们仍然——他们，或者他们的孩子，或者他们孩子的孩子，是伯克希尔的股东。但他们是合伙人。要再做一次很难，但如果我要在这个领域，我会尝试做同样的事情。我会努力找到信任我的人。而且我不想和那些说”你上个月跑赢标普500指数了吗？“或者”你的多空头寸是多少？“或者诸如此类话的人在一起。我卖了三年证券。

我只是不想处于那种境地，本质上，他们认为我可以做一些我做不到的事情。所以，我终于找到了一种方式，让少数人——我的意思是，我并不是——实际上，我是偶然发现的——让少数信任我的人，他们就是把钱交给了我。然后我们就幸福地生活在一起了。所以，新的管理层——以及他们之后的管理层，以及再之后的管理层——(咳嗽)他们只是——请原谅——他们只是一种根深蒂固文化的守护者。所有者相信这种文化。在那里工作的人相信这种文化。我们并不是说其他东西不能做得更好，或者诸如此类。我们只是说，这就是我们拥有的。而且我们有董事，我们有股权结构，我们的规模足够大，基本上可以抵御任何试图改变这种文化的企图。

而且，你知道，谈论如果我们的董事会成员做了这个，做了那个，他们，你知道——最终，显然，我们总是会遵守法律。我们是特拉华州的公司，我们遵守特拉华州的法律。但这并不意味着我们必须做其他每个特拉华州公司都做的事情，或者按照他们看待特拉华州法规的方式去做。我们会遵守法律，然后我们会把它当作一群信任我们的人在经营。我们感谢这种信任。查理？

24. “不断学习”

查理·芒格：嗯，我记得你有一家纺织厂的时候——

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，天哪。

查理·芒格：——它无法——

沃伦·巴菲特：我试图忘记它。(笑)

查理·芒格：——而纺织品实际上只是凝固的电力，按照现代技术的方式。田纳西河流域管理局的费率比新英格兰地区低60%。这绝对是一手绝望的牌，而你有智慧把它弃掉。

沃伦·巴菲特：二十五年后，是的。(笑)

查理·芒格：嗯，你没有再往里面投钱。

沃伦·巴菲特：不，那是对的。

查理·芒格：而且，不——当事情真的很糟糕时认清现实，并采取适当的行动，往往只需要最基本的常识。当你的竞争对手支付的电费低得多的时候，你到底怎么能在新英格兰地区经营一家纺织厂？

沃伦·巴菲特：我还要告诉你另一个问题。我的意思是，我派去经营它的人是个真正的好人。我的意思是，他在各方面都对我百分之百诚实。他是个正派的人，而且他懂纺织。如果他是个混蛋，事情会容易得多。我可能会以不同的方式思考。但我们只是 stumbled along 了一段时间。然后，你知道，我们运气好，Jack Ringwalt决定出售他的保险公司[国家赔偿公司]，我们做了这个做了那个。但我甚至在七八年后在新罕布什尔州又买了一第二家纺织公司，我的意思是，我不知道有多少。午饭之后我可能会多讲一些愚蠢的决定。我们犯的愚蠢决定多到令人难以置信。查理和我买了那家——还有桑迪·戈特斯曼——我们买了那家百货公司，那是在1966年。而且，你知道，我们是在用自己的钱。

我们到底为什么会认为——查理飞往巴尔的摩，我飞——我的意思是，我们在那些日子里真的努力工作。(笑)而且，那里又一样，我们有了不起的人。路易斯·科恩是个再好不过的人了。但那个行业的每个人都有不同的参照点。你知道，他们想扩张自己的公司。嗯，谁能为此责怪他们？而且，你知道，他们计划开几家新店。每个部门——鞋部说，这次我们会做得更好，等等等等。但整个想法是疯狂的。我们在那里待了一小段时间，最后我们想明白了。

查理·芒格：我们改变了方向。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但我们一开始到底为什么要这么做？(笑)

查理·芒格：嗯，因为我们当时很蠢。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，好吧，嗯——(笑声)认识到这一点很重要。我们为那支股票支付了每股6美元，如果那家百货公司成功了，它现在可能值每股30美元，而我们——但它失败了，所以。但我们做了其他事情，把它并入了伯克希尔，我们稍后会谈到这个。而且，你知道，现在我不知——现在的股价是大约每股15万美元，从六美元涨上来的。所以，如果它成功了，我们可能只赚了几美元。而因为它失败了，我们每股赚了几十万美元。但生活就是这样。(笑)你只要继续前进。而且——

查理·芒格：并且不断学习，这就是秘诀。

沃伦·巴菲特：不断学习。

查理·芒格：不断学习。

沃伦·巴菲特：不断学习。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that the future, for a long time, is about as assured as you can have in the world. We don’t have an answer for the nuclear problem or anything, but we have a culture that a), has worked; b) has the shares, and the shareholders, that will carry it a long way. And, you know, the first year — let’s say I die tomorrow — the first year, you know, everybody says, you know, what’s going to happen? Are they going to spin it off? They can do all these things. You’ve got the shares held in a place that it can’t happen. You’ve got a board of directors that understands that our culture is 99.9% of running the business. They don’t think that having meetings of the committees, and bringing in outside experts, or anything like that, mean a thing. I mean, it’s a process that the world has adopted, and they’ve done it for reasons we understand. But Berkshire’s just plain different, you know. We are a business that exists for people to trust us.

And all we have to do to fulfill that trust is fairly simple things. We’ve got the people to do it. We’ve got unbelievable resources to do it. And it isn’t that difficult, as long as you’ve got the freedom, essentially, to do it. And the world will write stories a year after, “So a year later, what has happened at Berkshire?” You know, the railroad will be run the same way. The big worry, of course, is that somebody comes in, figures they can make billions if, as a group, or, you know, people that sell the businesses and say, it’s better to be private, you know, or it’s better to be ‘pure’ this, or something like that. Well, you know, we’re a pure partnership, is what we’re pure at. (Laughs) And we do have what we think is a special relationship with our owners. And I don’t think the relationship changes, and the ownership doesn’t change that much. And, true, there’s nobody can take us over for a long, long time.

And, by that point, we would hope that maybe the superiority of this culture might be somewhat better understood by the world. And we will be here— if we have the same culture, we’ll be 100 years from now — assuming that, you know, we haven’t had a nuclear exchange or something. But Berkshire is built for forever. There is no finish point. Nobody’s waiting to retire, or have their options vested, or thinking about — we don’t have anybody that’s thinking about, should I take another job? You know, they’re doing what they want to do in life. And it isn’t because, you know, we’re topping somebody else’s offer, or that headhunters come around and say, we want this person or that person, and what’ll it take to get him? Well, they can’t get him. Now, I don’t know whether we could build it again, but we’ve got it. And we didn’t know we were building it, exactly, when we took over. You know, we had a lousy textile mill.

I mean, it isn’t like Charlie and I sat down — he didn’t happen to be in Berkshire, but he was my partner and everything, and so we were mental partners — we didn’t sit down and work out some plan that said, well, we’ll run the dumb textile business for 20 years, and then we’ll finally have to fold it, and then we’ll do this and that and everything. We just kept putting one foot in front of the other. But we did know how we felt about running a public company. And one thing we wanted to do, always, was we wanted to have people that were in synch with us. We don’t really want that group I saw in the Flamingo, you know, in 1952. We wanted people who trusted us. And we started, in my case, in the partnership, we started with seven. And Charlie started a partnership, but this is the same thing. We didn’t go to institutions. And we didn’t pay fees to people to bring in money or anything like that. We sat down with people.

In my case, I handed them a little sheet of paper, and it set the ground rules. I wanted to be sure we were on the same page. I said, you don’t have to read the partnership agreement. I mean, there’s no way in the world I would be taking advantage of you. I shouldn’t be here if you think I’d take — But I do want you to be on the same page, and measuring me by the same yardsticks I measure myself. And those people stayed with me, and they’re still— they, or their children, or their children’s children are shareholders of Berkshire. But they’re partners. And it would be hard to do that again, but I would do it with — if I were going to be in this field, I would try and do the same thing. I would try to find people to trust me. And I don’t want to be with people that are saying, how’d you do versus the S&P, you know, last month? Or, you know, what’s your long/short position? Or anything like that. I sold securities for three years.

And I just didn’t want to be in that position, where essentially, they thought maybe that I could do things that I couldn’t do. So, I finally found a way to get a few people — I mean, I didn’t — actually, I stumbled into it — but a few people that trusted me, and they just gave me their money. And we’ve lived happily-ever-after. So, the new management — and the management after them, and the management after them — (coughs) — they’re just — excuse me — they’re just custodians of a culture that’s embedded. The owners believe in it. People that work there believe in it. And we’re not saying other things can’t do better, or anything of the sort. We’re just saying, this is what we’ve got. And we have got the directors, we’ve got the share ownership and all of that to — and the size that, essentially, can ward off any attempts to change the culture.

And, you know, it’s silly to talk about, if our board members did this, and did that, and they, you know — In the end, obviously, we’re always going to follow the law. We’re a Delaware company and we follow Delaware law. But that doesn’t mean that we have to do what every other Delaware corporation does, and how they look at the Delaware statues. We will follow the law, and then we’ll run it as a group of people who trust us. And we appreciate that trust. Charlie?

24. “Keep learning”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I remember when you had a textile mill —

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, god.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and it couldn’t —

WARREN BUFFETT: I try to forget it. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and the textiles are really just congealed electricity, the way modern technology works. And the TVA rates were 60% lower than the rates in New England. It was an absolutely hopeless hand, and you had the sense to fold it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Twenty-five years later, yeah. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, you didn’t pour more money into it.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, that’s right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And, no — recognizing reality, when it’s really awful, and taking appropriate action, just involves, often, just the most elementary good sense. How in the hell can you run a textile mill in New England when your competitors are paying way lower power rates?

WARREN BUFFETT: And I’ll tell you another problem with it, too. I mean, the fellow that I put in to run it was a really good guy. I mean, he was 100% honest with me in every way. And he was a decent human being, and he knew textiles. And if he’d been a jerk, it would have been a lot easier. I would have probably thought differently about it. But we just stumbled along for a while. And then, you know, we got lucky that Jack Ringwalt decided to sell his insurance company [National Indemnity] and we did this and that. But I even bought a second textile company in New Hampshire, I mean, I don’t know how many — seven or eight years later. I’m going to talk some about dumb decisions, maybe after lunch we’ll do it a little. It is incredible how many dumb decisions we made. Charlie and I bought that — and Sandy Gottesman — we bought that department store, and that was in 1966. And, you know, we were working with our own money.

And why in the world did we think — And Charlie flew to Baltimore, and I’d fly — I mean, we used to really work in those days. (Laughs) And, there again, we had wonderful people. Louis Cohen couldn’t have been a better guy. But everybody in that business had a different reference point. You know, they wanted to expand their company. Well, who can blame them for that? And, you know, they were planning a couple of new stores. And each department — the shoe department said, well, we’ll do it better this time, and all that kind of thing. But the whole idea was crazy. And we got there for a little while, and we figured it out, finally. And —

CHARLIE MUNGER: We reversed course.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But why the hell did we do it in the first place? (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, because we were stupid.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, OK, well — (Laughter) That’s important to realize. We paid $6 a share for that stock, and if the department store had succeeded, it might be worth, you know, $30 a share now and we’d have — and it failed, so. But we did other things, and we merged it into Berkshire, and we’ll talk about that a little later. And, you know, now I don’t know whether it’s — $150,000 a share now, or something like that, from the six bucks. So, if it succeeded, we would have maybe made a few dollars. And because it failed, we made hundreds of thousands of dollars per share. But that’s the way life is. (Laughs) You just keep going. And —

CHARLIE MUNGER: And keep learning, that’s the secret.

WARREN BUFFETT: Keep learning.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Keep learning.

WARREN BUFFETT: Keep learning.

25. 改变巴菲特一生的”顿悟”时刻

沃伦·巴菲特：你可能会说，为什么需要那么长时间才能学会？嗯——午饭前我们还有几分钟。我们应该——谈谈这个问题。因为我确实为此准备了一些东西。我11岁开始买股票。我读了图书馆里所有关于股票的书。我热爱它。我父亲热爱——你知道，那是他的事业，我会去他的办公室，在那里读书。我攒钱，终于在11岁时，我可以买一支股票了。我可以告诉你，那时候——我九岁时去了纽约证券交易所。我父亲带我们去了纽约——每个孩子去一次纽约——他带我去了，我去了纽约证券交易所，我对此充满敬畏。我可以告诉你专业经纪系统如何运作，零股安排，我可以告诉你金融史，以及所有这些事情。

然后我对技术分析变得非常感兴趣，画股票图表，做了各种疯狂的事情。花了无数个小时。攒钱买其他股票。尝试做空。我什么都做。然后，在我19或20岁的时候，我记不清具体在哪里做的了，我在某个地方拿起了一本书。不是学校的教科书，而是在内布拉斯加州的林肯市。我——你知道，我看着这本书，看到了一个段落，它告诉我我一直在做错事。(笑)我的整个方法都错了。我以为我是在从事挑选会上涨的股票的事业。而在一个段落中，我明白了那完全是愚蠢的。我带了一些非常有趣的东西。让我们放一下——我们把这个图表叫做什么？哦，在这里，是的。让我们放一下[幻灯片]幻觉一。好了。我们看到了。

你知道，现在如果你看那个，有些人会看到两张脸，有些人会看到一个花瓶，有些人会看很久只看到两张脸。但思维会从一边翻转到另一边，有个名字叫——他们称之为”歧义错觉”或类似的东西。还有其他东西谈到”顿悟”时刻——或者在大力水手的旧漫画中，Wimpy头上会有个小气球，然后灯泡会亮起来。有这样一个点，你突然看到了之前没看到的东西。嗯，我花了——我当时有一种幻觉，我们在看那个[幻灯片]一，比如说，两张脸。转到——让我们转到标着二的幻灯片。如果你从一边看，它看起来像一只兔子，如果从另一边看，它看起来像一只鸭子。而且，你知道，思维是一个非常有趣的地方。

我认为人们称之为”统觉团”，当你的头脑中有各种各样的事情在进行。它们持续多年，坐在那里然后消失(笑)。然后，突然之间，你看到了和你之前所见不同的东西。现在，对于股票，我充满热情，我有不错的智商，我在阅读和思考，你知道。对我来说赚点钱很重要。我有世界上所有的动力。然后我读了一章——实际上，我读了一段——在《聪明的投资者》的第8章，它告诉我我没有在看鸭子，我看的是——现在它是兔子——无论它是什么。无论你称之为”电灯泡”，还是称它为”真相时刻”——无论它是什么——那件事发生在我林肯市。我的意思是，它改变了我的一生。

如果我没有读到那本书，我不知道我还会花多长时间去寻找头肩形态、200天移动平均线、零股比率以及无数其他的东西。而且我热爱那种东西。只是我看的是错误的东西。我经历过这种情况——我相信查理也经历过。这种情况在你一生中会发生几次。突然之间，你看到了某件重要的事情，而你为什么一开始就没看到呢？也许是上周，也许是一年前，也许是五年前。也许是学习如何与人相处，你知道。我的意思是，实际上，对人友善是否更好，或者不友善。或者——我的意思是，它们只是——学习如何——如果你想让世界爱你，你必须做什么，等等。当你看到它时你就明白了，但在此之前的十年里你却看不到。

我不知道查理对此有没有想法，但在商业上这种情况发生过几次，我研究一家公司十年了。然后有件东西在你的脑子里重新排列了，你知道，你会说，嗯，为什么我五年前没看到这个？这种情况我遇到过几次，显然——这里每个人都遇到过——只是在生活的不同领域。你会想，我怎么会这么蠢？嗯，这就是查理——当他在做律师的时候，他有个合伙人，罗伊·托尔斯。每个陷入麻烦的聪明家伙——通常是男性，通常和女人有关——你知道，他们会走进办公室，垂头丧气的。他们会说，当时觉得是个好主意，你知道。我的意思是——(笑声)然后他们的生活就瓦解了，在很多情况下。

所以，那个统觉团不知怎的就在那里，时不时地会产生一些洞察。实际上，如果它产生的是关于你行为的洞察，而不是关于赚钱的洞察，那就更好了。有些人永远得不到。他们不知道为什么——你知道，他们的孩子恨他们，或者这个世界上没有人在乎他们是死是活。事实上，他们宁愿他们死，因为他们一直在讨好他们以获取他们的艺术收藏品，或者其他什么。这就像——查理会说，你知道，写下你自己的讣告，然后逆向推导。这不是个疯狂的想法，但是，查理，我不知道。关于统觉团，你知道些什么？

查理·芒格：嗯，我知道那就是大脑的工作方式。而且很容易搞错。诀窍的一部分是学会纠正自己的错误。我们在这方面做了很多。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

查理·芒格：经常是太晚了。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在错误上做得比在合理的好想法上做得好。

原文

25. The “aha” moment for Buffett that changed everything

WARREN BUFFETT: And you can say, why would it take guys that long to learn? And — well, we’ve got a few minutes before lunch. We should — let’s address that problem. Because I did bring something along on that. I started buying stocks when I was 11. I’d been reading every book in the library on it. I loved it. My dad loved — you know, it was his business and I’d get to go down to his office and I’d read the books down there. And I saved the money, and finally, by the time I was 11, I could buy a stock. And I could tell you, at that time — I went to New York Stock Exchange when I was nine. My dad took us to New York — each kid to New York once — and he took me, and I went to the New York Stock Exchange, and I was in awe of it. I could tell you how the specialist system worked, and the odd lot arrangements, and I could tell you the history of finance, and all of these things.

And then I got very interested in technical analysis, and charted stocks, and did all kinds of crazy things. Hours and hours and hours. And saved money to buy other stocks. And tried shorting. And I just did everything. And then, when I was either 19 or 20, and I can’t remember exactly where I did it or something, I picked up a book someplace. It wasn’t a textbook at school, but it was in Lincoln, Nebraska. And I — you know, I looked at this book, and I saw one paragraph, and it told me I’d been doing everything wrong. (Laughs) I just had the whole approach wrong. I thought I was in the business of trying to pick stocks that would go up. And, in one paragraph, I saw that that was totally foolish. And I’ve brought something that is really interesting. Let’s put up — what did we call this chart? Oh, here we are, yeah. Let’s put up [slide] illusion one. Done. There we have it.

You know, now if you look at that, some people will see two faces, some people will see a vase, and some people will look a long time and only see two faces. But the mind flips from one side to another, and there’s some name for it that — they call it “ambiguous illusions” or something of the sort. There’s other things that talk about aha moments — or, in the old comic strips with Popeye, Wimpy would have a little balloon over his head, and the lightbulb would go on. There’s this point where all of a sudden you see something you haven’t seen. Well, it took me — I had an illusion that I was looking at, we’ll say in that one, two faces. Go to the — let’s go to the one labeled two. And if you’re looking at it from one side, it looks like a rabbit, and if you look the other way, it looks like you’re looking at a duck. And, you know, the mind is a very funny place.

And I think people call it an apperceptive mass, when you have all kinds of things going on in your mind. And they go on for years, and they sit there and get lost (laughs). And then, all of a sudden, you see something different than what you were seeing before. Now, it took me, in stocks, which I was intensely interested in, and I had a decent IQ, and I was reading and thinking, you know. And it was important to me to make some money on it. I had every motivation in the world. And then I read a chapter — I read a paragraph, actually — in chapter 8, I think it was, of the Intelligent Investor, and it told me that I wasn’t looking at the duck, I was looking, you know — now it was the rabbit — whatever it may be. And whether you call it a lightbulb” — whether you call it, you know, a moment of truth — whatever it may be — and that happened to me in Lincoln. I mean, it changed my life.

If I hadn’t read that book, I don’t know how long I would have gone on looking for head-andshoulders formations, and 200-day moving averages, and the odd lot ratios, and a zillion things. And I love that kind of stuff. Except it was the wrong stuff I was looking at. And I’ve had that happen — and Charlie’s had it happen, I’m sure. It happens a few times in your life. And all of a sudden, you see something important that, why in the hell didn’t I see this in the first place? Maybe it’s a week ago, maybe it’s a year ago, maybe it’s five years ago. Maybe it’s learning how to get along with people, you know. I mean, whether, actually, it’s better to be, you know, kind, or not, you know. Or whether —I mean, they’re just — learning how — if you want the world to love you, what you have to do, or whatever. You know it when you see it, but you didn’t see it for ten years before.

