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2023年年度股东大会

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2023年年度股东大会

上午场

1. 伯克希尔自己的”查尔斯国王”

沃伦·巴菲特：早上好，早上好。感谢各位的到来。奥马哈热爱这一切，我也热爱，查理也热爱。我们很高兴你们来到这里。

在提问之前，我们只做一个非常简短的开场，因为我们希望能回答至少60个问题，一半来自这座体育场之外的观众，一半来自在座的各位。

所以，我想直接开始介绍董事们以及今天早上已经在网页上公布的财报，但我们会很快地过一遍，然后进入问答环节。今天早上我醒来时，意识到我们在英国有一场竞争性的广播正在播出。

（笑声）他们正在庆祝查尔斯国王，而今天我们这里也有自己的查尔斯国王。（掌声和欢呼声）

坐在他旁边的是格雷格·阿贝尔，他负责除保险以外的所有运营业务。（掌声）

在格雷格旁边，是一位我在1986年认识的人，自那以后他让我们一直看起来很不错。我们负责保险业务的人，阿吉特·贾恩。阿吉特？（掌声和欢呼声）

原文

2023 Annual Meeting

Morning Session

1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning, good morning. And thanks for coming. Omaha loves it, I love it, Charlie loves it. We’re glad to have you here.

We’re going to make this preliminary, before the questions, very short because we want to get in at least 60 questions, half divided by the audience outside this arena and half from you.

So, I would just like to get right to the directors and the earnings that have been put up on a web page this morning, but we’ll cover those very fast and then we’ll get to the questions. Now, when I woke up this morning, I realized that we had a competitive broadcast going out somewhere in the UK.

And (Laughter) they were celebrating a King Charles, and we’ve got our own King Charles here today. (APPLAUSE AND CHEERING)

And next to him we have Greg Abel, who’s in charge of all the operations except for insurance. (Applause)

And next to Greg, we have a man I ran into in 1986 and has made us look good ever since. We have the man in charge of insurance, Ajit Jain. Ajit? (Applause and cheering)

2. 介绍董事

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我们这里有我们的董事们在前排。请他们简短地站起来，然后我会继续下一个环节，他们今天都在这里。

首先，按字母顺序，有霍华德·巴菲特（掌声），有苏茜·巴菲特，有史蒂夫·伯克，肯·切诺特，克里斯·戴维斯，苏·德克尔，夏洛特·盖曼，小汤姆·默菲，罗恩·奥尔森，沃利·韦茨，以及梅丽尔·威特默。

这就是我们能得到的最佳阵容。

原文

2. Directors introduced

WARREN BUFFETT: And now we have our directors here in front. And if they would just stand briefly and then I’ll go onto the next one, and they’re all here today.

First of all, doing it alphabetically, there’s Howard Buffett, (Applause). There’s Susie Buffett, there’s Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Chris Davis, Sue Decker, Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy Jr., Ron Olson, Wally Weitz, and Meryl Witmer.

That’s as good as you can get.

3. 组织这一切的女性

沃伦·巴菲特：在我们进入今天早上新闻稿中发布的财报之前，我还想提到一个人。让我们看看这里都有谁。我们有——

这真让人难以置信。你能想象一个叫梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗的名字吗？（笑）她在嫁给另一个夏皮罗之前是梅丽莎·夏皮罗，而她在我没有任何帮助、查理没有任何帮助的情况下组织了这一切（掌声），当然还有隔壁房间很多人的帮助。梅丽莎。（掌声和欢呼声）

是的，这很容易。如果你能记住她的第二个名字，你就能记住她的第三个名字。所以，梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗。

原文

3. The woman who organized the whole thing

WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s one other person I would like to mention before we get onto the earnings that were put in the press release this morning. Well, let’s see who we have here. We’ve got —

This is hard to believe. Can you imagine a name, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro? (Laugh) And she was Melissa Shapiro till she married another Shapiro, and she put this whole thing together with no help from me, no help from Charlie, (Applause) and a lot of help from the people in the other room. Melissa. (APPLAUSE and CHEERING)

Yeah, it’s very easy. If you can remember her second name, you can remember her third name. So, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro.

4. 明年伯克希尔大部分业务的盈利将下降

沃伦·巴菲特：说到这里，我想接下来转到财报和几张解释我们核心业务的小幻灯片，然后我们将进入问答环节。我身后的幻灯片已经准备好了，现在就看。

我们在第一季度报告的营业利润略高于80亿美元。当我们谈论营业利润时，基本上指的是伯克希尔·哈撒韦按通用会计准则（GAAP）要求的盈利，但不包括已实现和未实现的资本收益。

还有几个其他非常小的项目，但基本上，我们预计随着时间的推移会实现资本收益。否则我们为什么要持有这些股票呢？这并非总是奏效，但总体而言，随着时间的推移效果相当不错。但在任何一天、任何季度、任何年份，甚至偶尔在五年期内，股票价格都会反复无常地波动。

现在，我们拥有很多其他企业。我们将这些股票视为企业。我们拥有许多其他企业，它们被合并报表，其价值不会大幅波动。如果我们有一点伯灵顿铁路的流通股，或者有一点能源公司的股票在交易，这些股票也会波动很大。

但企业才是关键。因此，正如你在第一季度看到的，营业利润大约为80亿美元。我要说的是，从我们得到的反馈来看，在整体经济中，我认为我们大多数企业今年的盈利实际上会比去年低。

在过去六个月左右的各个时期，这些企业已经离开了那个令人难以置信的阶段——那是我自二战以来见过的企业最异常的时期，大量资金涌向那些无法获得商品的人手中。

二战时期更极端，但这次也很极端。当时的问题只是如何把商品送到客户手中。人们购买商品，不等打折。如果你不能卖给他们一种东西，他们就会把另一种东西放入待办清单。那是一个非同寻常的时期。

那个时期已经结束了。如你所知，这并不是说就业率断崖式下跌或诸如此类的事情，完全没有。但现在的气候与六个月前不同了。我们的一些经理感到惊讶。有些人订购了太多库存，然后突然到货了，而人们的心态已不如之前那样。

现在，我们将在以前不需要打折的地方开始打折。但尽管我认为今年总体上会比去年慢，我们的处境实际上让我预期——请相信我当我说”预期”时，没有什么事情是确定的。

明天没有什么是确定的，明年没有什么是确定的，市场、商业预测或其他任何事情也从来没有什么是确定的。我们不太关注市场或预测，除非市场恰好提供了有趣的机会。

但尽管如此，正如你从这份初步报告中所看到的，我们在两个方面处于有利地位。我们的投资收益今年将比去年大得多。这是已经确定了的。我的意思是，你马上会看到，我们有大约1250亿美元的资金投入到非常短期的投资中。

信不信由你，就在不久之前，我们在这1250亿美元上只能获得4个基点，几乎等于零，这意味着我们每年只能获得5000万美元。而现在，同样的钱——就在前天，由于市场对债务上限的担忧出现了一些有趣的转折，我们实际上以5.90的利率购买了30亿美元的国库券。这是5.92的债券等价收益率。所以，我们将从不久之前每年只产生5000万美元的投资收益，变成每年产生大约50亿美元的投资收益。因此，我们的投资收益肯定会大幅增加。

而保险承保业务与商业活动不相关。它取决于飓风、地震和其他事件。所以，从概率的角度看，今年我们的保险承保业务很可能比去年表现更好。

它不受所谓的商业周期或一般适用于工业、零售业等行业的情况的影响。所以，如果没有发生大规模地震或飓风正好侵袭错误的地点，我预计（尽管不能承诺）我们的营业利润将高于去年。

如果我们看我们主要盈利的两个要素——它们都看起来会朝着有利的方向发展，那么我预计我们的营业利润将高于去年，但我不能保证。

如果我们看第二张幻灯片，我会给你们这些营业利润数据，让你们对自疫情开始以来以及作为基数的前一年发生的情况有一个概览。如你所知，我们保留了所有的盈利。

因此，如果每年我们保留300亿或350亿美元（或任何数额），随着时间的推移，你应该期待更多的营业利润。我的意思是，这个数字在五年、十年或十五年后应该会显著提高，因为我们有保留盈利的优势，这正是我们达到今天这些数字的原因——因为我们开始时这些数字几乎为零。

它们是通过保留盈利达到的，并且我们将继续保留盈利。因此，如果这些数字上升，那也算不上什么伟大的成就。我们希望的只是它们以合理速度上升。历史上，它们有时以不合理的速度上升。

但那时我们管理的资金规模小得多，以我们目前的资本基础，这无法重复。因为我注意到——我相信是在这张幻灯片上。我们来看一看。不，那会在——让我们看看，下一页。让我们移到下一张幻灯片。我们展示的是，截至3月31日，我们的GAAP净资产为5040亿美元。

现在，可能让你惊讶的是，美国没有其他公司的数字有这么大。这不是因为我们拥有美国最有价值的公司。其他公司用他们的钱回购了股票。

他们本可以累积5040亿美元的GAAP净资产。但基本上，根据GAAP会计准则，我们现在比美国任何其他公司都拥有更多的净资产。当然，如果你用净资产收益率来衡量，要在这么大的基数上快速增长就变得非常困难，但我们希望能做到。

不是快速增长，而是合理的增长。就在那下面，你会看到叫做”浮存金”的东西。浮存金是留在我们手中的钱，有点像银行存款，但又有非常重要的区别。但你要获得银行存款，必须支付利息。

而且现在你必须支付更高的利息，还要经营一家银行并做很多事情。基本上，这代表目前未支付的损失准备金。在保险业，你是提前收到保费的。因此，在我们资产负债表上作为净负债出现的项目，为我们提供了资金，我们可以以世界上任何其他我知道的保险公司都无法享有的自由度来运用这些资金，仅仅因为我们拥有如此巨额的净资产。

我们的浮存金现在达到1650亿美元，而坐在最左边的那位先生负责将这一数字从1986年的微不足道增加到这个令人难以置信的数字，而且在大多数年份（几乎所有的年份）里，它没有让我们付出任何成本。所以，这就像拥有一家没有员工、没有利息、而且无法让我们手中的钱被迅速提取的银行。

这是一项非常有价值的资产，但在账面上却显示为负债。阿吉特负责建立这笔财富，这是通过在全球范围内超越其他保险公司来实现的。现在，我们的一些保险公司又由才华横溢的经理人管理，他们以各种方式做出了贡献。

从我职业生涯初期的GEICO开始。关于浮存金，如果你仔细想想，想象一下资产负债表。这边是负债，那边是资产，负债方为资产方提供资金。这很简单。股东权益提供资金，长期债务也提供资金，等等。

但股东权益在某种意义上是非常昂贵的。长期债务在一段时间内很便宜，但它可能变得昂贵，最终也可能到期，而且可能无法续借。但浮存金是另一项负债，却没有让我们付出任何成本。

它不会很快消失。它以与股东权益相同的方式为资产方提供资金。没有多少人这么想，但我们一直这么想，而且它是随着时间的推移积累起来的。所以，我在底部展示了截至3月31日现金和国库券的变化情况。

我要告诉你们，在四月份，我们很可能在这个项目上又增加了大约70亿美元。部分原因是我们没有买入那么多股票，因为这会减少现金和国库券。我们在四月份买入了价值约4亿美元的股票。

这在可用现金方面是负面的。然而，我们净卖出了一些股票，这大概带来了40亿美元。当然，我们还有营业利润，大概在25亿美元左右。我猜我们在四月份可能将现金和国库券增加了60到70亿美元。

我只是想让你们感受一下伯克希尔现金流的状况。然后，如果我们移到最后一张——我想这是最后一张了。应该显示在那里的，A类等效流通股数量。你会注意到每年我们的股份数量都在减少。

所以，如果我们拥有更多企业，而这些企业赚了更多钱，作为伯克希尔股东，你的份额每年都会增加，而无需你投入任何资金。当然，你是在放弃本可以以股息形式获得的东西。但我们之所以能走到今天，是因为我们保留了资金。

我们在1967年确实支付过股息，每股10美分。那是一个可怕的错误。（笑）我总是告诉人们，我当时去了洗手间，董事们趁我不在时投了票。但这不是真的。我在场，我承认。（笑）但我们进行了再投资，这产生了超过5000亿美元的股东权益和超过300亿美元的营业利润。

我们将继续遵循这一政策，因为它非常有意义。说到这里，我想我们已经完成了开场。10-Q报告在网页上。如果你有一两周的假期，你可以在阅读10-Q报告上度过。但这就是伯克希尔的精髓。

原文

4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I would like to next move onto the earnings and a couple small slides that explain what we’re all about, and then we’re going to get to Q&A. And the slide is up behind me, and there it is.

We reported in the first quarter operating earnings a little over $8 billion. And when we talk about operating earnings, we’re basically referring to the earnings of Berkshire Hathaway as required under GAAP, excluding however, capital gains both realized and unrealized.

There’s a few other very minor items, but basically, we expect to make capital gains over time. Why would we own the stocks otherwise? Doesn’t always work out, but overall, it works out pretty well over time. But in any day, any quarter, any year, even occasionally over a five-year period, the stock prices move around capriciously.

Now, we own a lot of other businesses. We consider those stocks businesses. We own a lot of other businesses where they get consolidated, and they don’t move around in value. Now, if we had a little bit of Burlington stock outstanding, if we had a little bit of the energy stock trading, those stocks would move around a lot.

But the businesses are what count. So, the operating earnings, as you’ll see in the first quarter, came it at about $8 billion. And I would say that in the general economy, the feedback we get is that, I would say, perhaps the majority of our businesses will actually report lower earnings this year than last year.

In various degrees in the last six months or so, at various times, the businesses have left the incredible period, which is about extraordinary as I’ve seen a business since World War II, which poured out a lot of money to people who couldn’t get goods.

It was more extreme in World War II, but this was extreme this time. And it was just a question of getting goods to deliver. And people bought, and they didn’t wait for sales. And if you couldn’t sell them one thing, they would put another thing in their backlog. It was an extraordinary period.

And that period has ended. As you know, it isn’t that employment has fallen off a cliff or anything, in the lest. But it is a different climate than it was six months ago. And a number of our managers were surprised. Some of them had too much inventory on order, and then all of a sudden it got delivered, and people weren’t in the same frame of mind as earlier.

And now we’ll start having sales at places where we didn’t need to have sales before. But despite the fact that this year I think in general will be slower than last year, we actually are situated so that I would expect, and believe me when I say expect, nothing is sure.

Nothing is sure tomorrow, nothing is sure next year, and nothing is ever sure, either in markets or in business forecasts, or in anything else. And we don’t pay much attention to markets or forecasts unless the markets happen to offer something interesting to do.

But nevertheless, we are positioned in two respects, as you’ll see from this first report. Our investment income is going to be a lot larger this year than last year. And that’s built. I mean, as you’ll see in a minute, we’ve had $125 billion or so in very short-term investments.

And believe it or not, not that long ago we were getting four basis points, which is next to nothing on that $125 billion, which means we were getting $50 million a year. And now the same money, just the day before yesterday, we actually bought because of some funny twist the market, because of doubts about the debt ceiling.

We bought $3 billion of bills at 5-90. That’s 5.92 bond equivalent yield. So, we will have what produced just not that long ago on a 12-month basis was producing $50 million a year, producing something in the area of $5 billion a year. So, we’re in a position where the investment income is certain to increase quite a bit.

And insurance underwriting does not correlate with business activity. It depends on things like hurricanes, and earthquakes, and other events. So, on a perspective basis, on a probability basis, we’re likely to have a better year this year in insurance underwriting than we had last year.

It just isn’t affected by what you might call the business cycle or what applies to generally in industry, retailing, you name it. So, I would expect in one massive earthquake or one hurricane that came in at just the wrong place could affect that prediction. But on a probabalistic basis, our insurance looks better this year.

So, if you get two of the elements there of our main elements of earnings that look like they will swing in our direction, I would expect, but I can’t promise, that our operating earnings will be greater than last year.

And if we’ll move to the second slide, I give you those operating earnings figures just to give you a overview of what has happened since the pandemic started, and also the year before as a base. And we retain all our earnings, as you know.

So, if we’re retaining $30 billion or $35 billion, or whatever it may be, a year, they should expect more operating earnings over time. I mean, this number should be significantly higher five, or ten, or 15 years from now because we have the advantage of retaining earnings, and that’s what got us to these figures because they were essentially nothing when we started.

And they got there by retaining earnings and will keep retaining earnings. So, it’s no great triumph if these numbers move up. And what we hope is that they move up at a reasonable rate. Historically, they moved up at an unreasonable rate sometimes.

But we were working with much smaller sums then, and that can’t be repeated with our present capital base. Because I note there — I believe it’s on this slide. Let’s take a look. No, that will be — let’s see, it’s on the — well, on the next place, page. Let’s move to the next slide. We show that we had on March 31st, now what was it, $504 billion of GAAP net worth.

Now, what might surprise you is that there’s no other company in the United States that has a number that is that large. Now, that isn’t because we have the most valuable company in the United States. Other companies have used their money to repurchase shares.

They could’ve accumulated $504 billion in GAAP. But basically, we have more under GAAP accounting now than any other company in the U.S. And of course, if you measure return on equity that becomes a very big number to increase at a rapid rate, but we hope to do so.

Not a rapid rate, a decent rate. And right below that, you see something called float. And float is money that is left in our hands somewhat akin, but very importantly different, than a bank deposit. But you have to pay interest to get a bank deposit.

And you have to pay more interest these days, and you have to run a bank and do a lot of things. And basically, this is money that represents unpaid losses at this time. You get paid in advance in insurance. So, what shows up as a net liability on our balance sheet gives us funds to exercise with an amount of discretion that no other insurance company that I know of in the world enjoys, just because we have so much net worth.

And our float now comes to $165 billion, and the man sitting at the far left is responsible for moving that number up from a pittance in 1986 to this incredible figure, which in most years, practically all years, hasn’t cost us anything. So, it’s like having a bank with no employees, no interest, and no ability to withdraw the money in a hurry that we have working for us.

And it’s a very valuable asset that shows up as a liability. And Ajit is responsible for building up this treasure, which has been done by out-competing insurance companies all over the world. And now, a number of our insurance companies, in turn, are run by talented managers who contributed one way or another.

Start with GEICO at the beginning of my career. And that float, if you think about it, just think of a balance sheet. You have liabilities here and you have assets over here, and the liability side finances the asset side. It’s very simple. And stockholders’ equity finances it, long-term debt finances it, and so on.

But stockholders’ equity is very expensive in a real sense. Long-term debt has been cheap for a while, but it can get expensive, and it can also become due eventually and it may not be available. But float is another item that’s a liability but hasn’t cost us anything.

And it can’t disappear in a hurry. And it finances the asset side in the same way as stockholders’ equity. And nobody else thinks of it much that way, but we’ve always thought of it that way, and it’s a build up over time. So, I show at the bottom what’s happened with cash and Treasury bills through March 31st.

And I will tell you that in the month of April, we’ve probably added about $7 billion to that factor. Now, part of that is because we didn’t buy as much stock, because that reduces cash and Treasury bills. We bought about $400 million worth of stock in the month of April.

That’s a minus in terms of cash available. And we, however, sold, net, some stock, which produced maybe $4 billion. And of course, we had operating earnings, probably $2.5 billion or something in that area. And my guess is we probably increased our cash and Treasury bills $6 billion and $7 billion in the month.

And I just want to give you a feel for how the cash flows at Berkshire. And then if we move to the final — I think it’s the final one. We should have the one up there, Class A equivalent shares outstanding. And you’ll notice that every year the number of our shares go down.

So, if we own more businesses, and the businesses make more money, your share as shareholders at Berkshire increases every year without you laying out any money. Now you’re laying out the alternative which you could receive in dividends. But the reason we’ve gotten to where we are is because we kept the money.

We did pay a dividend in 1967, $0.10 a share. It was a terrible mistake. (Laugh) And I always tell people that I’d for the men’s room and the directors voted while I was gone. But that isn’t true. I was there, I confess. (Laugh) But we’ve reinvested, and it’s produced the $500 billion plus of shareholders’ equity and the $30 billion plus of operating earnings.

And we’ll continue to follow that policy because it makes a great deal of sense. And with that, I think we’ve taken care of the preliminaries. The 10-Q is on the web page. And if you have a week or two vacation, you could spend it reading the 10-Q.

But that is the essence of Berkshire.

5. 未能全额担保硅谷银行存款将是”灾难性的”

沃伦·巴菲特：说到这里，我将开始请贝基·奎克提问，我们将交替让贝基和现场观众提问。她的问题来自全国各地，我相信你确定了发问者。交给你了，贝基。

贝基·奎克：谢谢，沃伦。第一个问题来自加利福尼亚州尔湾的兰迪·杰夫斯。他问：“如果硅谷银行的存款没有得到全额担保，你认为对国家的经济后果会是什么？”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我只想说，那将是灾难性的。（笑）这就是为什么它们得到了担保。尽管联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的限额是25万美元，这是法规的表述，但这并不是美国会像让债务上限导致世界陷入动荡那样行事的方式。

我无法想象政府、国会、美联储或FDIC中任何人会说：“我想成为明天上电视向美国公众解释为什么我们只担保25万美元，然后我们要引发全国每家银行的挤兑并破坏世界金融体系的那个人。“（笑）所以，我认为这是不可避免的。查理，你有什么要说的吗？

查理·芒格：不，我没什么要补充的。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

顺便提一下，我现在应该说明，阿吉特和格雷格将在中午结束的上午场会议中在这里。所以，如果你们有问题要问他们，最好在会议前半段提出。午餐后，查理和我会回来。

原文

5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I will start with Becky Quick, and we will alternate between Becky and the audience. And her questions have come in from all of the country, and I believe you identified the sender. And go to it, Becky.

BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. The first question comes in from Randy Jeffs in Irvine, California. And his question is, “If Silicon Valley Bank’s deposit had not been fully covered, what do you think the economic consequences would’ve been to the nation?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d would just simply say it would’ve been catastrophic. (Laugh) And that’s why they were covered. And even though the FDIC limit is $250,000, that’s the way the statute reads, but that is not the way the U.S. is going to behave any more than they’re going to let the debt ceiling cause the world to go into turmoil.

And I can’t imagine anybody in the administration, in the Congress, in the Federal Reserve, whatever it may have been, FDIC — I can’t imagine anybody saying, “I’d like to be the one to go on television tomorrow and explain to the American public why we’re keeping only $250,000 insured, and we’re going to start a run on every bank in the country and disrupt the world financial system.” (Laugh) So, I think it was inevitable. Charlie, do you have anything?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I have nothing to add.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.

Well, incidentally, I should mention this now, Ajit and Greg will be here in the morning session which ends at noon. And so, if you have questions to direct to them, the time to do it is in the first half of the show. And then after lunch Charlie and I will be back.

6. 我们从未因情绪做出投资决策

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。一号区域？

观众：嗨。我是来自马萨诸塞州哈勒尔的纳拉夫·帕特尔。巴菲特先生、芒格先生，看起来你们在作为投资者过于保守和过于激进之间找到了一个最佳平衡点。你们是否曾经因为情绪而做出过糟糕的投资决策？你们是如何努力避免这种情况发生的？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们确实做过很多次糟糕的投资决策。我犯的比查理多。我愿意相信这是因为我的决策更多，但可能我的成功率更差。（笑）但我想不起来在伯克希尔的历史上，我们曾做出过任何情绪化的决策。

我知道电影里有杰米·李·柯蒂斯出场，（笑声）但那只是为了搞笑。我的意思是，杰米·李，她很好，但她还没有好到能让我或查理做出情绪化的决定。（笑声）查理，我相信你对此有话要说。

查理·芒格：嗯，这与大多数公司会议上展示的是不同的电影。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们是否曾做出过情绪化的决策？

查理·芒格：没有。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们说的是在商业领域。是的，不。你在生活中不必成为一个完全没有情绪的人，但在做出投资或商业决策时，你绝对应该是一个没有情绪的人。

你可以争辩说，我们可能曾做出过情绪化的决策，也许是在一位经理人为我们服务了一段时间，而我们忽略了一个事实——他们可能不再像以前那样了。但我们的业务非常好，有时反而运行得更好。

我的意思是，我提到过韦斯科，以及出色的路易斯·文森蒂。它在自动驾驶模式下运行了一段时间，但我不认为我们因此遭受了损失。但你可以争辩说，如果我们像爱路易斯那样多，我们可能会更早发现一些迹象。但我认为这并没有对结果产生任何影响。你同意吗，查理？

查理·芒格：是的，我对此表示同意。我很高兴我们在韦斯科的做法。顺便说一句，我们花了几千万买下了它，后来它变得值二三十亿美元。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，这在储蓄和贷款行业并不常见，你可能已经注意到了。（笑）那个行业的人们真的疯了，而我们有路易斯这样的好人。

查理·芒格：我们没有疯。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们没有疯。是的。

原文

6. We’ve never made an emotional investing decision

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Area one?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Narav (PH) Patel, Harel (PH), Massachusetts. Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, it seems like you found the sweet spot between being too conservative and too aggressive as investors. Do you ever make bad investment decisions because of your emotions? And what do you do to try to keep that from happening?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we make bad investment decisions plenty of times. I make more than Charlie. I like to think it’s because I make more decisions, but probably my batting average is worse. (Laugh) But I can’t recall any time in the history of Berkshire that we made an emotional decision.

I know the movie had Jamie Lee [Curtis] in there, (Laughter) but that was for laughs. I mean, Jamie Lee, she’s good, but she’s not good enough to get me or Charlie to make an emotional decision. (Laughter) Charlie, I’m sure you have something to add on that.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s a different movie than is shown in most corporate meetings. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: But have we ever made an emotional decision?

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s in business we’re talking about. Yeah, no. You don’t want to be a no emotion person in all of your life, but you definitely want to be a no emotion person in making an investment or business decision.

You can argue that we’ve probably made an emotional decision, perhaps, when a manager has been with us for some period, and we’ve ignored the fact that perhaps they weren’t quite what they were earlier.

But our businesses are so good that they run better sometimes when — I mean, I’ve talked about Wesco, for example, the wonderful Louis Vincenti. And it ran on automatic pilot for a while, but I don’t think we suffered by it. But you can argue if Louis as much as we did, we might’ve spotted it a little bit earlier. But I don’t think it made any difference in the results. Would you agree with that, Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, (UNINTEL PHRASE) with it. I’m glad we the way we did at Wesco. By the way, we bought the thing for a few tens of millions, and it became worth $2 billion or $3 billion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that wasn’t common in the savings and loan business, as you may have noticed. (Laugh) They really went crazy in that industry, and we had a wonderful guy in Louis.

CHARLIE MUNGER: We didn’t go crazy.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we didn’t go crazy. Yeah.

7. 贾恩：GEICO的技术”仍在进展中”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自明尼阿波利斯的本·诺尔。他说自己是伯克希尔股东30年了，参加过很多次伯克希尔会议。他今年又来到了这里。

这个问题是提给阿吉特和格雷格的。他说：“去年我问过你们GEICO和BNSF似乎如何在其主要竞争对手面前失去阵地，GEICO在远程信息处理方面，BNSF在精准调度铁路方面。”

“阿吉特，你回应说，预计GEICO将在大约一到两年内取得进展。格雷格，你谈到了你对BNSF的自豪，但你没有直接回应精准调度铁路的威胁。请你们各自就这些竞争挑战以及我们公司应对这些挑战的战略提供看法？”

阿吉特·贾恩：关于GEICO和远程信息处理，让我先说一下，GEICO当然已经抓住了牛角，并在努力缩小与竞争对手在远程信息处理方面的差距方面取得了快速进展。现在他们已经达到了这样一个点：在所有新业务中，接近90%的定价都加入了远程信息处理输入。

不幸的是，其中只有不到一半被投保人实际采用。我想指出的另一点是，尽管我们在缩小远程信息处理差距方面取得了改进，但我们仍未开始实现真正的收益。

而瓶颈的真正罪魁祸首是技术。GEICO的技术需要的改进比我之前认为的要多得多。它有超过600个遗留系统，它们之间实际上不能互相通信。我们正在努力将它们压缩到不超过15到16个能够互相通信的系统。

这是一个巨大的挑战，正因为如此，尽管我们在远程信息处理方面取得了改进，但由于技术原因，我们仍然有很长的路要走。正因为如此，以及更广泛地在风险匹配定价方面的整个问题，GEICO仍然是一个进展中的工作。

我不知道你们中是否有人有机会看到第一季度的结果，但GEICO第一季度表现非常好，综合比率达到93点几，这意味着利润率约为6点几。尽管这非常好，但我们还不能把这视为板上钉钉，因为有两项异常项目对此有所贡献。

首先，我们有所谓的上年准备金释放。我们减少了前几年的准备金，这对此有所贡献。其次，每年第一季度往往是汽车保险承保人季节性的好季度。

所以，如果调整这两个因素，我猜测GEICO到年底的综合比率将略低于100，而他们的目标是96。我希望他们在明年年底前能达到96的目标。

但不要对此过于兴奋，我认为重要的是要认识到，即使达到96，也将以失去保单持有人为代价。盈利能力和增长之间存在权衡，显然，我们将强调盈利能力而不是增长。而这将以保单持有人为代价。

所以，可能要到两年后，我们才能重新回到正轨，在盈利能力和增长两个战线上同时作战。

原文

7. Jain: GEICO’s technology is ‘still a work in progress’

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Ben Knoll in Minneapolis. He says he’s a Berkshire shareholder of three decades and he’s attended many Berkshire meetings. He’s here again this year.

And this is addressed to Ajit and Greg. He says, “Last year I asked you about how GEICO and BNSF appeared to lose ground to their leading competitors, GEICO on telematics and BNSF on precision scheduled railroading.

“Ajit, you responded by saying how you expected GEICO to make progress in about a year or two. Greg, you spoke about your pride in BNSF, but you didn’t directly address the threat of precision scheduled railroading. Will each of you please provide perspective on these competitive challenges and our company’s strategies to address them?”

AJIT JAIN: In terms of GEICO and telematics, let me make the observation that GEICO has certainly taken the bull by the horns and has made rapid strides in terms of trying to bridge the gap in terms of telematics and its competitors. They have now reached a point where on all new business, close to 90% has a telematics input to the pricing position.

Unfortunately, less than half of that is being taken up by the policyholders. The other point I want to make is even though we have made improvements in terms of bridging the gap on telematics, we still haven’t started to realize the true benefit.

And the real culprit of the bottleneck is technology. GEICO’s technology needs a lot more work than I thought it did. It has more than 600 legacy systems that don’t really talk to each other. And we are trying to compress them to no more than 15, 16 systems that all talk to each other.

That’s a monumental challenge, and because of that, even though we have made improvements in telematics, we still have a long way to go because of technology. Because of that, and because of the whole issue more broadly in terms of matching rate to risk, GEICO is still a work in progress.

I don’t know if any of you had a chance to look at the first quarter results, but GEICO has had a very good first quarter, coming in at a combined ratio of 93 and change, which means a margin of six and change. Even though that’s very good, it’s not something we can take to the bank because there are two unusual items that contributed to it.

Firstly, we’ve had what is called prior year reserve releases. We’ve reduced reserves for the previous years, and that contributed to it. And secondly, every year the first quarter tends to be a seasonally good quarter for auto insurance writers.

So, if you adjust for those two factors, my guess is the end of the year GEICO will end up with a combined ratio just south of 100, as opposed to the target they’re shooting for is 96. I hope they reach the target of 96 by the end of next year.

But instead of getting too excited about it, I think it’s important to realize that even if you reach 96 it will come at the expense of having lost policyholders. There is a trade-off between profitability and growth, and clearly, we are going to emphasize profitability and not growth. And that will come at the expense of policyholders.

So, it will not be until two years from now that we’ll be back on track, fighting the battles on both the profitability and growth fronts.

8. 阿贝尔：BNSF持续致力于效率和安全改进

沃伦·巴菲特：格雷格？是的。

格雷格·阿贝尔：谈到BNSF，我首先要再次表达对BNSF团队的高度自豪。我们有一支由[CEO]凯蒂·法默和她的经理们组成的杰出团队，他们每天都在为铁路事业做出出色的工作。同时，他们也会首先承认，还有更多工作要做。

关于精准调度铁路的具体问题，美国其他大型一级铁路公司都遵循这种做法，包括加拿大的两家公司。我们很清楚他们在做什么，显然也密切关注他们的运营指标。

我们的团队每天都在努力提高效率，这是显而易见的。我想说我们会平衡客户的需求。如果回顾2022年之前，我们看2019、2020、2021这三年的时期，BNSF团队在效率方面取得了显著进展，为股东和客户带来了整体价值。

与此同时，为我们的员工维护了一条非常安全的铁路。所以，我们正在取得出色的进展。去年也没有停止。他们取得了巨大进展。

同样，2022年的现实是，我们确实经历了一段我们称之为”重新调整铁路”的时期。

我们走出了疫情，面临供应链挑战。我们在港口还有一些其他劳工问题和其他事情在发生。

现实是，我们的团队优先考虑的是让铁路为长期运营重新归位，而不是短期专注于在2022年达到某些运营指标。我们很清楚我们在这些指标上的位置。

但真正的重点是，以一种安全的方式重新调整铁路，以便能够为我们的客户提供长期价值和长期服务。这实际上就是我们将继续在该团队身上看到的。

将会持续取得进展。有时有些年份进展不那么快，甚至我们会出现倒退。但从长期来看，我们将看到该团队取得卓越成果，我们为拥有这项资产感到无比自豪。谢谢。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我只是想说——他值得掌声——他们两个都值得掌声。

原文

8. Abel: BNSF continues to work on efficiency and safety improvements

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg? Yeah.

GREG ABEL: Moving to BNSF, I’ll start again by expressing great pride in the BNSF team. We have an exceptional group led by [CEO] Katie [Farmer] and her managers that show up every day to do great work on the railroad. At the same time, they would be the first to acknowledge there’s more to be done there.

The specific reference to precision scheduled railroading, the other large Class A railroads in the U.S. follow that, and including the two in Canada. We’re well aware what they’re doing, and obviously pay close attention to their operating metrics.

And our team strives every day to be more efficient, obviously. I would say we balance it with the needs of our customers. If I look back to pre-2022, so we look at the three-year period of 2019, 2020, 2021, the BNSF team made significant progress on their efficiencies, and delivering overall value back to the shareholders and to their customers.

And at the same time, maintaining a very safe railroad for our employees. So, we’re making excellent progress. That didn’t stop last year. They made great progress.

Again, the reality in 2022 is we did go through a period of time where we had to call it, “Reset the Railroad.”

We came out of the pandemic, there were the supply challenges. We had certain other labor issues and other things going on at the port.

And the reality is, our team prioritized getting the railroad back in place for the long-term, not a short-term focus on hitting certain operating metrics in 2022. We’re well aware of where we were relative to those metrics.

But the real focus was to get the railroad reset in a safe manner so it could deliver long-term value and long-term service to our customers. And that’s really what we’ll continue to see with that team.

There’ll be continual progress. There’ll be years where it’s not as quick, or even we go backwards. But over the long-term, we’ll see exceptional results from that team, and couldn’t be more proud that we have that asset. Thank you. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: I would just — well, he deserves — but both of them deserve applause.

9. 托德·库姆斯在GEICO”做得非常出色”

沃伦·巴菲特：我想补充一件事。（掌声）

在GEICO，托德·库姆斯是阿吉特和我选择的，让他回到GEICO解决风险匹配定价的问题，而这正是保险的核心。他恰好在疫情爆发前抵达，当时各种事情都发生了变化。

但托德在GEICO做得非常出色。他与阿吉特紧密合作。他在奥马哈有房子，经常回来，我们有时周末也会聚在一起。所以，在困难情况下这算是一项了不起的成就。他还没有完全到家，但他在GEICO以多种方式做出了非常大的改变。

我还想提另一件事，在过去十年左右的时间里，保险行业成立了很多上市公司。但没有一家是我们愿意拥有的，而且它们总是从一开始就说：“这是一家科技公司，不是保险公司。”

当然，它们是科技公司。每个人——无论是保险公司还是其他很多领域——都在使用这些工具，但你仍然需要恰当地将定价与风险匹配起来。它们无一例外地报告了巨额亏损，吞噬了资本。

但有一家公司人们通常没有听说过。据我所知，在过去十年里成立的公司中，只有一家取得了压倒性的成功。那就是阿吉特和四位与他一起加入的人创办的一项新业务。它叫做伯克希尔·哈撒韦专业保险公司。浮存金有多少，阿吉特？

阿吉特·贾恩：接近120亿美元。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们积累的浮存金可能比所有这些公司加起来还要多。它在承保损失方面基本上没有让我们付出任何成本。那四个人已经变成了全球大约1500人的团队。我们与整个行业竞争，并带来了四位具有独特才能的人才。

现在，正如我所说，我们在全球大约有1500人。我们带来了资本和只有伯克希尔真正能够提供的能力。所以，这是智慧、才华、精力和金钱的结合。

没有人真正成功地进入了这个领域——该领域已经有不少人不喜欢我们进入。而我们做到了这一点，却没有付出一个子儿的入场费。这是任何已上市的公司都无法比拟的。人们看到我们做到了，但他们无法复制。

这就是阿吉特创造的东西。彼得·伊斯特伍德领导了这个团队——伯克希尔·哈撒韦专业保险公司。这真是了不起。总之，让我们继续——为他们鼓掌。（掌声）

原文

9. Todd Combs doing ‘wonderful job’ running GEICO

WARREN BUFFETT: I would like to add one thing. (Applause)

At GEICO, Todd Combs was Ajit’s choice and my choice to go back to GEICO to work on the problem of matching rate to risk, which is what insurance is all about. And he arrived with exquisite timing, right before the pandemic broke out and all kinds of things changed.

But Todd is doing a wonderful job at GEICO. And he works closely with Ajit. He has a home in Omaha, he comes back here, and we get together on the weekend sometimes too. So, that’s been a remarkable accomplishment under difficult circumstances. And he’s not all the way home, but he’s made a very, very big change in multiple ways at GEICO.

And one other thing I would like to mention, there have been a lot of public companies created in the last decade or thereabouts in insurance. And there’s none of them that we would like to own, and they always started out in their perspective saying, “This is a tech company, not an insurance company.”

Of course, they’re a tech company. Everybody, whether they’re insurance or a lot of other places, are using the facility but you still have to properly match rate to risk. And they invariably have reported huge losses, they’ve eaten up capital.

But there’s been one company that nobody has generally heard of. There’s only been one that I know of, company started in the last ten years, that has been an overwhelming success. And that’s a company that Ajit and four people who joined with him set to develop a new business. It’s called Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. What’s the float, Ajit?

AJIT JAIN: Coming up to $12 billion.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve built more float than probably all these companies combined. It’s cost us essentially nothing in terms of an underwriting loss. The four people have turned into, I don’t know, 1,500 around the world. We took on the whole industry and we brought some unique talent in the four people that came.

And now have, like I said, 1,500 or so worldwide. And we brought capital, and we brought capabilities that really only Berkshire could supply. So, it was the combination of brains, and talent, and energy, and money.

And no one has really successfully entered this space — plenty of people in the space who didn’t like us coming. And we did it without it costing us a dime of entry. And it’s been unmatched by any of the companies that went public. And people have seen us do it, but they can’t duplicate it.

And that’s what Ajit has created. And Peter Eastwood has led this group, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty. And it’s just remarkable. So, anyway, with that — let’s go on — give them a hand for that. (Applause)

10. 芒格谈AI：“老式的智慧相当好用”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们进入第二个区域。

观众：嗨，查理。嗨，沃伦。我是凯伦，来自新加坡。

沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴你问到了这个。你的优先级是对的。

观众：是的。我有关于人工智能和机器人的问题。我的问题是：随着人工智能和机器人技术的持续进步，您认为这项技术对股市和整个社会会有哪些积极和消极的影响？您认为有哪些特定行业和公司将受到最大影响？（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：凯伦，谢谢你让查理回答这个问题。（笑声）

查理·芒格：嗯，如果你走进比亚迪在中国的工厂，你会看到机器人以令人难以置信的速度投入应用。所以，我们将在世界上看到更多的机器人。我个人对围绕人工智能的一些炒作持怀疑态度。我认为老式的智慧相当好用。（笑声）（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：人工智能中没有任何东西能取代阿吉特。这是毫无保留的说法。它可以做很多了不起的事情。你知道，比尔·盖茨给我带来了可能不是最新版本，但一个他以为我能驾驭的版本。（笑）他必须对我小心，不能带我太快。

它做了这些了不起的事情。但它不会讲笑话。比尔事先告诉了我，这让我有了心理准备。它就是不擅长那方面。但你知道，比如检查所有法律意见，自时间之初以来的所有东西，并消除所有——我的意思是，它可以做各种各样的事情。

当某样东西可以做到各种各样的事情时，我会有点担心，因为我知道我们无法”不发明”它。你知道，我们确实发明了原子弹——出于一个非常非常好的理由——在第二次世界大战期间。我们这样做是极其重要的。

但对于未来200年的世界来说，这种能力被释放出来是好事吗？我们别无选择。

当你开始某件事——嗯，爱因斯坦在原子弹之后说过：“这改变了世界上的一切，除了人类思考的方式。”

我会说同样的事情可能——不是说同一件事——我的意思是，对于人工智能，它可以改变世界上的一切，除了人类思考和行为的方式。这是一个巨大的步骤。这是一个很好的问题，我们只能给出我们最好的回答。

原文

10. Munger on AI: ‘Old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well’

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let’s go to section two.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie. Hi, Warren. I’m Karen, here from Singapore.

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m glad you got that in. Your priorities are right.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. I have questions on AI and robotics. Here’s my questions. As AI and robotics continue to advance, what do you believe will be the positive and the negative impacts of this technology on both the stock market and society as a whole? And there any specific industries and companies that you believe will be most impacted? (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Karen, I thank you for asking Charlie that question. (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you went into BYD’s factories in China, you would see robotics going at an unbelievable rate. So, we’re going to see a lot more robotics in the world. I am personally skeptical of some of the hype that has gone into artificial intelligence. I think old-fashioned intelligence works pretty well. (Laughter) (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: There won’t be anything in AI that replaces Ajit. State that unqualifiedly. It can do amazing things. You know, Bill Gates brought me out maybe not the latest version, but one he thought maybe I could handle. (Laugh) He has to be careful with me, in terms of leading me too fast.

And it did these remarkable things. But it couldn’t tell jokes. Bill told me that ahead of time, and it prepared me. And it just isn’t there. But you know, with things like checking all the legal opinions, you know, since the beginning of time and everything, and eliminating all the — I mean, it can do all kinds of things.

And when something can do all kinds of things, I get a little bit worried because I know we won’t be able to un-invent it. And you know, we did invent, for a very, very good reason, the atom bomb in World War II. And it was enormously important that we did so.

But is it good for the next 200 years of the world that the ability to do so has been unleashed? We didn’t have any choice.

When you start something — well, Einstein said after the atom bomb, he said, “This has changed everything in the world except how men think.”

And I would say the same thing may — not the same thing — I don’t mean that — but I mean with AI, it can change everything in the world except how men think and behave. And that’s a big step to take. It’s a good question, and it’s the best answer we can give.

11. 芒格：商业房地产低迷将”相当显著且相当令人不快”

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自汤姆·西摩。他说：“最近《金融时报》一篇文章的第一句话是：‘查理·芒格警告美国商业地产市场风暴即将来临，美国银行充斥着他说随着房地产价格下跌而形成的不良贷款。’”

“请详细说明商业房地产的现状。损失会有多严重？哪些领域或地区看起来尤其糟糕？”

我再补充另一个观众的问题，他想知道伯克希尔是否会因此更加积极地参与商业房地产。

查理·芒格：嗯，伯克希尔从未在商业房地产方面非常活跃。对于应税投资者来说，像伯克希尔这样的公司做法效果更好。所以，我不预期伯克希尔会受到巨大影响。但我确实认为，美国以及其他地方市中心的空心化将相当显著且相当令人不快。

我认为国家最终会度过这一切，但就像他们说的，这通常会涉及到不同的所有者。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，建筑物不会消失，但——

查理·芒格：所有者会消失。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，（笑声）但大多数人在房地产中喜欢用无追索权贷款。有一次我问查理，有一个房地产人士，我们在和他谈话，你知道，“他们怎么决定一栋这样的建筑值多少钱？“答案是：“取决于他们能借到多少钱而不用签个人担保。”

如果你看看房地产整体情况，你会明白正在发生的现象，只要你提醒自己，这恰恰是大多数在房地产行业做大的人的态度。这确实意味着贷款人最终得到了房产。

当然，他们通常不想要房产，所以房地产运营商指望与他们谈判，而银行往往会展期并假装没问题。有很多各种活动让我们远离商业房地产开发，那是在大规模发生的。

但这一切都有后果，我认为我们开始看到后果了：那些能够以2.5%借款的人发现按当前利率行不通，于是他们把房产交还给那些给了他们建造所需全部资金的人。查理有更多经验。不过，查理是从房地产起步的。

查理·芒格：是的，这很难。我更喜欢我们现在做的事情。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，就像查理几个月前在我离开他家时对我说的——我去拜访他，我们聊了几个小时。当我离开时，屋里除了一个女儿没有别人。我说：“查理，我会继续做我们一直做的事情。“查理连头都没抬，毫不犹豫地说：“沃伦，你只会做这个。“（笑声）他说得也对。

原文

11. Munger: Commercial real estate downturn will be ‘quite significant and quite unpleasant’

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Tom Seymour. He says, “The first sentence of a recent Financial Times article read, ‘Charlie Munger has warned of a brewing storm in the U.S. commercial property market with American banks full of what he said were bad loans as property prices fall.’

“Please elaborate on what’s going on in commercial real estate. How bad will the losses be, and what sectors or geographies look particularly bad?”

I’ll just add an addendum from another viewer who wrote in and wanted to know if Berkshire would be more active in commercial real estate as a result.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Berkshire’s never been very active in commercial real estate. It works better for taxable investors than it does for corporations to act the way that Berkshire is. So, I don’t anticipate huge effects on Berkshire. But I do think that the hollowing out of the downtowns in the United States and elsewhere in the world is going to be quite significant and quite unpleasant.

I think the country will get through it all right, but as they say, it will often involve a different set of owners.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and the buildings don’t go away, but —

CHARLIE MUNGER: The owners do.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (Laughter) but most people like to buy with non-recourse in real estate. And one time I asked Charlie, there was some real estate guy, we were talking to him, you know, “How do they decide how much a building like this is worth?” And the answer is, “It’s whatever they can borrow without signing their name.”

And if you look at real estate generally, you’ll understand the phenomenon that’s happening if you remind yourself that that’s the attitude of most people that have become big in the real estate business. And it does mean that the lenders are the ones that get the property.

And of course, they don’t want the property usually, so the real estate operator counts on negotiating with them, and the banks tend to, you know, extend and pretend. And there’s all kinds of activities that (UNINTEL) about us out of commercial real estate development, which occurs on a big scale.

But it all has consequences, and I think we’re starting to see the consequences of people who could borrow at 2.5%, and find out it doesn’t work at current rates, and they hand it back to somebody that gave them all the money they needed to build it. Charlie’s had more experience. Charlie got his start in real estate, though.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, it’s difficult. I like what we do better. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, as Charlie once said to me when I was leaving his house a few months ago — I was visiting him, we talked for a couple of hours. And as I left, there wasn’t anybody else in the house except one daughter. I said, “Charlie, I’ll just keep doing what we’ve been doing.” And Charlie, without looking up or pausing a second, said, “That’s all you know how to do, Warren.” (Laughter) He was right too.

12. “给你带来机会的是别人做蠢事”

沃伦·巴菲特：三号区域，是吗？

观众：嗨。我叫（听不清），来自加利福尼亚州圣克拉拉。我的问题是问查理和沃伦的。鉴于能够显著提高生产力的颠覆性技术兴起，人工智能是其中之一，您如何看待价值投资在这个新时代的未来？您认为投资者应该采用哪些适应措施或新原则？对于在这个快速变化的环境中保持成功的投资者，您有什么建议？谢谢。

查理·芒格：嗯，我很高兴回答这个问题。我认为价值投资者将会面临更困难的时期，因为现在有这么多人竞争数量减少的机会。所以，我给价值投资者的建议是：习惯赚得更少。

沃伦·巴菲特：查理在我们认识的整个过程中一直对我这么说。我的意思是，我们相处得很好，因为——

查理·芒格：嗯，我们现在确实赚得更少了。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但这主要我想是因为（笑声）（听不清）——

查理·芒格：我们年轻的时候赚得更多。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们从未想过能管理5080亿美元。

查理·芒格：不，我们从未想过。

沃伦·巴菲特：你知道，但我会争辩说仍然会有很多机会。而会有很多机会的部分原因是，科技对此没有任何影响。我的意思是，如果你看看自1942年我开始投资以来世界如何变化，你会说：“嗯，一个对飞机一无所知、对发动机和汽车一无所知、对电力等等一无所知的孩子，怎么能行呢？“但新事物的出现并不会夺走机会。

给你带来机会的是别人做蠢事。（笑声）（掌声）嗯，在我们经营伯克希尔的58年里，我会说做蠢事的人数大大增加了。他们做又大又蠢的事情，而他们这样做的部分原因是因为他们可以比我们开始时容易得多地从别人那里拿到钱。

所以，在过去十年里，你可以创办十到十五家愚蠢的保险公司，如果你善于此道，你可以变得富有——无论业务是否成功，承销商都拿到了报酬，律师也拿到了报酬。如果这在大规模上发生——这在58年前是不可能的。

你拿不到钱去做一些我们想做的蠢事，（笑）幸运的是。所以，我认为投资已经在这个任何人都可以参与的巨大的资本主义市场中大量消失，但大钱在于向别人兜售想法。

而不是取得超额收益。我认为，如果你管理的资金不是特别大——而我们的资金很大——但如果你管理少量资金，我认为机会会更大。但查理和我一直在这个问题上看法不同。他喜欢告诉我这个世界有多悲观，而我喜欢告诉他：“我们会找到一些东西的。“到目前为止，我们俩都有点对的。（笑）查理，你在这个问题上会退让一英寸吗？还是不会？（笑声）

查理·芒格：现在有太多的钱掌握在太多聪明人手中，他们都试图互相超越、互相推销，从别人那里获得更多钱。这是一个与我们所开始的截然不同的世界。我想它会有其机会，但也会有一些不愉快的插曲。

沃伦·巴菲特：但他们在你不需要参与的竞技场上互相较劲。我的意思是，如果你看看政府债券市场，国库券市场，我的意思是，有一张国库券与其他不一致，前几天我们买了30亿美元。

但这个世界绝大多数是短期导向的。如果你参加一个投资者关系电话会，他们都在试图弄清楚如何填满一张表格，以展示今年的盈利。管理层对满足他们的预期感兴趣，这样他们就可以稍微超出预期。

我的意思是，这是一个为任何试图思考什么应该在五年、十年或二十年内奏效的人量身定做的世界。我只是认为，我很愿意今天出生，带着不太多的钱出发，希望把它变成很多钱。查理实际上也会的。（笑）

他会找到事情做，我向你保证。不会和以前完全一样，但他会积累起一大堆，一大堆，一大堆。

查理·芒格：我不喜欢把一大堆钱变成一小堆钱的刺激。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们可能——

查理·芒格：我喜欢我的大堆钱保持原样。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一句，我们在这一点上是一致的。

查理·芒格：是的，我们一致。（笑声）你是大堆钱的最极端爱好者之一。（笑声）

原文

12. ′ What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things’

WARREN BUFFETT: Station three, is it?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name is (UNINTEL PHRASE), I’m from Santa Clara, California. And my question is to Charlie and Warren. Given the rise of disruptive technologies that can improve productivity significantly, and AI being one of them, how do you envision the future of value investing in this new era? And what adaptations or new principles do you think investors should adopt? And any recommendations for investors to remain successful in this rapid changing landscape? Thank you.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m glad to take that one. I think value investors are going to have a harder time now that there’s so many of them competing for a diminished bunch of opportunities. So, my advice to value investors is to get used to making less.

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie has been telling me the same thing the whole time we’ve known each other. I mean, we get along wonderfully because —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we are making less.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But that mostly I think is (Laughter) (UNINTEL PHRASE) —

CHARLIE MUNGER: We did that when we were younger.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we never thought we could manage $508 billion.

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, we never did.

WARREN BUFFETT: You know, but I would argue that there are going to be plenty of opportunities. And part of the reason there are going to be plenty of opportunities, the tech doesn’t make any difference for any of that. I mean, if you look at how the world’s changed in the years since 1942 when I started, you’d say, “Well, how does a kid that doesn’t know anything about airplanes, that doesn’t know anything about engines and cars, and doesn’t know anything about electricity and all that?” But new things coming along don’t take away the opportunities.

What gives you opportunities is other people doing dumb things. (Laughter) (Applause) Well, the 58 years we’ve been running Berkshire, I would say there’s been a great increase in the number of people doing dumb things. And they do big, dumb things, and the reason they do it to some extent is because they can get money from other people so much easier than when we started.

So, you could start ten or 15 dumb insurance companies in the last ten years, and you could become rich if you were adroit at it, whether the business succeeded or not, and the underwriters got paid, and the lawyers got paid. And if that’s done on a large scale — which it couldn’t be done 58 years ago.

You couldn’t get the money to do some of the dumb things that we wanted to do, (Laugh) fortunately. And so, I think that investing has disappeared so much from this huge capitalistic market that anybody can play in, but that the big money is in selling other people ideas.

It isn’t outperforming. And I think if you don’t run too much money, which we do — but if you’re running small amounts of money, I think the opportunities will be greater. But then Charlie and I always differed on this subject. He likes to tell me how gloomy the world is, and I like to tell him, “We’ll find something.” And so far, we’ve both be kind of right. (Laugh) Charlie, would you budge an inch on that, or not? (Laughter)

CHARLIE MUNGER: There is so much money now in the hands of so many smart people, all trying to outsmart one another and out-promote one another, getting more money out of other people. And it’s a radically different world from the world we started in. And I suppose it will have its opportunities, but it’s also going to have some unpleasant episodes.

WARREN BUFFETT: But they’re trying to outsmart each other in arenas that you don’t have to play. I mean, if you look at that government bond market, at the Treasury bill market, I mean, you have this one bill that’s out of line with the others, and went (UNINTEL PHRASE) $3 billion of it the other day.

But the world is overwhelmingly short-term focused. And if you go to an investor relations call, they’re all trying to figure out how to fill out a sheet to show the earnings for the year. And the management is interested in feeding them expectations, so we’ll slightly be beaten.

I mean, that is a world that’s made to order for anybody that’s trying to think about what you do that should work over five, or ten, or 20 years. And I just think that I would love to be born today, and go out with not too much money, and hopefully turn it into a lot of money. And Charlie would too, actually. (Laugh)

He would find something to do, I will just guarantee you. And it wouldn’t be exactly the same as before, but he would have a big, big, big pile.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would not like the thrill of losing my big pile into a small pile. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: But we might —

CHARLIE MUNGER: I like my big pile just the way it is. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: We agree on that, incidentally.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, we do. (Laughter) You’re one of the most extreme lovers of the big pile. (Laughter)

13. AIG责任承接交易结果”还不错，不算出色”

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题是给沃伦和阿吉特的。来自新泽西州利文斯顿的杰森·普洛纳。

他说：“2016年，你们与AIG达成了一项非常独特的过渡交易，你们承担了高达200亿美元的责任，以换取约100亿美元的预付款。请你们介绍一下在利率上升的背景下，这个过渡交易的进展？”

“然后在几周前的东京，你谈到了那些资产容易受到利率上升影响的银行的风险。如果能了解伯克希尔的负债如何受到久期的影响，将不胜感激。”

沃伦·巴菲特：这个问题是给阿吉特的，还是给我的，还是都有？

贝基·奎克：都有。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我先说一点我的看法，但阿吉特是关键人物。他是完成这笔交易的人。我们得到了100亿美元，我们这么说吧。但我们没有被限制必须把这笔钱投入债券。所以，利率对我们与AIG的交易或与任何人做类似交易的影响程度可能有限。

但我们不必将其投入匹配的债券或任何类似的东西。它进入一个通用的资产池，由我们管理，而流动资产现在超过1300亿美元。它并没有像人们喜欢想象的那样被放在某个小隔间里。

没有其他保险公司能做到这一点。它们无法那样思考。它们甚至不习惯那样思考。但它们无法那样思考是因为它们没有我们的资产负债表。我们的净资产占美国所有财产意外险公司的约26%。

到目前为止，我们必须支付的款项运行得还算温和。如果我错了，阿吉特会纠正我，因为他一直关注着。我们所支付的金额略低于我们预期在损失份额中需要支付的金额。

但这符合AIG的目的。这笔交易来到我们这里，是因为我们处于独特的位置。没有其他人能够承做这样的交易，就像我们承接劳合社的业务一样。我的意思是，当劳合社将其大量风险转移给伯克希尔·哈撒韦以实际上复苏其市场时，他们表示除了伯克希尔·哈撒韦别无选择。

所以，我们不会经常看到这样的交易。如果它们只有5亿美元左右，其他人就会进去提供更多的钱。在华尔街，每个人都在找资金。但如果他们开始谈论像AIG这样的交易，就没有其他选择了。阿吉特，请纠正我的所有数字。（笑声）

阿吉特·贾恩：不。看这笔交易自我们完成以来的表现，一个方法是在我们完成交易时，我们对每年将支付多少做了某些预测。我们所做的是监测自交易开始以来的实际赔付情况，并将其与我们预期支付的金额进行比较。

正如沃伦提到的，这两个数字非常接近。更具体地说，实际赔付额是我们预测到此时应赔付额的96%，这还不错，但不算出色。我们仍然领先于预期。如果我们最终支付的金额低于预测，那么我们不仅会以一个非常优惠的利率（显著低于4%）借到钱，而且我们还会赚取一笔费用，按2015年美元计算是100万美元。

所以，我们以低于4%的利率借到了钱，并且还赚取了100万美元的费用，这比我们预期的稍微好一点。所以，总体而言，我们对这笔交易非常满意，我们很高兴做了这笔交易。但游戏还没有结束。侵权责任还在不断出现。所以，我谨慎乐观地认为这笔交易的结果将会比我们预期的更好。

查理·芒格：嗯，真正有趣的是，在伯克希尔内部，财产意外险公司每美元保费背后有四倍于正常水平的股东资本。当然，我们看到了大交易。如果你有一个想转嫁给别人的大笔责任，你会信任谁？

沃伦·巴菲特：而且我们每年有250亿美元或更多的收入来自保险以外的业务，与保险不相关，没有附带义务。我们不支付股息。如果我们支付股息，你知道，你削减了股息，第二天试试看还能不能去承保保险业务。

我的意思是，这是一个人们指望你赔付的行业。当我们拿走那100亿美元时，我们并没有同意将其投入五年期或十年期债券。我们甚至不那样思考。与我们做生意的人知道，无论经济发生什么，他们都有一个像没有人一样的对手方能够支付100亿美元。

所以，这不仅是因为保险公司的实力极其雄厚，还因为我们每个月都有所有这些收入进账，而且我们没有很多债务。我的意思是，我们在铁路和能源层面有债务。但在其他运营方面——而且我们不担保那些债务，但它是（听不清）。

世界上没有另一个伯克希尔，阿吉特在谈判时认识到了这一点。如果金额足够大，对方也同样认识到这一点。有各种各样的人喜欢承做5亿或3亿美元的业务，他们可能考虑将其贷出去，因为这是他们的保险公司可以以较高利率做的事情。但这不是我们玩的游戏，我们对此毫无兴趣。

原文

13. AIG liability assumption deal is turning out to be ‘good but not great’

WARREN

标题：2023年度股东大会

第二部分/第五部分

正如我们的团队在其他评论中强调的那样，行业内的脱轨事故确实会发生。我们对此极为重视。并非所有事故都具有危险性，但无论如何，我们都在不断思考如何预防它们。当可能出现潜在事故时，我们如何检测它？我们该如何处理我们的列车？最终，关键在于恰当应对。因为事故总会发生。我认为我们拥有一支极其尽职的团队，随时准备应对他们影响到的社区。

原文

And as our teams highlighted in other comments, obviously derailments do occur in the industry. We take them incredibly seriously. They’re not all hazardous, but irrespective of that, we’re constantly looking at how do we prevent them. How do we detect them when we potentially have one that’s going to occur? And what do we do with our trains? And then ultimately it comes down responding properly. Because they will occur. And I think we have an incredibly dedicated team that’s always ready to respond to the communities they’re impacting.

沃伦·巴菲特：脱轨事故确实存在。一年有多少起？

格雷格·阿贝尔：嗯，行业内有一千多起。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，是的。你知道，你开始运输货物，而我们是公共承运商。我们运输非常沉重的货物。我们在华氏100度的天气下运输。也在零度下运输，还要绕过弯道。我们有坡度。（笑）即使是1%的坡度，当你下山时，我不知道你后面有多重，我的意思是，铁路运营并不是一门容易的生意。

当然，这些系统基本上是在19世纪末设计的。我们拥有22,000英里的轨道，我想是吧。这还不包括侧线和一些其他设施。这不是一门容易的生意。我们会犯错。

我们不会因为发生脱轨事故就认为犯了错。十年、二十年或三十年后，我们仍然会发生脱轨事故。我们必须运输某些我们希望不必运输的产品。我们是公共承运商。我们喜欢运输氯气和氨气吗？不。

但它们必须在这个社会中从一个地方运到另一个地方。我们是公共承运商。如果他们选择我们的铁路，我们就装载它们。

但我们比过去做得更好了。但我们还有很长的路要走。这样说公平吗？

格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对公平。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: There are derailments. How many a year?

GREG ABEL: Yeah, well, there’s a thousand-plus in the industry.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. You know, you start hauling freight, and we’re a common carrier. And we take very heavy freight. And we take them in 100° weather. And we take it at 0° and we go around curves. And we have grades. (Laugh) And even a 1% grade, if you’re going down a hill with, I don’t know how much weight behind you, I mean, railroading is not an easy business.

And of course, the systems were designed, you know, basically in the late 1800s, amid the late 1800s. And we have 22,000, I think it is, miles of track. And that doesn’t count sidings and some other things. It is not an easy business. We’ll make mistakes.

We’re not making a mistake because we have a derailment. We will have derailments ten, 20 years, or 30 years from now. And we have to carry certain products we wish we didn’t have to carry. We’re a common carrier. Do we like carrying chlorine and ammonia and all? No.

But they’re going to move from one place to another in this society. And we are a common carrier. And we load them if they select our railroad.

But we are better than we used to be. But we’ve got a long way to go. Is that a fair enough statement?

GREG ABEL: Absolutely.