And I don’t know whether Charlie’s got some thoughts on that or not, but that’s happened in a few situations in business, where I’ve looked at a company for a decade. And then there’s something that just all gets rearranged in your mind, and, you know, you can say, well, why didn’t I see this five years ago? But I’ve had it happen a few times, obviously — and everybody here has — just in different areas of their lives. And you think, how could I have been so stupid? Well, that’s what Charlie’s — when he was in the law practice, he had a partner, Roy Tolles. And every smart guy that would get in trouble — usually it was guys, and usually it was with women — and, you know, they’d come into the office, and they’d look, you know, down-faced and everything. And they’d say, it seemed like a good idea at the time, you know. I mean — (Laughter) And their lives unraveled, you know, in many cases.

So, there is that apperceptive mass that’s sitting in there inside somehow, and every now and then it produces some insight. It’s better, actually, if it produces insight into your behavior than whether it produces insight to make money. And some people never get it. And they wonder why — you know, whether their kids hate them, or whether there’s nobody in the world that would give a damn whether they live or die. In fact, they prefer they die because they’ve been courting them for their art collection, or whatever it may be. It’s just — Charlie would say, you know, just write your obituary and reverse engineer it. And not a crazy idea, but, Charlie, I don’t know. What do you know about apperceptive masses? Which are (laughs) you know, optical illusions.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I know that that’s the way the brain works. And that it’s easy to get it wrong. And part of the trick is to get so you correct your own mistakes. And we’ve done a lot of that.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Frequently way too late.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve done better with the mistakes than we have with the good — the reasonably good ideas.

26. Robinhood的”瓦解”是上帝的正义

查理·芒格：嗯，把一个好主意做过头太容易了。这就是现在正在发生的事情。有很多好主意被严重做过头了。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，告诉我一个没有被做过头的好主意，但等会儿再说，当人群没在听的时候。(笑)它——我的意思是，这就是——

查理·芒格：但看看Robinhood，从顶峰到谷底发生了什么。这不是很明显会发生类似的事情吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：你再说一遍？什么——

查理·芒格：Robinhood。记得吗，它出来了，上市了，然后——

沃伦·巴菲特：哦。

查理·芒格：——它引诱所有人进行这种短期赌博，支付高额佣金，隐藏的回扣，等等等等。很恶心。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你去年就这么说了，他们生你的气，然后卖了一大堆股票，他们拿到了钱，然后——

查理·芒格：是的，但现在它正在瓦解。上帝正在伸张正义。

沃伦·巴菲特：我喜欢内部人士的大——不，但他们从中拿到了很多钱。我的意思是，据我回忆，他们是大的卖家。

查理·芒格：那可能是——

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

查理·芒格：——但还是有一些正义的。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我碰巧同意这一点。(掌声)不过，到处树敌是否是个好主意，那是另一个问题，我们确实在这么做。去批评别人到底明智吗？

查理·芒格：可能不明智，但我忍不住。

沃伦·巴菲特：(笑)(掌声)嗯——这是我认识的最聪明的人，他98岁了还没搞明白，所以——(笑声)放弃吧。享受它。好了，我们就此午饭，我们争取一点钟回来时更聪明。

原文

26. Robinhood’s “unraveling” is God’s justice

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s so easy to overdo a good idea. That’s what’s going on now. You have a lot of good ideas that are being grossly overdone.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, just tell me about one that hasn’t been, but tell me later, when the crowd isn’t listening. (Laughs) It — I mean, that’s where —

CHARLIE MUNGER: But look what happened to Robinhood, from its peak to its trough. Wasn’t that pretty obvious, that something like that was going to happen?

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell me again? What should —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Robinhood. Remember, it came out, and it went public, and —

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — it lured everybody into all this short-term gambling, and big commissions, and hidden kickbacks, and so on and so on. It was disgusting.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And you said so last year, and they got mad at you, and they sold a bunch of their stock, and they’ve got the money, and —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but now it’s unraveling. God is getting just.

WARREN BUFFETT: I love the insiders of great — no, but they’ve gotten a lot of money from it. I mean, they were big sellers, as I remember.

CHARLIE MUNGER: That may be —

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

CHARLIE MUNGER: — but there’s been some justice.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I happen to agree with that. (Applause) Whether it’s a good idea to go around making enemies of people, though, that — that’s another question, which we do. Is it wise to criticize people at all?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Probably not, but I can’t help it.

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) (Applause) Well — and here’s the smartest guy I know, and he’s 98 and he hasn’t figured it out yet, so — (Laughter) Give up. Enjoy it. Well, with that we’ll go to lunch, and we’ll try to come back wiser at one o’clock.

下午环节

1. 吉米·巴菲特浮筒船卖得很快

沃伦·巴菲特：好了，让我们重新开始。我被告知，我们到目前为止已经卖了15艘[吉米·巴菲特派对浮筒]船，就在不久前外面说的——所以趁它们还有货赶紧买。第一艘交付大约要等一年。但订购的人可以享受10%的折扣，不管这意味着什么。我自己也订了一艘。我们在另一个房间进展顺利。我们上半场只收到七个问题，这是新低。所以我们会尽量快一点。我无法想象为什么进行得这么慢。我的意思是，是谁一直在说那么多话？(笑声)好了。

原文

Afternoon Session

1. The Jimmy Buffett pontoon boats are going fast

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s reconvene. I think we sold 15 [Jimmy Buffett party pontoon] boats, so far, I was told that a while — a little a while ago out there — so get them while they last. We won’t have the first one available for delivery for about a year. But people are getting 10% off, whatever that means, who order one. And I’ve ordered one myself. And we’re – things are going well in the other room. And we only got seven questions, which is a new low, in the first half. So, we’ll try and move a little faster. I can’t imagine why it went that slowly. I mean, who’s — who’s doing all that talking? (Laughter) OK.

2. 巴菲特：我已经”果断地退后”，不再表达政治观点

沃伦·巴菲特：四号站。

杰夫·乌沃洛伊：嗨，沃伦和查理。我是来自旧金山的股东杰夫·乌沃洛伊。近年来，美国公司在政治领域扮演了更积极的角色。无论是反对特定法案，还是推广各种社会事业，通常是在股东或员工团体的要求下。虽然这些运动的目标可能值得称赞，但它们可能会疏远相当一部分客户和员工群体。CEO们应该如何决定哪些问题应该表态，或者他们的公司是否应该在政治领域参与？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个很棒的问题，显然我对此考虑了很多。我曾一度说过，“当我担任伯克希尔CEO的工作时，我不会把我的公民身份放在盲目信托中。“但我也学到了——在任何话题上发言，你可以让更多人持久地生气，而不是让他们暂时高兴。在某些话题上，他们会把气撒在我们的公司上，这意味着我们雇佣的一些人，其中一些我们最终可能不得不解雇。这意味着股东会受到伤害。我真的认为，在所有可能让人们非常生气的话题上都发言如此重要吗？他们是否应该被要求付出那个代价？我得出的结论是，答案是否定的。我到底为什么要伤害另一个房间里那些为伯克希尔做各种各样事情的人？

我为什么要因为我说了一些话——这些会让全国20%的人立刻不同意，有时他们会如此生气以至于试图报复——而伤害你们？因为他们不能冲我喊叫，他们可能会发起针对我们公司或其他什么的运动。所以我认为，就我而言，我不会到处采取立场，以至于不是”沃伦·巴菲特说”，而是”伯克希尔·哈撒韦”或”伯克希尔·哈撒韦的沃伦·巴菲特”说。我被识别出来。而且我不想让你们的生活——我只是决定我不会那么做。如果我想那么做，我应该辞职。如果我认为我的公民身份，发言如此重要，我会放弃我最爱的东西，那就是拥有这份工作。(笑)我不想那么做。

所以，我已经果断地退后了，我不想说任何基本上会被归因于伯克希尔，并让别人承担我言论后果的话。这就是我的立场。我可以告诉你，在大多数公司，或者许多公司——这不公平。但在很多公司，你知道，CEO们必须考虑他们的董事会对他们说什么，他们特意选举人们进入董事会，因为这是社会可接受的，这些代表不同的群体，有时非常强烈。如果他们考虑他们的利益相关者，这个群体、那个群体，他们会受到董事会压力去采取立场。这是一个我们不会进入的领域。查理，你怎么看？

查理·芒格：嗯，甚至比你，我必须非常小心我说什么。(笑声)现在——(笑声)

男性声音：是的。这是——(掌声)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们俩的区别是我忍不住多说一点。(笑声)我看到报纸上的头条新闻，一次又一次地说，“巴菲特正在买入某某股票。“嗯，我没有在买入某某股票。是伯克希尔·哈撒韦在买入，可能是伯克希尔另外两个员工的工作。写文章的人完全不知道是我授意的还是我甚至都没听说过。但头条新闻如果说”巴菲特正在买入这个”会比说”伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们不知道是他的员工还是他”吸引更多人。头条新闻的目的是吸引人们阅读故事。所以——混淆很可怕。最容易做的事情基本上是闭嘴，不要有一大堆人问他们一开始没想问的迷人问题。但我很高兴你问了那个问题。那是个好问题。

我可能对这个问题的思考，比思考这支股票或那支股票是否便宜还要多。

原文

2. Buffett” I’ve “decidedly backed off” from expressing political views

WARREN BUFFETT: Station four.

JEFF VUVOLOY: Hi Warren and Charlie. I’m Jeff Vuvoloy (PH), shareholder from San Francisco. In recent years, American companies have taken on a more active role in the political realm. Whether it is speaking out against specific bills, or promoting various social causes, often at the behest of shareholder or employee groups. While the goals of these movements can be laudable, they risk alienating significant portions of customer and employee bases. How should CEOs decide which issues to take a stand on, or whether their companies should engage in the political realm at all? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a terrific question, and that is one obviously I’ve had to think about plenty. And at one point I said, “I don’t put my citizenship in a blind trust when I take the job as CEO of Berkshire.” But I’ve also learned that — you can make a whole lot more people sustainably mad than you can make temporarily happy by speaking out on any subject. And on certain subjects, they will take it out on our companies, and that means that the people that are employed by us, some of them we would end up letting go. It means that the shareholders get hurt. And do I really think that it’s so important that I talk on every possible subject that people can get very upset about? Whether they should be asked to pay that price? And I’ve come to the conclusion, the answer is no. Why in the world do I want to hurt the people in that other room that do all kinds of things for Berkshire.

Why do I want to hurt you because I say something that 20% of the country is going to instantly disagree with, and sometimes they will be so upset about it that they will try and take it out. And since they can’t scream at me, they may have campaigns against our companies or anything else. So I think, as it applies to me, I’m not going to go around and take positions where instead of saying, “Warren Buffett says,” it will say, you know, “Berkshire Hathaway,” or “Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway.” I get identified. And I do not want to make the lives of you — and I’ve just decided I’m not going to be doing that. And if I want to do that, I should quit my job. If I think my citizenship, speaking out is that important, I’ll give up what I love the most, which is having this job. (Laughs) I don’t want to do that.

So, I’ve decidedly backed off, I don’t want to say anything that’ll get attributed, basically to Berkshire, and have somebody else bear the consequences of what I talk about. So that’s where I stand. And I can tell you that at most companies, or many — that isn’t fair. But in the great many companies, you know, CEOs, they have to think about what their board says to them, and they’ve made a point of electing people to their boards, because it’s socially acceptable, who represent different constituencies, sometimes very strongly. And if they think their stakeholders, for this group and that group and that group, they’ll get pressured by their boards to take positions. And it’s just a territory that we’re not going to get into. Charlie, how do you feel about that?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, even more than you, I have to be very careful about what I say. (Laughter) Now — (Laughter)

MALE VOICE: Yeah. It’s — (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: And the difference between the two of us is I can’t resist saying a little more. (Laughter) I see headlines in papers, just time after time after time, that say, “Buffett’s buying such and such.” Well, I’m not buying such and such. Berkshire Hathaway is buying it, and it may be the work of two other people that work at Berkshire.” And people who write the articles don’t have the faintest idea whether it was at my instigation or whether I’d even heard of it. But the headline will attract more people if it says, “Buffett buying this,” than if it says, “Berkshire Hathaway, and we don’t know whether it’s the people that work for him or him.” The headline is designed to bring people into the story. So — The confusion is terrible. And the easiest thing to do is to basically shut up and not have a bunch of people fascinating questions that they didn’t ask for in the first place. But I’m glad you asked that question. That is a good question.

And I probably thought more about that question than I think about whether this stock or that stock is cheap.

3. 伯克希尔不是要用于政治的”武器”

沃伦·巴菲特：说到这里，我们要去——让我们看看。那是四号站。我们回到贝基那里。

贝基·奎克：说到这个，让我们问一个来自大卫·卡斯的问题。他写道：“拜登总统的2023财年预算案将对净资产至少1亿美元的家庭的未实现资本利得征收20%的最低税。您对此有何看法？“如果你不想回答，也许查理可以。(笑声)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们会知道的。(笑声)老实说，我们都应该说我们会受到它的影响。如果是1亿美元，我们俩都会受到影响。所以我们的观点是——我没有观点。查理？我没有我想被归因于的观点——

查理·芒格：我倾向于不参与这类所得税的事情。我的政策是，我支付他们通过的任何税收，我不想参与关于税收的游说。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。(掌声)我要补充一点。游说真的很令人反感。我曾为一位候选人做过一次，最后我和一群香烟公司的说客待在一个房间里。他们不关心内布拉斯加州。他们不关心——他们什么都没有。他们在这里是因为他们正在递交捐款。而我是一个方便的陪衬。而且，你知道，基本上让你想吐。另一方面，我们经营铁路业务、能源业务、保险业务，它们都受到广泛监管。我也不想成为铁路集团中唯一不参加活动的铁路公司。保险集团中唯一不参加活动的保险公司。所以，你知道，其他人可以合理地认为我们在这种情况下是搭便车者。所以我通常告诉经理们，你知道，“不要用伯克希尔的钱给你喜欢的候选人。

不要施压供应商去做——“伯克希尔不是一件武器——它被组织中的某些人使用过。但不要用它来从任何人那里勒索钱来支持你喜欢的人、你妻子上过的学校或其他任何东西。其中一些事情仍然在发生。但我不告诉我们的员工不要属于任何行业协会。查理写了一封有史以来最伟大的信件之一，如果你去搜索，输入我记得是1989年芒格储蓄和贷款之类的。我们退出了美国储蓄和贷款联盟，我想是的。我们警告过他们。我们说，“我们无法忍受，你知道，你们对这个国家做的事情。“当一群非常好的人聚在一起，但他们决定这对他们的储蓄和贷款有利来做这个或那个。我们警告过他们，最后查理写了一封信，就像我说的，可以在搜索中找到。它应该是最值得骄傲的信件之一——肯定是伯克希尔发出的最值得骄傲的信件之一。

他就是这样说的：“我们再也无法忍受了，我们要辞职。“但这是一件非常难做的事情。这是一种艰难的生活方式，到处批评(笑)和你一起工作的人、邻居。他们是完全正派的人，但他们经营的机构在做一些他们非常反感的事情。我们支持我们的能源子公司的部分活动。而且，你知道，我不想发现人们是出于个人原因做这些事。我的意思是，那样他们就有麻烦了。但我不说他们不能做，因为我不想在某些事情出现时束缚他们的手脚，基本上，要么是行业内的竞争对手，要么是行业本身，我们不会独自站在那里说，“嗯，我们在道德上更优越，所以你们出钱买它吧。“这就是我的立场。查理？

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。当我没什么要补充时，它从不困扰我，但他似乎卡在那里了。(笑)总之。贝基，那个问题是你提的吗？

贝基·奎克：是的。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

原文

3. Berkshire is not a “weapon” to be used politically

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, we’ll go to — well, let’s see. That was station four. We’ll go back to Becky.

BECKY QUICK: On that note, let’s go to a question from David Cass. He writes in, “President Biden’s fiscal 2023 budget request would impose a 20% minimum tax on the unrealized capital gains for households worth at least $100 million. What are your views on this issue?” And if you don’t want to answer, maybe Charlie does. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ll find out. (Laughter) And in all honesty, we should both say that we would be affected by it. If it’s $100 million, we’d both be affected. So our point of view is — and I have no point of view. Charlie? I have no point of view that I would want attributed to —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I tend to stay out of the income tax things like this. My policy is I pay whatever taxes they pass, and I don’t want to engage in lobbying about taxes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause) And I would add one thing. Lobbying is really distasteful. I once did it for a candidate, and I ended up in a room with a bunch of lobbyists for cigarette companies. They didn’t care about Nebraska. They didn’t care about — and they didn’t have anything. They were there because they were handing over a contribution. And I was a convenient accessory. And, you know, it made you want to throw up, basically. On the other hand, we operate in the railroad business, energy business, insurance business, and they’re extensively regulated. And I don’t also want to be the only railroad that stays out of the railroad group. The only insurance company that stays out of the insurance group. So, you know, other people can rightly figure that we’re a free rider under those circumstances. So I tell the managers generally, you know, “Don’t spend Berkshire’s money on candidates that you like.

Don’t pressure suppliers to do —” Berkshire is not a weapon to use — and it’s been used by certain people in the organization. But don’t use it to muscle money out of anybody else for who you like or what school your wife went to or whatever it may be. And some of it goes on anyway. But I don’t tell our people to don’t belong to any trade associations. Charlie wrote one of the great letters of all time, and if you go to search, type in I think 1989 Munger savings and loan or something. We resigned from the U.S. Savings and Loan League, I guess it was. And we warned them. We said, “We just cannot stand, you know, what you’re doing to the country.” And when a bunch of very nice people get together, but they decided it’s in the interest of their savings and loan to do this or that. And we warned them, and finally Charlie wrote a letter, which is, like I say, available on search. And it should be one of the proudest letters — certainly one of the proudest letters that’s ever come out of Berkshire.

And he just said, “We can’t stand it anymore, and we’re resigning.” But that’s a very tough thing to do. It’s a tough way to live, to just go around criticizing (Laughs) the people you work with, and neighbors. And they’re perfectly decent people, but they’re running institutions that are doing things that are very distasteful to them. And we belong, support some of our subsidiaries in energy. And, you know, I don’t want to find people are doing it for personal reasons. I mean in that case, they’re in trouble. But I don’t say they can’t do it, because I don’t want their hands tied if something comes up, and essentially either their competitors within the industry or the industry (UNINTEL), we’re not going to stand alone and say, “Well, we’re morally superior, so you put your money up and buy it.” So that’s where I end up. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Never bothers me when I don’t have anything to add, but he seems stuck on that. (Laughs) Anyway. Becky, did that come from you?

BECKY QUICK: It did.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, OK.

4. 了解不止一个学科是有帮助的

沃伦·巴菲特：然后是五号站。

宋耀：哦，谢谢沃伦和查理。我的名字是宋耀。我来自中国，现在在芝加哥大学学习。我非常钦佩你们两位，特别是查理。你是我从小到大的偶像。我的问题也是给查理的。我的问题是如何在投资决策和生活中实践多学科框架？比如，如何让它更实用。谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？(掌声)

查理·芒格：嗯，显然，了解不止一个学科对你有帮助。有句老话说，手里只有锤子的人看什么都像钉子。如果你不能掌握所有学科，你可能会做出错误的决定。我所说的就是这些。但是当你进入别人的领域，你说：“我是多学科的。你是专家，但我比你知道得更多。“你会让他们非常恼火。他们会为此恨你。我可以证实这一点。我已经做过几次了。(笑声)

沃伦·巴菲特：而且，你知道，中国——在某种程度上，他们的文化在某种程度上尊重年龄。所以查理赢了我。(笑)我甚至不想在中国问题上和他竞争。我在年龄上追不上他。好的。不过我会试试。让我们看看。接下来是贝基。

原文

4. It helps to know more than one discipline

WARREN BUFFETT: Then station five.

SONG YAO: Oh, thank you, Warren and Charlie. My name is Song Yao. I’m from China, and now studying in the University of Chicago. I really admire you two, especially Charlie. You are my idol since I was a child. And my question is also for Charlie. My question is how to practice the multi-disciplinary framework in making investment decisions and in life? Like, how to make it more practical. Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie? (Applause)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, obviously, it helps you to know more than one discipline. There’s an old saying, you know, that a man who carries only a hammer thinks everything else is a nail. And you may go on wrong decisions if you don’t have some command of all the disciplines. That’s all I ever said. But you do irritate people terribly when you come into their territory, you say, “I’m multi-disciplinary. You’re the expert, and I know better than you.” They hate you for it. I can attest to it. I’ve done it several times. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: And, you know, China — well, to a certain degree, and they have a culture that, to some extent, reveres age. So, Charlie’s got me beat. (Laughs) I don’t even try and compete with him on China. I can’t catch him on age. OK. I’m going to try to, though. Let’s see. We’ve got Becky coming next.

5. 通胀”几乎欺骗了所有人”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自菲利普·金。他写道：“在70年代，您写了一篇题为《通胀如何欺骗股票投资者》的文章。您说股票无法跟上通胀，因为公司无法提高它们的股本回报率。您认为今天仍然如此吗？”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当然，债券也可以欺骗股票投资者。(笑)应该说，通胀也欺骗债券投资者。它欺骗把现金藏在床垫下的人。它几乎欺骗了所有人。而且问题是，如果你有一个不需要任何资本的生意，比如说美元贬值90%或类似情况，那么东西贵了十倍。如果它不需要任何资本，你可以收取十倍的价格，你保持了你的相对地位。但大多数生意需要一些资本。如果我们的公用事业——就说从现在起若干年后美元价值只有十分之一——我们基本上必须进行十倍的资本投资。

我们从中获得回报，但我们被迫进行资本投资以基本上维持原地踏步。我写过一篇与此相关的文章，我要告诉你一个有名的故事，你们都会同情的。我为《财富》杂志写了那篇文章，写完时大约有7000字。《财富》杂志不喜欢发表7000字的文章，他们让我的朋友卡罗尔·卢米斯向我解释，知道我会更听她的话。但我很固执，是个男人，我说，你知道，“每个字都是宝贵的”，他们要么发表要么不发表。然后他们派了一个编辑，一个非常好的人，到奥马哈来。这个人向我解释说用那么多字是不对的。我说，“嗯，那没关系，但如果你们不发表，我会在别处发表。“我这种行为非常令人讨厌。然后我开始有点不安，所以我把它寄给了我的朋友梅格·格林菲尔德。

梅格是《华盛顿邮报》一位非常非常伟大的编辑，我们是非常非常好的朋友。一个了不起的女人。梅格，她对大多数作家都很严厉，但她对我比较友好。她不想太伤害我。所以我说，“嗯，梅格，你觉得怎么样？“她说，“嗯，沃伦，“她说，“你不需要在这篇文章里把你知道的所有事情都说出来。(笑声)这个观点说得很到位。所以我把那篇文章写得更短，基本上说了同样的内容。你知道？如果你真的能在未来100年里有一个完全稳定的货币单位，对企业和投资者总体来说会更好。查理？不？我们去六号站。通胀——问题是程度如何。问题是你能不能确定2%并保持——答案是没人知道。你知道吗？我的意思是，你不知道，没人知道。

你可以听各种东西，但没人知道未来十年、二十年、五十年或下个月的通胀会是多少。人们一直在谈论它，因为你感兴趣，想知道你的问题的答案。他们不知道答案，但有很多人会告诉你他们知道答案——如果你付他们足够的钱的话。还有些人会免费告诉你，因为他们认为这能提高他们的声望，让他们更有价值等等。但答案是，他们不知道。我们也不知道。不过，对抗通胀的最佳保护仍然是个人赚钱能力。如果你小提琴拉得很好，在通胀期间你会表现得相当不错。我的意思是，比别人拉得好，人们会付钱给你做这件事。各种各样的事情。所以你的技能不会被夺走，但你的钱可能会。好的，六号站。哦，等一下。那是——接下来是贝基吗？贝基？

贝基·奎克：是的。现在是六号站。

原文

5. Inflation “swindles almost everybody”

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Phillip King. He writes, “In the ’70s you wrote an article entitled, ‘How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor.’ You said that stocks cannot keep pace with inflation, because companies cannot increase their return on equity. Do you believe that this is still the case? Yeah. And of course bonds can swindle the equity investor too. (Laughs) Inflation, I should say, swindles the bond investor too. And it swindles the person who keeps their cash under their mattress. It swindles almost everybody. And the problem, if you have a business that doesn’t take any capital, and let’s just say the dollar depreciates 90% or something, so things cost ten times as much. If it doesn’t take any capital you can charge ten times as much, and you’ve kept your relative position. But most businesses take some capital. If our utility business — just to say that the dollar is worth 1/10th some years hence from now, we have to have ten times the capital investment, basically.

And we get paid a return on that, but we have forced capital investment to essentially keep in the same place. And I wrote an article that related to that, and I will tell you one famous story, which you will all sympathize with. In that I wrote that story for Fortune, and when I finished it, it was about 7,000 words. And Fortune didn’t like publishing 7,000 words, and they had my friend Carol Loomis explain that to me, knowing that I would pay more attention to her than anybody else. But being stubborn and male, I said, you know, “Every word is precious,” and they can either run it or not. So then they sent an editor, a very nice guy, out to Omaha. And this guy explained to me that just wasn’t right to use that many words. And I said, “Well, that’s fine, but if you don’t do it, I’ll write it someplace else.” Very disgusting behavior on my part. And then it was beginning to bother me a little, so I sent it to my friend Meg Greenfield.

And Meg was a great, great, great editor at The Washington Post, and we were very, very good friends. Wonderful woman. And Meg, who was tough as nails with most writers, but she was kind of nice. She didn’t want to really hurt me too much. So I said, “Well, Meg, what do you think?” And she said, “Well, Warren,” she says, “You don’t have to tell everything you know in this article. (Laughter) And it made the point. And so I write that article shorter, and I say more or less the same thing. You know? And you’re better off — if you really could have a totally stable unit of monetary use for the next 100 years, it would be better for business and investors in general. Charlie? No? We will go to station six. Inflation — the question is how much. And the question is whether you can decide that 2% and keep it — the answer is nobody knows. You know? I mean you do not know, and nobody knows.

You can listen to all kinds of stuff, but nobody knows how much inflation there will be over the next ten years or 20 years or 50 years or next month. And people talk about it all the time, because you’re interested in knowing the answer to your question. And they don’t know the answer, but there are a lot of people that will tell you they know the answer if you pay them enough. And other people that will tell you for nothing, because they think it enhances their prestige and makes them more valuable and all that. But the answer is they don’t know. And we don’t know either. The best protection against inflation, though, still is your own personal earning bar. If you play the violin very well, you will do reasonably well during inflation. I mean play it better than other people, people will pay you for doing that. All kinds of things. So your skills will not be taken away, and your money may be. OK, station six. Oh, wait a second. Was that —? Is it Becky next? Becky?

BECKY QUICK: That’s right. It’s station six.

6. 公司内部”说谎文化”是如何形成的

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。六号站。好的。

马丁·韦根德：我的名字是马丁·韦根德。我住在田纳西州纳什维尔。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢你们一生的教诲，也感谢今年让我们回到奥马哈。(掌声)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，谢谢。

马丁·韦根德：你们提到过，公司得到它应得的股东。在今年的信里，你提到你最大的满足之一是为个人长期股东工作。随着机构指数基金的影响力日益增长，管理层如何能培养像伯克希尔这样的股东文化？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，幸运的是，我们拥有这种文化，我们更知道如何保持它，而不是如何建立一种。这非常有趣。我们今天有1,470,000股A类股在外流通。比一年前少。那些位置都坐满了。我的意思是，你们就是现有的股东。我们喜欢我们现有的群体。所以，当我们有固定数量的座位时，我们到底为什么要出去招募其他人来取代你们？你知道？我的意思是，我们能拥有的理想股东群体就是我们今天拥有的群体。而且，你知道，如果我们有一个教堂，我们想让人们周复一周地回来。如果我们座位有限，而且我们有很好的会众，我们就不会出去再招募50或100个人，而不得不赶走我们已经有的50或100个人。我们已经有了。我知道几乎每一家公司，你知道，都在招揽新的人进来。不管他们是否在改善他们得到的群体，这在我们看来基本上都是疯狂的。

我们不想要任何与现在不同的人(笑声)和我们现有的不同。而且，你知道，我们不会摆脱指数基金，所以我们必须摆脱像你们这样的人，但我们不想摆脱像你们这样的人。(笑)我只是不明白，如果你有一个社区，土地面积或其他什么的大小使得你只能有十个邻居，而且他们都是好邻居，你为什么要出去对街上的一大批人说，你知道，“你为什么不去买我隔壁那家伙的房子？“你知道，(笑)这很奇怪，但有非常多人靠做这个谋生，他们从不真正质疑。我几乎想问任何每个月都做分析师陈述的公司，“你试图摆脱现有的哪一个股东？“你知道，基本上，因为我希望你不会在年底有比现在更多的流通股。

难道我应该，你知道，让路(笑)给那些正在考虑你的股票下周会怎么样的其他基金取代我吗？这是一个非常非常非常奇怪的情况。当然，真正疯狂的发展是人们在和所谓的分析师群体交谈，你知道，金融界的高级祭司，有些公司一个月不止做一次。想象一下，如果你为那家公司工作，你去那家公司工作，每个月他们都重复这些关于他们公司的事情，“每个客户获得更多服务很重要，现在是6.2，我们必须达到7，“或者类似的话。他们月复一月地说，所以它变成了一种教条。CEO或者他的代表这样说，然后下个月你如何说，“顺便说一下，我们真的错了，这是我们应该努力的方向。“你不能那么说。

新CEO面临的可怕问题是，在之前的CEO说过最重要的事情是达到盈利目标之后。嗯，你知道，他很可能是通过时不时地作弊来达到目标的。这个人把接力棒交给你，你会站出来说吗，“嗯，我们确实一直在作弊，不做盈利预测，只给股东真实的结果，而不是编造一些东西，这对公司的发展是反生产力的。“会计部门，你知道，他们做不到。这不是人性，而且，你也不会被任命为继任者。但你不能进去说，“我们一直在延续这些神话，说我们总是能实现8%的增长，或者我们能做这个做那个，或者最重要的事情是这个。”

如果你每个月都在向人们宣扬这就是我们的立场，然后再问另一个问题，把这种信息传递给大众，传给分析师等等，你就无法进去改变它。这是一种完全破坏性的政策。我的意思是，你知道，在GAAP会计准则内，我可以在数字上玩很多游戏。伯克希尔做过了很多蠢事。我们从未告诉任何人数字必须是这样或那样，或者要改变什么。我的意思是，一旦你开始，就全都完了。你无法停止。就像从收银机里拿出5美元一样。你知道，你第一次拿出5美元，你会说，“嗯，我会还回去的。“然后做几次，你就再也停不下来了。事实上，做过一次你可能就再也停不下来了。但如果一件事是有破坏性的，那就不要开始它。预测盈利，我想不出还有更破坏性的事了。

我有36万人在外面，他们知道我是否在说谎。他们中的很多人。他们知道他们送进来的数字，然后被改变了吗？你知道，你在传达什么信息？在伯克希尔内部，我们有一个戏剧性的例子。只是，你知道，如果你开始说谎，你就有大麻烦了。就这么简单。如果你开始对你的团队说，不知怎的，你有一份工作——你有股东关系，你的工作就是出去告诉大家，在成千上万的股票选择中，我们的股票是最值得买的，每天都是。那是疯狂的。那你告诉他们什么？嗯，他们试图，你知道，看看风往哪个方向吹，弄清楚他们必须告诉别人什么。然后他们出去告诉他们，如果你是人，而你已经说过，“我们将赚到每股3.59美元，“你就能得到3.59美元。而且能在相当长一段时间内做到。

而且，你知道，你可以有所有这些流程，但如果你有一种说谎的文化，流程就真的——它们只是消失了。查理和我见过，嗯，可能每次我们加入董事会时都见过。查理，跟他们说说？(笑)

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为伯克希尔的文化在我们离开后会持续很长时间。我认为它应该，而且我认为它会发展得相当好。美国其他企业界则相当不同，而且我认为每过十年就变得更加不同。而且它正变得非常奇怪。很快他们就会在线上举行所有股东会议，股东甚至都不会来。它只是变得非常奇怪。指数基金在投票方面变得越来越重要。就像生活中其他一切事物一样。它在变化，而且不总是以你喜欢的方式。

沃伦·巴菲特：而且最终会影响到选择不同的CEO以及各种事情。我的意思是，你不会任命一个继任CEO，他进来说以前所做的一切，你知道，都有点欺诈性。你知道吗？我的意思是，如果我们需要在季度结束后记录一笔额外的销售，如果我们需要调整准备金，一旦你开始说谎，就一切都完了。我只是不知道有什么办法可以绕过这个，除了尽一切可能不要——如果你在高层树立了错误的榜样，你就真的有麻烦了。你知道吗？我们从未告诉任何人去改数字。我们永远不会。如果他们一直在改数字，你知道，我们会有各种麻烦，因为他们知道，我知道，下一个人也会知道。它只会恶化。我们真的一次又一次地看到这种情况。董事会运作的方式，你知道，必须是流程导向的。

我的意思是，我理解特拉华州在制定法规时面临的问题，法官在审视事物时面临的困境，但强调流程对一个组织可能产生的影响是惊人的，因为他们认为只要被允许，他们可以做任何事情。而且，你知道，最终地基会崩溃的。

原文

6. How a “culture of lying” can develop at a company

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Station six. OK.

MARTIN WEGAND: My name is Martin Wegand. I live in Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for your lifetime of teachings and for hosting us back in Omaha this year. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you.

MARTIN WEGAND: You have mentioned that companies get the shareholders they deserve. And in this year’s letter, you mentioned a great satisfaction of yours is working for the individual long-term shareholders. With the growing influence of institutional index funds, how can management teams foster a shareholder culture like the one we have at Berkshire? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, fortunately we have it, and we know more about how to keep it than to institute one. And it’s very interesting. We have a 1,470,000 class A shares outstanding today. Fewer than we had a year ago. And those seats are filled. I mean you are the shareholders in place. We like the group we have. So why in the world, when we got a fixed number of seats, should we go out and recruit other people to replace you? You know? I mean the ideal shareholder group we can have is the group we have today. And, you know, if we had a church, we’d want the people to keep coming back week after week after week. If we had a limited number of seats, and we had some wonderful parishioners, we would not go out and recruit another 50 or 100 of them and have to throw out 50 or 100 of the ones we already had. We’ve got. And every company I know, virtually, you know, is wooing new people to come in. And whether they’re improving the group they get or not, I mean it strikes us as basically crazy.

We don’t want anybody different (Laughter) than we have now. And, you know, we’re not going to get rid of the index fund, so we have to get rid of people like you, and we don’t want to get rid of people like you. (Laughs) And I just don’t understand why if you had a neighborhood, and the size of the terrain or whatever it was would be such that you could have ten neighbors,

（笑声）如果他们不想做大，就不会有今天的成就。这些事情不会凭空发生。但这并不意味着这是他们唯一的目标。他们也希望投资者获得良好回报等等。但他们肯定不会采取一种会导致强烈反弹、使他们规模大幅缩水的政策。他们能想清楚自己的利益所在。而恰好在这种情况下，这会产生正确的结果——他们不会控制美国，但他们会做对自己有利的事情。他们必须做的事情，必须是在政治上可接受的。唯一可能搞砸对他们来说本来很好的一笔交易的事情，就是让国会改变规则。你知道，投资公司法（1940年）真正改变了人们的行为方式，并在很长一段时间内极大地主导了局面。任何与联邦政府作对的人都会输，对吧？

如果你试图做那种事——他们其实并不需要这么做。他们只会说，“好吧，我们放弃投票权，或者我们像其他人一样投票。”当然，如果你像其他人一样投票，那么当指数基金持有全国90%的股份时，别人只需买入3%或4%的股份就能控制一家公司，因为基金会自动跟随你那很小的份额。你会看到这一切如何展开。我是说，这是一个大案例，但并非不寻常的案例。

原文

(Laughs) And they wouldn't be where they are in life if they hadn't wanted to get bigger. Those things don't happen by accident. That doesn't mean that it's the only thing they want. They want their investors to get good results and everything. But they are certainly not going to follow a policy which is going to cause a backlash that causes them to be a lot smaller there. They can figure out their self-interest. And it just so happens that in this case, it would achieve the right result, which is that they would not control America, but they'll do what's good for themselves. And what they have to do, what's politically acceptable. The only thing that really can mess up what is a very good deal for them is to have Congress change the rules. And, you know, the rules were — the Investment Company Act of 1940 really changed how people behaved, and it's governed things in a big way for a very long time. And anybody that takes on the federal government loses. You know?

And if you’re talking about trying to do that sort of thing — and they don’t need to do it. They just say, “Well, we’ll give up voting, or we’ll vote our shares as the rest of the people do.” And of course if you vote your shares as the rest of the people do, then if the index fund’s at 90% of the country, you could take over a company by somebody else buying 3% or 4%, because you just automatically get the funds to follow your very small little percentage. You’ll see it all play out. I mean it’s a big case, but it’s not an unusual case.

9. 伯克希尔与其能源子公司的关系

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。7号站。

埃里克·埃尔塔：是的。我是埃里克·埃尔塔，住在新墨西哥州阿尔伯克基。首先，我想非常感谢你们俩毕生慷慨分享的知识。你们极大地推动了人类的前进。更重要的是，你们教会了我们在座的各位，以及无数不在场的人，如何更理性地行事，如何以更多的爱对待彼此，以及如何过更充实的生活。为此，我想表达由衷的感谢。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

查理·芒格：嗯哼（肯定）。

埃里克·埃尔塔：至于我的问题，我想问关于伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司以及其演变出的独特结构，因为伯克希尔并未100%拥有这家公司。问题的第一部分与格雷格的持股以及他与整个伯克希尔相应的激励对齐有关。

埃里克·埃尔塔：有一位智者名叫查理，他在1995年哈佛大学的一次演讲中教导我们激励对人类行为有多么重要。我谨慎估计，格雷格在BHE的股份目前价值超过5亿美元。我很好奇您是否能分享任何计划，将其伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源的所有权转换为伯克希尔的股票？如果没有这样的计划，您能否解释为什么我们不必担心格雷格未来的激励结构？

埃里克·埃尔塔：第二部分是关于实体层面的杠杆。您总是说，鉴于BHE的盈利能力，它运作着适量的杠杆。话虽如此，相对于当前的盈利，尤其考虑到我们在伯克希尔习以为常的情况，这仍然是一个非常非常大的债务数字。我好奇如果伯克希尔100%拥有伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司，您是否仍会以同样的杠杆水平运营该业务？

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。谢谢。第二部分最容易回答，所以我先回答。然后我把第一个问题扔给查理。（笑声）但伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司实际上被其受监管的公用事业公司要求——它基本上是从受监管的公用事业起步的，如今仍由这些业务主导。我们也有兴趣购买更多受监管的公用事业公司。不同的州和不同的监管机构以不同的方式要求其持有大量债务，因为，在爱荷华州或随便哪个州，监管机构会说，你借债比获得股权资金更便宜，这在历史上几乎总是如此。他们说，既然我们会给你一定的股权回报率——比方说，随便选个数。假设他们允许我们9%的股权回报率，而我们能以3%的利率借到大量资金，他们会说，如果你全部使用股权，会导致客户费率更高。

我们很乐意在我们的公用事业公司中全部使用股权（笑声），但监管机构不会容忍，因为在传统体系下，这会导致消费者价格更高。所以这是系统内建的。实际上，我们的监管机构基本上不会允许我们在全部股权结构下获得同样的股权回报率。答案是，你知道——实际上，你之前在影片中看到了，那些收听网络直播的人没看到。但仅在爱荷华州，我们最近获得了批准，要花费超过30亿美元的资金，但他们希望我们——爱荷华州有历史，像联盟中的每个州一样——除了内布拉斯加州，那里全是公共电力。但每个私人电力公司，你知道，他们有历史要求一定比例的债务。他们希望你通过债务筹集大量资金，因为这能为消费者提供更便宜的电力。所以答案是，如果我们100%拥有伯克希尔能源公司，我们绝对会遵循同样的做法。我们会按照公用事业委员会告诉我们的要求来运营，因为他们代表那些州的人民。查理，你想——

查理·芒格：嗯，另一个问题也很简单。这是一个历史偶然。它并没有造成任何大的紧张或违反受托责任。我们与沃尔特·斯科特也有类似的问题，他曾是多年的董事，也持有同一家公司的股票，同样是个历史偶然。我根本不认为这是一个大问题。我从没见过格雷格有任何行为不符合伯克希尔的最佳利益。是的。自从2000年左右我们买入伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司以来，我们一直持有不同的比例。碰巧的是，我的妹妹也在这里，当时我们在家里，正在开派对。大概有20或30人，可能30人。沃尔特对我说：“你有空吗？我想跟你谈点事。”于是我们去了书房之类的地方，沃尔特说：“你知道，我们有了这家公司，它似乎不太适合公开上市的模式。你愿意买下它然后私有化吗？”

我说：“当然。”你知道？（听不清）价格。当我们回到奥马哈——当时是在西海岸。我们回到奥马哈，会见了大卫·索科尔，除了沃尔特之外，他是大股东。我们商定了价格。我记得沃尔特对大衛说：“别跟沃伦讨价还价。（笑声）你知道，他会让你忘了这回事，然后去做别的事情。”于是我们就买下了。所以从一开始结构就有点奇怪，我们要跟一个上市公用事业控股公司打交道，还有各种各样的事情。它演变至今，现在我们拥有大约91%的股份，沃尔特的遗产拥有——我完全不知道那部分会怎样。沃尔特从未跟我谈过，我也从未问过他。但无论如何，这与他相关的利益以及现在的遗产有关。大概接近8%吧。格雷格也有一份。

从我们的角度来看，如果他们来找我们——如果他们只是想做点什么，我们会说，“好的。”如果格雷格想这样做，我们也会同样对待，他可能也想这样做。但从我们的角度来看，我从未见过任何决策有一丁点——如果我认为那会有所不同，他就不是管理伯克希尔的合适人选。当然，问题在于，你会涉及大量与内部人士相关的过程。只要我活着，我的利益100%与伯克希尔一致。董事会，可能有点不太情愿，但他们只会说，“好吧，沃伦认为这笔交易没问题。那肯定没问题。”这是真的。（笑声）所以我可以和任何人做交易，而且不会搞砸过程。

但另一方面，如果我不在了，董事们会受到压力，要按律师说的做，律师告诉他们做这做那。然后他们想请投资银行来做评估。从那时起，整个事情就变成了一场游戏。而且费用高昂，耗时巨大。所以如果在我活着的时候发生会更好，但没有理由——我们显然更愿意拥有100%而不是91%，因为这样伯克希尔会有更多盈利。但没有理由试图对斯科特的利益或格雷格做什么，除非他们想这么做。合乎逻辑的做法是，如果斯科特那边有什么变动，我们肯定会提供给格雷格。但谁知道未来会发生什么。我能保证的一件事是，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东永远不会被占便宜，如果有人对此有不同看法，你可以起诉我的遗产之类的东西（笑声）。这不会发生。

但实际上，如果在我活着的时候做，会比以后做容易得多。但是——

查理·芒格：我希望我们有20个更多像这样的利益冲突。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）是的。完全正确。是的。不，这是一个完全合理的问题。但这从来不是问题。任何达成的答案对各方都好。现在，我没有任何感觉——我完全不知道斯科特家族持有的股票会怎样，或者他们对此有何看法。这取决于他们。沃尔特是我们的合伙人。就我们而言，我们把他相关的任何人都当作合伙人对待。他们知道这一点，不用担心我们会占他们便宜。如果他们什么都不做，我们能理解。如果他们想做点什么，我们也能理解。不过这是个好问题。谢谢。

原文

### 9. Berkshire's relationship with its energy subsidiary

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station seven.