16. 伯克希尔公用事业公司专注于清洁能源，但需要全国协调一致的努力

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，五号台。

观众成员：您好，沃伦先生和芒格先生。我叫苏静华（音译），来自中国，（外语）公司。首先，今天能来到这里，我非常激动，也深感荣幸。我的问题是：随着越来越多人关注环境竞争保护，以及政府也支持新能源产业，您如何看待新能源的持续发展？新能源企业未来如何才能实现更好的发展？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我认为格雷格最适合回答这个问题，因为自从我们收购了一家中美能源公司但现在称为伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的公司以来，他每年都在讨论这个议题，准备报告，希望我们能帮助解决一些问题。我们可能比美国任何一家公用事业公司投入的资金都多，我猜想。

格雷格·阿贝尔：绝对如此。

沃伦·巴菲特：而我们还只是触及了表面。但当你跨越州界时，这并不容易。我的意思是，你有不同的司法管辖区。这个国家在输电方面应该比现在更先进。我们一直是推动这一进程的最大因素。但为什么你不跟他们谈谈呢？

格雷格·阿贝尔：当然，谢谢，沃伦。所以，毫无疑问，全球和美国都在进行一场能源转型。在某些方面，我希望在美国，我们至少能有一个全国性的清晰计划，知道如何推进这件事。

但现实是，除了一些例外，它是州与州之间各自为政的。因此，结果是，当你想到伯克希尔哈撒韦能源时，我们旗下有三家美国公用事业公司。它们都参与多个州的业务。但它们正在逐个州制定计划，然后试图将它们整合到各个州。

机会是巨大的，因为转型正在进行。我们已经在BHE概述了我们在碳减排方面的目标，到2030年，相对于2005年，他们将减少50%的碳足迹。所以，这是《巴黎协定》以及他们希望公用事业公司达到的标准。

我们正走在这条正确的道路上。但要实现它，是一段真正的旅程。我经常和沃伦谈。当我们在2000年代中期收购太平洋公司时，我们立即认识到要建设大量的可再生能源，就像我们在中西部和爱荷华州一直在做的那样。

但那基本上是在一个州内。而现在，太平洋电力公司，我们在六个州运营。我们从2000年代中期就开始做了。现在到了2023年，我们才完成了其中的三分之一多一点。当时这是一个60亿美元的输电项目。今天，我们建成了三分之一多一点。我们可能已经花费了接近70亿美元。这是正确的成果。

这对我们的客户来说仍然是一个很好的成果。但作为转型的一部分，你绝对必须建设它来输送所有那些可再生能源。这就是沃伦强调的复杂性。你不能某天醒来就解决这个问题。

你从输电开始，然后建设资源。但就在同一家公司，如果我们看看我们在BHE能源以及那次能源转型中所做的事情，我们有700亿美元的已知项目，这些项目确实是正确服务我们的客户并在那些公用事业公司中实现那种能源转型所必需的。

这将在未来十年内完成。所以，我们有一支绝对能够迎接挑战的团队。他们正在兑现承诺。这对我们每一家公司以及我们的股东来说都是一个非常好的商业机会。因为随着我们部署这些资本，我们显然会从中获得股本回报。但这将是一段漫长的旅程。它将在一个较长的时间内发生。而且越往后发展，就越依赖于各种正在进步但尚未成熟的技术的演变。

原文

16. Berkshire utilities focusing on clean energy but coordinated national effort is needed

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Warren and Mr. Munger. My name is Soo Jing Hua (PH) from China, (FOREIGN LANGUAGE) company. And first of all, I’m so excited and very honored to be here today. And my question is: With more and more people focusing now on environmental competition protection and the government supporting the new energy industry as well, so what are your thoughts on the continued development of new energy? How may the new energy firms achieve better developments in the future?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Greg I think, is the best to answer that because since we bought a company called MidAmerican but now called Berkshire Hathaway Energy. But he has been talking about it yearly, preparing reports hoping that we can help solve a number of the problems. And we probably spent more money than any utility, I would guess, in the United States.

GREG ABEL: Absolutely.

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’ve just scratched the surface. But it is not easy when you cross state lines. I mean, you’ve got different jurisdictions. And this country should be ahead of where it is in terms of transmission. We have been the biggest factor in helping that. But why don’t you tell them a little bit about it?

GREG ABEL: Sure, thanks, Warren. So, there’s no question there’s an energy transformation going on around the globe and as Warren touched on, in the U.S. And in some ways, I would hope here in the U.S. we’d at least have a clear plan across the nation as to how to approach that.

But the reality is it is state by state with some exceptions. So, as a result, when you think of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, we own three U.S. utilities there. And they all participate in multiple states. But they’re developing plans state by state and then trying to integrate them across the various states.

The opportunities are significant because there is a transformation going on. We’ve outlined our goal on where we’re going relative to carbon at BHE where they’ll by 2030 reduce their carbon footprint by 50% relative to 2005. So, that’s the Paris Accord and the standard they want to hold the utility industry or the utility companies to.

And we’re well on that path. But to achieve it is a true journey. I’ve often talked to Warren. When we bought Pacific back in the mid-2000s, we immediately recognized to build a lot of renewable energy like we’ve been doing in the Midwest and Iowa.

But that was basically in a single state. Now PacifiCorp, we’re in six states. We started that back in the mid-2000s. Here we are. And we laid out a great transmission plan. Here’s how we’re going to build it. Here’s how we’re going effectuate it, and all the benefits for our customers over that period of time.

Here we are in 2023, and we have a little more than a third of that. At the time it was a $6 billion transmission project. Today we have a little more than a third of it built. And we’ve spent probably closer to $7 billion. And it’s the right outcome.

It’s still a great outcome for our customers. But as part of the transformation, you absolutely have to build it to move all that renewable energy. And that’s sort of the complexity Warren was highlighting. You can’t just wake up one day and solve this problem.

You start with transmission, and then you build the resources. But at that same company, and if we look at what we’re doing across BHE Energy and that energy transformation, we have $70 billion of known projects that are really required to properly serve our customers and achieve that type of energy transformation across those utilities.

And that’s in the coming ten years. So, we have a team that’s absolutely up to the challenge. They’re delivering on their commitments. And it’s a very good business opportunity for each of our companies and for our shareholders. Because as we deploy that capital, we obviously earn a return on equity of it. But it will be a long journey. It’ll happen over an extended period of time. And the further you get out there, the more dependent upon the evolution of a variety of technologies that are progressing, but not there yet.

沃伦·巴菲特：你提出了一个问题。我想再多花一分钟谈谈，因为它非常重要。我真的不知道我们的政府形式在解决你所描述的问题方面是否理想。我们曾经解决过一次。在二战期间，我们接手了一个半死不活的国家。

我们发现自己陷入了一场世界大战。我们在世界大战中所做的是，把一群人带到华盛顿，年薪一美元。我不知道是不是西德尼·温伯格还是高盛。你随便点名吧。我们给了他们巨大的权力，来重新调整美国的资源，以应对他们面临的问题，那就是打造一个战争机器。

他们找到亨利·凯泽，让他造舰船。他们去找福特汽车公司，说：“你们制造坦克和一些飞机。”他们以一种令人难以置信的方式重组了美国的工业企业。

因为他们拥有联邦政府的权力。他们拥有美国企业的聪明才智。他们拥有美国企业的设施。这带来了非常成功的成果。但是，在和平时期，当有50个州，并且你必须让他们合作时，我们能这么做吗？

你可以发布命令。但你无法指定资本流向。这是另一端。你知道，我们试图通过税收优惠之类的办法来做这件事。但我们还没有创造出二战时期那种行之有效的团结目标和机制，那时基本上每个人都觉得自己的唯一工作就是打赢战争。

我们当时想出了如何利用我们的工业能力来有效击败轴心国。那么，在当前的民主制度下，你如何重建这种能力？我不确定我知道答案。但我确实知道问题所在。我认为，如果你手上有一场紧急情况，我的意思是，你真的需要重新规划美国的能源系统。

我不认为你能在没有某种类似机制、紧迫感等的情况下做到这一点。资本在那里。人才在那里。目标是显而易见的。但我们似乎就是无法在和平时期做到这一点，因为我们习惯于遵循一套给定的程序。

你知道，中国是一个国家。我们有50个州。我们有一套完全不同的政府体系。

我们应该能够经受住考验，但到目前为止还没有奏效。所以，谢谢你的提问。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ve raised a question. I want to just take an extra minute now because it’s so important. And I don’t really know whether our form of government is ideal at all in terms of solving the problem you describe. We have solved it one time. In World War II, we took a country that was semi-limping along.

And we found ourselves in a world war. And what we did in a world war is we brought a bunch of people to Washington at a $1 a year. I don’t know whether it was Sidney Weinberg or Goldman Sachs. You just name them. And we gave them enormous power to reorient the resources of the United States to face the problem that they faced, which was to create a war machine.

And what they did was they found Henry Kaiser, you know, and told him to build ships. And they went to the Ford Motor Company and said, “You build tanks and some airplanes.” And they reordered the industrial enterprise of the United States in a way that was unbelievable.

Because they had the power of the federal government. And they had the ingenuity of American business. And they had the facilities of American business. And it led to a very successful outcome. But can we do that in a peace time where you’ve got 50 states and you have to get them to cooperate?

And you can issue orders. But you can’t designate where the capital goes. It’s the other end. And, you know, we try and do it with tax incentives and all of that sort of thing. But we haven’t created the unity of purpose and the machinery that worked in World War II where essentially everybody felt their one job was to win the war.

And we figured out how to use our industrial capacity to in effect defeat the Axis powers. And how do you recreate that with, you know, the present democratic system? I’m not sure I know the answer. But I sure know the problem. And I think that if you’ve got an emergency on your hands, I mean, you really need to re-engineer the energy system of the United States.

I don’t think you can do it without something resembling the machinery, the urgency, whatever. The capital’s there. The people are there. The objective is obvious. And we just don’t seem to be able to do it in a peace time where we’re used to following a given set of procedures.

And, you know, China’s one country. And we’ve got 50 states. And we got a whole different system of government.

We should be up to the test, but so far it hasn’t worked. So, thank you for the question.

17. 阿贝尔将决定伯克希尔的下一代管理者

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基。

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自费城的克里斯·弗里德。他说：“我们知道格雷格·阿贝尔和阿吉特·贾因是伯克希尔的下一代领导者。目前在格雷格和阿吉特之后，谁能接替他们的职责？”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这将是个问题。除非出现特殊情况，格雷格将接替我的职位。然后他将处在一个需要找到他的替代者或更接近他水平的人的位置上，因为他在很多方面都比我做得好。

他将需要那个替补。当问题出现时，我们知道阿吉特对此的看法。但格雷格很可能会做出最终决定，我的意思是，这是他的责任。阿吉特会给他最好的建议。我认为格雷格遵循这个建议的可能性非常、非常、非常高（笑）。

但这些问题并不容易。每个人都在谈论管理团队板凳深度之类的事情，那是胡扯。我的意思是，你知道，他们没有那么多能同时管理五家净资产最大的公司和各种多元化业务的人。

但你也不需要五个人。你需要很多优秀的运营管理者。你需要一个高层人物来配置资本并确保你找对了运营管理者。我们设计了一套将保险业务与其他业务分开的体系。

我认为这是一个非常好的设计。但现在就宣布这两个不同业务领域的人选并不明智，因为从现在到那时可能会发生很多变化。而最可能（笑）的变化是这份工作本身发生了变化。查理。

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的。我们在伯克希尔的子公司中有很多优秀的人才涌现出来。我们的运营总体上比其他的大型综合企业公司做得更好，这是有原因的。原因之一是我们更换管理者的频率远低于其他人。这帮助了我们。

原文

17. Abel will decide on next generation of Berkshire managers

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky.

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chris Freed in Philadelphia. He says, “We know that Greg Abel and Ajit Jain are the next generation of Berkshire leaders. Who are currently behind Greg and Ajit in their respective roles?”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that will be the question. Well, Greg will be, absent some extraordinary circumstance, but he’s going to succeed me. And then he will be sitting in a position where he needs his equivalent or something closer to his equivalent, because he’s better at many things than I’ve been.

He will need that substitute. And when the question comes, we know Ajit’s opinion on that. But Greg will probably be the one that will make the final decision, I mean, being his responsibility. And Ajit will give him his best advice. And I think the odds are very, very, very high (Laugh) that Greg would follow it.

But those are not easy questions. Everybody talks about the executive bench and all of that sort of thing, which is baloney. I mean, you know, they don’t have that many people that can run five of the largest net worth companies and all kinds of diverse businesses.

But you don’t need five people either. And you need a lot of good operating managers. And you need somebody at the top that allocates capital and makes sure that you’ve got the right operating manager. And we’ve designed something where we separate the insurance and the rest of the business.

And I think it’s a very good design. But we wouldn’t be smart to name that decision now about the two different areas of the business because a lot can change between now and then. And the most likely (Laugh) change is that this job changes. Charlie.

CHARLIE MUNGER: I got nothing to add. We have a lot of good people that have risen in the Berkshire subsidiaries. And there’s a reason why our operations have by and large done better than other big conglomerate companies. And one of them is that we change managers way less frequently than other people do. And that’s helped us.

沃伦·巴菲特：当保罗·安德鲁斯去世时，我们知道他认为谁应该接管那里。但没有理由宣布这件事。我的意思是，我们本可以活到100岁。我们的一位经理不久前去世了。他多大年纪，在加兰公司？

格雷格·阿贝尔：嗯，90多岁，西摩。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，西摩·利希滕斯坦。西摩，在他80岁时我给他写了一封信，我说：“我很高兴你80岁了。等你90岁时我会再给你写信。”（笑）他90岁时我又写了一封。（笑）他没活到100岁。

但他有一个非常出色的后辈接替他。事实上，随着岁月流逝，他在某种程度上与他共同管理。但这是具体情况具体分析。最重要的是让合适的人来管理整个地方。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: When Paul Andrews died, we knew who he thought should take over there. But there wasn’t any reason to announce that. I mean, we should live to be 100. We had one of our managers die not long ago. And how old was he, at Garan?

GREG ABEL: Yeah, mid-90s, Seymour.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Seymour Lichtenstein. And Seymour, I wrote him a letter when he was 80 and I said, you know, “I’m glad you’re 80. And I’ll write you again when you’re 90.” And (Laugh) I wrote him again when he was 90. And (Laugh) he didn’t make it to a hundred.

But he had a terrific fellow following him. And he really managed it jointly, to some extent, as the years went by. But it’s case by case. And the main thing to do is have the right person running the whole place.

18. 美国有太多的“部落主义”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。六号台。

观众成员：早上好，我叫哈奇·冈本（音译），来自日本宫崎。巴菲特先生，我是您拯救的所罗门兄弟公司8000名员工之一。那时我还年轻。我在世界贸易中心7号楼工作。我一直一直想亲自感谢您拯救了那家公司、它的员工，包括我和我的家人。所以，谢谢您，巴菲特先生。（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）也要感谢德里克·莫恩，他之前在日本工作，我在任命他的前一天才第一次见到他。如果没有德里克来，那件事不会成功。所以，不管你在日本教了他什么，（笑）谢谢。

观众成员：谢谢您，先生。我的问题是，您不时提醒我们不要做空美国。您认为对我们来说，保持国家强大的最重要的事情是什么？在风险方面，如果国家的实力被削弱，可能的原因是什么？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们（掌声）经历了很多考验。我的意思是，我们是一个如此年轻的国家。你知道，当你想到日本，想到美国，我们在这个舞台上实在是太新了。我的意思是，你知道，我们才建国234年。

那算不了什么。我的意思是，你知道，查理和我加起来，我们活过了这个国家寿命的三分之二。（笑声）我的意思是，我们经历了46次全国大选的考验。我们做过一些糟糕的选择。我们经历过一场内战。我的意思是，这个国家在某些方面拥有巨大的优势。

因为我们在1790年起步时，人口只占世界的0.5%。而现在我们占据了世界GDP的近25%。这并不是因为我们在土地方面有什么不可思议的优势。当人们试图通过控制海洋来统治世界时，东西两侧各有大洋是件好事。

你知道，我们在加拿大和墨西哥有好邻居。但这真是一个奇迹。你会问：“我们如何保持这个系统中的优良部分？”嗯，要剔除我们明显的缺陷。我们以一种非常不稳定、断断续续的方式在做。但总的来说，美国现在比我出生时是一个好得多的地方，这是一个巨大的进步。

我的意思是，我一周前刚做了根管治疗。我就在想：“我不知道谁发明了奴佛卡因，但我支持他。”你知道，我的意思是，（笑）但体现在无数方面。我的意思是，你可以浪漫化过去。但算了吧。那是苦活。但现在我们确实有了原子弹，我们希望有核能。

你知道，我们希望原子从未被分裂。但它已经被分裂了。你无法把它收回瓶子里。所以，挑战是巨大的。你知道，我父亲在20世纪40年代在国会任职。那时看起来一团糟。尽管战争在某种程度上带来了统一。

但仍然非常党派化。现在我认为我们的问题是，党派之争在我看来已经演变成了部落主义。而部落主义的效果就没那么好了。我的意思是，一旦进入部落主义，你甚至听不到另一方的声音。而部落主义可能导致暴民。

我的意思是，它就这样发展。我的意思是，你在（听不清）见过。我们在这里也见过一定程度。所以，我们在前进过程中必须以某种方式改进我们的民主。我们要处理我们所生活的这个世界。但如果让我选择世界上任何一个地方出生，我仍然会选择美国。

而且我希望今天出生。我的意思是，这个世界比以往任何时候都好。借助现代通讯，我们也能更清楚地看到它在许多方面有多糟糕。它有问题。我1930年出生时，世界上有20亿人。

现在大约有77亿，而且还在增长。我们经历了千年，人口几乎没有什么变化。当然，我们以一种不可思议的方式将能源引入了这个世界，现在有77亿人使用着比我出生时（当时只有20亿人）多得多的能源。

所以，这是一个激动人心的世界。这是一个充满挑战的世界。你知道，我不知道事情的解决方案。我确实认为，我们需要思考不同的解决方案，来解决重要问题，并且不要自欺欺人地认为会有奇迹发生，或者每个人都会团结起来，大家一起欢呼，问题在2050年就会消失。

至于我们适应得有多好，我们拭目以待。我会说，到目前为止，看起来并不乐观。但我相信，当林肯看着内战发生的种种时，情况看起来也绝不乐观。所以，我认为美国有能力做出非凡的事情。如果他们再做一次，我也不会感到惊讶。查理可能——

查理·芒格：嗯，我比沃伦稍微不那么乐观一点。（笑声）我认为通往人类幸福的最佳道路是期望更少。我认为未来会更加艰难。我认为让很大比例的年轻和聪明的人全都进入财富管理领域，就其对美国文明的自然影响而言，是一种疯狂的发展。我们不需要现在这么多财富管理者。

沃伦·巴菲特：但查理出生于1924年1月1日。你不想回到那时吧，查理？（笑）

查理·芒格：是的，我不想。而且我喜欢更多的财富管理者，他们仅仅反映了财富更多的事实。但我不喜欢每个人都进入财富管理。最好去麻省理工学院或其他地方。我认为现在的世界有点疯狂。

沃伦·巴菲特：选择你的道路。（笑）

原文

18. America has too much ‘tribalism’

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station six.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, my name is Hatch Okamamti (PH) from Miyazaki, Japan. Mr. Buffett, I was one of the 8,000 employees at Salomon Brothers that you saved. I was younger back then. I was working at 7 World Trade Center. I’ve always, always wanted to thank you in person for saving that company, its employees, including myself and my family. So, thank you, Mr. Buffett. (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause) And thank Deryck Maughan who actually had been over in Japan before that and who I met for the first time the day before I put him in. And it wouldn’t have worked if Deryck hadn’t come. So, whatever you taught him in Japan, (Laugh) thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, sir. Now, my question time to time you have reminded us to not bet against America. What do you think are the most important things for you guys to remain strong? On the risk side, if the strength of the country’s undermined, what could be the reasons?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve had (Applause) a lot of tests. I mean, we’re such a young country. You know, when you think about Japan and you think about the United States, it’s just incredible how new we are to the block. I mean, you know, what are we? 234 years old since we started.

That’s nothing. I mean, you know, Charlie and I combined, we’ve lived two thirds the life of the country. (Laughter) I mean, we’ve been tested at 46 national elections. And we made some bad choices. And we’ve had a civil war. I mean, so the country has had enormous advantages though in some way.

Because we started with one half of 1% of the world’s population in 1790. And we now have something close to 25% of the world’s GDP. And it wasn’t because we had some incredible advantage in terms of the land. It was nice to have two oceans on each side back when people tried to rule the world by ruling the waves.

You know, and we’ve had good neighbors in Canada and Mexico. But it’s a miracle. And you say, “How do we keep the good parts of the system?” Well, culling out our obvious defects. And we do it in a very herky-jerky manner. But net, the United States is a better place to live than it was when I was born by a huge factor.

I mean, I just got a root canal a week ago. And I was just thinking, “I don’t know who invented Novocain, but I’m for him.” You know, I mean, (Laugh) but in a million ways. I mean, you can romanticize about the past. But forget it. It is work. But now we do have an atom bomb and we wish nuclear power.

You know, we wish the atom had never been split. But it has been. And you can’t put it back in the bottle. So, the challenges are huge. You know, my dad was in Congress back in the 1940s. And it looked like a mess then. Although it was unified by the war to some degree.

But it was still very partisan. Now the problem we have, I think, is that partisanship, it seems to me, has moved toward tribalism. And tribalism just doesn’t work as well. I mean, when it gets to tribalism, you don’t even hear the other side. And tribalism can lead to mobs.

I mean, it just flows. I mean, you’ve seen it (UNINTEL). We’ve seen it to a degree here. So, we have to refine in a certain way our democracy as we go along. We deal with the world we live in. But if I still had a choice of any place to be born in the world, I’d want to be born in the United States.

And I’d want to be born today. I mean, it is a better world than we have ever had. And with present-day communications, we can also see much more how terrible it is in many ways. And it’s got problems. When I was born in 1930, there were 2 billion in the world.

And now there’s maybe 7.7 billion and growing. And we went millennia with really no change in population. And of course, we’ve introduced energy in an incredible way into something where we now have 7.7 billion people using way more energy than they did when I was born when there were 2 billion people.

So, it’s an exciting world. It’s a challenging world. And, you know, I don’t know the solutions on things. I do think that we do need to think about different solutions in terms of how we get important problems solves and that we don’t kid ourselves that something magic will happen or that everybody will get together and we’ll all just cheer, and it’ll go away by 2050.

And how well we adapt to that, we will see. I would say so far it doesn’t look very promising. But then I’m sure that when Lincoln looked out at what was going on in the Civil War it didn’t look very promising either. So, I think that the U.S. is capable of doing remarkable things. And I think it wouldn’t surprise me if they do it again. Charlie may —

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m slightly less optimistic than Warren is. (Laughter) I think the best road ahead to human happiness is to expect less. I think it’s going to get tougher. And I think the solution of having a huge proportion of the young and brilliant people all go into wealth management is a crazy development in terms of its natural consequences for American civilianization. We don’t need as many wealth managers as we have.

WARREN BUFFETT: But Charlie was born on January 1st, 1924. And you’d hate to go back to that, wouldn’t you, Charlie? (Laugh)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, I would. And I like more wealth managers who are just merely reflecting the fact there’s more wealth. But I don’t like everybody going into wealth management. Better go to MIT or something. I think the world’s a little crazy now.

WARREN BUFFETT: Take your choice. (Laugh)

19. 没有企业掠夺者会有足够的资金在巴菲特之后针对伯克希尔

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。（笑声）

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自丹尼斯·德贾尼罗。正如沃伦在2022年年报中所说，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国库券。它还将避免可能导致在任何不便时刻出现令人不安的现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。

在沃伦去世后，他的A类股将转换为B类股并分配给各个基金会。这些基金会随后将出售这些股份以资助他们的事业。沃伦估计出售他所有股份需要12到15年。

我担心像卡尔·伊坎这样的企业掠夺者或某个团体可能购买足够多的这些股份来控制伯克希尔，并完全无视沃伦持有大量现金和美国国库券的理念，转而贪婪、鲁莽、高度投机，从而毁掉伯克希尔作为坚如磐石金融堡垒的地位。我还担心伯克希尔子公司的运营方式可能发生变化。沃伦和查理是否担心这些事情可能发生？

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，公平地说，我们对此考虑了很多。但我并不非常担心。确实，格雷格和董事们会拥有一个很长的蜜月期，仅仅因为其他投票权仍然存在。但确实，最终他们将根据我们的运营相对于其他人的表现来被评判。

现在，如果我们在12到15年内不支付任何股息，那么要接管伯克希尔将需要1.5万亿美元。我认为这限制了那个群体。他们喜欢考虑能借多少钱来收购。（笑）这行不通。

没有人能靠自己接近这个数字。而且我认为重要的是伯克希尔被视为国家资产而非国家负债。我们的运作模式必须对这个国家有益。我们当然有记录，再经过12到15年，资本更多，公司更多。

会有更多的事情发生，我们的数千亿美元可以以大量就业、产品和行为的方式进入经济。这可以与其他方式进行比较。所以，我认为如果我们配得上成功，我们就会胜出。我认为这种情况发生的可能性非常、非常、非常高。查理。

查理·芒格：嗯，我不会花太多时间担心我死后50年才会发生的事情。我认为如果你大致上照顾好每一天的责任，尽量提前思考，那么你就顺其自然地接受结果。所以，我很坦然。但我不认为——我认为他担心得过分了。

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。基本上，我们俩都不担心。（笑声）但我们有计划。我们确实有计划。你知道，我脑子里有一个伯克希尔一直是怎样的模型。这个模型在58年里已经被修改了很多次。我最初或者很快知道的一件事是，它不应该是家纺织公司。

（笑）那是一个重要的决定。（笑声）我的意思是，我们只是顺手打好手里的牌。我们做了一些非常好的决定。我们绝不会做出让我们毁灭的决定。只有那些威胁到地球的事情，我们对此没有答案。

但我们让自己保持比任何人都更好的状态。我们就是不会有大量到期债务。我们不会有可以大规模兑现的保单。我们会持有看起来数量巨大的资本。

确实是一大笔资本。但背后有巨大的盈利能力，巨大的多样性，一切。所以，我们的商业模式会被评估，它会与我们乐意与之比较的很多人进行比较。所以，我认为我们在向未来交付非常安全的东西。

而且我认为我们拥有别人没有的股东基础。我的意思是，据我所知，这个国家里没有人有（除非他们有上市前或类似的员工持股公司）。但这是，你知道，58年来将股东视为公司所有者的产物。

但那意味着什么？这意味着拥有快乐的客户。这意味着（掌声）受到社区欢迎而不是被他们拒绝。这意味着在金融危机时期，政府更愿意与你合作。因为在某些情况下，你能提供国家无法提供的东西。

你会坚守在那里。同时，这对业务也有好处。我们会遇到各种各样的危机。但如果这些危机没有威胁到地球（这让你担心我们所面临的一些威胁），我们会对美国有利。如果我们对美国有利，我们就能生存下去。

原文

19. No corporate raider will have enough money to target Berkshire after Buffett

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky. (Laughter)

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Dennis DeJaniero. As Warren stated in the 2022 annual report, Berkshire will always hold a boat load of cash in U.S. Treasury bills. It will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses.

After Warren passes away, his A shares will be converted into B shares and distributed to various foundations. These foundations will then sell the shares to fund their causes. Warren estimates it will take 12-15 years for all his shares to be sold.

I worry that a corporate raider like Carl Icahn or a group will buy up enough of these shares to take control of Berkshire and completely disregard Warren’s philosophy of holding a lot of cash and U.S. Treasury bills, and instead be greedy, reckless, and highly speculative and ruin Berkshire’s position as a rock-solid financial fortress. I also worry that changes might be made in how Berkshire’s subsidiaries are run. Do Warren and Charlie worry that these things could happen?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s fair to say we think about it plenty. But I don’t worry enormously. It is true that Greg and the directors will have a honeymoon period for a long time simply because other votes that will still remain. But it’s true that eventually they will get judged based on how well our operation fares versus others.

Now if we don’t pay any dividends in 12 or 15 years, you’re talking a trillion and a half that it would take to take over. And I think that limits the group. They like to think about how much they can borrow against it. (Laugh) It doesn’t work.

And there’s nobody that can come close to doing it themselves. And I think that the important thing is that Berkshire be regarded as a national asset rather than a national liability. We’ve got to be a plus to the country with our form of operation. And we certainly have got a record which will then be 12 or 15 years longer, done with much more capital, more companies.

More things will have happened where our hundreds of billions can work its way into the economy in terms of lots of jobs, lots of products, lots of behavior. And it can be compared with other things. So, I think we win out if we deserve to win out. And I think the odds of that happening are very, very, very high. Charlie.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t spend much time worrying about something that happened 50 years ago after I’m dead. I think if you sort of take care. Each day’s responsibility is pretty low. And think ahead as well as you can. Then you just take the results as they fall. So, I’m philosophical. But I’m not — I think he’s fretting unnecessarily.

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Neither one of us are worried, basically. (Laughter) But we plan. We do plan. And, you know, I’ve got a model in my mind of what Berkshire has been the model. It’s been modified plenty of times over 58 years. The one thing I knew initially or very quickly was it shouldn’t be a textile company.

(Laugh) That was an important decision. (Laughter) And, I mean, we’ve just played the hand as it came along. And we made a few really good decisions. We’ll never make a decision that kills us. Only things that are a threat to the planet, we don’t have any answer for those.

But we keep ourselves in better shape than anybody else. And we just aren’t going to have big maturities of debt that come along. We aren’t going to have insurance policies that can be cashed in en masse. And we will sit with what looks a huge amount of capital.

And it is a huge amount of capital. But there’s a huge amount of earning power. There’s a huge amount of diversity, everything. So, our business model will be graded, and it’ll be graded against a lot of people that we like to be graded against. So, I think we’re handing something very secure over to the future.

And I think we’ve got a shareholder base like nobody has. I mean, there isn’t anybody in the country that I know of unless they’ve had a employee-owned company prior to going public or something of the sort. But this is the product of, you know, 58 years of regarding the shareholder as the owner of the company.

But what does that mean? That means having happy customers. It means being (Applause) welcomed by your community rather than having them turn you away. It means that the government feels better with you if there’s a financial crisis. Because you can provide something that actually the country can’t under some circumstances.

And you’ll be there. And at the same time, it’ll be good for the business. And we will have crises of one sort or another. But if they aren’t challenging the planet, which worries you in terms of some of the threats that we have, we’ll be a plus to the United States. And if we’re a plus to the United States, we’ll survive.

20. 关于找到阿吉特·贾因和本·罗斯纳的芝加哥潜水艇的故事

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）七号台。

观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，谢谢你们让我们度过这个周末。我叫博·克莱顿（音译），来自北卡罗来纳州达勒姆。

我们在这里的原因之一是你们是伟大的故事讲述者。我们把这些故事带回家里。

你们能否分享一些我们可能没听过的（笑声）关于阿贝尔先生和贾因先生的故事，能体现他们作为领导者的品格和才干的故事？（掌声）

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我先从阿吉特开始。（笑）他1986年走进办公室，而我大概在1969年就有了进入再保险业的聪明想法。所以，我摸索了17年。我有一个很棒的家伙在管理它。

但他也喜欢某些经纪人。我的意思是，他以传统方式运营。高质量等等，但他没有试图改变系统。他试图在某种程度上改进系统。我们一事无成。在荒野中徘徊了17年。

我以为我们能做点好的东西。然后阿吉特在一个星期六来了，我想是迈克·戈德堡（音译）引荐他来的。迈克凭此举应被永久（笑）铭记。我和他聊了一会儿。我想我可能一边和他聊天一边在拆周六的邮件。

他对保险完全没有经验。但他实际上对企业的运作方式了解不少，因为他做过管理咨询。和他谈过之后，我知道我挖到金子了。所以，我雇用了他，并给他提供了一些资金支持。

我们几乎立刻进入了一个对他行动非常有利的市场时期。而阿吉特，你知道，如果我可以在世界上挑选十位顶尖的保险经理，我可以把所有人都选上，但你也无法取代阿吉特。我们仍然喜欢交谈。

我们不像以前那样频繁交谈了，但我们过去几乎每天都谈。但他独一无二。你知道，如果你活得足够久，你只需要一个独一无二的人。（笑）

保罗·安德鲁斯（音译）在TTI坚持了下来，拥有世界上所有的钱。每次我和他谈加薪之类的事情时，他都说：“我们明年再谈。”他不是你从顶尖商学院获得顶级选秀权时能得到的那种人。我要说的是，我在招聘时从未看过任何人在哪里上学。

我的意思是，如果有人给我邮寄简历之类的，我不在乎他们上过什么学校。恰好阿吉特上过一些非常好的学校。但他成为阿吉特并不是因为上了那些学校。查理，你可以讲一两个故事。你是怎么找到路易斯·文森蒂的？（笑）

查理·芒格：嗯，他就在那里。但你必须认出他。有一次我问路易斯，他以前体重只有155磅，是怎么在斯坦福大学（我想是）踢上橄榄球主力四分卫的。他说：“呃，”他说，“我速度很快。”他确实很快。但（笑）我们在公司内部发现了许多速度很快的人。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们有个人四年级就退学了，是吗？本·罗斯纳。我说错了吗？

查理·芒格：噢，是的。完全自学成才。本·罗斯纳对过去那些老社区里的零售业比任何人都了解。他像鹰一样注视着自己生意中的一切，他令人惊叹。这就是一个例子。我们从未找到任何人能做——当本去世时，那种能力也离开了我们。

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你想听一个有点意思的故事，因为本·罗斯纳有一个合伙人，利奥·西蒙。利奥·西蒙是莫·安嫩伯格的女婿。因此，利奥非常、非常、非常富有。而本白手起家。但他们彼此喜欢。

有一次，远在他们涉足我们后来收购的生意之前，他们想到要买一艘一战时期的潜水艇，并把它带到“世纪进步”博览会，那实际上是1933年（我想）在芝加哥举行的世界博览会。所以，他们几乎没花什么钱就买下了那艘潜水艇。

他们以为从奥马哈来参加第一次世界博览会的普通人愿意花25美分（或类似价钱）参观一下潜水艇。于是，他们把它从佛罗里达（或者他们买到它的地方）拖到芝加哥。然后他们进入芝加哥，正拖着一艘潜水艇在芝加哥的街道上行驶。（笑）

你知道，这造成了人们无法想象的交通问题。所以，一个警察走过来对本说：“你以为你们这些人拖着那艘潜水艇要去哪儿？”（笑）本说：“你得跟我的合伙人卡彭先生谈谈。”（笑）

警察说：“行了，你走吧，继续开。”然后（笑声）这就是本·罗斯纳。后来利奥·西蒙去世了，大约在1967年，本·罗斯纳继续把一半的利润送给他那位极其富有的遗孀（她自然是莫·安嫩伯格的大女儿）。

我想莫在沃尔特（第十个）出生之前一连生了九个女孩。我可能差一个。但不管怎样，我去过他那豪华的公寓。总之，本让她保留了一半的生意。他让她签署租金支票，只是让她看起来像是在生意中做了点什么。

她显然不需要那笔钱，但他觉得一旦他的合伙人利奥去世了，他就有义务这样做。然后她开始批评他。那时，本去找了他的律师，实际上也是她的律师，威尔·萨尔斯泰纳（音译）。我不知道威尔后来怎么样了。

但他给我打了个电话，因为本想找我，他想让我买下它。他希望我，如果我买下它，他就能摆脱这个前合伙人的妻子。他让查理和我回去，我们去了威尔·萨尔斯泰纳的办公室。本说：“我会干到年底，就这些。但我会以600万美元的价格把这东西卖给你。”

我当时有200万美元现金，几百万美元房地产，还有几百万美元运营收益。这简直太疯狂了。但他觉得既然他卖了个低价，那她也要为那一半的生意承受一半的低价。所以，某个时候他看着我。查理，你描述剩下的事吧。（笑）

查理·芒格：他说：“我听说你是西部出枪最快的人。”他说：“拔枪吧。”（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在一家纽约律师的办公室里。（笑）这个家伙在卖掉他的宝贝。他告诉我们他就要走了。我私下对查理说：“如果这家伙年底走了，你可以扔掉所有写过的心理学书了。我的意思是，这不可能发生。”

于是，我们买下了它，和本一起幸福地生活。有一次他带我去看我们在布鲁克林的一处房产。路上我说：“本，你知道，开始时我向你保证过我不会干涉生意。”他知道“但是”要来了。他只是说：“谢谢你，沃伦，”然后就把我噎住了。（笑声）

他很有趣。我们有太多本·罗斯纳的故事了，但现在你听到了一个以前从未发表过的。

原文

20. Stories about finding Ajit Jain and Ben Rosner’s Chicago submarine

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station seven.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for having us this weekend. My name is Beau Clayton (PH), and I’m from Durham, North Carolina.

One of the reasons that we are all here is that you’re great storytellers. And we carry those stories back home with us.

Can you please share a couple stories that maybe we haven’t heard before (Laughter) about Mr. Abel and Mr. Jain that capture their character and their caliber as leaders? (Applause)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’ll start out with Ajit. (Laugh) He walked into the office in 1986, and I’d gotten the bright idea of going into the reinsurance business I think in maybe 1969. So, I’d stumbled along for 17 years. And I had a wonderful guy that ran it.

But he also liked certain brokers. I mean, he was running it the traditional way. Top quality and everything else, but he didn’t try and change the system. He tried to improve the system to some degree. And we went nowhere. Seventeen years wandering around in the wilderness.

And I thought we could have something good. And then Ajit came in on a Saturday and Mike Goldberg (PH) had steered him in, I think. And Mike deserves to be enshrined (Laugh) in perpetuity for that act. And I talked with him a while. I think maybe I was opening the mail on Saturday while I talked with him.

And he had absolutely zero experience with insurance. But he’d actually seen a good bit about how corporate America operated, because he’d been in management consulting. And after talking with him, I knew I’d struck gold. And so, I hired him and gave him the backing of some money.

And we hit a very good period in the market almost right away for him to act. And Ajit, you know, if I had the top pick of ten insurance managers in the world, I could take all ten and you can’t replace Ajit. And we still enjoy talking.

We don’t talk as frequently as we used to, but we used to talk about every day. But he’s one of a kind. And, you know, if you’re going to stick around long enough, you only need one of a kind. (Laugh)

Paul Andrews (PH) stuck around at TTI, had all the money in the world.

Every time I talked to him about getting a raise or something of the sort, he said, “We’ll talk about that next year.” He was not what you get when you get the top draft picks from the leading business schools. And I will say this, I have never looked at where anybody went to school in terms of hiring.

I mean, somebody mails me a resume or something, I don’t care where they went to school. And it just so happens that Ajit went to some pretty good schools. But he isn’t Ajit because he went to those schools. And Charlie, you can tell a story or two. How’d you find Louis Vincenti? (Laugh)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he was there. But you’ve got to recognize him. I asked Louis once how he managed to play first-string football at, I think, Stanford when he only weighed 155 pounds. And he said, “Well,” he said, “I was pretty quick.” And he was pretty quick. But (Laugh) we have found a lot of people within our companies who are pretty quick.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we had one guy that quit at fourth grade, didn’t we? Ben Rosner. Am I wrong?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yeah. Totally self-educated. Ben Rosner knew more about retailing in those old neighborhoods than anybody. And he watched everything in his business like a hawk, and he was amazing. Now there was an example. We never found anybody who could do what — when Ben died, that ability left us.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and you want a story that’s kind of interesting, because Ben Rosner had a partner, Leo Simon. And Leo Simon was Mo Annenberg’s son-in-law. And Leo, therefore, was very, very, very wealthy. And Ben started with nothing. But they liked each other.

And one time well before they got involved in the business we bought, they got the idea of buying a submarine from World War I and taking it to the Century of Progress, which was the World’s Fair, in effect, in Chicago I think in 1933. So, they bought the submarine for practically nothing.

And they figured the average guy from Omaha who’s going to his first World’s Fair could get a submarine for a quarter or something, that they’d pay it. So, they hauled it from Florida, wherever they got it, hauled it to Chicago. And then they got into Chicago, and they were hauling a submarine down the streets of Chicago. (Laugh)

And, you know, it was creating traffic problems like nobody could imagine. So, a cop came over and he said to Ben, he says, “Where do you think you guys are going with that submarine?” (Laugh) And Ben says, “You’ll have to talk to my partner, Mr. Capone.” (Laugh)

And the cop says, “You’re on. You know, just keep going.” And (Laughter) that was Ben Rosner. And then Leo Simon died, and when he died in 1967 or so, Ben Rosner kept delivering half the profits to his widow, who was incredibly rich, of course, being Mo Annenberg’s first-born daughter.

I think Mo had nine girls in a row before Walter came along, the tenth. I may be off by one. But anyway, I went to his fancy apartment. And anyway, Ben kept her in for half the deal. And he had her sign the rent checks just so she would look like she was doing something in this business.

And she didn’t need the money, obviously, but he just felt he was obligated once his partner, Leo, died. And then she started criticizing him. And at that point, Ben went to his lawyer, who was her lawyer, actually, Will Salsteiner (PH). I don’t know whatever happened to Will.

But he gave me a call because Ben wanted to call me because he wanted me to buy it. And he wanted me, if I bought it, he’d be rid of the ex-partner’s wife. And he had Charlie and me come back, and we went to Will Salsteiner’s office. And Ben says, “I’ll work until the end of the year, and that’s all. But I’ll sell you this thing for $6 million bucks.”

And I had $2 million in cash, and a couple of million in real estate, and a couple million of operating earnings. It was just crazy. But he felt if he was getting a lousy price, she was taking a half of the lousy price for half the money. So, he looked at me at some point. Charlie, you describe the rest of it. (Laugh)

CHARLIE MUNGER: He said, “I hear you’re the fastest draw in the West.” He says, “Draw.” (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re in a New York lawyer’s office. (Laugh) And this guy is selling his baby. And he told us he’s leaving. I got Charlie on the side, I said, “If this guy leaves at the end of the year, you can throw away every psychology book that’s ever been written. I mean, it isn’t going to happen.”

And so, we bought it and we lived happily ever after with Ben. And one time he was taking me over to see a property we had in Brooklyn. And along the way I said, “Ben, you know, I promised you I wouldn’t interfere in the business when we started.” And he knew a “but” was coming. And he just said, “Thank you, Warren,” and then he shut me up. (Laughter)

He was a lot of fun. We have so many Ben Rosner stories, but now you’ve heard one that hasn’t been published before.

21. 贾因对财产巨灾再保险组合感到满意

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自柴·戈希尔（音译）。他写道，这是给阿吉特的。“再保险行业正经历过去15年来最艰难的定价环境之一。伯克希尔历来在这些经济回报非常有吸引力的压力时期参与其中。”

“今年，尽管回报如此强劲，伯克希尔似乎对将资源部署到财产巨灾再保险方面不感兴趣。您能详细说明尽管有这些回报却不参与的原因，以及您在收购阿勒格尼后计划如何塑造您的再保险业务的更广泛看法吗？”

阿吉特·贾因：好的。关于阿勒格尼，这个回答很简单。我们将运营单位视为独立的。就阿勒格尼而言，他们以“跨大西洋再保险”的品牌在再保险业务中拥有重要地位。

那家公司将像过去一样运营。在战略或管理方面不会有任何改变。他们会继续做他们正在做的事情。他们一直非常成功，希望将继续成功。

现在，就我过去几年一直积极参与的财产巨灾业务而言，你说得对，过去15年是一段困难时期。价格没有吸引力。尽管我们在过去15年中在财产巨灾业务中有所参与，但实际上微不足道。

去年12月31日，这是巨灾再保险的一个重要续保日期，我们曾希望我们能迎来几天的阳光，能够部署我们的资本，并能够承保一些相当有吸引力的业务。在12月底，直到大约12月的第三周，我非常乐观地认为我们有机会将数十亿美元记入账簿。

但在12月的最后十天，不幸的是，大量承保能力从各处涌现出来。我们预期实现的价格并没有真正达到我们的定价要求，因此1月1日是一个巨大的失望。

我们没有承保我们希望的那么多。现在，快进到4月1日，这是另一个重要的续保日期，我们有很多待用的资本。我们很幸运地保留了这些资本。因为在4月1日，价格突然再次飙升，远高于1月1日的水平，开始对我们有吸引力了。

所以，现在我们有一个对财产巨灾风险敞口非常大的组合。打个比方，我们今天的风险敞口比五六个月前增加了近50%。所以，我认为我们已经承保了我们的能力所允许的尽可能多的业务。

我们对自己的承保情况非常满意。利润率一直很健康。我只想向您提到一点，虽然利润率健康，但我们有一个非常不平衡的组合。这意味着如果佛罗里达州发生大飓风，我们将遭受非常重大的损失。

相比之下，如果在佛罗里达州以外的任何地方发生非常大的损失，与我们的竞争对手相比，我们的损失会小得多。总的来说，我对这个组合非常满意。它比过去好了很多。我不知道它能持续多久，当然，如果飓风发生在佛罗里达州，我们所有单位加起来可能会损失高达150亿美元。如果没有损失，我们将赚取数十亿美元的利润。

沃伦·巴菲特：阿吉特，当你打电话给我说你想让我们暴露在（不管是多少）额外几十亿的风险敞口下时，我花了多长时间说“是”？（笑）

阿吉特·贾因：是的，我们思考风险敞口的方式是，你知道，在整个公司的保险运营中综合考虑。鉴于我们拥有略低于3000亿美元的资本，我们认为这是一个我们愿意承担的5%的风险敞口。

所以，为了讲完沃伦的故事，几周前我们在全球大约有130亿美元的风险敞口。我给沃伦打电话说：“我们到了130。如果我们能增加到150就好了。这是一个很好的整数。”那通电话不到30秒。（笑）我想沃伦甚至没听数字就说了“是”。（笑声）

沃伦·巴菲特：我希望他再给我打电话。（笑声）

原文

21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chai Gohill (PH). This he writes, this is for Ajit. “Reinsurance industry is going through one of the hardest pricing environments in the last 15 years. Berkshire historically has participated during these stressed times when economic returns are very attractive.