ERIC ERTA: Yeah. Eric Erta, and I live in Albuquerque, New Mexico. So I want to first say thank you so much for a lifetime of knowledge you’ve both graciously shared with all of us. You’ve contributed greatly to push our species forward. Moreover, you’ve taught all of us here, along with many, many millions not here, how to behave more rationally, treat one another with more love, and lead more fulfilling lives. And for that, I want to say a very sincere thank you. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Uh-huh (AFFIRM).

ERIC ERTA: As for my question, I want to ask about Berkshire Hathaway energy, and the unique structure that has evolved there, given that Berkshire doesn’t own 100% of the company. The first part of that question is related to Greg’s ownership and his corresponding incentive alignment with overall Berkshire.

ERIC ERTA: Now, there’s a wise man named Charlie that in 1995, at a speech to Harvard, taught us how important incentives are to human behavior. I would conservatively say that Greg’s stake in BHE is worth more than $500 million at present. And I’m curious if you can share any plans that you have to convert is Berkshire Hathaway energy ownership to Berkshire stock? And if there isn’t a plan to do this, can you please explain why we shouldn’t be concerned about Greg’s incentive structure going forward?

ERIC ERTA: The second part is about leverage at the entity. You have always said that BHE operates with an appropriate amount of leverage, given it’s earning power. With that said, it’s still a very, very large debt figure in relation to current earnings, especially with what we have become accustomed to at Berkshire. And I’m curious if Berkshire owed 100% of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, would you still operate the business with the same amount of leverage?

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Thank you. The second part is the easiest one to answer, so I’ll take that. Then I’ll throw the first one back to Charlie. (Laughter) But Berkshire Hathaway Energy actually is required with it’s regulated utilities — and it basically started pretty much with regulated utilities, and still is dominated by that. And we’re interested in buying more regulated utilities. It’s required in different ways by different states and by different regulatory authorities to have a large amount of debt, because, in Iowa or to pick any state, the regulatory authorities are going to say you can get debt money cheaper than you can get equity money, which historically has largely almost always been true. And they say that since we’re going to allow you a return on equity — we’ll say, just pick a figure. But let’s say they allow us a return on equity of 9%, and we can borrow a lot of capital at 3%, they say it’ll result in higher rates to customers if you put in all equity.

We would love to have all equity (Laughs) in our utilities, but the regulator wouldn’t stand for it, because under the trad system it would result in higher prices to consumers. So that’s built into the system. And well, our regulator wouldn’t allow us, essentially, to get the same return on equity and have an all equity structure. And the answer is, you know — well, you actually saw in the film earlier, which the people that are hearing the webcast didn’t see. But just in Iowa, you know, we recently got approval to spend three and a fraction billion dollars, but they want us — Iowa has a history, and like every other state in the union — except Nebraska, which is all public power. But every private power, you know, they have a history of wanting X percent to be in debt. They want you to raise a lot of money in debt because it means cheaper power for the consumer. So the answer is if we owned 100% of Berkshire Energy, we would absolutely be following the same. We would be operating pursuant to what the utility commissions tell us they want us to do that. They represent the people of those states. Now Charlie, do you want —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the other one’s simple too. It’s a historical accident. It’s not causing any big tension or breaches of fiduciary duty. We had the same problem with Walter Scott, who was the director for years and years, and owned stock in the same company, also an historical accident. I just don’t think it’s a big problem at all. I see no behavior from Greg ever that isn’t in the best interests of Berkshire. Yeah. And we’ve had various percentages of Berkshire Hathaway Energy ever since we bought it in around 2000. And it happened, my sister, who’s here, we were at our house, and there was a party going on. And 20 or 30, probably 30 people. And Walter said to me, “Have you got a minute or two? I’d like to talk to you about something.” So we went in the library or someplace, and Walter says, “You know, we’ve got this company and it doesn’t seem to fit the public mold very well. And would you want to buy it and go private?”

And I said, “Sure.” You know? (UNINTEL) the price. And when we got back to Omaha — it was out on the West Coast. We got back to Omaha and we met with David Sokol, who was the big holder, beside from Walter. And we agreed on a price. And I remember Walter saying to Dave, “Don’t negotiate with Warren. (Laughs) You know, he’ll tell you to forget and he’ll do something else.” And we bought it. So it was kind of a weird structure from the start, and we had a public utility holding up any (UNINTEL) deal with and all kinds of things. And it’s evolved, and it now has us with 91% roughly, and it has Walter’s estate — and I don’t know where that goes at all. And Walter never talked to me about it, and I never asked him about it. But it’s, one way or another, interest connected with him, and the estate now. Close to eight, I guess. And Greg’s got one.

And, you know, from our standpoint, if we made a deal with — if they ever came to us and (UNINTEL) just wanted to do something, you know, we’d say, “Fine.” We’ll do the same thing with Greg if he wanted to, and he probably would want to, I mean. But from our standpoint, I’ve never seen any decision remotely — if I thought that would make a difference, you know, he just wouldn’t be the right kind of person to run Berkshire. And the problem, of course, is that you’ve got lots of process that can be involved with insiders and everything. And as long as I’m alive, you know, my interests are 100% with Berkshire. And the board, and probably and to some extent a little reluctantly, but they’d just say, “Well, Warren thinks the deal’s OK. It must be OK.” Which is true. (Laughs) So I could make a deal with anybody and it doesn’t get all messed up with process.

But on the other hand, if I’m not around, you know, the pressures are to directors to do whatever the lawyers tell them to do, and the lawyers tell them to do this and that. And then they want to bring in investment bankers to make evaluations. And the whole thing is a game from that point forward. And it’s expensive. It takes a lot of time. So it would be better if it happened while I’m alive and around, but there’s no reason — we’d rather have 100% than 91%, obviously, because more earnings for Berkshire. But there’s no reason to try and do anything with either the Scott interests or Greg, unless they want to do it. And the logical thing is if anything happened with the Scotts, we’d certainly offer it to Greg. But who knows what happens in the future. The one thing I can guarantee you, Berkshire Hathaway holders will never be taken advantage of, and, you know, you can sue my estate or something like that (Laughs) if anybody felt differently about that. It isn’t going to happen.

But it’s a lot easier if it’s done while I’m around, actually, than if it’s done later. But —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I wish we had 20 more conflicts of interest just like it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) Yeah. That’s exactly true. Yeah. No, it’s a perfectly logical question. But it was not a problem. And any answer that’s arrived at will be good for all concerned. And right now, I’ve got no feeling that — I have no knowledge at all of where the stock that the Scotts have goes or how they feel about it or anything. And that’s up to them. You know, Walter was our partner. As far as we’re concerned, we treat anybody connected with him as our partner. And they know that and they don’t have to worry about us taking advantage of them. And if they don’t do anything, we can understand that. If they want to do something, we can understand that. It’s a good question, though. Thank you.

10. 芒格：我愿意承担投资中国的风险

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自蒙大拿州博兹曼的史蒂夫·布莱克摩尔。这个问题是给查理的。他说：“过去，您曾基于估值指标对中国投资做出过有利的评价。您现在怎么看？在您的分析中，您对政府行为有多重视？”

贝基·奎克：“中国共产党近期的活动，包括侵犯人权、公然从美国公司和其他机构进行网络盗窃、对商业和媒体的言论进行打压等等，是否让您改变了对投资中国的看法？您如何评估在威权政权下投资的明显危险，正如最近俄罗斯在乌克兰的暴行所证明的那样？”

查理·芒格：嗯，这些都是好问题。毫无疑问，中国政府让投资中国的美国投资者感到担忧。在近几个月和几年里，比早期更甚。所以存在一些紧张局势。这影响了一些中国股票的价格，尤其是互联网股票。就在最近一两天，中国领导人似乎在这件事上有所转向，说他做得太过分了，将大幅后退等等。所以我们看到了一些希望的迹象。但没错，在中国投资，或者说与中国的政权打交道，确实比在美国面临更多困难。情况不同。那是一个遥远的国度，他们有自己的文化和忠诚等等。我投资中国的原因是我能够以低得多的价格买到好得多的公司，我愿意承担一点风险，以便以更低的价格买入更好的公司。其他人可能会得出相反的结论。

现在每个人都比两三年前更担心中国。事情就是这样。

沃伦·巴菲特：我没什么要补充的。（笑声）（掌声）

原文

### 10. Munger: I'm willing to risk investing in China

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Steve Blackmore in Bozemon, Montana. This is to Charlie. He says, “In the past you’ve made favorable statements about investing in China, in part based upon valuation metrics. What is your opinion now, and how much weight do you put on the actions of the government in your analysis?”

BECKY QUICK: “Do the recent communist party activities in China, including human rights violations, blatant cyber theft from U.S. companies and others, crackdowns on speech from business and media, et cetera, cause you to change your opinion on investing in China? And how do you evaluate the clear dangers of investing under authoritarian regimes, as recently evidenced by Russian atrocities in Ukraine?”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, those are good questions, and there’s no question about the fact that the government of China has worried the investors from the United States who invest in China. More in recent months in years than he did in the earlier periods. So there’s been some tension. And it’s affected the prices of some of the Chinese stocks, particularly internet stocks. Just in the last day or two the Chinese leader has sort of reversed course on that, and said he went too far and he’s going to pull way back and so on and so on. So we’re having some hopeful signs. But yes, there are more difficulties investing in, I mean, dealing with a regime in China than there are in the United States. And it’s different. It’s a long way away, and they’ve got their own culture and their own loyalties and so on and so on. And the reason that I invested in China is I could get so much better companies at so much lower prices, and I was willing to take a little bit of a risk to get into the better companies at the lower prices. Other people might reach the opposite conclusion.

And everybody is more worried about China now than they were two or three years ago. So that’s just the way it is.

WARREN BUFFETT: I have nothing to add. (Laughter) (Applause)

11. 伯克希尔保险浮存金的好处

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。8号站。

汤姆·林格：嗨，沃伦和查理，我叫汤姆·林格，来自宾夕法尼亚州韦恩。时隔两年回到这里太好了。非常感谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢光临。

汤姆·林格：在今年的致股东信中，您谈到了保险浮存金、浮存金的演变、每股浮存金、以及回购对增加每股浮存金的影响。关于回购，作为您的合伙人，我要感谢您谨慎的回购以及谨慎的股份发行。

汤姆·林格：我的问题是关于您的预期：浮存金保持稳定且成本为零或接近零的可能性有多大，尽管不时会有不利年份。伯克希尔的保险业务有什么特点让您有信心做出这样的陈述，而您的竞争对手也在尝试同样的事情，却无法在浮存金的成本和增长方面接近伯克希尔的记录？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，很有意思的是，他们实际上并没有尝试做同样的事情。回答你的问题是，如果不是我判断，加权概率显示浮存金对我们有用而不是有成本的可能性更高，我们就不会从事这个业务。在很长一段时间内，没人会知道答案。到目前为止还不错，但这是一种判断。我当然也可能错。但是，我认为我和查理都会说，我们认为几率偏向更好，几率相当大，而且如果有人能做好，我们处于非常有利的位置。但是，我们事先知道9/11会发生吗？我的意思是，这不是板上钉钉的事。

查理·芒格：不过，当你审视它时，想想它的潜力。如果我们能用全部浮存金购买我们几乎确定能给我们带来8%税后收益的普通股，那将是一大笔钱。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，110亿美元。我可以告诉你具体数字。（笑声）110亿或120亿美元。

查理·芒格：是的，这是一笔巨款。

沃伦·巴菲特：每年。

查理·芒格：是的。而且浮存金一直在增长，所以放松点。（笑声）但我们很乐意拥有这笔浮存金。

沃伦·巴菲特：但查理说的是几个“如果”，如果我们能赚到，如果我们能。答案是，你知道，这是我们的工作，我们认为我们能和任何人做得一样好，否则我们就不会去做。但我们的工作是弄清楚我们想进入哪些业务，当它们不再合理时，偶尔不得不放弃，比如纺织业务。但这些是艰难的决定。至于保险，1967年杰克·林沃尔特在11点45分左右顺道来办公室时，我一点概念都没有。查理或我安排了他。杰克大约每年一次会对监管机构发火。他就是不喜欢被监管。他会对自己说，“我要卖掉这个该死的公司。”有一天查理逮到他，他说：“杰克‘发情’了。”我说，“带他过来。”

所以他11点45分来了，杰克说他想摆脱这该死的业务。监管机构快把他逼疯了之类的。我说，“好，我买。”我说，“你想要什么价格？”他说，“比如，每股50美元。”我说，“好，成交。我们不需要审计，不需要任何东西。”然后杰克开始说，“嗯。”他立刻改变了主意，但他太诚实了，无法反悔。所以他说，“嗯，我想你会让我把代理权卖给你。”我说，“不。”当然，如果我说“是”，他就会说，“那我们做不成了。”所以我只是说，“不，你留着吧，杰克。”

他说，“我想你会让我做……”我说，“不，不，我不想让你做那个。”他希望我能给他一个退出的机会。但这样做了15或20分钟后，他看到我会同意他说的所有话，他说他以50美元的价格卖给我。所以他坚持了下来。就是这样。（欢呼）你知道，纯粹是运气。还有杰克——

查理·芒格：但是，沃伦，我们真的很喜欢我们的浮存金，不是吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：什么？

查理·芒格：我们真的很喜欢我们的浮存金。

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。

查理·芒格：我们爱它。

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们充分利用了它，但直到阿吉特来了我们才充分利用它。（笑声）谁知道那个家伙会在1986年走进我的办公室，然后我决定他就是那个让这个我一直无法按我预期方式运作的该死的东西发挥作用的人？谁知道盖可保险后来会出现？有各种各样的事情。你必须要做的一件事就是在机会来临时做好准备。你真的必须行动。幸运的是，我在一个我可以行动的环境里工作，我不会在任何其他环境工作，我会离开那里。但我工作的环境允许我这么做。董事会如果说“我们想成立一个委员会来审查每一项收购”等等，那将是疯狂的。我会说，“那很好，但你可以和其他人合作，因为（笑声）我真的不喜欢经历所有这些麻烦。”

我一生中还有其他事要做。有如此多的运气，但你必须做好心理准备，在事情合理的时候采取行动，并且要大干一场，立即行动。然后你必须确保有资源去做。

查理·芒格：伯克希尔相对缺乏官僚主义——

沃伦·巴菲特：难以置信。

查理·芒格：——在非常非常长的时间里为公司赚了很多额外的钱。

沃伦·巴菲特：也让我的生活更快乐。

查理·芒格：是的，那是理想的。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，但最终，我们处于一个异常有利的位置，可以完全按照我们想要的方式利用浮存金，同时从不让自己处于一个接近做出无法兑现承诺的位置。在阿吉特来之前，我们有两家小的保险子公司，是我买入的两家公司。一家我真的不太了解，另一家是我独自完成的。它们都是灾难。如果放任不管，它们可能会破产。我们不想那样做。所以，如果母公司介入，或者我们把它放在另一家保险公司里，我们就能支付 liabilities，我们确实这么做了。

原文

### 11. The benefits of Berkshire's insurance float

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station eight.

TOM RINGE: Hi Warren and Charlie, my name is Tom Ringe. I’m from Wayne, Pennsylvania. It’s great to be back here after two years. Thank you very much.

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks for coming.

TOM RINGE: In this year’s letter, you talked about insurance float, the evolution of float, the per share float, the effect on repurchase to increase the per share float. And in regard to the repurchase, I would say thank you as your partner for your careful repurchase, as well as careful issuance of our shares.

TOM RINGE: My question is about your expectation for the likelihood that float will be stable and the cost will be zero or close to that over time, with adverse years from time to time. What about Berkshire’s insurance businesses give you the confidence to make that statement when your competitors are trying to do the same thing, but haven’t been able to come close to achieving Berkshire’s record in cost and growth of float? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, they really aren’t trying to do the same thing, which is kind of interesting. The answer to your question is we wouldn’t be in the business unless it was my judgment that the likelihood, the weighted probabilities are higher that the float will be useful to us rather than costly to us. And nobody will know the answer to that for a very long time. So far, so good, but it is a judgment. And absolutely I could be wrong about it. But, you know, I think both Charlie and I would say that we think the odds are that it’s weighing better, and the odds are pretty good, and that we’re quite well-positioned to do it if anybody does it. But, you know, did we know 9/11 was coming? Or, you know, I mean, it is not a sure thing.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Just think of what the potential is, though, when you’re reviewing it. If we could buy common stocks we were virtually sure would give us 8% after taxes with our whole float, that would be a hell of a lot of money.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, $11 billion. I can tell you what it’d be. (Laughs) $11 billion or $12 billion.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, and it’s an enormous amount of money.

WARREN BUFFETT: Annually.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. And the float has been growing, so relax. (Laughter) But we’re glad to have the float.

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie’s talking a couple of ifs there, if we could earn it, and if we could. The answer is, you know, it’s our job and we think we can do it as well as anybody, or we wouldn’t be doing it. But it’s our job to figure out what businesses we want to be in, and when they don’t make sense, reluctantly, occasionally, to give up on them, like the textile business. But those are the hard decisions. And insurance, I didn’t have the faintest idea back in 1967 when Jack Ringwalt stopped by the office at about a quarter of 12:00. And Charlie or I set him up. And Jack, about once a year, he’d get mad at the regulators. He just didn’t like being regulated. And he’d say to himself, you know, “I’m going to sell this damn thing.” And Charlie caught him one day and he said, “Jack was in heat.” You know, I said, “Bring him around.”

So he came up quarter of 12:00, and Jack said he wanted to get rid of this damn business. The regulators were driving him nuts or something. And I said, “Fine, I’ll buy it.” And I said, “What price do you want?” And he said, “Like, $50 a share then.” I said, “Fine, we’ve done it. We don’t need an audit, we don’t need anything.” And then Jack started, and then he says, “Well.” Immediately he really changed his mind, but he was too honorable to back out. So he said, “Well, I suppose you’ll want me to sell you the agencies.” And I said, “No.” And, of course if I’d said yes, then he’d say, “Well, then we can’t do it.” So I just said, “No, you keep them, Jack,” you know.

And he says, “I suppose you’ll want me to do,” and I said, “No, no, I won’t want you to do that.” He was hoping I would just give him an out. But after doing that for 15 or 20 minutes, he saw that I was going to agree to everything he said, and he said he’d sell it to me at $50. So he forward through. And that was that. And, (CHEER) you know, it was pure luck. And Jack —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, but Warren, we really like our float, don’t we?

WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me?

CHARLIE MUNGER: We really like our float.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah.

CHARLIE MUNGER: We love it.

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we’ve made the most of it, but we didn’t make the most of it until Ajit came along. (Laughs) And, you know, who knew that the guy was going to walk into my office in 1986 and, you know, I would decide that he was the guy to make this damn thing work that I hadn’t been able to make work the way I wanted it to? And who knew that GEICO would come along later? There’s just all kinds of things. The one thing you have to do is be prepared when opportunity comes. You really do have to just move. And fortunately I operate in an environment, and I wouldn’t operate in any other environment, I’d get out of there, but I operate in an environment where I can do it. And it would be crazy of the board to say, “We want to set up a committee to review every acquisition,” and all that. And I would say, “That’s fine, but you can work with somebody else because (Laughs) I just don’t like to go through all that stuff.”

You know, I’ve got other things to do with the rest of my life. There’s so much luck, but you do have to be mentally prepared to do something when it makes sense, and do it big time, and do it instantly. And then you’ve got to be sure you’ve got the resources to do it.

CHARLIE MUNGER: The relative absence of bureaucracy at Berkshire —

WARREN BUFFETT: Unbelievable.

CHARLIE MUNGER: —has made the company a lot of extra money for a very, very long time.

WARREN BUFFETT: And it’s made my life happier.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And yes, that’s ideal. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but in the end, we are extraordinarily well-positioned to do exactly what we want to do with float, while at the same time never putting ourselves in the position, never coming close to making a promise we can’t keep. We had two small insurance subsidiaries well before Ajit, with two companies I had bought. One I really didn’t know that much about, the other one I did it all by myself. And they were disasters. And left alone, which they could’ve been, they’d have gone bankrupt. And we just didn’t want to do it. So, you know, we could pay the liabilities if the parent company got involved, or we put it in another insurance company or something, and we did it.

12. “我把伯克希尔看作一幅画”

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，伯克希尔，以某种疯狂的方式，我把它看作一幅画。你知道，它规模无限。它有一块不断扩大的画布，我可以画我想画的东西。如果有人想画别的，那我就找个更小的东西来画。你知道，实际上，我对画一窍不通。带我去艺术博物馆，我真正想知道的只是男洗手间在哪里。（笑声）我就是不感兴趣。别人看画能看到些什么，然后后来还能看到更多。我是说，他们在感知能力方面确实有所不同。对我来说，伯克希尔就是一幅画，我可以画。显然，目标是希望我的合伙人能从中受益。但我真正喜欢的是画画这件事。

只要它在我脑海中，我随着时间推移能在画中看到不同的东西，这几乎是我每时每刻都能享受的最大乐趣。我不为别人推荐这个。偶尔，也不算太偶尔，我会在画中看到一些东西，心想，“嗯，我本应该那样做。”然后我回去重新画。这很有满足感。谁知道人类为什么会这样反应。但我确实知道什么让我快乐，什么不让我快乐。我找到了让我快乐的事。那为什么我要改变它呢？（笑声）这就是对一个我记不清是什么问题的简短回答。（笑声）

原文

### 12. "I look at Berkshire as a painting"

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, Berkshire, you know, in a crazy way, I look at Berkshire as a painting. You know, and it’s unlimited in size. It’s got an ever-expanding canvas and I get to paint what I want. And if somebody wants to paint something else, then I’ll (Laughs) get a smaller little thing and I’ll paint away. And, you know, I actually, you know, I don’t know anything about paintings. Take me to an art museum, and you know, all I really want to know is where the men’s room is. But, (Laughter) you know, I’m just not interested. And other people look at paintings and they see something. And then they see something additionally later on. I mean, they really have a different sort of perception ability in relation to that. And to me Berkshire’s a painting and I get to paint. And, you know, the object, obviously I want my partners to come out well in it. But the real thing I like is the painting.

And as long as, you know, it’s in my head and I see different things in it as I go along, and you know, it’s, you know, the closest thing I can come to enjoying myself every minute of the day. And I don’t prescribe it for other people. And occasionally I, well, not so occasionally, but I see things in the painting, you know, I think, “Well, I should’ve done that differently.” And I go back and paint it over. And it’s satisfying. And who knows why human beings react in that manner. But I do know what makes me happy and what doesn’t make me happy. And I found what makes me happy. So why in the world would I change it? (Laughs) So that’s a short answer to a question that I can’t remember what it was. (Laughter)

13. 经济刺激是必要的，但它加剧了通胀

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯的安德鲁·凯索。他说：“去年沃伦提到，通胀已显著影响了伯克希尔旗下公司支付和收取的价格。鉴于这些通胀趋势自去年会议以来仍在持续，并且在某些情况下加速了，您能否评论一下，这次的通胀时期与美国以往的通胀时期（如1970年代和1980年代）相比如何？美国企业和公民可以做些什么来减少通胀带来的负面影响？”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们已经在某种程度上应对了这个问题，你要做的是发展那些人们愿意在未来为之付费的技能，无论交易单位是什么。但就我们自身业务中的通胀而言，我们看到的情况非常惊人。我想你采访过家具城的伊夫·布鲁姆金，两年来，这些商品的价格一直在上涨。我们以更高的价格出售，人们手上的钱比以前多了。他们喜欢购物。他们可以买到某些东西。就像二战期间，印了很多钱，但人们买不到汽车，买不到冰箱，甚至连糖、咖啡等东西也不能想买多少就买多少。买汽油还得用小票。最终，如果人们手上有大量货币而商品很少，价格就会上涨。

你可以做各种事情来试图压低它。当然，通胀从来不会完全相同。经济学中没有事物在第二次发生时与第一次完全相同，因为第一次的经验会影响第二次时人们的态度，而他们的态度总会影响活动本身。这是一个有趣的现象。人们写教科书，基于上一次的经验。人们读教科书，所以下次行为会不同。然后他们奇怪为什么结果和上次不同。总之，我们——当我说“我们”的时候，我指的是美国政府——政府向人们发放了大量的钱。在某个时候，这些钱不可能像货币流通量较少时那么值钱。这里有一个我认为可能会让你吃惊的有趣数字。反正它让我吃惊。美联储每周四会公布资产负债表。美联储和财政部是复杂的机构。

但他们确实会发布这种合并报表，包含各个联邦储备银行以及多年来立法涉及的各种东西。但有一张资产负债表。大约15年前，如果你看，美联储发行了我之前谈到的那些钞票。这是最新的。（笑声）他们印这些纸片。它们以某种方式到了人们手里。有趣的是，人们说现金已死，无现金社会等等。但在大约10或15年前，流通中的货币大约是8000亿美元。如果你看上周四的报告，你会发现现在流通中的货币大约是2.2万亿美元。2.2万亿美元。美国大约有3.3亿人。我们这样来看。

3.3亿人，几乎有2.3万亿美元流通中的货币，合每人7000美元，理论上每个男人、女人和孩子都有7000美元的现金。嗯，这不准确。但你知道美联储的记账基本上是对的。外面确实有这么多。我不知道这些钱在哪。我的意思是，我不知道是否在俄罗斯，是否在南美，我不知道查理是否全拿着。（笑声）这是一笔惊人的数字，对吧？现金已死，而我们平均每人拥有7000美元。在你消化这个数字的时候，想想看，如果美国政府说，他们私下决定，要寄给美国每个家庭100万美元会怎样？美国大约有1.3亿个家庭。他们会给你寄100万美元现金。附带几个条件。一个是在接下来的30天内如果谈论此事，钱就会消失。就像老电视剧里那样，“噗”一声消失。30天后你可以花掉。突然间，美国家庭财富，美联储估计大约130万亿美元。基本上，家庭财富翻了一番。你只是寄了钱出去，但你不告诉别人每个人都是如此。你只是说他们中了彩票之类的。

现在你手上有相当于家庭财富总额的额外财富。平均而言，人们翻倍了。他们多了这130万亿美元的财富。一个月后，他们可以花掉。会发生什么？价格会上涨。但会立即上涨吗？你不知道别人也拿到了，你只知道你拿到了，所以你不觉得需要冲出去买东西。但一旦消息传开，我们寄出的金额，联邦政府，我只是说资源的分配，就是像这样的数字。它会影響價格。必須影響價格。如果你回家发现你的净资产是昨天的十倍，但其他每个人也是一样，这不会增加经济中的面包数量或汽车数量。这只意味着这东西的价值，它的购买力会下降。

你不能买到比实际存在更多的东西。这是一个非常奇怪的时期，我们向人们发放了大量金钱，他们以某种方式拿到钱，却发现没有以前那么多东西可买。我们还遇到了供应链中断。所有这些事情同时发生。但最终的结果是，他们走进内布拉斯加家具城，开始买东西。他们在我们的其他公司也这么做。而且方式非常奇特。现在他们在买，比如说，珠宝店一般来说不是非常好的生意。两年前，每个拥有珠宝店或商场里有多家珠宝店的房东都在担心如何收到租金。而现在，几乎每一家珠宝店的生意都比他们梦想的要好得多，库存却少得多，因为人们进来就买。他们不等促销。当他们走进商店，他们会买点东西然后离开。而且他们付了钱。

他们手上有钱。所以我们正在看到这样一个事实的展现：我们以这样或那样的方式寄了很多钱给人们。这非常间接，当谈论一个大系统时会变得复杂。但这就是发生的事情。我可以向你保证，如果我们给美国每个家庭寄100万美元，而你不知道这事发生了，你明天不会预期行为上有多大改变。但不知何故，在某个时候，如果你开始每月都这样做，并且人们真的知道你在做，那么他们就会开始预期并提前购买，远期购买。经济学中有无数的事情发生。但答案是，我们已经经历了大量的通货膨胀，如果你要寄出我们寄出那么多钱，几乎不可能不导致通胀。而且我们可能做对了。

事实上，我认为在某个时刻，如果美联储（实际上是印钱的机构）没有这么做，你们的生活会糟糕得多，非常糟糕。那是一个重要的决定。这就是通胀发生的原因。天知道，它可以结束。你可以让国家陷入衰退。你可以做各种事情。顺便说一句，这个国家会经历衰退，也会周期性地经历萧条。事情会以不同方式发展。你今天读报纸，一年后会想，“我一年前为什么读那报纸？”事情就是这样。1942年我买第一只股票时，我知道之后会发生的一切吗？当然不知道。我什么都不知道。但我只需要有一个想法。那个想法并不成熟，可能只是每个孩子在国家刚刚参战时的感受，对吧？

我们以为美国会赢。如果美国赢，它会普遍地赢。储蓄债券的利率是2.9%。我知道是因为我们买了。它们最初叫战争债券，然后叫国防债券，然后叫储蓄（笑声）债券。但它们是同样的东西。你印了大量的钱，钱就会变得更不值钱。不是一文不值。有一次我在CNBC上遇到麻烦，因为我说它会变得更不值钱，但被缩写成了“一文不值”。（笑声）所以我花了好几年才学会如何区分那些词。总之，这就是我对经济学所知的一切，甚至更多。查理可能能补充。

查理·芒格：嗯，它以从未见过的规模发生。那些支票只是寄给每一个声称有生意并有员工的人。他们可能在短时间内用钱淹没了这个国家。正如你所说，他们可能不得不这么做。但这是以前从未有过的规模。

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们遇到了以前没有遇到过的问题。

查理·芒格：是的，哦（笑声）不，我不是说那不是个好主意。

沃伦·巴菲特：我的意思是，在我的书里，[美联储主席]杰伊·鲍威尔是个英雄。很简单。他做了他必须做的事。如果他什么也不做，那就是在吮手指。有很多——我不该说很多——但有些其他联储主席会吮手指。世界会在他们周围崩塌。没人会确切地责怪他们，他们会责怪病毒、中国人以及各种事情。

查理·芒格：嗯，真正有趣的国家是日本，他们先是回购了所有债务，然后开始回购所有普通股。这真的很奇怪。他们得到了什么？25年的停滞。谁能预测到呢？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，没人预测到任何事。（笑声）我们对任何人的预测都不感兴趣，包括我们自己的。很简单。我们所知道的是，我们能配得上你的信任，没有理由去做不配的事。我们无法预测，但基本上我们认为我们在努力打造一个伯克希尔，它或许无法承受核交换，但能承受我们力所能及的任何事情。这让我们感觉良好。这并不让我们感觉完美。我们甚至希望能向你承诺更多，但我们不能承诺更多。所以很简单。

原文

### 13. Economic stimulus was needed, but it has fueled inflation

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Andrew Kesaw (PH) from Minneapolis, Minnesota. He says, “Last year Warren mentioned that inflation had noticeably impacted the prices that Berkshire’s businesses were paying and charging. Given those inflationary trends have continued, and in some cases accelerated since last year’s meeting, could you comment on how this particular inflationary period ranks among previous such periods in the United States, like the 1970s and 1980s? And what can American businesses and citizens do to reduce the negative impacts that inflation brings about?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve sort of attacked them, what you do yourself, and then, you know, you develop the skills that people are willing to pay for in the future, regardless of what the unit of exchange is. But in terms of inflation in our own businesses it’s extraordinary how much we’ve seen. You know, I think you interviewed Irv Blumkin at the Furniture Mart, and two years, you know, the prices have just kept coming in higher for these things. And we sell them for higher prices, and people have more money than they’ve had before. And they like to buy. And there are certain things they can buy. It’s like during World War II, you had a lot of money created, and people couldn’t buy cars, and they couldn’t buy refrigerators, and they couldn’t even buy as much sugar or coffee or things as they wanted. And they had little stamps for gasoline and all kinds of things. Well, eventually if you get a lot of money in people’s hands and you don’t have very many goods, prices go up.

You can do all kinds of things to, you know, try and talk it down. And, of course, inflation is never the same. Nothing in economics is the same the second time after it happens than the first, because the first affects people’s attitudes in the second, and their attitudes always influence the activity itself. I mean, it is an interesting phenomenon. People write a textbook, and they write it based on the last experience. And people read the textbooks, so they behave differently next time. And then they wonder why they’re getting a different result than they got the time before. So anyway, we have sent out lots and lots and lots, and when I say “we” I mean the United States government, the government has sent out lots of money to people. And at some point, you know, the money can’t be worth as much as it was when there was less money out. Here’s an interesting figure that I think probably will astound you. It astounds me, anyway. The Federal Reserve, every Thursday, puts out a balance sheet. And the Federal Reserve and Treasury, they’re complicated institutions.

But they do put out this kind of consolidated statement of all the various Federal Reserve banks, all these things that have entered into legislation over the years. But there’s a balance sheet. And 15 years ago, roughly, if you look, you know, the Federal Reserve issues those notes I talked about a while back. And there’s the current one. (Laughs) And they print these pieces of paper. And they, one way or another, they get into the hands of people. Well, the interesting thing is, people said cash is dead and all that sort of thing, you know, cashless society. Well, there were $800 billion, go back ten or 15 years, about $800 billion of currency in circulation. And if you look at last Thursday’s report, you’ll see there’s something like, now, $2.2 trillion of currency in circulation. $2.2 trillion. Now, there’s about 330 million people in the United States. Let’s look at it that way.

And with 330 million people, and you have almost $2.3 trillion of currency in circulation, that’s $7,000 per person, every man, woman, and child, in theory, has $7,000 worth of currency. Well, you know, that isn’t right. But you do know that the Federal Reserve’s bookkeeping is essentially right. They’ve got that much that’s out there. I don’t know where it is. I mean, I don’t know whether it’s in Russia. I don’t know whether it’s in South America. I don’t know where, you know, I don’t know whether Charlie’s got it all. I mean, (Laughter) it’s a staggering sum, you know? Cash is dead, and yet we, on average, have $7,000 for every person in the United States. Now, while you’re absorbing that, think for a moment what would happen if the U.S.

government said, well, they work it out in private and they decide that they’re going to send, the Federal Reserve, and I’m not going to blame the Federal Reserve for this, someone back in Washington decides they’re going to send out $1 million to every household in the United States. And there are 130 million households in the United States or something like that, you know? And they’re going to mail you $1 million in cash. And there were a couple provisions attached to it. One is if you talked about it in the next 30 days, the money disappeared. So just like in one of those old TV shows or something, and poof, disappears. And after 30 days you could spend it. Well, all of a sudden, the household wealth of the United States, the Federal Reserve puts out an estimate, is $130 trillion or something like that. So basically, you’ve doubled the household wealth. And all you’ve done is mailed out people, but then you don’t tell them you’re doing it with everybody. You just say they won the lottery, or whatever it may be.

And now you’ve got an amount equal to household wealth. On average people have doubled. They’ve got this extra $130 trillion of wealth. And in a month, they can spend it. Well, what’s going to happen? Well, prices are going to go up. But are they going to go up immediately? Well, you don’t know the other guy got it, you just know you’ve got it, so you don’t really feel like you’ve got to rush out and buy things. But as soon as word gets around, well, we’ve mailed out, if you look at the amount we’ve distributed, the federal government, I’m just talking about the distribution of resources, we’re talking numbers like that. And it affects prices. It has to affect prices. If you had ten times as much, if you went home and you found out you had ten times the net worth you had yesterday but everybody else has the same thing, it doesn’t increase the amount of bread in the economy or the number of cars. It just means that the price, the value of this is going to go down.

And it’s purchasing power. You can’t buy more than exists. So it’s a very strange period where we have lots of money sent out to people, who one way or another were getting it, that they didn’t find as many things to buy as before. And we had supply chain disruption. And you have all these things happen. But the end of it is they go into the Nebraska Furniture Mart and they just start buying things. And they do it with our other companies. And they do it in very peculiar ways. And now they’re buying, I mean, one thing, jewelry stores were, generally speaking, not a very good business. And two years ago, every landlord that had a jewelry store, or multiple jewelry stores in their mall, you know, was wondering how they were going to get their rent. And now every jewelry store virtually is doing incredibly better than they ever dreamt with way less inventory, because people just come in and buy. They don’t wait for sales. You know, when they walk in the store they’re going to walk out and they’re going to have bought something. And they paid for it.

They’ve got the money. So we are seeing an unleashing of the fact that we’ve just mailed a lot of money to people, one way or another. It’s very indirect, and it all gets complicated when you talk about a big system. But this is what’s happened. And I will guarantee you that if we mail out $1 million to every household in the United States, and you don’t know that it’s happened, you know, you don’t really expect much to happen in behavior tomorrow. But somehow, at some point, and then if you start doing that every month, we’ll say, and people really know you’re doing it, then they start anticipating it and buying ahead of time and forward. I mean, there’s a million things that happen in economics. But the answer is we’ve had a lot of inflation and it was almost impossible not to have, if you’re going to mail out the kind of money we’ve mailed out. And it’s probably a good thing we did it.

In fact, I think there was one point when the Federal Reserve, which in fact creates the money, if they hadn’t done it your lives would be a lot worse, a whole lot worse now. And that was an important decision. And that’s why you’ve had inflation. And heaven knows, I mean, it could end. You can throw the country into recession. You can do all kinds of things. The country’s going to have recessions, incidentally, and it’s going to have depressions periodically. And things will happen differently. And you’ll read a newspaper today and you’ll wonder a year from now, “Why was I reading the newspaper a year ago?” I mean, it’s just the way it works. When I bought the first stock in 1942, did I know everything was going to happen afterwards? Of course not. I didn’t know a damn thing. But I just needed to have one idea. And that idea wasn’t really well-formed, it was just probably the way practically every kid felt about the country when we’d just gone into a war, you know?

We thought America was going to win. And if America was going to win then, it was going to win just generally. And savings bonds were paying 2.9%. I learned that because we bought them. They called them war bonds originally, and then they called them defense bonds, and then they called them savings (Laughs) bonds. But they were the same thing. And you print loads of money and money’s going to be worth less. Not worthless. I got in trouble doing that one time at CNBC, because I said it was going to be worth, separately, less. But it got contracted down to “worthless”. (Laughter) So it took me a few years to learn to separate those words somehow. Anyway, that’s everything I know about economics and more. And Charlie can probably improve on it.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it happened on a scale which would never seen before. Those checks are just mailed out to everybody who claimed to have a business and claimed to have employees. They’ve probably drowned the country in money for a while. And as you say, they probably had to do it. But it was something that had never been done on that scale before.

WARREN BUFFETT: But we had a problem we hadn’t had before.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, oh (Laughs) no, I’m not saying it wasn’t a good idea.