“This year, it appears Berkshire has not been interested in deploying its resources towards property cat reinsurance despite such strong returns. Can you elaborate on reasons for not participating despite these returns, and your broader view on how you’re planning to shape your reinsurance business post-acquisition of Alleghany?”

AJIT JAIN: OK. In terms of Alleghany, that’s an easy response. We treat our operating units independent of each other. And as far as Alleghany is concerned, they have a major presence in the reinsurance business under the brand name of TransAtlantic Re.

That company will operate the way it’s been operating in the past. There will be no change in terms of strategy or management. And they will keep doing what they’re doing. They’ve been very successful, and hopefully will keep being successful.

Now, in terms of the property cat business that I have been active in over these last several years, you’re right that the last 15 years has been a difficult time. Prices have not been attractive. And even though we have had some presence in the property cat business in the last 15 years, it really has been minimal.

This December 31st, which is a big renewal date for cat reinsurance, we were hoping that we would get a few days in the sun, and we’d be able to deploy our capital, and be able to write some fairly attractive business. As it happened towards the end of December, until about the third week of December, I was very optimistic that we would get a chance to put several billion dollars on the books.

But in the last ten days of December, unfortunately a lot of capacity came out of the woodworks. Pricing that we were expecting to realize didn’t really come and meet our pricing requirements, as a result of which January 1 was a big disappointment.

We did not write as much as we were hoping to write. Now, fast forward to April 1, which is another big renewal date, we had a lot of powder dry. And we were lucky that we kept the powder dry. Because April 1, suddenly prices zoomed up again, a lot higher than what they were on January 1, and started to look attractive to us.

So, now we have a portfolio that is very heavily exposed to property catastrophe. To put that in perspective, our exposure today is almost 50% more than what it was five, six months ago. So, I think we have written as much as our capacity will allow us to write.

We are very happy with what we’ve written. The margins have been healthy. The only thing that I want to mention to you is that, while the mentions have been healthy, we have a very unbalanced portfolio. What that means is if there’s a big hurricane in Florida, we will have a very substantial loss.

As opposed to that if we have a very big loss anywhere other than Florida, relative to our competition, we will have a much smaller loss. Net-net, I’m very happy with the portfolio. It is a lot better than what it’s been in the past. I don’t know how long it’ll last, and of course if the hurricane happens in Florida, we could lose, across all the units, as much as $15 billion. And if there isn’t a loss, we’ll make several billion dollars as profit.

WARREN BUFFETT: And, Ajit, when you called me and said you’d like to expose us to whatever it was, a couple billion more of exposure, how long I took to say yes. (Laugh)

AJIT JAIN: Yeah, so the way we think about our exposure is, you know, in the insurance operations collectively across the entire company. Given that we have about a little less than $300 billion of capital, we think of that as a 5% exposure that we’re willing to take on.

So, to complete Warren’s story, a few weeks ago we had about $13 billion of exposure all across the globe. And I called up Warren and I said, “We’re up to $13. It’ll be nice if we can go up to $15. That’s a good round number.” And that was less than a 30-second phone call. (Laugh) I think Warren said yes without even listening to what the numbers were. (Laughter)

WARREN BUFFETT: I hope he calls me again. (Laughter)

22. “我们不会变得更聪明”，但“我们会变得更明智一点”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，八号台。

观众成员：您好。我叫阿达尔·弗洛雷斯（音译），我成为股东大约16年了。我来自墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉。

我的问题是给沃伦和查理的。公司普遍面临一个永恒的困境：是打造能够盈利并提升公司竞争地位的产品。

在最好的情况下，你可以打造同时具备这两种特征的产品，就像谷歌那样。

但大多数时候，公司需要在短期利润和长期防御性之间做出选择。例如，亚马逊专注于构建他们著名的亚马逊飞轮，初期利润有限，以期获得更强的网络效应，希望未来能获得更具防御性的利润。

当您投资时，您经常谈到建立竞争护城河的重要性。您对CEO们关于如何平衡这个困境（本质上是短期利润与长期防御性）有什么建议？谢谢。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案就是掌控你自己的命运，我们在伯克希尔做到了。我们感受不到来自华尔街的压力。你知道，我们没有投资者电话会。我们不必做出承诺。我们有机会犯自己的错误，偶尔也能发现一些运作良好的东西。

但我们认识到，这个房间里的人以及像他们一样的人，才是我们为之工作的对象。我们不是为了一群关心我们是否达到核心预期或任何其他事情的人工作。所以，我们拥有可以使用的自由。

我们感兴趣的是永远拥有一家出色的企业。我们从很多优秀的企业中学到了东西。但我们在前进过程中确实学到了很多。查理和我经常提到，我们在收购时思糖果时学到了多少，我们确实是这样。

但我们在收购本·罗斯纳遍布美国东部的女装连锁店时也学到了。我们在1966年试图进入百货商店业务时也学到了。当我们购买价的墨水还没干时，我们就意识到自己做了件（笑）蠢事。

我的意思是，我们一直在学习消费者的行为方式。我无法学习企业的技术方面。如果我能懂就好了，但这并非必不可少。你知道，很明显，我们拥有苹果这家企业，它比我们的能源业务还要大。

我们可能只拥有5个点，6%或7%。但我们的持股比例每年都在增加，而我完全不懂手机。但我确实了解消费者行为。我知道人们是如何考虑是否购买第二辆车的。我知道他们如何外出到不同的地方——我们拥有汽车经销商。

我们一直在从我们所有的业务中学习，比如人们如何反应于加兰动物服装与购买其他东西。所以，时思糖果是一个突破。但我们只是不断学习更多关于人们如何行为，以及一个好企业如何可能变成坏企业，以及一些好企业如何能够随着时间的推移保持其竞争优势。

所以，伯克希尔的各位，我们没有什么公式。但我们也能在十秒钟内判断出某件事是否有趣。我的意思是，当我接到这些电话，他们想发送方案之类的（那是胡说八道），我的意思是，那是一群（笑）靠绘制这些未来预测之类东西拿钱的人。

如果他们知道未来，你知道，我们不知道未来，但我们确实了解某些类型的企业。我们了解什么是合适的价格，我们了解我们认为在消费者行为和企业面临的威胁方面可以预测什么。这就是我们一直以来的做法，也是我们将继续做的事情。

随着时间的推移，我们不会变得更聪明，但我们确实会变得更明智一点。你也可以坐在办公室里，拿着电话来做这件事，我们也喜欢这样。查理？

原文

22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station eight.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Adal Flores (PH), and I’ve been a shareholder for about 16 years. And I’m coming from Guadalajara, Mexico.

My question is for Warren and Charlie. Companies have the eternal dilemma between building products that can make profits and increase their company’s competitive position.

In the best case, you can build products that have both characteristics at the same time, like Google did.

But most of the time, companies need to choose between short-term profits and long-term defensibility. For example, Amazon was focused on building their famous Amazon flywheel with limited profits initially, in order to obtain stronger network effects, with the hope of getting more defensible profits in the future.

When you invest, you constantly speak about the importance of building competitive moats. What advice would you give to CEOs about how to balance this dilemma, which is essentially short-term profits versus long-term defensibility? Thank you.

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is to control your destiny, which we’ve been able to do at Berkshire. We feel no pressure from Wall Street. You know, we don’t have investor calls. We don’t have to make promises. We get a chance to make our own mistakes, and occasionally find something that works well.

But we recognize that the people in this room and people like them are the ones that we’re working for. And we’re not working for a bunch of people that care about whether we meet the core estimate or anything. So, we have a freedom that we get to use.

And we’re interested in owning a wonderful business forever. We learned from many wonderful businesses. But we do learn a lot as we go along. Charlie and I have often mentioned how we learned so much when we bought See’s Candies, which we did.

But we learned when we bought Ben Rosner’s chain of women’s dress shops spread all over the eastern part of the country. We learned when we tried getting into the department store business back in 1966. And as the ink was drying on our purchase price, we realized we’d done something (Laugh) dumb.

I mean, we’re learning all the time how consumers behave. I’m not going to be able to learn the technical aspects of businesses. It’d be nice if I knew it, but it isn’t essential. And, you know, obviously we’ve got a business at Apple, which is larger than our energy business.

And we may only own five points, 6% or 7%. But our ownership goes up every year, and I don’t understand the phone at all. But I do understand consumer behavior. And I know how people think about whether to buy a second car. I know how they go out to different — we own auto dealerships.

We’re learning all the time from all of our businesses how people react to Garanimals versus selling them something else. And so, See’s was a sort of breakthrough. But we just keep learning as to more about how people behave and how a good business can turn into a bad business, and how some good businesses can maintain their competitive advantage over time.

And so, we don’t have some formula, Berkshire people. But we can also tell in ten seconds whether it’s something of interest. I mean, when I get these calls and we want to send decks and all that sort of thing, which is nonsense, I mean, it’s a bunch of guys (Laugh) that get paid for drawing up these projections of the future and everything like that.

If they knew the future, you know, we don’t know the future, but we do know certain kinds of businesses. We know what the right price is, and we know what we think we can project out in terms of consumer behavior and threats to a business. And that’s what we’ve been about and that’s what we’ll continue to be about.

We don’t get smarter over time, we get a little wiser, though, following it over time. And you can do it while sitting in the office with a telephone, too, which we like. Charlie?

23. 巴菲特为何投资数十亿美元于日本“五大商社”

查理·芒格：嗯，给他们讲讲日本投资的故事。应该再讲一遍。那是个好故事。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，很简单。我的意思是，早年间别人翻看《花花公子》时，我基本上是在翻阅穆迪手册。有一部电影叫《翻遍每一页》，我几天前又看了一遍，是丽兹·戈特利布拍的。

我推荐世界上的每个人都看看，因为我过去翻遍了每一页。我在穆迪手册翻了成千上万页，在波士顿公用事业部也翻了，在保险部门也翻了。我就是不停地翻页。嗯，这持续了一段时间。但现在我们需要大的想法来找到投资机会。你的问题是什么，查理？

查理·芒格：给他们讲讲日本。

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，日本的事情很简单。我的意思是，本和我喜欢看公司。我的意思是，我喜欢看公司的数据。这里有五家非常、非常庞大的、易于理解的公司。大多数，可能全部，我们都曾以十几种不同的方式与它们做过生意。

如果你从这儿走几英里，我们最后一座燃煤发电厂就是其中一家公司建造的。所以，它们就在那里。作为一个群体，它们当时的情况是，以我们将要支付的价格买入，它们的收益率约为14%。

它们支付可观的股息。有些情况下它们还会回购股票。它们作为一个群体拥有大量我们能理解的业务，尽管这并不意味着我们对任何一项有深刻的理解。但我们见过它们运营，了解一切。

没什么特别的。同时，我们可以通过最终以日元融资来消除汇率风险。这成本将是0.5%。嗯，如果你一边得到14%，另一边是0.5%，而且你有无限期的资金，它们又在做明智的事情，并且规模很大，所以我们就开始买入它们。

我可能直到开始买入六个月后才告诉格雷格。然后当我们对每家的持股达到5%时，我在90岁生日那天宣布，我们持有超过5%的股份。最近我们第一次去拜访了他们。我们对那里的发现不仅仅是惊喜，更是高兴。现在我们持有它们7.4%的股份。未经它们同意，我们不会超过9.9%，并且到年底我们又卖出了1640亿（日元）之类的。

查理·芒格：即使我们只有50亿美元之类的资金，它们

2023年年度股东大会
第3部分，共5部分

你知道，如果任何一方在某些方面表现霸道，他们可以在一定程度上得逞，因为替代选择会导致双方毁灭。但如果他们做得太过分，就会增加真正出事的可能性。

原文

And, you know, if either side is a bully in some ways, they can get away with it, to an extent, because the alternative would drive them both into destruction. But if they push it too far, they increase the probability that something really does go wrong.

所以，这是博弈论困境之一。但你们确实需要两国的领导人。也需要民众至少大致了解这些国家在未来一个世纪将如何运作的总体形势。并且要知道，那些承诺过多、夸下海口的领导人可能会让你陷入极大的麻烦。

原文

So, it’s one of those game theory dilemmas. But you really need the leader of both countries. And you need the populace to understand, at least, the general situation in which these countries are going to operate over the next century. And know that some leader that promises too much can get you in a hell of a lot of trouble.

你知道，你们有一种制度以某种方式产生领导人，他们又有另一种制度以另一种方式产生领导人。要阻止任何一方过于努力地玩这场游戏，并以为另一方会顺从，你知道，这就像玩“胆小鬼博弈”，开着车冲向悬崖。

原文

And, you know, you’ve got one kind of a system that gets its leader one way. They’ve got another system that gets its leader another way. And keeping either side from trying to play the game too hard, and thinking the other side will go along, you know, it’s like playing chicken, you know, and driving toward a cliff.

所以，如果你有任何外交技巧、说服才能或诸如此类的东西，你真正需要的是那些能够说服对方国家以及本国民众的人，让他们明白：“这就是我们正在做的事情。我们必须做得对。我们不会放弃所有东西，但我们也不会试图拿走所有东西。”

原文

So, if you’ve got any diplomacy skills, persuasive skills, or anything like that, you really want people that will convince the other country, as well as his own or her own country, that, “This is what we’re engaged in. We’ve got to do it right. We won’t give away the store, but we won’t try and take the whole store, either.”

而不幸的是，我们才刚刚开始。我的意思是，我们了解了当时的情况。过去是苏联。相互确保摧毁是我们当时的政策。这阻止了很多事情发生，但也带来了与古巴导弹危机那次非常、非常、非常惊险的擦边球。

原文

And we’re just at the beginning of this, unfortunately. I mean, we learned what the situation was. It used to be the Soviet. And mutually assured destruction was our policy then. And that kept a lot of things from happening, but it also came with a very, very, very close call with Cuba.

这些是几百年前就存在的不同博弈。英国可能会统治并夺取法国或西班牙，但现在你参与的是一个绝不能犯大错的游戏。而且我认为，两国对此理解得越深刻，领导人越感到他们的公民了解这一点，我们的处境就会越好。

原文

And these are different games that existed hundreds of years ago. Britain might rule and seize France or Spain, but now you’re playing with a game that you can’t really make a huge mistake in. And I think that the better that’s understood in both countries, the more the leaders feel that their citizenry does understand that, the better off we’ll be.

还有大量的人口统计问题，或者大量的煽动性言论，以及大量的威权行为，我的意思是，这一切都带有危险性。自1945年以来，世界在核领域经历了许多惊险时刻，磕磕绊绊地走到了现在。

原文

And that a lot of demography, or a lot of inflammatory speaking, but a lot of authoritarian action, I mean, it all carries its dangers. And the world has stumbled through the years post 1945 with a lot of close calls in the nuclear arena.

而现在我们有了流行病。还有网络问题，以及其他一大堆事情。所以，我们拥有的毁灭性工具比以往任何时候都多。中国和美国都必须明白这场游戏是什么，并且理解你们不能逼得太紧。

原文

And now we’ve got pandemics. And we’ve got cyber, and a whole bunch of other things. So, we’ve got more tools of destruction than the world’s ever had. And it’s imperative that China and the United States both understand what the game is and understand that you can’t push too hard.

但两个地方都会是竞争性的。而且两者都可以繁荣。这就是愿景：中国将成为一个更美好的国家，美国将成为一个更美好的国家。这两者并不矛盾。

原文

But both places are going to be competitive. And both can prosper. That’s the vision that is out there, that China will have a more wonderful country, the United States will have a more wonderful country. And the two are not [incompatible].

对于未来100年左右将要发生的事情而言，它们几乎是不可或缺的。而且我认为，两国领导人肩负着一项重要任务，就是要让大家理解这一点，并且不要做煽动性的事情。我们将拭目以待，看看从1945年延续至今的运气是否还能持续。我认为我们可以在一定程度上影响这种运气。带着这个振奋人心的消息，我们把时间交给贝基。（笑声）

原文

They’re almost imperative in terms of what’s going to happen in the next 100 years or so. And I think that the leaders of both countries have got an important job in having that understood, and not to do inflammatory things. And we’ll see whether the luck that has taken us from 1945 to present holds out. And I think we can affect, to some extent, that luck. And with that cheery message, we will hand it to Becky. (Laugh)

26. “对于我们在日本部署的资本，我感觉比在台湾要好”

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自罗希特·贝拉尼（音译）。“伯克希尔在台积电持有大量头寸，但与其惯常的持股时间表相反，仅在短短几个月内就卖出了几乎所有头寸。虽然您在CNBC采访中表示地缘政治问题是催化剂，但您当初买入该股票时，这些问题似乎并没有什么不同。那么，在那几个月里，还有什么其他因素发生了变化，促使公司抛售了价值近50亿美元的台积电股票？”

原文

26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Roheet Bellany (PH). “Berkshire bought a substantial position in Taiwan Semiconductor, and contrary to its normal holding timeline, sold almost the entire position within a few short months.

While you cited in a CNBC interview that geopolitical issues were the catalyst, these issues were seemingly no different when you acquired that stock.

So, what else, if anything, changed in those few months and prompted the firm to offload close to $5 billion worth of Taiwan Semiconductor shares?”

沃伦·巴菲特：台积电是世界上管理最好、最重要的公司之一。而且我认为，五年、十年或二十年后，你仍然可以这么说。我不喜欢它的地理位置。我重新评估了这一点。我是说，我认为它不应该在台湾以外的任何地方，尽管他们显然会在这个国家（指美国）开设芯片产能。实际上，我们从阿勒加尼公司得到的一家子公司正在参与他们在亚利桑那州的建设项目。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Taiwan Semiconductor’s one of the best managed companies and important companies in the world. And I think you’ll be able to say the same thing five, or ten, or 20 years from now.

I don’t like its location. And I’ve reevaluated that. I mean, I don’t think it should be any place but Taiwan, although they will be, obviously, opening up chip capacity in this country.

And actually, one of our subsidiaries that we got in Alleghany is participating in their Arizona construction activities.

但问题是，我们更愿意拥有同样类型的公司。在芯片行业，没有人能望其项背，至少在我看来是这样。而且那个与之相关的91岁左右的人，我想我曾在阿尔伯克基和他打过桥牌，他们是出色的人，出色的公司。但我更愿意找到出色的人——在芯片行业我找不到。但出色的人、出色的竞争地位以及其他一切，我宁愿在美国找到它们。

原文

But it’s a question of we would rather have the same kind of company. And there’s nobody in the chip industry that’s in their league, at least in my view.

And the man that is a 91-year-old or so connected with it, that I think I played bridge with in Albuquerque, and they’re marvelous people, marvelous company. But I’d rather find marvelous people — and I won’t find it in the chip industry.

But marvelous people and marvelous competitive position and everything, I’d rather find it in the United States.

对于我们在日本部署的资本，我感觉比在台湾要好。我希望事实并非如此，但我认为这是现实。根据正在发生的某些事情，我重新评估了这一点。查理？

原文

I feel better about the capital that we’ve got deployed in Japan than Taiwan. I wish it weren’t so, but I think that’s the reality. And I’ve reevaluated that in the light of certain things that were going on. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我的看法是，如果沃伦想感觉舒服，他大可自便。（笑声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my view is that Warren ought to feel comfortable if he wants to. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是啊，是啊。把这个写进会议记录里。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Put that in the minutes. (Laughter)

27. 本·格雷厄姆伟大的投资著作仍然很受欢迎

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，十号站台？

原文

27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station ten?

观众：首先，感谢你们让我们的生活更美好。我叫布戈米尔·巴拉诺夫斯基。我是纽约西卡特合伙公司的创始合伙人。我们管理着多代家族的财富，因此我的问题与此相关。巴菲特先生，在1976年您对本杰明·格雷厄姆的悼念文章中，您写道：“沃尔特·李普曼谈到那些种树供后人乘凉的人。”本·格雷厄姆就是这样的人。你们俩都是这样的人。您能否与我们分享您对伯克希尔未来百年的愿景？这是向你们两位提出的问题。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, thank you for making our lives better. My name is Bugomil Baranowsky. I’m a founding partner of Sicart Associates in New York. We manage multi-generational family fortunes, hence my question. Mr. Buffet, in 1976 in your tribute to Benjamin Graham you wrote, “Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under.” Ben Graham was such a man. You’re both such people. Could you share with us your 100-year vision for Berkshire? It’s a question to you both.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想补充一点关于本·格雷厄姆的事情。本·格雷厄姆为我做了各种各样的事情，而且他从不期望任何回报。我的意思是，你能想到的，他都做了，而且没有任何隐藏的——应该说，没有丝毫他期望回报的迹象。我查过：他在1949年写了一本书，在某种意义上，它用非常有说服力的语言告诉我，我过去八九年花时间热爱并投入的工作完全是错误的。那本书——我时不时会在亚马逊上查看它的排名，你知道，亚马逊根据销量对成千上万本书进行排名。而本·格雷厄姆的书一直在排名中名列前茅，比如第300名、第350名左右，一直如此。没有哪本书能像它一样。前几天我给哈珀柯林斯出版社写了封信，因为他们要推出新版本。我问他们卖了多少册。他们回复说记录不够久远，但这本改变了我的生活、并且持续超越历史上所有投资著作的小书，已经卖出了730万册。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to add one thing about Ben Graham. Ben Graham did all kinds of things for me, and he never expected one thing in return. I mean, just you name it, and he did it, and there wasn’t any hidden — you know, the slightest hint, I should say, of anything he expected in return.

And I checked: He wrote a book in 1949 that, in a sense, said to me, in very persuasive terms, that what I’d been spending the previous eight or nine years worked at, and loving, was all wrong. And that book has been — I check it every now and then on Amazon where it ranks, and, you know, Amazon ranks hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of books by sales.

And Ben Graham’s book has been up there, like, number 300, or 350, or something like that, forever. And there isn’t a book like it. I wrote Harper Collins a note the other day because they’re bringing out another edition. And I asked them how many copies have been sold. And they said the records didn’t go back far enough, but they had 7.3 million copies of this little book that changed my life and continues to outsell every investment book ever.

投资书籍层出不穷，你知道，它们可能一时排在第400名或第1000名左右，然后突然之间就掉到了第25000名或者20万名。而这本——你想想，在多少个领域里你能找到一本能够长期保持如此地位的书籍？你回头看看1950年排名第一、第二或第三的书，再看看51年、52年的情况：它们都无法持续。我是说，它们就是无法持续。食谱书也许有一两本能维持一段时间，但也仅此而已。而这本书经久不衰，每个人都不断地推出新书，讲述许多其他东西。但他们说的任何话，都没有他在1949年那本相对较薄的小书里所说的那么重要。

原文

Investment books come along and, you know, they’re number 400, or 1000 or something for a while, and then all of a sudden, they’re number 25,000, or (Laugh) 200,000.

And this book — you know, in how many areas can you find any book that has had that sustained position? You go back and look at number one in 1950, or number two or number three, and you look at it in ‘51 and ‘52: They don’t continue.

I mean, they just don’t continue. Cookbooks, maybe one or two of them, last for a while, but there is nothing. And this book lives on, and everybody keeps bringing out new books, and saying a lot of other things. But they aren’t saying anything that’s as important as what he said in 1949 in this relatively thin little book.

所以，你知道，我们对伯克希尔的愿景恰恰就是我们今天所说的：我们希望它是一家由股东拥有、以社会乐见其存在而非反感的方式运作的公司。我们将拥有无限的资本，获得大量的人才，并且我们拥有一个无与伦比的基础。没有理由它不能像本的书那样永续存在，也许还能成为其他人的榜样。如果是这样，我们会非常高兴。查理？

原文

So, you know, our vision for Berkshire is exactly what we said today: We want it to be a company that is owned by shareholders and behaves in a way that society is happy that it exists, and not unhappy. And we will have unlimited capital, we’ll get lots of talent, and we’ve got a base that can’t be beat.

And there’s no reason why it can’t be perpetuated, just like Ben’s book, and maybe be an example to other people. And, if so, we’ll be very happy. Charlie?

查理·芒格：是的。关于本·格雷厄姆，有一件非常有趣的事：他是一位极具天赋的老师，一个非常高尚的职业。而这正是经久不衰的东西。然而，有一个有趣的事实是他晚年感到有些难为情的：本·格雷厄姆一生中超过一半的投资回报来自于一只股票，一只成长股：GEICO，伯克希尔的子公司。在他经营的时候，有很多廉价但质量较差的公司，你可以从一只跳到另一只赚点小钱。但他赚大钱的地方是一只成长股，买入一家被低估的优秀公司是一件非常好的事情，正如伯克希尔一次又一次发现的那样。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the really interesting things about Ben Graham: He was a really gifted teacher, a very honorable profession. And that is what has lasted. However, an interesting fact that he was sheepish about in his old age, was that more than half of all the investment return that Ben Graham made in his whole life came from one stock, one growth stock: GEICO, Berkshire subsidiary.

And at the time he operated, there were a lot of sort of lousy companies that were too cheap, and you could make a little money floating from one to another. But the big money he made was one growth stock, buying one undervalued great company is a very good thing, as Berkshire has found out again and again and again.

沃伦·巴菲特：本在1949年版后记中确实指出了这一点，并承认了它，但也从中吸取了一些好的教训。“你知道，”他说，“生活就是这样：你做好准备，沿途没有输掉一切，然后机会就来了。”GEICO的出现是因为沃斯堡的一位银行家为利奥·戴维森提供了融资，我想那位银行家得到了四分之三的股份。我不是指“利奥·戴维森”，而是利奥·古德温，他创立了GEICO，当时叫政府雇员保险公司，你可以猜出首字母缩略词。这笔交易差点告吹。我记得交易金额大约是150万或125万左右。由于交付的净资产存在2.5万美元的差额，交易差点告吹。而这是一家如今价值数百亿美元的企业。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And Ben wrote a postscript to the ‘49 edition pointing out exactly that fact, and acknowledging it, but also took some good lessons from it. “You know,” he said, “that’s the way life is: That you prepare, and you, you know, don’t lose on everything along the way, and then something comes along.”

And GEICO came along because a banker in Fort Worth that had financed Leo Davidson, and I think the banker got three-quarters of it. I don’t mean “Leo Davidson,” Leo Goodwin, who founded GEICO then called Government Employees Insurance Company, and you can figure out the acronym.

The deal almost fell apart. The deal was, as I remember, for maybe a million and a half or something like — a million and a quarter. And it almost fell apart because of a difference of $25,000 in the net worth delivered. This is a business that’s, you know, worth tens of billions.

但他也指出了其中的讽刺意味。我的意思是，他非常诚实，在智力上完全诚实地面对自己方法的缺陷和优势。在某种程度上，你知道，查理和我在我们的生活中也看到了这一点。我是说，有点像准备好了的头脑、在需要行动时行动的意愿、以及忽略世界上所有推销员的意愿——忽略他们是至关重要的，而正是这一两件事让你做出正确的决定。

原文

But he pointed out the irony in that, too. I mean, he was honest, he was totally intellectually honest about the failings, and also the strengths, of his approach. And, to some extent, you know, Charlie and I have seen that in our lives.

I mean, sort of the prepared mind, the willingness to act when you need to act, and the willing to ignore every salesman in the world — and it’s imperative to ignore them, and it’s one or two things that make the right decision.

如果你在配偶的选择上做出了正确的决定，你就已经赢了。你知道，这是一个极其重要的决定，而你有全世界的时间去做。我是说，你比我小时候有更多的时间来做这个决定。而你知道，我不知道是否有三分之一或某个百分比的人搞砸了这件事。这真的很有趣。

原文

If you make the right decision on a spouse, I mean, you’ve won the game. You know, there’s an enormously important decision, and you’ve got all the time in the world. I mean, you’ve got more time than you used to have when I was a kid to make that decision.

And, you know, I don’t know whether a third, or whatever percentage, blow that one. You know, it is really interesting.

要做的事情就是不断努力把事情想透彻，不要做太多蠢事，“迟早，你会遇到一个‘极品大赢家’”，正如查理会说的那样。

原文

The thing to do is just keep trying to think things through and not do too many stupid things, “And, sooner or later, you have a lollapalooza,” as Charlie would say.

28. GEICO正在与汽车制造商讨论在展厅销售保险

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

原文

28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

贝基·奎克：“好的。这个问题来自亚利桑那州谢拉维斯塔的一位股东泰拉夫塔（音译），他向阿吉特提问。他想知道关于电动汽车从制造商那里购买保险而非从汽车保险公司购买保险的情况。《华尔街日报》最近的一篇文章显示，电动汽车在销售中占比虽小但正在增长。特斯拉和通用汽车正在提供他们自己的电动汽车保险：GEICO将如何应对这种情况？”

原文

BECKY QUICK: “All right. This question comes from Terafta (PH), a shareholder in Sierra Vista, Arizona, who is asking a question of Ajit.

He wants to know about electric vehicles getting insurance from the manufacturer instead of car insurance companies. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal shows that EVs are a small-but-growing percentage of sales. Tesla and GM are offering their own electric vehicle insurance: What will GEICO do to combat this?

阿吉特·贾因：是的。所以，GEICO也在与一些原始设备制造商进行谈判，试图找出如何最好地与汽车制造商合作，在销售点提供保险。目前成功的案例还不多。（笑声）我们拭目以待。你知道，很明显，在销售点销售汽车保险是一种非常便捷的方式。但需要收集相当多的关于驾驶员的数据，而不仅仅是关于汽车的数据。这使得事情变得稍微复杂一些。

原文

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. So, GEICO is talking to a number of original equipment manufacturers as well to try and see how best they can work with the auto manufacturers and offer insurance at the point of sale. There haven’t been very many success stories (Laugh) as yet.

So, we’ll wait and see. You know, clearly, it is a very convenient way to sell auto insurance at the point of sale. But there’s a fair amount of data that needs to be collected on the driver, not just the car. And that makes it a little more complicated.

所以，我们自己正在与一些汽车制造商洽谈，我们希望在不久之后能与其达成协议。特斯拉和通用汽车都在媒体上大谈特谈要进入保险业务。实际上，我想通用汽车预计他们将承保30亿美元的保费。你知道，很难想象这些保费从何而来。但他们都是急不可耐。我想用不了多久就会有人找到“制胜秘诀”，而我们自己也在这场竞赛中。

原文

So, we are talking to some auto manufacturers ourselves, we are hopeful that we will strike a deal with some of them before too long.

Tesla and GM both have talked a lot in the press in terms of getting into the insurance business. And, in fact, GM, I think, has projected they’ll write $3 billion of premiums. Which, you know, it’s hard to imagine where it’ll come from. But there all hot to trot. I think somebody will find the secret sauce before too long, and we ourselves are in that race.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我想指出的是——通用汽车保险，几十年来——我的意思是，这并非新主意。优步曾经承保了大量保险，他们将其分保给某家公司，那家公司因此遭受重创。但——我不知道优步和——我忘了接手那家公司叫什么名字，阿吉特可能知道。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would point out that — General Motors Insurance, for decades — and, I mean, this is not a new idea. And Uber wrote a lot of insurance for a while, they laid it off with somebody, and that company got killed by it. But — and I don’t know the deal between Uber and — I forget the name of the company that took it on, Ajit would probably know.

阿吉特·贾因：詹姆斯河公司。

原文

AJIT JAIN: James River.

沃伦·巴菲特：詹姆斯河——是的。你知道，这不是新主意，它毫无神奇之处。我是说，很难想出一个比进步保险公司一大群非常聪明的人正在做的，以及GEICO更大程度上的一大群非常聪明的人正在做的，更能匹配风险与回报——抱歉，风险与价格——的方法。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: James — yeah. And, you know, it is not a new idea, it’s not magic in the least. I mean, it is hard to come up with something that is better at matching risk to reward — I’m sorry, risk to price, than a bunch of very smart people are doing at Progressive, and a bunch of very smart people are doing, to a greater extent, at GEICO.

而且，优步当初涉足这行时，我觉得很不可思议，你知道吗？他们本来会碰得头破血流。但他们把很大一部分——相当大的比例——分保给了别人，结果那家公司碰得头破血流。（笑声）你知道吗，但这只是个故事，华尔街喜欢它。我们有80家汽车经销商，业务量很大，我们既有买车的人，也有场地，出于某种原因，我们围绕这些经销商集团组建了一家保险公司来承保保险：你知道，很难改进现有体系。（笑声）

原文

And, I mean, it just was fascinating to me when Uber went into it, you know? And they were going to get their head handed to them. But they laid off a good bit of it — a very substantial percentage of it, with somebody else, who got their head handed to them.

(Laugh) And, you know, but it was a story, you know, and Wall Street loves it. We’ve got 80 car dealerships that do a lot of business, and, you know, we’ve got the people buying the cars, and the place, and we form an insurance company around those dealer groups, for some reason, that writes insurance: You know, it’s hard to improve on the present system. And — (Laugh)

阿吉特·贾因：是的。

原文

AJIT JAIN: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：我一分钱都不会付——哦，实际上我宁愿付钱来避免它。我的意思是——（笑声）——继续说，阿吉特。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I wouldn’t pay a penny — oh, I’d pay to avoid it, actually. I mean — (laughs) and — go ahead, Ajit.

阿吉特·贾因：是的。我想补充的唯一一点是，承保汽车保险的利润率是4%。这是一个非常小的数字，一旦有更多的人试图分一杯羹，要让所有参与者都能盈利就变得非常非常困难。

原文

AJIT JAIN: Yeah. The only point I’d like to add is the margins on writing auto insurance are 4%. Which is a very small number, and once there are more people that are trying to take a bite of the apple, it just becomes very, very difficult to keep all the mouths fed in a profitable manner.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。可以说，财产险——车险领域，大约在1920年出现过一个大的、新的想法，当时州立农业保险公司成立了，而州立农业至今仍保持着这个优势。除了伯克希尔，它是净资产方面的领先者。它是一家互助公司，但有个人只是发现了一个垄断车险的卡特尔。“来自默纳的农夫”是那本书的名字，我想是在伊利诺伊州，他创建了一个系统，真正从成本中削减了大约20个百分点。而且，你猜怎么着，他现在依然很成功，你知道吗？没有人拥有州立农业的股票——这实际上是对资本主义的一种侮辱。你在商学院学到的一切都说它不应该成功，因为没人拥有它，它不会上市，什么都没有。但它的净资产更多——几乎是别人的两倍。把伯克希尔排除在外，它大概是第二名的两倍，而且没有人真正大幅改进了它的体系。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can say there was one big, new idea in property — in car insurance, back in 1920 or so when State Farm started, and State Farm still has it. Next to Berkshire, it’s the leader in having net worth. It’s a mutual company, but some guy just figured that there was a cartel running car insurance. “A Farmer from Merna” is the name of the book, I think, over in Illinois, and he created a system where he really took 20 points or so out of the cost.

And surprise, surprise, here he is, you know? And nobody’s owned stock in State Farm — it’s an insult to capitalism, actually. Everything (Laughs) you learned at the business school says it shouldn’t work, because nobody owns it, nobody’s going public with it, no nothing.

But it’s got more net worth — it’s almost probably double. Leaving Berkshire out of the picture, it’s probably double the next guy, and nobody’s really improved on their system that much.

所以，这很有趣，人们并不真正关注本质。你知道，这些案例应该传达一个信息。但事实是，在华尔街，任何东西都可以被卖出去。考验在于你是否能卖掉它。如果你能卖掉它，它就会被卖出去，一大堆保险公司冒出来把它卖掉了。这可能是关于这只或那只股票的故事，当优步谈它的时候，听起来很不错。这真的很有意思。投资大众并没有学到多少东西。

原文

So, it’s fascinating how people don’t really look at the essence. You know, these are cases that should carry a message. But the truth is, in Wall Street anything can get sold.

The test is whether you can sell it or not. If you can sell it, it’ll get sold, and a bunch of insurance companies came along and got it sold. And this can be a story about this stock or that stock, and it sounded good when they talked about it at Uber for a while. And it is really interesting. The investing public does not learn much.

29. 指数基金正在“退缩”使用投票权

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。11号站台。

原文

29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.

观众：嗨。我叫杰夫·梅里亚姆（音译）。我来自明尼苏达州的伊代纳。我们多年来一直参加股东大会。为了让之前提问的那位教授非常紧张，我们家一半的财富都在伯克希尔·哈撒韦里。（笑声）

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Jeff Merriam (PH). I’m from Edina, Minnesota. We’ve been coming for years. To make that professor from the earlier question really nervous, half our family’s wealth is in Berkshire Hathaway. (Laugh)

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）但让我们让查理紧张一下。（笑）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laugh) But let’s make Charlie nervous. (Laugh)

观众：我的问题与未来的投票控制权有关。之前有人问过关于“公司掠夺者”的问题。我更想知道的是，到底谁会拥有投票控制权？会是机构吗？加州公务员退休基金？贝莱德？他们最终会通过我们必须勾选的ESG复选框来达到他们的目的吗？我们应该如何看待这个问题？

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question has to do with voting control in the future. There was a question earlier about corporate raider. I was more wondering about who is actually going to own the voting control? Is it going to be institutions? CalPERS? BlackRock? Are they eventually going to get their way with the ESG checkboxes that we’re going to have to check? And what should we be thinking about that?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你思考得很好。有趣的是，大型聚合体看起来当然是在指数基金里。但指数基金想要的是，它们希望社会不会因为它们拥有所有投票权而对它们感到不满。我想说，在过去一两年里，看起来它们不把投票权使用得那么——查理用的那个词是什么？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re thinking very well. And the interesting thing is the big aggregations look like, of course, they’d be in index funds. But what index funds want is they want a world in which society doesn’t get upset with them about the fact they’ve got all the voting power. And I would say in the last year or two it’s looked like a better idea for them not quite to get as — what was the phrase that Charlie used?

查理·芒格：但它们已经退缩了很多。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: But they’ve backed off a lot.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，它们退缩了很多。退缩符合它们的利益。有趣的是，在资金管理领域，你知道，游戏不在于业绩，而在于管理资产规模。指数基金对管理资产收取极低、极低、极低的费用。这是因为指数基金由先锋集团首创，当它成功时，很容易被复制。不是那么容易“复制”，但我的意思是，被模仿是不可避免的。但它附带的管理费是两个基点。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they backed off a lot. And it’s in their interest to back off. And, interestingly enough, in looking at money management, you know, the game is not performance, it’s assets under management. And index funds produce a tiny, tiny, tiny fee on assets under management. Because it was pioneered by Vanguard, and when it became successful it was very easy to replicate. Not so “easy,” but, I mean, it was inevitable that it be copied.

But it came with a management fee of two basis points. So, what people that have offered index funds would really like is you to buy their other funds, or let them manage money in some other way, so that they get higher fee on assets under management.

当然，这恰恰是指数基金最初被发明的动机。所以，这不是“亏本引流产品”，而是一种吸引资金的方式，然后他们希望人们忽略约翰·博格尔——杰克·博格尔说过的话，忽略他。本质上，他们放弃了那个想法，“我们将为你提供一个在印度做这个的基金，我们再为你提供另一个做那个的基金。”当然，这些管理费更高。

原文

Which, of course, is (Laugh) exactly why the index fund was invented in the first place. So, it’s not a “loss leader,” but it is a way to pull money in, and then you hope that people ignore what was said by —what’s the name that — you know, that — John Bogel — Jack Bogel — ignore him.

And, essentially, they give up the (UNINTEL) idea, “And that we’ll offer you a fund that does this in India, and we’ll offer you another fund that does that.” And, of course, those management fees are higher.

所以，他们实际上是在反其道而行之，抵消约翰·博格尔当初提出的理念。但在这个过程中，他们获得了大量的投票权，这在一段时间内很有趣，但他们最不希望的就是华盛顿或美国公众认为他们过度使用自己的影响力。所以，他们倾向于退缩。现在，如果你能弄清楚他们的自身利益所在，你就能判断他们的行为将走向何方。查理？你想为他们辩护吗？（笑）

原文

So, they’re really counter-selling the idea that John Bogel came along with. But in the process, they have achieved a lot of votes, and that was fun for a while, but the last thing in the world they want to do is have Washington, or the American public, decide that they’re throwing around their weight too much.

So, they’re tending to back off. Now, if you figure out where their self-interest is, you can judge where their behavior is going to go. Charlie? You want to defend them? (Laugh)

查理·芒格：不，你说的话能自圆其说。（笑）你说得完全正确。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you can square what you just said. (Laugh) You’re totally right on everything.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，既然如此，我就不问别人了。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case I won’t ask anybody else.

30. 巴菲特：格雷格·阿贝尔“和我一样了解资本配置”

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？（笑声）

原文

30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky? (Laughter)

贝基·奎克：好的。这个问题来自阿尔穆（音译）·格林内尔（音译），这问题是问沃伦和格雷格的。“自2019年以来，伯克希尔回购了巨额股票，减少了大约10%的股份数量，为现有股东增加了每股内在价值。格雷格预计将成为沃伦的CEO继任者，那么他是否会负责主要的资本配置决策，包括未来的股票回购？格雷格在伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司的发展中发挥了关键作用，我认为他是一个优秀的资本配置者。过去几年执行的回购中，他参与了吗？而且，沃伦和格雷格，你们是否共同评估伯克希尔的内在价值并做出股票回购决定？”

原文

BECKY QUICK: All right. This question comes from Almu (PH) Grinnell (PH), and this is for Warren and Greg.

“Since 2019 Berkshire repurchased huge amounts of stock, reducing approximately 10% of the share count, and increasing the intrinsic value per share for the continuing shareholders. Greg is expected to be the successor of Warren as CEO, so will he be in charge of the main capital allocation decisions, including future share buybacks?