WARREN BUFFETT: I mean, in my book, [Federal Reserve Chairman] Jay Powell is a hero. I mean, it’s very simple. I mean, he did what he had to do, you know? If he had done nothing, I mean, he would be, you know, it’d be very easy to engage in what you would call thumb sucking then. And plenty of, I shouldn’t say plenty of, but there are other Fed chairmen that would’ve been sucking their thumbs. And the world would’ve fallen around them. And nobody would’ve exactly blamed them, they would’ve blamed the virus and the Chinese and all kinds of things.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the really interesting company is Japan, where first they bought back all the debt, then they started buying back all the common stocks. Now, that’s really weird. And what did they get? Twenty five years of stasis. Who would’ve predicted that?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, nobody predicted anything. I mean, (Laughs) there’s nobody’s predictions that we’re interested in, including our own. I mean, it’s very simple. What we do know is that we can deserve your trust, and there’s no reason to do things that don’t deserve it. And we can’t tell, but basically we think we’re trying to build a Berkshire that can’t withstand a nuclear exchange, but it can withstand as much as anything that we can do anything about. And that leaves us feeling good. It doesn’t leave us feeling perfect. We’d like to even promise you more than that, but we can’t promise more than that. So it’s very simple.

14. GAAP会计准则是否应该改变？

沃伦·巴菲特：就此打住，我们继续到第18点。我们看看，那是9号站。

伊莱·阿布沙卡：尊敬的巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我是来自加拿大蒙特利尔的伊莱·阿布沙卡。我想感谢您为我们，您的股东同仁所做的一切。我的问题是关于GAAP规则。如果您能改变它，您会改变什么？它会是什么样子？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我会辞职不干。你会怎么做，查理？（笑声）不，这是一个不可能的问题。因为首先你必须决定GAAP应该反映什么。它不反映价值。但在某些情况下，当然，说明这是价值等等很重要。我的意思是，这是一种惯例，其设计通常是为了保护审计师，否则在这个国家，任何人都会为任何事情起诉任何人。它的设计是为了让那些想要报告市场期望的特定数额的人，基本上能够做到。我不知道该怎么制定规则。我的意思是，我观察过一些我很乐意让他们做邻居的人，如果我要离开两周，我的孩子要住在某人家，我很乐意让他们住那里。如果我在某处丢了钱包，他们捡到了会还给我。但他们会对任何到手的数字玩把戏。

当然，在一个人们玩弄数字的公司审计委员会任职是一件非常尴尬的事情。如果你提出异议，就会遇到各种麻烦。事实上，很多年前我写过一些东西。我猜大约15年前就預期到你这个问题了。我为审计委员会准备了一些问题建议。我不知道那时我是否在可口可乐或其他公司的审计委员会。但无论如何，我很清楚发生了什么。但你真的不得不跟着演戏，否则你也会因此惹上各种麻烦。所以我只是提出了四个我想知道的问题。它们是完全合乎逻辑的问题。然后没人采纳它们。（笑声）而且系统原样运行良好。审计师会被起诉，但没那么频繁。SEC有很多规则，我非常钦佩SEC。我认为因为有SEC，这个国家变得更好。

但设计一套人们无法规避的规则，是一个无解的问题或难题。我的一位作家朋友说：“令人愤慨的不是非法的事情，而是合法的事情。”这很难。你努力去做是值得的。你需要SEC。但SEC无法真正阻止那些如果被解释出来你会觉得愤慨的事情。审计师也有同样的问题。我的意思是，审计师想要规则，想要流程，想要能够运作。查理，他在所罗门公司的审计委员会任职，我们可能真的有数百万份合同，人们往里面填数字，他发现了一个2000万美元的差错，当时我们有全国最大的审计公司，安达信，我记得查理——

查理·芒格：他们现在没了。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们现在没了。但他们当时（笑声）是最大的。我记得查理有一次在审计中发现了2000万美元的差错。

查理·芒格：他们称之为“塞子”。当你的会计师开始谈论“塞子”时，这可不是好兆头。（笑声）

原文

### 14. Should GAAP accounting rules be changed?

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that one we’ll move on to 18. Let’s see, that’s station nine.

ELI ABUSHAKAR: Dear Mr. Buffet and Mr. Munger, I’m Eli Abushakar (PH) from Montreal, Canada. I would like to thank you for everything you’ve done for us, your fellow shareholder. My question is regarding the GAAP rules. If you were to change it, what would you change? What would it look like? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would resign the job. What would you do, Charlie? (Laughter) No, it’s an impossible problem. Because first of all you have to decide what GAAP is supposed to reflect. And it doesn’t reflect value. But in certain cases, of course, it is important to say that this is value and so on. I mean, it’s a convention and it is done so that the auditor generally is protected, because otherwise everybody sues everybody in this country for anything. And it’s designed to cause people who want to report a given amount of whatever is desired by the market to largely be able to do it. And I don’t know how I would write the rules. I mean, I’ve watched people who I would be delighted to have live next to me, you know, if I was going away for two weeks and my kids were to stay at somebody’s house, it’d be fine with me if they stayed there. If I lost my wallet someplace and they found it, they’d return it to me. But they’d play games with any number that came to them.

And, of course, it’s a very awkward thing to be on the audit committee of a company where people are playing around with the numbers. And they don’t want you, if you raise a stink you’ve got all kinds of problems. And I actually wrote something some years ago. I was kind of anticipating your question about 15 years ago, I guess. And I wrote four suggestions for questions to be asked of the audit committee. And I don’t know whether I was on the audit committee then of Coke or whatever. But anyway, I mean, it was just clear to me what was happening. But you really had to follow the charade, or you got in all kinds of trouble for doing that too. And so, I just put four questions out that I would want to know. And they were perfectly logical questions. And then nobody adopted them. I mean, (Laughs) and the system was fine as it was. The auditors got sued, but not that often. And the SEC had lots of rules, and I admired the SEC enormously. I think the country’s better off because of the SEC.

But it is a hopeless question, or problem to devise rules that people can’t get around. My friend that was a writer said, “It’s not the illegal things that are outrageous, it’s the legal things.” It’s very hard. You try and it’s worthwhile. You need an SEC. But the SEC can’t really stop stuff that, you know, you would find outrageous if explained. And the auditors have the same question. I mean, the auditors, they want rules, and they want processes, and they want it to be so they can operate. Charlie, he was on the audit committee of Salomon, and we had probably literally millions of contracts where people put numbers in and he found that $20 million, we had the largest auditing firm in the country then, Arthur Andersen, as I remember Charlie —

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’re gone now.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they’re gone now. But they were (Laughter) the largest. And Charlie found a $20 million error I think one time in an audit.

CHARLIE MUNGER: They called it a plug. When your accountant starts talking about a plug, it’s not good. (Laughter)

15. 所罗门公司的“浮动塞子”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我要讲一个以前没讲过的故事。（笑声）你们在影片里看到了，在场的人看到我在八月向一个小组委员会作证，他们当时就是要找麻烦。我当时决定，对每个问题都诚实回答，不试图回避任何事情。我就坐在他们面前，说了我知道和不知道的事情。我说过一件事，绝对是真话，就是我只在所罗门公司待了大约十天，我说：“我还没看到任何在会计方面让我觉得糟糕的东西。”但我只待了十天。而这个给我们惹了所有麻烦的家伙，到目前为止是我找到的唯一问题。我不知道还会发现什么，我怎么能知道一个进行着数量惊人交易的地方在发生什么？

我说：“我所看到的，会计在我看来是合法的。”大约一个月后，我非常庆幸自己之前而不是之后作证，一位非常优秀的CFO，他们都是非常好的人。他进來說：“沃伦，有件事你可能应该知道。”我说：“什么事？”他说，12年前，所罗门公司与菲布罗公司合并了，后者是一家巨大的贸易公司。所罗门是一家巨大的投资银行。他们成为了一个巨大的巨头。他说，12年前我们合并时，我们有些搞不清，他们用贸易基础记账，我们用结算基础记账。然后他说，我们从未真正搞清楚如何合并账簿。这是美国最大的审计公司，安达信，负责签署这份东西。所以我们有这个数字，它每天都会变动。

它只是被放进去以使资产等于负债。（笑声）今天它是173,412,000美元，精确到分。明天它又会不同。我对自己說：“我非常高兴一个月前在国会作了证，因为我当时不知道。”但如果他们再问我，我会如实告诉他们发生了什么。“我们只是有这个每天浮动的数字，12年来我们都没找到它，安达信也不知道它在哪。”（笑声）你必须让资产等于负债，对吧？那你还能做什么？事实就是这样。世界上确实会发生奇怪的事情。这个家伙——

查理·芒格：我想名字叫“浮动塞子”。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。查理在审计委员会。（笑声）我一直建议的一件事（没人想做，我也能理解）是，世界上有数万亿美元的合同，每天人们在银行、投行等地方填上小小的数字。商品交易员也是，在伯克希尔，我们也会填一些数字，比如监管机构要求我们对公用事业进行的对冲。我提过一两次这个建议：如果你真想做些有趣的事，找几个年轻人，给他们几周时间，挑出100份最复杂的、长期、条款繁多的衍生品合同。看看承诺做某事的一方怎么估值，再看看报告的另一方怎么估值。随机挑100个操作。

我只是想知道，如果我们把一份合同估值2800万美元，另一方估值3300万美元，而且两家用的是同一家审计公司，他们却都签字了。我认为没人采纳过这个建议。（笑声）那将是我真正想深入了解会计现状时首先会做的事。但生活中有很多事情你无法改变。没人会去找麻烦，制造诉讼、新闻故事（笑声）等等。我不怪他们。

原文

### 15. Salomon's "floating plug"

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll tell you a story I haven’t told before. (Laughs) You saw in that movie, people over here saw me testify in August before a subcommittee who were out, you know, to get their way. And I just decided, you know, I was just going to answer every question honestly, and I was not going to try and draw up everything. And then so I just sat in front of them, and said what I knew and didn’t know. And one of the things I said, which was absolutely true, is that I’d only been there ten days or so at Salomon, but I said, “I really haven’t seen anything yet that strikes me as terrible in accounting.” But I’ve been there ten days. But this guy who got us in all this trouble, so far he’s the only thing I’ve found. I don’t know what else is going to be found, how in the hell could I know what was going on in a place that was doing, you know, incredible numbers of transactions and everything?

Well, I said, you know, “What I’m seeing, the accounting strikes me as legit.” About a month later, I was so happy I’d testified earlier and not later, a very fine CFO, and these are decent people. They’re very decent people. And he comes in and he said, “Warren, there’s probably something you should know.” And I said, “Well, what’s that?” And he said, well, 12 years earlier, or whatever it was, Salomon had merged with Phibro, which was a huge trading company. Salomon was a huge investment banking company. And they became this huge powerhouse. And he said that 12 years ago when we merged with them, we sort of couldn’t find exactly, they were on a trade basis and we were on a settlement basis. And then he said we never really figured out how to put the books together. This was the largest audit company in the United States, Arthur Andersen, that’s responsible for signing this thing. So, we had this number and every day it moves around.

And it’s just put in there to make assets equal liabilities. (Laughter) And, you know, today it’s $173,412,000, you know, and down to the penny. And tomorrow it’ll be something different, you know? And I thought to myself, “I am sure glad I testified before Congress a month ago, because I did not know then.” But if they ever ask me again, I’m going to tell them exactly what happened. “We’ve just got this number that floats around every day, and we haven’t found it in 12 years, and Arthur Andersen doesn’t know where it is.” (Laughter) And, you know, you’ve got to make the assets equal to the liabilities, right? So what else do you do? And that’s exactly what happened. And strange things happen in this world. This one guy —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the name was the floating plug. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you know, yeah. And Charlie’s on the audit committee. (Laughter) Yeah, the one thing I’ve always suggested, nobody ever wants to do this, and I can understand why, but you’ve got trillions of dollars worth of contracts and everything that people are putting down little numbers for every day at banks and investment banks and all over the world. I mean, commodity traders, and at Berkshire we stick down, you know, there’s certain hedging the even the regulators want us to do in terms of giving utilities. And we put a little number in. And I made this suggestion once or twice that if you really want to do something sort of interesting, you know, just get some young guy that, give them a

18. 巴菲特为何不会用25美元买下所有比特币

沃伦·巴菲特：好，我们请贝基来提问。

贝基·奎克：关于这个话题我们收到了很多问题。我来问一个来自Raj的问题。他说：“你对比特币和/或加密货币的看法有没有任何（笑声）改变？我自己对此感到很矛盾，”因为过去两年中，他自己的观点略有演变，从比特币是欺诈和浪费，变成了比特币处于投机泡沫但可能有某些用途。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，（笑）我不应该回答任何关于这个话题的问题，但我还是会回答。你知道，观看这场会议的人中有各种人，有些做多比特币，没有人做空，没有人想被踩住喉咙。我不怪他们，我也不喜欢别人踩我的喉咙。但我想这么说，如果这个房间里的人拥有美国所有的农田，你提出给我1%的权益，你说只要支付我们这笔钱，比如100亿、200亿，你出这个便宜的价格250亿美元，我今天下午就给你开支票，250亿美元，这样我就拥有了1%的农田。

如果你告诉我你拥有美国所有公寓楼的1%，你提出给我1%的权益，这样我就拥有全国所有公寓楼的1%，你要价可能是250亿美元或其他什么，我也会给你开支票。你知道，这很简单。现在，如果你告诉我你拥有世界上所有的比特币，你出价25美元卖给我，我不会要，因为我要它做什么？我无论如何都得把它卖回给你。我是说，也许不是同一个人，但它什么也做不了。公寓会产生租金，农田会生产食物，如果我拥有所有比特币，我就回到了15年前那个可能不存在或可能存在的人的状态。如果我拥有全部，他可以制造一些神秘感。但每个人都了解我的风格。

我的意思是，所以（笑）如果我想把它脱手，你知道，人们会说：“嗯，我为什么要买比特币？你为什么不叫它巴菲特币，自己做一种之类的？做点什么吧。但我不会为此给你任何东西。”顺便说一句，你是对的。但这解释了生产性资产和依赖下一个出价高于上一个买家之间的区别。现在，净来看，如果你仔细想想，已经支付了很多佣金，我是说，有各种虚构的成本非常真实，有人已经支付给了一群为这场游戏提供便利的人。但无论公众中的某一群体取出了什么，或者某一业主群体，都是从其他人那里得到的。我是说，其他人进入了房间，他们转移了资金。但房间里并没有更多的钱，只是换手了，其中可能涉及很多欺诈和成本，你知道，一大堆事情。你会亏损，你知道，你会忘记数字或忘记等式。

你可以对很多事情这样做。我是说，历史上一直如此。某些东西有价值但不生产有形之物。我是说，你可以说一幅伟大的画作，你知道，500年后可能仍有一些价值。也许不会，但如果它足够有名，可能性很大。会有一些东西。我是说，你知道，你可以找到人付钱。如果有人想卖给你一座金字塔之类的，你可以向观众收费，你知道，它会长久存在，不会生产任何东西，但人们会觉得去那里很有趣，因为他们听说过金字塔。但基本上，资产要有价值，必须能向某人提供某种东西。而在美国只有一种货币被接受。我是说，你可以想出各种东西。我们可以发行伯克希尔币，或者，你知道，我们可以发行伯克希尔钞票或类似的东西。但如果我们称之为钱，我猜会惹上麻烦。

但最终，这是货币，世界上没有任何理由让美国政府——其货币是人们更偏好的——我是说，实际上有接近2.3万亿美元的这种小纸片在某个地方流通，相当于美国每个男人、女人和孩子有7000美元，即使大多数可能不在美国。谁知道呢。但这是唯一算作钱的东西。任何认为美国会改变到让伯克希尔钞票取代其货币的人，你知道，是疯了。所以无论如何，尽管有这些缺点，你知道，它在未来一年、五年或十年是涨是跌，我不知道。但我相当确定的一件事是它不会增值，它不生产任何东西。它有一种魔力，人们把魔力附着在很多东西上。我是说，在华尔街，创造一个魔力是一个目标，你知道？我们不是一家保险公司，我们是一家科技公司。

嗯，他们是一家保险公司。但大约十几个人筹集了很多钱，他们只是说：“别管我们卖保险的事实。我们是一家科技公司。”嗯，最终他们写了保险，绝大多数此后都损失了很多钱。你可以编造一些东西，在从别人那里拿钱方面很有效，这就是为什么——

查理·芒格：我对此有稍微不同的看法。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：那我卖一些给你。

查理·芒格：嗯，（笑）在我的一生中，我试图避免那些愚蠢、邪恶、让我在跟别人比较时显得糟糕的事情。而比特币三者兼备。（笑声）首先，它很愚蠢，因为它很可能归零。其次，它很邪恶，因为它破坏了我们迫切需要维护其完整性和政府控制的联邦储备体系和本国货币体系。第三，它让我们跟中国的共产主义领导人相比显得愚蠢。他足够聪明，在中国禁止了比特币，而我们拥有所有所谓的文明优势——（掌声）——我们比中国的共产主义领导人愚蠢得多。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，当全国有25%的人因为我们今天说的话而生气时，记住查理是最后一个发言的，而且是最——（笑声）

19. 部落主义加剧是危险的

沃伦·巴菲特：我真的认为一个重要的发展，但我不知道有什么办法可以应对，我的总体感觉是，虽然无法证明，但我基本上认为人们现在比长期以来的行为更具部落性。我是说，人们总是会有党派倾向，会有宗教信仰，会有各种各样的事情。但它变得相当部落化。我凭经验说话，因为我曾经也是部落化的。你知道，我们今天在坦白，你知道，内布拉斯加橄榄球就是部落化的。当我看电视时，我看到我们内布拉斯加的球员踩出了界外一英尺，但裁判不知怎么没看到，判为“界内”，然后他们重播了六次，我会继续相信那是“界内”，即使就在我眼前他们踩了出去。你知道，这就是部落行为。而且很有趣。我是说，（笑）参与其中。

但当一群人开始说“二加二等于五”，另一群人说“二加二等于三”，你知道，如果你去问他们，他们会给你这些答案，那就可能变得非常危险。有趣的是，至少对我来说是这样，部分是因为我的年龄。但我实际上认为，仅凭记忆，上一次这个国家被视为部落化的时期，实际上是我小时候罗斯福当政的时候：要么你恨罗斯福，要么你爱他。我是说，没人关心阿尔夫·兰登或温德尔·威尔基在跟他竞选。他们就是有这些情感：要么把罗斯福的照片挂在墙上，以罗斯福的名字给孩子取名，要么他们恨他，认为他会，你知道，“哦，第三个任期？”等等，等等，有一百万件事。这个国家在30年代非常非常部落化，但罗斯福的部落更大。在我看来，他们做了一些很棒的事情。

但我恰好在一个不吃甜点就不能说罗斯福坏话的家庭长大。我是说，相信我，如果你不吃甜点，你就会说罗斯福的坏话。（笑）所以从小就这样训练，你知道，做了各种事情。所以，我想我看到过一个不是那样的时期，当艾森豪威尔与史蒂文森竞选时，或者其他情况。我是说，你知道，人们有党派行为，总有一定程度的“部落性”。但我不认为这对社会总体来说是好的发展，当人们变得部落化时，不管怎样。（掌声）查理，你是哪些部落的成员？（笑）

查理·芒格：嗯，在加州，我们有一个完全被操纵的立法机构，以至于没有人能被选民赶下台。因此，立法机构里只有疯狂的右派和疯狂的左派。他们每十年聚一次，通常立法机构里有大约六个温和派，然后他们重新划分所有选区来赶走他们，因为两派都无法容忍他们。这就是加州政府的情况。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？你住在那里，还得回去？（笑）

查理·芒格：是的，是的。

沃伦·巴菲特：我敢肯定你会——

查理·芒格：我宁愿住在那里也不愿住在俄罗斯。（笑声）（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧。我们还没得罪谁？（掌声）是谁，伦尼·布鲁斯，他曾经说：“还有我忘了冒犯的人吗？”

20. 巴菲特最喜欢的老板

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我相信是第10区。

萨赫杰：你好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫萨赫杰，来自新泽西。我目前是罗格斯大学的一名新生。你们很早就知道自己想成为投资者，而且显然做得非常出色。对于那些仍在试图弄清楚自己想专注于什么、找到自己使命的人，你们有什么建议？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一个非常有趣的问题。因为我非常非常幸运。我找到了我想做的事情，因为我父亲恰好从事一个他不感兴趣的行业，但他们那里有一些书，我爱我的父亲，我会去那里读书，它们引起了我的兴趣。你知道，我很庆幸他不是职业拳击手之类的，否则，你知道，我可能一颗牙都不剩了。（笑）这是偶然，完全是偶然，但我确实认为当你看到它时你就知道。这并不意味着你能追随。我会告诉学生们，就像我在报告里写的，我是说，你知道，“找到你喜欢做的事情。”我是说，你一生大部分时间都在做这件事，为什么你要一辈子和你不喜欢的人一起工作？除非你不得不，有时会发生这种情况。就为你最崇拜的人工作。有一次我在斯坦福演讲。

我想，几天后有人出现在汤姆·墨菲的办公室。那个人做对了。当然，这也是我毕业后做的事。我想为本·格雷厄姆工作。我是说，我不在乎报酬，这没什么区别——你知道，我只知道那是我想要的。然后我烦了他三年，他终于雇佣了我。然后我找到了一个比本更愿意为其工作的人，碰巧就是我自己。（笑声）所以从那以后我就一直为自己工作。但我一生中大约有四个老板。你知道，我去过《林肯日报》。名字我一时想不起来了，他是个很棒的老板。还有奥马哈的J.C. Penney的库珀史密斯，他们都是很棒的人。但我还是更喜欢为自己工作。当然，查理和我都为我的祖父工作过，我们只是觉得那不太有趣。

我不记得了，你当初为什么决定去那家商店工作，查理？查理1940年在那里工作，我工作——

查理·芒格：嗯，我只是为了工作体验而工作，我不需要钱。我父亲给我充足的零用钱，我还有一些私人业务。所以，我在你家杂货店工作有点像闹着玩。

沃伦·巴菲特：每天12小时？

查理·芒格：是的。

沃伦·巴菲特：——闹着玩？

查理·芒格：是的，闹着玩，没错。

沃伦·巴菲特：你觉得那是你时间的好投资吗？（笑）我是说，回头看？

查理·芒格：嗯，我以前从没做过，我想有一点那种经历。而且我没打算做太久。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯。（笑声）那肯定不是我在那里工作的原因。（笑）

查理·芒格：嗯——你知道，我可以给那位年轻女士一些建议。找出你不擅长的事情，然后全部避开。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

查理·芒格：这就是沃伦和我找到我们职业的方式。

沃伦·巴菲特：绝对。你知道，我们——

查理·芒格：我们在其他所有事情上都失败了。

沃伦·巴菲特：我们尝试了所有事情，直到找到理想的雇主：我们自己。（笑）你知道吗？那是我们真正钦佩的事情。

查理·芒格：我知道：沃伦说：“为你钦佩的人工作。”（笑声）他唯一知道的只有他刮胡子时看到的那个人。

沃伦·巴菲特：我想他是自雇人士。

查理·芒格：因为他和我都在刮胡子。

沃伦·巴菲特：但这并不是坏建议。这不是坏建议。我是说，如果他们有的选的话。我是说，查理在40年代的某一年去服役了，他当时并没有选择为谁工作的自由。而且，据我所记得，查理，你为谁工作其实并没有那么顺利，对吧？

查理·芒格：嗯——如果你仔细想想，有两件事我们俩都从未成功过：第一，我们从未在不喜欢的事情上成功过，对吧？

沃伦·巴菲特：对。

查理·芒格：第二，我们从未在真正困难且不擅长的事情上成功过。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且我们60年来一直做我们喜欢的事。

查理·芒格：是的，我们做到了。

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，我们用自己的方式找乐子，而且——

查理·芒格：我只是很惊讶。你会想，如果你聪明，你可以在不感兴趣的事情上也做得很好。但你做不到。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我自己的情况肯定有很多例子。但我们在这里就不深入了。

21. 芒格喜欢美国拥有大量石油储备

沃伦·巴菲特：我们请贝基来提问。

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的福斯特·泰勒。他说他最近听了伯克希尔·哈撒韦2008年年会，当时你谈到了全球石油产量。那时你谈到了如果全球石油产量在25年内低于8500万桶，会产生重大影响。现在14年过去了，全球石油产量看起来是7900万桶。与此同时，我们正在消耗我们的战略石油储备。美国是否应该采取不同的做法？如果我们不更加积极主动，你认为未来十年这些行动会带来什么后果？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理是石油方面的专家。

查理·芒格：嗯，但是——（笑）

沃伦·巴菲特：只是比我强。（笑声）

查理·芒格：塞缪尔·约翰逊说过：“很难确定虱子和跳蚤哪个更优先。”很难说我们俩谁在石油方面更无能。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们还在竞争。（笑）

查理·芒格：我对这个话题有不同看法。我喜欢拥有大量石油储备。如果我是美国的仁慈独裁者，我会把这里大部分的石油留着，然后高高兴兴地按阿拉伯人定的价格买他们的石油，并保留自己的。我认为在未来200年里，它会是非常宝贵的东西。其他没有人有我的观点，所以我不在意，我只是认为他们都错了。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）嗯——

查理·芒格：但无论如何，这不是正常的观点。

沃伦·巴菲特：我们自己的观点也相当灵活。我是说，实际上，联邦政府正在向经济中投放多少亿桶的石油。你知道，就在不久前，生产一桶石油的想法还被认为是什么可怕的事情。我是说，试试每天不用1100万桶石油，看看明天会发生什么。这是每个人都有立即感受的事情。你知道，这会牵扯到各种不同的部落，如果你以任何方式谈论它，你会冒犯很多人。但最后我认为，至少目前，大多数人觉得在美国有一些石油比没有好。而且我们用得很多。如果我们试图在三五年内改变，没人知道会发生什么，但在我看来，成功几率极低。查理，你为什么不说点更戏剧性的，这样你就是冒犯最多人的那个人？（笑声）

查理·芒格：嗯，如果你仔细想想，石油行业现在被污名化得这么厉害，我几乎想不出更有用的行业了，我不知道投机者怎么样，但我认识的石油工程师和设计炼油厂、管道的人，是我认识的最优秀、最可靠的人之一。而且我看到美国石油供应几乎没有什么问题（掌声）。所以我基本上爱上标准石油了。我没有那种它是个邪恶、疯狂的地方的感觉。我希望世界其他地方能像我们的大型石油公司一样运转良好。

22. 决定是否回购伯克希尔股票并不难

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们最好转到11号站。（笑）我不确定11号站是否就位？

格伦·唐：哦，我们在这里。来自overflow room的问候。我叫格伦·唐，来自纽约的股东。这是我第20次参加伯克希尔年会，我很高兴我们再次能够亲临现场。多年来，你们两位给我们所有人带来了巨大的快乐，就我个人而言，你们的智慧不仅让我成为更好的投资者，更重要的是，让我成为更好、更快乐的人。能感谢你们是我的荣幸。所以，沃伦和查理，谢谢你们。（掌声）

查理·芒格：嗯，这正是我喜欢的问题。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这——很好。

查理·芒格：再来几个这样的问题吧。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，或者你可以再说一遍。（笑）

查理·芒格：也许你可以唱出来。（笑声）

格伦·唐：也许我该就此打住了。

沃伦·巴菲特：格伦，继续。

格伦·唐：我的问题有关股票回购。自从两年前你们开始大规模回购伯克希尔股票以来，回购金额每月在10亿到30亿美元之间。据我估计，当伯克希尔交易价格相对内在价值有约20%折价时，回购率大约是每月30亿美元；约10%折价时，每月20亿美元；折价0到10%时，每月10亿美元。我这样大致对吗？还有其他因素影响股票回购的速率吗？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，在你这么友好的开场白后，我不得不说（笑）你实际上错了。如果有人在过去三四五个月的某个时间点提出向我们出售价值500亿美元的股票，我们会接受的。你知道，就是这么简单。而且，正如我之前提到的，我们在四月没有买任何股票。这是当我们能做到的时候，而且我们知道——至少我们认为概率非常高，我们当然相信我们自己的估值和投资判断——如果我们认为这对剩余股东有改善，我们就会回购。如果不是，我们就不回购。如果我们有选择，是购买我们喜欢的业务还是回购股票——控制因素是手上有多少钱，我们更愿意买业务。所以，你知道，我们不会晚上不睡觉去算公式之类的。

但我们从不认为我们没有在做事的时候去做。如果我们有一个柠檬水摊，查理和我还有你拥有它，柠檬水摊每周大约赚一美元之类的，我们分掉了。然后你说你想退出。如果你报一个价，我们柠檬水公司里有资金，我们会买断你。如果我们不喜欢那个价格，我们就不会买断你。这就是我们的感觉。但我们确实有义务做我们认为聪明的事情，并且绝不带来任何风险——在任何情况下，我们能够设想的，绝不带来财务问题的任何风险，也许除了核战争之类的，你知道，我们会去做。但这永远不会成为太大的因素。查理，我想前几天谈到了亨利·辛格尔顿。我记得他随时间回购了公司89%的股份。

他之前曾在高估时疯狂卖出或发行股票，然后在低估时回购。但关键是，当然，要让人们认为你这样做是错的，这样他才能买大量股票。还有一些其他公司也买了大量股票，但伯克希尔不会有这样的机会。因为我们有明智的股东，就是这么回事。如果我们有同一批股东持有两天期的看跌期权，他们是我们的股东，我们可以在很短时间内买下整个公司。但这是一个很容易评估的概念。我是说，我买的第二只股票——我买了城市服务优先股，那是第一只。第二只股票是一家叫“德克萨斯太平洋土地信托”的公司。它来自19世纪80年代德克萨斯太平洋铁路的破产清算。他们有300多万英亩土地，拥有矿产权、地表权等一切。

但在19世纪80年代那是很糟糕的土地。但他们有一些章程说可以用土地销售收入，每年用来购买股票。你知道，我13或14岁的时候坐在那里想：“如果我活到100岁，我就会拥有整个地方。”嗯，我还没活到100岁，也不会买下整个地方。所以两个计算到目前为止都不完美。但这是一家非凡的公司，非常非凡。因为他们谈论每年6000美元的放牧费之类的，也许吧，当他们有300万英亩的时候。然后他们不断发现石油，更多石油，更多石油。他们改变了形式，种种事情，但他们周复一周地买股票。我坐在那里计算要多久我能拥有整个公司。显然我做了一些不正确的（笑）计算，因为它不会那样发生。

但我仍然很明显地看出，如果他们在那里有300万英亩，他们搞完了，保留矿产权等一切，他们正在做的，你知道，以一个非常便宜的价格，对于任何长期持有的人来说，结果应该会很好。对于任何长期持有的人来说，结果确实非常好。但没人知道他们会发现很多石油，最终埃尔帕索会扩张到足够远，以至于靠近埃尔帕索的地表土地变得值钱。你还要再走200英里才能找到下一个城镇，但（笑）那是另一个问题。所以，有些东西就是这么简单，你知道吗？但你知道，如果人们想拿博士学位之类的，所以他们写出几百页，里面有很多希腊字母，各种这样的东西，要么你在有吸引力的价格上买断你的合伙人，要么你不是。

如果你手上有钱这样做，价格有吸引力，你又没有其他机会，你知道，为什么不做呢？你这样做肯定能获益。如果你有其他更聪明的事情，那就不做。如果绝对意义上不聪明，你也不做。查理，你有什么要补充的吗？——1943年你在做什么？（笑）你在服役？

查理·芒格：嗯，沃伦，如果我们不完全享受从小起步走了相当一段距离这件事，那我们就疯了。而且能有好伙伴同行，这是一种受眷顾的生活。我们非常幸运。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且，明天——（掌声）——周一——我可以告诉你，几乎可以肯定，如果有人提出——嗯，会有伯克希尔的股票交易，但我们不会买入。但也有相当的机会某天很多股票——我们会加一点——不是很多。伯克希尔有——我们的股东太聪明了，这是我们的问题之一（笑）如果我们想回购股票。但我们真的不想挤走任何人。但我们也在这里是为了给留下来的人增加价值。我是说，这并不复杂，有时我们会做，有时不会。不会有公式，但会有我刚才表达的原则。我猜我的继任者，以及他们的继任者，会有类似的计算，因为我们找的是理性且忠于伯克希尔的人。

所以，格伦，谢谢你的到来。

23. “独立”的董事会董事其实并不独立

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基，下一个是你。

贝基·奎克：这个问题是来自纽约布鲁克林的戴夫·谢恩（音）提出的。他回应了今天早些时候他听到的一些话。他说：“未来，格雷格能否像你之前提到的那样，以同样的自主性行事？并在没有董事会批准的情况下，立即做出数十亿美元级别的决策？”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我猜董事会会像人们通常做的那样。他们会施加更多限制，或者在很多事情上，或某些事情上，进行更多的咨询，比对我做的要多。我是说，他们不一定“需要”这样做，但他们会觉得他们没有经验，没有像了解我那么长时间地了解他，等等一堆事情。他们会觉得特拉华州的法律能更好地保护他。顺便说一句，他们没有董事和高级职员责任保险。我是说，纽约证券交易所的几乎所有公司都有。我们就是不买。我是说，我是董事会成员，你对一大群人作为信托受托人，你和我——我是说董事和我。你知道，很好。但非常有趣：人们会去博物馆董事会，你知道，他们被期望捐款。人们会去大学董事会，被期望捐款。

他们说：“能成为大学董事会或博物馆董事会的一员是巨大的荣誉，所以你应该为我们筹款。”嗯，坦率地说，我认为我们的董事会比大学董事会或医院董事会更有趣。我不知道他们在博物馆或艺术董事会上谈论什么。但人们发现他们可以每年赚30万美元，这对某些人来说极其重要，对另一些人来说毫无意义。而且，我是说，很可能，如果有人安排董事完全没有报酬，也会有很多人想当董事，这算是一种有威望的事。但事实上，这是很容易得到的钱。“独立董事”的整个概念，坦率地说，就是完全没有意义。

查理·芒格：你不认为一个需要30万美元才能在这里的董事是独立的？

沃伦·巴菲特：他需要钱，是的。我是说——

查理·芒格：他就像奴隶一样“独立”。

沃伦·巴菲特：我要读几句话，这绝对是事实，只是我稍微修改了一下。我不想让任何人被明显识别出来。但这是逐字摘录。而且我不说这是男是女，我会用男性代词，因为更容易。但我从很多年前收到的一封信中挑了几句话。这封信说：“我写这封信给你非常不情愿，而且感到个人尴尬。我已经尝试了所有传统的筹钱方式。”这个人需要几百万美元，我在街上看见他也不认识他，但你知道，他写了这封信说：“我需要几百万美元。”然后这是我发现你可能感兴趣的部分，我保留了这封信。“我的收入100%来自我的董事会费用。”嗯，我查了一下他。

当时他是五家声望卓著公司的董事，还担任过其他公司的董事，并且还将担任更多公司的董事。但他急需用钱，他说他的收入“100%来自董事会费用”。而他是一个独立董事，在每一家公司都被归类为“独立董事”。这对我来说简直令人震惊。你知道，我们几分钟后就要开股东大会了，或者即将开始，令我震惊的是，2006年我们拥有可口可乐公司9%的股份。我是说，也许他们给了我免费的可口可乐。但我们伯克希尔·哈撒韦拥有9%，我们显然关心可口可乐公司的看法。而且恰好在那段时期，加州公务员退休基金和其他一些机构建议投票反对我们做某件事。曾经有两大机构投资者因为Dairy Queen买了些可口可乐而投票反对我。或者，实际上是拥有我们特许经营权的人买了些可口可乐。

我是说，他们以为我不会在心里加总吗？如果我们拥有几十亿、几百亿美元，我会被妥协？但这太疯狂了。所以，有一年，我的投票支持率从96%——也许是98%——降到了84%。因为——我忘了是2004年还是2006年：某个时候他们就是断定我不是那种能承担这些责任的人。（笑）而且，你知道，这是他们收入的重要组成部分，我是说，他们想要这样。他们可能想做很多其他好事，这不意味着他们是坏人。但如果区别在于你怎么生活，以及在这种情况下这个人是否可能破产：你怎么能把这样的人叫做“独立”，然后说任何拥有大量股份的人——你知道，比如沃尔特·斯科特，你懂的，“不独立”，这太荒谬了。但规则就是这样，我们遵守规则。

查理·芒格：嗯，他们现在不只是要他们“独立”。他们还要一匹马，一只兔子，一头牛，等等。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，我感觉像伽利略——

查理·芒格：独立还不够。你得有非常多样化的独立。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。如果他们急需钱，比如这个例子中100%收入来自董事会费用；你又是全国五个最有声望的董事会成员；在每个董事会上都被归类为“独立”；你只希望你的CEO被另一个CEO打电话问：“这家伙行吗？”然后你说：“当然行。”这意味着：“因为他不惹麻烦，”然后他就进了第六个董事会。不管了。

查理·芒格：我所能说的是，这不是我们心目中的“独立董事”。

沃伦·巴菲特：不。不。这一切都有点疯狂。这引出一个事实，大约15分钟后，我们将不在这里举行年会。我们会在3:45重新集合，然后进行会议要求的业务事项。

原文

18. Why Buffett wouldn’t buy all the bitcoin for $25

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to Becky.

BECKY QUICK: We got a lot of questions on this topic. I’ll ask this one that came from Raj. He says, “Have you changed your views on bitcoin and/or cryptocurrency in any (Laughter) respect? I’m conflicted about this,” because his own views have slightly evolved during the past two years from bitcoin is a fraud and waste to bitcoin is in a speculative bubble but might have some uses.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Laughs) I shouldn’t answer any question on the subject, but I will. You know, there’s all kinds of people watching this that are long bitcoin and there’s nobody that’s short, and nobody wants their windpipe stepped on. I don’t blame them, I don’t like people to step on my windpipe. But I would say this, that if the people in this room owned all of the farmland in the United States, and you offered me a 1% interest in it, and you said for a 1% interest in all the farmland in the United States, pay our group, well, let’s see ten, 20, pay us this bargain price, $25 billion, I’ll write you a check this afternoon, $25 billion, now I own 1% of the farmland.

If you tell me you own 1% of the apartment houses in the United States and you offer me a 1% interest, so I’ll have a 1% interest in all the apartment houses in the country, and you want whatever it may be for it, call it another $25 billion or something, I’ll write you a check. You know, it’s very simple. Now, if you told me you owned all of the bitcoin in the world, and you offered it to me for $25, I wouldn’t take it, because what would I do with it? I have to sell it back to you one way or another. I mean, maybe not these same people, but it isn’t going to do anything. The apartments are going to produce rental, and the farms are going to produce food, and if I’ve got all the bitcoin I’m back where whatever his name was, who may or may not have existed was, you know, 15 years ago. If I’ve got it all he could create a mystery about it. But everybody knows what I’m like.

I mean, so (Laughs) if I’m trying to get rid of it, you know, people will say, “Well, you know, why should I buy some bitcoin? Why don’t you call it Buffett Coin, you know, and make your own or something? Do something. But I’m not going to give you anything for it.” And you’d be right, incidentally. But that explains the difference between productive assets and something that depends on the next guy paying you more than the last guy got. Now, net, if you look at it, a lot of commissions have been paid and, I mean, there’s all kinds of fictional costs that are very real that somebody has paid to a bunch of people who facilitate this game. But whatever one group of the public has taken out, or one group of owners, has come in from other people. I mean, other people have entered the room and they move money around. But there’s no more money in the room, it just changed hands with a lot of maybe fraud and costs involved and, you know, a whole bunch of things. You lose, you know, you forget the numbers or forget the equation.

You can do that with a lot of things. I mean, it’s been done throughout history. Certain things have value that don’t produce something tangible. I mean, you can say a great painting, you know, probably will have some value 500 years from now. It may not, but the odds are pretty good that if it was a big enough name at some point. There will be a few things. I mean, you know, you can find somebody to pay. If somebody wants to sell you a pyramid or something, and you can charge the viewers, you know, it’ll be around a long time and it would produce anything, but people will find it interesting to go there, because they’ve heard about the pyramids. But basically assets, to have value they have to deliver something to somebody. And there’s only one currency that’s acceptable in the United States. I mean, you can come up with all kinds of things. We can put out Berkshire Coins or, you know, we can put out Berkshire Money or anything like that. But we’d get in trouble, I guess, if we call it money.

But in the end, this is money and there’s no reason in the world why the United States government, whose currency people prefer. I mean, literally there’s just under $2.3 trillion just of these little pieces of paper floating around someplace, $7,000 for every man, woman, and child in the United States, even though most of them probably aren’t in the United States. Who knows. But this is the only thing that’s money. And anybody that thinks the United States is going to change to where they let Berkshire Money replace theirs, you know, is out of their mind. So anyway, with those few deficiencies, you know, whether it goes up or down in the next year or five years, ten years, I don’t know. But the one thing I’m pretty sure of is that it doesn’t multiply, it doesn’t produce anything. It’s got a magic to it and people have attached magics to lots of things. I mean, it’s a goal in Wall Street, you know, to create magic, you know? We are not an insurance company, we’re a tech company.

Well, they’re an insurance company. But a dozen people or so have raised a lot of money, they just say, “Just don’t pay any attention to the fact that we sell insurance. We are a tech company.” Well, in the end they wrote insurance and overwhelmingly they’ve lost a lot of money since then. You can make up things that work well in getting money from other people and that’s why —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have a slightly different way of looking at it. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll sell you some then.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, (Laughs) in my life I try and avoid things that are stupid and evil and make me look bad in comparison with somebody else. And bitcoin does all three. (Laughter) And in the first place, it’s stupid because it’s very likely to go to zero. In the second place, it’s evil because it undermines the Federal Reserve system and the national currency system, which we desperately need to maintain its integrity and government control and company on. And third, it makes us look foolish compared to the communist leader in China. He was smart enough to ban bitcoin in China, and with all of our presumed advantages of civilization — (applause) — we are a lot dumber than the communist leader in China.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and when 25% of the people of the country get mad because we’ve said what we said today, just remember Charlie spoke last, and was the most — (Laughter)

19. Increased tribalism is dangerous

WARREN BUFFETT: The one development that I really do think is actually important, but I don’t know any way to do anything about it, but my general sense, and there’s no way to prove it, but I essentially believe people are now behaving somewhat more tribal than they have for a long time. And, I mean, people are always going to be partisan, and they’re going to have religious beliefs, they’re going to have all kinds of things. But it gets pretty tribal. And I speak from experience because I’ve been tribal. And, you know, we’re confessing today, and, you know, Nebraska football is tribal. And when I watch a television set, and I see our guy, Nebraska, step out of bounds by a foot, but somehow the ref misses it and calls it “in,” and then they show six replays, I’ll continue to believe it was “in” even though it’s right in front of my eyes that they stepped out. You know, that’s tribal behavior. And it’s fun. I mean, (Laughs) to participate in.

But it can get very dangerous when one group of people say, “Two plus two is five,” and the other say, “Two plus two is three,” you know, and they’re going to give you those answers if you call them. And the interesting thing is, to me at least, and partly because of my age. But I actually think, just from memory, that the last time that the country was seen as tribal was actually when I was a kid and Roosevelt was in: Either you hated Roosevelt or you loved him. I mean, nobody cared about the fact Alf Landon was running, or Wendell Wilkie was running against him. They just had these feelings: They either had Roosevelt’s picture on the wall, and named their kids after Roosevelt, or they hated him and they thought he was going to, you know, “Oh, a third term?” and, you know, a million things. And the country was very, very tribal in the ’30s, but Roosevelt’s tribe was bigger. And, in my opinion, they did some wonderful things.

But I happened to grow up in a household where we didn’t get served dessert until we said something nasty about Roosevelt. I mean, and, believe me, if you don’t get dessert, you’re going to say something nasty about Roosevelt. (Laughs) And so you trained them young, and did, you know, all kinds of things. And so, I think I’ve seen a period that wasn’t that way, when Eisenhower was running against Stevenson, or whatever it might be. I mean, you know, people had a partisan behavior, and they had a certain amount of “tribal” always. But I don’t think it’s a good development for society generally when people get tribal, regardless. (Applause) Charlie, what tribes are you a member of? (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in California, we have a legislature which is completely jerrymandered so nobody can ever be thrown out by the voters. And, therefore, the only people in the legislature are insane rightist and insane leftists. And they get together every ten years, and there’s usually six moderates somewhere in the legislature, and so they re-jigger all the districts to throw them out, because neither part can stand them. Now, that is government in California. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah? And you live there and you have to go back? (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m sure you’ll —

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I prefer living there to living in Russia. (Laughter) (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Who haven’t we gotten in trouble with yet? (Applause) Who was it, Lennie Bruce, that used to say, “Is there anyone I’ve forgotten to offend?”

20. Buffett’s favorite boss

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Section 10, I believe.

SAHEJ: Hello, Mr. Buffet and Mr. Munger. My name is Sahej, I am from New Jersey. And I’m currently a freshman at Rutgers University. You knew quite early on that you wanted to be investors, and you’ve obviously been amazing at it. What advice would you have for someone who’s still trying to figure out what they want to focus on and find their calling?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that is a very interesting question. Because I was very, very lucky. In that I found what I wanted to do because my dad happened to be in a business that he wasn’t interested in, but they had some books down there, and I loved my dad, and I’d go down and read the books and they interested me. And, you know, I’m glad he wasn’t a professional boxer or something, or, you know, I wouldn’t have any teeth left or anything else. (Laughs) It was accident, just totally accident, but I do think you know it when you see it. And it doesn’t mean you can follow. I would tell the students, as I wrote in the report, I mean, you know, “Find out what you love doing.” I mean, you spend most of your life doing it, and why in the world would you want to be around for a lifetime working with people that you didn’t like? Unless you had to, which sometimes happens. Just work for whomever you admire the most. I gave a talk at Stanford one time.

And somebody showed up at Tom Murphy’s office, I think, a couple of days later. That person was right. And, of course, it’s what I did when I got out of school. I wanted to work for Ben Graham. I mean, I didn’t care what I got paid, it didn’t make any di — you know, I just knew that that’s what I wanted to do. And then I pestered him for three years and he finally hired me. And then I found somebody else that I’d even rather work for than Ben, who happened to be myself. (Laughter) And so I’ve been working for myself ever since. But I had about four bosses in my life. You know, I went down to The Lincoln Journal. Name slips my mind at the moment, he was a wonderful boss. And it was Coopersmith at J.C. Penney’s here in Omaha, and they all were wonderful people. But I still preferred working for myself. And, of course, Charlie and I both worked for my grandfather, and we just didn’t find it that interesting.

I don’t remember, why’d you ever decide to go to work at the store, Charlie? Charlie worked there in 1940, I worked —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I worked just for the experience of working, I didn’t need the money. My father gave me an ample allowance and I also had a private business. So, I was kind of working as a lark in your grocery store.

WARREN BUFFETT: Twelve hours a day?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: At — for a lark?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, as a lark, yes.

WARREN BUFFETT: Do you consider that a good investment of your time? (Laughs) I mean, just looking back on it?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’d never done it before, and I wanted to have a little of that experience. And I wasn’t going to do it very long.

WARREN BUFFETT: Hmm. (Laughter) That sure as hell wasn’t the reason I worked. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — you know, I could give that young lady the advice. Figure out what you’re bad at and avoid all of it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s the way Warren and I found our profession.

WARREN BUFFETT: Absolutely. You know, we —

CHARLIE MUNGER: We failed at everything else.

WARREN BUFFETT: We worked at everything till we found the ideal employers: ourselves. (Laughs) You know? And that was something we really admired.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know: Warren said, “Work for somebody you admire.” (Laughter) The only one he knew was the one he was shaving.

WARREN BUFFETT: I think he was self-employed.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Because he and I were shaving.

WARREN BUFFETT: But it isn’t bad advice. It isn’t bad advice. I mean, if they’ve got an option. I mean, Charlie went into the service in whatever year it was, in the ’40s, and he didn’t really have a choice of who he was going to work for. And, as I remember, it didn’t really work out that well (Laughs) who you worked for, Charlie, did it?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well — if you stop to think about it, there are two things that neither one of us has ever succeeded at: One, we’ve never succeeded at anything that didn’t interest us, right?

WARREN BUFFETT: Right.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we’ve never succeeded at anything that was really hard where we didn’t have much aptitude for it.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve been doing whatever we pleased for 60 years.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we did.

WARREN BUFFETT: And, you know, we have fun in our way, and —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m just amazed. You’d think, if you’re smart, you could do things that don’t interest you well. But you can’t.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ve certainly got a lot of examples in my own case. But we won’t get into them here.

21. Munger likes having big U.S. oil reserves

WARREN BUFFETT: And we will go to Becky.

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Foster Taylor, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He said he recently listened to the Berkshire Hathaway 2008 Annual Meeting, where you talked about global oil production. At the time you talked about major ramifications if global oil production went below 85 million barrels in 25 years. We are at the 14-year mark, and global oil production looks to be 79 million barrels. At the same time, we’re depleting our strategic oil reserves. Should the United States be doing something differently, and do you see consequences to these actions in the next ten years if we do not become more proactive?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie’s the expert on oil.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, but — (Laughs)

WARREN BUFFETT: Only compared to me. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Samuel Johnson said, “It’s hard to determine the order of precedency between a louse and a flea.” And it’s hard to tell which of us is more incompetent in oil. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re still competing. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have a different view on this subject. I like having big reserves of oil. If I were running the benevolent despot of the United States, I would just leave most of the oil we have here, and I’d pay whatever the Arabs charge for their oil and I’d pay it cheerfully and conserve my own. I think it’s going to be very precious stuff over the next 200 years. And nobody else has my view, so it doesn’t bother me, I just think they’re all wrong.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) Well —

CHARLIE MUNGER: But at any rate, that is not the normal view.

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ve been pretty flexible on our own view. I mean, actually, the Federal Government is serving up however many billion barrels of the stuff into the economy. And, you know, it wasn’t that long ago that, you know, the idea that anybody produced a barrel of oil was somehow something terrible. I mean, just try doing without 11 million barrels a day and see what happens tomorrow. It is something that everybody has a feeling on, immediately. And, you know, this gets into a whole bunch of different tribes of sorts, and you offend an awful lot of people if you talk in any way about it. But, in the end I think, at the moment at least, most people feel that it’s nicer to have some oil in this country than not have it. And we’re using a lot of it. And if we were to try and change over, in three years, or five years, nobody knows what would happen, but the odds that it would work well are extremely low, it seems to me. Charlie, why don’t you say something more dramatic so you’ll be the one that offended the most people? (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you stop to think about it, the oil industry is being so vilified now, I can hardly think of a more useful industry, and I don’t know about wildcatters, but certainly the petroleum engineers I know, and the people who design our oil refineries, and pipelines, are some of the finest and most reliable people I know. And I see very little trouble (Applause) with the oil supply thing in the United States. So I’m basically in love with Standard Oil. And I don’t have this feeling that it’s an evil, crazy place. I wish the rest of the world worked as well as our big oil companies.

22. Deciding whether to buy back Berkshire stock isn’t that hard

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we better move on to station 11. (Laughs) I’m not sure whether station 11 is operative?

GLEN TONGUE: Well, we’re here. Greetings from the Overflow Room. My name is Glen Tongue, I’m a shareholder from New York. This is my 20th Berkshire Annual Meeting, and I’m delighted that we’re able to, once again, be here in person. You two have brought tremendous joy to all of us through the years, and, speaking personally, your wisdom has not only made me a better investor, but, more importantly, a better, happier person. It’s a privilege and honor to thank you. So, Warren and Charlie, thank you. (Applause)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s my kind of a question.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that — that’s fine.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let’s have more of those. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, or you can say it again. (Laughs)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Maybe you could sing it. (Laughter)

GLEN TONGUE: Maybe I should quit at this point.

WARREN BUFFETT: Glen go to it.

GLEN TONGUE: My question relates to share repurchases. Since you started buying back Berkshire shares, in size two years ago, the repurchases have ranged between $1 billion and $3 billion per month. By my estimate, it appears that the buyback rate is about $3 billion per month when Berkshire’s trading at a 20% or so discount to intrinsic value, $2 billion per month at about a 10% discount, and a billion per month at a zero to 10% value. Do I have that approximately right? And do any other factors influence the rate of share repurchases?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, after you were so nice in your introduction, I have to say that (Laughs) you’re actually wrong in that. If somebody had offered us $50 billion worth of stock at a certain point in the last three or four, five months, we’d have taken it. You know, it’s that simple. And, as I mentioned earlier, we haven’t bought any stock in April. It’s something that, when we can do it, and we know, at least we think the probabilities are very high, we certainly believe it in terms of our own evaluation and our own investment, if we think that we’re improving things for the remaining shareholder, we’ll buy it back. And if we don’t, we don’t buy it back. And if we have the choice of buying businesses that we like, or buying back stock — the controlling factor’s how much money we have, we’d rather buy businesses. And so, you know, we don’t stay awake at night working out formulas, or anything of the sort.

But we don’t ever do it if we think that we’re not doing something at the time. If we had a lemonade stand, and Charlie and I and you owned it, and the lemonade stand was making us about a buck a week or something, and we divided it up. And then you said you wanted to get out. And if you said one number, and we’d have the funds in our little lemonade company, we’d buy you out. And if we didn’t like the price, we wouldn’t buy you out. And that’s the same we feel. But we do feel an obligation to do things that we think are intelligent and in no way risk — absolutely no way present any risk, of financial problems under any circumstances, we can envision, except maybe something like nuclear war, you know, we will do it. But it never can be that big a factor. Charlie, I think, spoke the other day, in connection with Henry Singleton. I think he bought back 89% of the company over time.

And he’d sold stock like crazy, or issued it, much earlier when it was overpriced, and he bought it back underpriced. But the key to that, of course, if having people think you’re wrong in doing it, so he was able to buy a ton of it. And there are some other companies that have bought a ton of it, and Berkshire isn’t going to get the chance to do that. Because we’ve got sensible shareholders is what it amounts to. If we had the same group of shareholders that own two-day puts, and they were our shareholders, we could buy back the whole company, you know, in a very short period of time. But it’s such an easy concept to assess. I mean, the second stock I bought — I bought City Service Preferred, that was the first one. The second stock I bought was a company called “Texas Pacific Land Trust.” And that came out of the bankruptcy of the Texas and Pacific Railroad back in the 1880s, or something like that. And they had three million-some acres, and they owned the minerals, and they owned the surface, and everything else.

But it was terrible land in the 1880s. But they had some kind of a charter that said that they could use the proceeds from land sales, whatever it was they were going to buy in stock every year. And, you know, I sat there, when I was 13 or 14, and I figured, “If I live to be a hundred, I would own the whole place.” Well, I haven’t lived to be 100 yet, and I wouldn’t have bought the whole place. So both calculations are, so far, imperfect. But it’s been a remarkable company, just plain remarkable. Because they would talk about grazing fees of $6,000 a year, or something like that, you know, maybe, when they had three million acres. And then they kept finding oil, and more oil, and more oil. And they’ve changed the form, and all kinds of things, but they bought stock week after week after week. And I sat there and figured out how long it would take until I owned the whole company. And I obviously made some improper (Laughs) calculations because it wouldn’t have worked that way.

But it still was apparent to me that it would be a very good idea, if they had three million acres down there, that if they got all through with it, and they kept their mineral rights, and all kinds of things, which they were doing, you know, at a very cheap price it ought to work out well for anybody that sat around for a long time. And it has worked out extremely well for anybody who sat around a long time. But nobody knew that they were going to find a lot of oil, and that eventually El Paso would grow out far enough so that the surface lands became worth some money, that were somewhat near El Paso. And you had to go a couple hundred more miles to find the next person, but (Laughs) that was another problem. So, some of this stuff is so simple, you know? But, you know, if people want to get their Ph.D. or something, so they work out hundreds of pages, and have lots of Greek letters in it, and all that soft of thing, and either you’re buying out your partner at an attractive price, or you’re not buying him out at an attractive price.

And if you’ve got the money around to do it, and the price is attractive, and you don’t have some other opportunities, you know, why not do it? You’ve got to come out ahead by doing it. And if you’ve got other things that are more intelligent, you don’t do it. And if it isn’t intelligent on an absolute basis, you also don’t do it. Charlie, have you got anything to add to the — what were you doing in 1943? (Laughs) You were in the Service?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren, we’d be crazy if we didn’t rather enjoy having come a considerable distance from small beginnings. And to do that in good company, it’s a favored life. We’ve been very fortunate.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And, tomorrow — (Applause) — Monday — I can tell you, it’s almost certain that, if anybody offers us — well, there will be shares traded of Berkshire, and we won’t buy any. But it’s also a pretty fair chance someday a lot of shares — we’ll add a few shares — not a lot. Berkshire’s got the — our shareholders are too smart, that’s one of our problems (laughs) if we want to repurchase shares. But we really don’t want to squeeze out anybody. But we also are here to do things that increase the value for the people who stick with us. I mean, it’s not very complicated, and there’ll be times when we’ll do it, and there’ll be times when we won’t. There won’t be any formula, but there will be the principles that I’ve just expressed. And my guess is that my successor, and their successor, will have a similar calculation, because we’re looking for people that are rational and devoted to Berkshire.

So, Glen, thanks for coming.

23. “Independent” board directors aren’t really independent

WARREN BUFFETT: And, Becky, you’re next.

BECKY QUICK: This question was sent in by Dave Shane (PH) from Brooklyn, New York. He’s responding to something he heard earlier today. He said: “In the future, will Greg be able to act with the same spontaneity that you mentioned earlier? And make immediate, multibilliondollar decisions without board approval?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my guess is that the board will respond as people do. They’ll put some more restrictions, or they’ll have some more consultation on a lot of matters, or some matters, than they do with me. I mean, they won’t “need” to, but they’ll feel that they haven’t had the experience, they haven’t seen him as long, and a whole bunch of things. And they’ll feel that the Delaware laws protects him better. And, incidentally, they don’t have directors and officers liability insurance. I mean, virtually every company on the New York Stock Exchange has it. And we just don’t buy it. I mean, I’m on the board, and you’re a trustee for a whole bunch of people with trusts, you and me — I’m talking about the directors and me. You know, fine. But it’s very interesting: People go out on museum boards, you know, and they’re expected to contribute. People go on college boards, and they’re expected to contribute money.

And they say, “It’s a great honor to be on a university board,” or a museum board, or whatever, “It’s a great honor, and therefore you should raise money for us.” Well, frankly, I think our board’s more interesting than being on a university board, or, you know, a hospital board or something. I wouldn’t know what they were talking about anyway, on a museum board or an art board. But people have found that they can make $300,000 a year, you know, which is enormously important to some people, and is meaningless to others. And, I mean, the chances are, if somehow, they’d arranged it so that directors didn’t get paid at all, there’d be plenty of people wanted to be directors, and that’d be a prestigious sort of thing, and all that. But, in effect it’s money that comes very easily. The whole idea of the “independent director,” frankly, is it just doesn’t really make any sense.

CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t think a director is independent who needs $300,000 to be here?

WARREN BUFFETT: He needs the money, yeah. I mean —

CHARLIE MUNGER: He’s “independent” the way a slave is independent.

WARREN BUFFETT: I am going to read a few sentences which are absolutely the case, except I’m doctoring it. I don’t want anybody to be identified obviously with this. But these are wordfor-word excerpts. And I’m not telling whether it’s a woman or a man, I’m going to use a male pronoun just because it’s easier. But I picked out a few sentences from a letter I received many years ago. And this letter said: “I’m writing to you with a great deal of reluctance, and a sense of personal embarrassment. I’ve tried all of the conventional means of raising the money.” This person needed a couple million dollars, and I wouldn’t have known the person if I saw him on the street, you know, but he wrote this letter and said, “I need a couple million dollars.” And then this is the item that I think you might find interesting, and I’ve kept the letter. “My income is composed 100% of my board fees.” Well, I just looked him up.

At the time and he was a director of five prestigious companies, and had been directors of others, and was going to be a director of a whole bunch of things. But he was desperate for money, and he says he’s “getting 100% of it from board fees.” And he was an independent director, classified as “an independent director” at every one of these companies. And it’s just astounding to me. You know, we’re going to have a shareholders meeting in just a couple of minutes, or we’re going to start it, and it’s just astounding to me that in 2006 we owned 9% of the Coca-Cola Company. I mean, maybe they gave me a free Coke. But we owned 9% at Berkshire Hathaway, we obviously cared about the views of the Coca-Cola Company. And it just so happened in that era CalPERS and a few others had recommended that we be voted against for something or other. And at one time there were two big institutional investors that voted because they didn’t think I was independent because Dairy Queen bought some Coca-Cola. Or, actually, the people that had our franchise bought some Coca-Cola.

I mean, do they think I can’t add things in my head? If we’ve got billions and billions and billions of dollars, that I’m going to be compromised? But it’s just nutty. And so, one year, my vote fell from 96%, maybe it was 98%, voter approval, to 84%. Because — I forget whether it was 2004 or 2006: Somewhere along the line they just decided that I wasn’t the right sort of person to be able to handle these responsibilities. (Laughs) And, you know, the idea that it’s an important part of their income, I mean, what they want. They may want to do a lot of other good things, it doesn’t mean they’re terrible people. But if the difference is how you live, and in this case whether the person might go broke: How in the world you can call somebody like that “independent,” and then say that anybody who owns a lot of st — you know, and whether Walter Scott’s you know, “not independent,” it’s just ridiculous. But it’s the way the rules are, and we follow the rules.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, they don’t want them just “independent” now. They want one horse, one rabbit, one cow, one whatever. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, I feel like Galileo —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Independence is not enough. You’ve got to have a very diverse kind of independence.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. And if they desperately need the money, in this case 100% of the income coming from it; and you’re on five of the most prestigious boards in the country; and classified as “independent” on each; and all you’re hoping is that your CEO gets called by another CEO and says, “Is this guy OK?” And you say, “Of course, he’s OK.” Which means, “Because he doesn’t cause trouble,” and so he gets on a sixth board. Anyway.

CHARLIE MUNGER: All I can say is it’s not our idea of an “independent director.”

WARREN BUFFETT: No. No. It’s all a little crazy. Which brings us to the fact that we’re not going to have our annual meeting here in about 15 minutes. We’ll reconvene at 3:45 and then we’ll do the business of the meeting that is required.