Greg has been key in the development of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and I think a good capital allocator. Has he been involved in the share repurchases that have been executed over the past years?

And do you, both Warren and Greg, work together in the estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value, and the share buyback decisions?”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，答案是格雷格——我会把问题交给他，但答案是格雷格和我一样了解资本配置，这对我们来说是幸运的。他会做出这些决定，我认为会非常接近于我做出这些决定的框架。这个框架我们已经阐述了30年，（笑）大概这么长时间了。人们把它搞得比实际复杂得多——我是说，特别是如果你在读博士或类似学位，这是一个很好的课题，可以写上50页或100页，布满脚注。但它并不比我们共同有一家企业更复杂：比如你、我和查理有一家企业，你想卖掉你的权益，而我们能以低于我们认为其价值的价格买下来，并且不会在任何方面误导你关于企业正在发生的事情。那我们就会买下来。但是，格雷格，轮到你了，因为你将来会做这件事。（笑）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that Greg — I’m going to turn it over to him, but the answer is Greg understands capital allocation as well as I do, and that’s lucky for us.

And he will make those decisions, I think, very much in the same framework as I would make them. And we’ve laid out that framework now for 30 years, (Laugh) or something like that. People make it way more complicated than — I mean, particularly if you’re working on a doctorate or something, it’s just a great subject to have lots of footnotes in, you know, 50 pages, or 100 pages.

But it’s no more complicated than if you and I and Charlie had a business, and you wanted to sell your interest, and we could buy it for less than we thought it was worth, and without misleading you in any way about what was going on. And we’d buy it then. But, Greg, you’re on because you’re going to be doing it in the future. (Laugh)

格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。是的，嗯，我认为，沃伦，你说得很好。我的意思是，框架已经制定好了，我们知道你如何应对它，以及你和查理如何应对它，并且真的看不到这个框架会改变。当机会出现时，我们希望积极回购伯克希尔股票。我们认为，当机会出现时，伯克希尔股东能够拥有我们每个运营业务和股权投资组合中更大份额，这是一个很好的结果。

原文

GREG ABEL: Right. Yeah, well, I think, Warren, you said it really well. I mean, the framework’s been laid out, we know how you approach it, and how you and Charlie have approached it, and really don’t see that framework changing. When the opportunity present itself, we’ll want to be an active repurchaser of Berkshire shares. We think it’s a great outcome for Berkshire shareholders to own a larger piece of each of our operating businesses and the portfolio of the equity companies when the opportunity presents itself.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能成为你能做的最愚蠢的事，也可能成为你能做的最聪明的事。而且，（笑）把它搞得比这更复杂，开始涉及所有这些（听不清），你显然首先要做企业需要做的事情，如果机会在那里：发展现有业务，收购更多业务，等等。然后你对股息做出决定。但这个决定变得相当不可撤销，因为你不会在没有对股东基础等产生重大影响的情况下削减股息。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: It can be the dumbest thing you can do, or it can be the smartest thing you can do. And (Laugh) you know, to make it more complicated than that, and start getting into all this (UNINTEL), you obviously do what the business needs to do first if the opportunities are there: Grow your present business, buy additional businesses, whatever it may be.

And then you make a decision on dividends. But that decision becomes pretty irrevocable because you don’t cut dividends without having major effects in your shareholder base and a lot of things.

然后，如果你有充足的资本，并且你认为你不会全部用完，而你的股票具有吸引力，并且它为剩余股东增加了内在价值，那这就是不言而喻的事。如果股价高于内在价值，那同样是不言而喻的，你甚至不需要听任何人的话，无论哪个投资银行家来告诉你“这是执行回购计划的方法”。

原文

And then, if you’ve got ample capital, and you don’t see that you’re going to use it all, and your stock is attractive, and it enhances the intrinsic value for the remaining shareholders, it’s a no-brainer.

And if it’s above the price of intrinsic value, it’s a no-brainer that you don’t even listen to anybody, no matter what investment banker comes in and tells you, “Here’s how to do a repurchase program.”

31. 芒格对新冠疫苗怀疑论者说了两个字

沃伦·巴菲特：好的：1号站台。

原文

31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic

WARREN BUFFETT: OK: Station 1.

观众：我是汤姆·尼尔森，来自明尼苏达州北奥克斯的一名播客。查理，在2022年，你用了诸如“真的非常愚蠢”、“大规模的愚昧无知”和“疯狂”之类的词来形容你认为犹豫不决、不愿接受未经测试的mRNA新冠基因疗法的30%的美国人。你今天仍然坚持这些说法吗？

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Nelson, a podcaster from North Oaks, Minnesota.

Charlie, in 2022 you used phrases like, “really massively stupid,” “massive kind of ignorance,” and “crazy” to describe what you said was the 30% of Americans hesitant to submit themselves to untested mRNA COVID gene therapy. Do you stand behind those quotes today?

查理·芒格：是的。当然。（笑声和掌声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Sure. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们在午饭前还有时间再问一个问题。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we got time for one more, then, before lunch.

32. “在一家真正优秀的企业里，很难判断继任管理层”就像伯克希尔

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑声）贝基？

原文

32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) Becky?

贝基·奎克：好的。（笑声）我以为我不在提问环节了，但让我们看看。嗯——让我看看——（笑声）

原文

BECKY QUICK: OK. (Laughter) Thought I was out, but let’s see. How about — let’s see here — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：可能很快就是“该吃午饭了吧？”但——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Could be, “How about lunch?” pretty soon. But —

贝基·奎克：（笑）不，不，好的。我们接这个给你。这个问题来自德鲁·埃斯蒂斯。这是给沃伦的问题：“在您1969年致合伙人的信中，您写道：‘在任何一家创始人兼企业主要驱动力仍然活跃的公司里，评价二把手仍然非常困难。真正了解一个人如何经营公司的唯一方法是让他去经营。’这个明智的陈述现在适用于伯克希尔。一旦‘二把手’们开始经营伯克希尔，您会建议伯克希尔的所有者关注什么？具体来说，如果采取哪些行动，应该让我们感到担忧？”

原文

BECKY QUICK: (Laugh) No, no, OK. Let’s take that one for you. This one comes from Drew Estes. This is a question for Warren: “In your 1969 Letter to Partners you said, ‘In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it’s still very difficult to evaluate second men.’

‘The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let them run it.’

This wise statement now applies to Berkshire. Once the ‘second men’ are running Berkshire, what would you advise owners of Berkshire to watch for? Specifically what actions, if taken, should give us concern?”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想我会因为这样一个事实而感到些许安慰，即我99%的净资产都在（笑）公司里——所以我可能对它有着更强烈的兴趣，并且可能超过1000亿美元的慈善事业也将受到影响。但我想说的是，我没有第二个选择。我是说，找到这样的人太难了，但我也亲眼目睹了格雷格的行动，我百分之百地放心。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think I would have some comfort in the fact that 99% of my net worth is (Laugh) in the company — so I’ve probably got a stronger interest in it, and perhaps $100 billion or more of philanthropy will be affected by it. But I would say that I don’t have a second choice. I mean, it is that tough to find, but I’ve also seen Greg in action, and I feel 100% comfortable.

而且，就像我说的，我不知道：如果格雷格出了什么事，我会告诉董事们，你知道吗，他们遇到了麻烦，而我提不出任何人选，如果他们让伯克希尔处于自动驾驶状态，它可以非常出色地运行很长一段时间。

原文

And, like I say, I don’t know: If something happened to Greg I would tell the directors, you know, they have a problem, and I don’t have anybody to name, and if they put somebody in Berkshire on automatic pilot, it can work extremely well for a long time.

我是说，这不像企业会消失或诸如此类的事情。在一家真正优秀的企业里，很难判断继任管理层。因为如果继任者不去办公室，企业也能良好运转很长时间。也许这种缺乏有益投入的情况会在五年后显现出来。我是说，可能会持续很长、很长、很长时间。

原文

I mean, it isn’t like the businesses go away or any other thing of the sort. And it’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business. Because if they don’t show up at the office, it’ll keep working for a long time. And maybe that lack of useful input may show itself in five years. I mean, it may go a long, long, long time.

那么股东们呢，他们被一群关心你是否达到盈利预测或其他东西的人告知管理层是否优秀？这非常、非常困难，非常困难。我曾是20家公司的董事会成员：这非常困难。如果你让我对每一家的管理层进行排名，非常难做到。因为有些企业天生就比其他企业好。有些企业最好几乎不要管理。另一些企业确实需要帮助，但它们的业务本身很糟糕。汤姆·墨菲在很久、很久、很久以前告诉我，他说：“生意的秘诀是买一家好企业。继承一家好企业也可以。”（笑）

原文

And how are the shareholders, you know, advised by a bunch of people that are concerned about whether you’re meeting earnings projections or something telling them whether the management’s any good? It is very, very hard, it’s very hard. I’ve been on the board of 20 companies: It’s very hard. If you asked me to rank the management of each one, it’s very difficult to do.

Because some are just better businesses than others. Some would be better off not managed hardly at all. Others really need help, but they got a lousy business. And Tom Murphy told me a long, long, long time ago, he said, “The secret of business is to buy a good business. And it’s OK to inherit one, too.” (Laugh)

格雷格继承了一家好企业，我认为他会让它变得更好。但我认为，把接下来的十位候选人中的任何一位放进去，然后试图在三年后判断他们是否干得好，并不容易。所以，这对董事会来说将是一个非常有趣的差事。

原文

And Greg is inheriting a good business, and I think he will make it better. But I don’t think it’s easy to put any one of the next ten nominees in and try and judge, three years later, whether they’ve done a good job or not. So, that’ll be a very interesting job for the board.

但它不应该听华尔街的。那是他们的工作。如果他们安排了某个人——如果出现意外，我们的飞机都坠毁了，他们安排了某个人，他们在评估那个人方面有真正的工作要做。我是说，这将取决于他或她是否是个好的演说家，取决于他们是否讨好华尔街以获得支持，诸如此类的事情。

原文

But it shouldn’t listen to Wall Street on it. They’ve got the job. If they put somebody in — if there’s a surprise, we both go down in a plane, they put somebody in, they’ve got a real job in assessing that person. I mean, it will depend on how good he or she is as a talker, it’ll depend on, you know, them courting Wall Street to be supportive of them, all kinds of things.

我们董事会有一些非常优秀的人，但他们在那个职位上会面临挑战，我也会，我曾经在其他公司处于那种位置，当一位非常伟大的领导者离开后，在从葬礼回来的路上，你知道，没有人确切知道该做什么。

原文

And we’ve got some very good people on the board, but they would be challenged in that position, as would I, where I have been in that position in other companies, where a very great leader has left, and on the way from the funeral, you know, nobody knows what to do exactly.

下午场

1. 华盛顿应明确担保所有美国银行存款

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，请就座。那边销售情况非常好，所以你们是我的理想观众。（笑声）我不断收到报告，说我们正在打破各种纪录。我们将从第26号问题开始，转到2号站台。

原文

Afternoon Session

1. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, so take your seats please. Sales are terrific out there, so you’re my kind of crowd. (LAUGH) I’ve been getting reports we’re breaking all kinds of records. And we’re going to start off with question number 26, which goes to station two.

观众：沃伦和查理，你们好。我叫詹姆斯，来自马来西亚。鉴于美国银行最近面临的挑战，您对银行业有何展望？您如何评估该领域的风险和机遇？

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren and Charlie. My name is James from Malaysia. Given the recent challenges faced by the U.S. banks, what is your outlook on the banking industry? How do you assess the risk and the opportunity in this section?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，预料到会有一些关于银行的问题，我决定我们应该开始使用银行语言来描述（笑声）——还有查理。（笑声和掌声）银行业的情况与以往非常相似，恐惧总是具有传染性的。历史上，这种恐惧有时是合理的，有时则不然。我父亲在1931年因为银行挤兑失去了工作，当时州立银行发生了挤兑。阿拉莫国家银行的负责人说：“我们是国家银行，国家银行从未发生过挤兑。”当然，他们都面临同样的问题。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anticipating a few questions on banks, I decided we should start using bank language here to (LAUGHTER) describe —

And Charlie. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)

The situation in banking is very similar to what it’s always been in banking, that fear is contagious, always.

And historically sometimes the fear was justified, and sometimes it wasn’t. My dad lost his job in 1931 because of a bank run, and they had a bank run on state banks. And the head of the Alamo National Bank said, “Well, we’re a national bank, and they didn’t never a run on the national banks.”

And, of course, they both faced the same problem. So, it used to be that if you saw people lining up at a bank, the proper response was to get into the line. And they’d always leave it. And the story is that Sidney Weinberg of Goldman Sachs, during one of the bank runs back in 1907 or thereabouts, had a job as a runner at Goldman Sachs, and asked his boss if he could take the week off.

所以，过去如果你看到人们在银行排队，正确的做法是加入队伍。他们总会离开的。有一个故事说，高盛的西德尼·温伯格在1907年左右的一次银行挤兑期间，当时他在高盛担任信差，他问老板是否可以请一周假。老板说：“当然，反正也没什么大事。”于是，他排进了队伍，不管是克尼克博克信托公司还是哪里。当他排到队伍前面时，他把自己的位置卖给了别人。他并没有在那家银行开户，但那位置就是一笔资产。（笑声）

原文

And the boss said, “Sure, not much is going on anyway.” So, he got in line, whether it was the Knickerbocker Trust or wherever. And as he got toward the front of the line, he sold his place in line to somebody. He didn’t have an account at the bank, but that was an asset. (LAUGHTER)

多年来，银行体系发生了巨大变化。在我看来，当我们建立联邦存款保险公司时，我们做了一件非常明智的事情。第一次世界大战后，一年内曾有高达2000家银行倒闭。我是说，银行挤兑只是常态的一部分。如果人们担心他们的钱在银行里不安全，都试图提取存款，你就无法很好地运行经济。所以，联邦存款保险公司非常合乎逻辑。多年来它发生了一些变化，但我们现在是2023年。

原文

And the banking system has changed so much over the years. And we did something enormously sensible, in my view, when we set up the FDIC. As many as 2,000 banks had failed in one year back after World War I. I mean, bank runs were just part of the picture.

And if you have people that are worried about whether their money is safe in the bank and are all trying to withdraw, you can’t run an economy very well. So, the FDIC was very logical. It’s got changed over the years some, but here we are in, you know, 2023.

我们实际上看到联邦存款保险公司对所有活期存款以100%的比例赔付或提供赔付。然而仍然有人非常担心他们的存款——定期地、地域性地、以各种疯狂的方式。这本来不应该发生。所以，信息传达非常糟糕。政客们传达得很糟糕，他们有时有动机让它糟糕。机构传达得很糟糕，我想说新闻界也传达得很糟糕。

原文

And we actually see the FDIC pay off at a hundred cents on the dollar to everybody or make it available on all demand deposits. And yet you still have people very worried about their — periodically, geographically, all kinds of crazy ways.

And that just shouldn’t happen. So, the messaging has been very poor. It’s been poor by the politicians, who sometimes have an interest in having it poor. It’s been poor by the agencies, and I would say it’s been poor by the press.

我的意思是，你不应该让这么多人误解这样一个事实：尽管可能有债务上限，但它将会被修改。尽管联邦存款保险公司有25万美元的限额，但联邦存款保险公司、美国政府和美国公众对银行倒闭和存款人实际损失存款没有兴趣。我们在硅谷银行那个周末看到了一个示范项目，而公众仍然感到困惑。

原文

I mean, you shouldn’t have so many people that misunderstand the fact that although there may be a debt ceiling, it’s going to get changed.

Although there’s a $250,000 limit on FDIC, the FDIC and the U.S. government and the American public have no interest in having a bank fail and have deposits actually lost by people. We had a demonstration project the weekend of Silicon Valley Bank, and the public is still confused.

所以，一部1934年生效的法律，尽管在某些方面有所缓和，但在像银行体系这样重要的事情上仍未得到理解，这确实是个问题。我不认为美国公众那么愚蠢，而且，嗯，顺便说一句，我在东京提出了那个打赌，我还没有听到任何人想接受我100万美元的赌注，赌的是无论存款规模多大，公众在银行的活期存款是否会损失。

原文

So, it really, it’s something to have a law that became effective in 1934, although mollified it in some ways, not understood about something as important as the banking system.

I don’t think the American public is that dumb, and I just, well, I made that offer over in Tokyo, incidentally, that I haven’t heard from anybody that wants to take up my $1 million bet on whether the public will lose money if they have a demand deposit at a bank, no matter what the size.

这就是我们生活的世界。这意味着一个点燃的火柴可能引发一场大火，也可能被吹灭。谁知道会发生什么。我们毫不担心——我们把我们的钱以现金和国库券的形式存放在伯克希尔，因为我们在季度末持有1280亿美元左右的资金。我们希望如果银行系统暂时以某种方式停滞不前，我们能够在那里提供支持。它不应该停滞，我认为它不会，但我认为它有可能。而且我认为银行监管的激励措施如此混乱，如此多的人有动机让它们混乱，这完全是疯狂的。

原文

So that’s the world we live in. It means that a lighted match can turn into a conflagration, or it can be blown out. And who knows what will happen. And we don’t have any worry — we keep our money in cash and Treasury bills at Berkshire, because we keep $128 billion or whatever it was at the end of the quarter.

And we want to be there if the banking system temporarily even gets stalled in some way. It shouldn’t, I don’t think it will, but I think it could. And I think that the incentives in bank regulation are so messed up, and so many people have an interest in having them messed up, that it’s totally crazy.

我的意思是，房利美和房地美当时占据了美国抵押贷款业务大约40%的份额。那非常巨大。它们受到监管，仅这两家公司就由某个机构监管。我忘了他们叫它什么了。但是有150人负责判断房地美和房利美是否在做正确的事情。嗯，我可以做到。你知道，查理也能做到。而且我不确定他们甚至需要助手来做这件事。但激励措施完全错误。房地美和房利美在8月份表现良好，或者2008年7月和8月表面表现良好，你知道，在9月初就被接管了。随后发生的事情简直令人难以置信。

原文

I mean, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were doing 40% or so of the mortgage business in the United States. That is huge. They were regulated, just those two companies were regulated by some group. I forget what they called it. But they had 150 people that were in charge of just figuring out whether Freddie and Fannie were doing the right thing.

Well, I could’ve done it. You know, Charlie could’ve done it. You know, and I’m not sure they needed an assistant even to do it. But the incentives were all wrong. And Freddie and Fannie, which were doing fine in August, or apparently doing fine in July and August of 2008, were put into conservatorship, you know, early in September.

And the things that followed from that were just incredible. So, there are second order and third order and fourth order effects that are somewhat unpredictable, as to what they will be and the sequence and all that. But things change. And if people think that deposits are sticky anymore, they’re just living in a different era.

所以，存在二阶、三阶和四阶效应，它们是什么、发生的顺序等都有些不可预测。但情况会变。如果人们认为存款还具有粘性，他们只是活在一个不同的时代。你知道，按下按钮，你不需要排队等好几天，看着出纳员慢慢数金币（笑声）指望队伍消失。你几秒钟内就会遭遇挤兑。所以，未能妥善解决这个问题是一个问题。谁知道它会导致什么。

原文

You know, press a button, you don’t have to get in a line and wait for days and have the teller counting out the money slowly in gold so (LAUGH) that you hope the line goes away. You’re going to have a run in a few seconds. So, the way it hasn’t been addressed properly is a problem.

And who knows where it leads.

2. 巴菲特：倒闭银行的CEO应受到惩罚

沃伦·巴菲特：但你必须惩罚那些做错事的人。以第一共和国银行为例，你可以看看他们的10-K报告，发现他们向客户提供非政府担保的大额固定利率抵押贷款，有时在转变为浮动利率前长达十年。这是一个疯狂的做法。如果对银行有利，他们会说“我会以1.5%的利率再融资，然后是1%”，如果反过来对他们有利，他们会拖上十年。你不能提供那样的期权。

原文

2. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished

WARREN BUFFETT: But you will have to have a punishment for the people that do the wrong thing. And if you take First Republic, for example, you could look at their 10-K and see that they were offering non-government guaranteed mortgages to, in jumbo amounts, at fixed rates, sometimes for ten years before they changed to floating.

And that’s a crazy proposition. If it’s to the advantage of a bank, they’ve got the guy coming in and says, “I’ll refinance at 1.5% and then 1%,” and if it’s to the advantage the other way, they keep it out ten years. You don’t give options like that.

但第一共和国银行正是这样做的，而且这是显而易见的。全世界都忽视了它，直到它爆发。其中一些银行的内幕人士出售了部分股票。谁知道他们是否有一个计划，某个无辜的计划，还是他们开始感觉到了即将发生的事情。但你确实知道董事们无法依靠阅读某本书或类似的东西来解决问题。但他们确实有能力让CEO承担责任。CEO让银行陷入困境，CEO和董事都应该受到惩罚。

原文

But that what First Republic was doing, and it was in plain sight. And the world ignored it till it blew up. And some of the stock in some of these banks that were held by insiders was sold. And who knows whether they had a plan, or some plan that was innocent, or whether they started sensing what was coming.

But you do know that the directors are not going to be able to read some book or anything like that. But they do have the ability to hold the CEO accountable. The CEO gets the bank in trouble, both the CEO and the director should suffer.

未来的股东不应该受苦。他们什么都没做。这不会教会任何人任何教训，它教的教训是，如果你经营一家银行并搞砸了，你仍然是个有钱人，俱乐部不会抛弃你，慈善团体也不会停止邀请你参加他们的活动。世界照常运转。这对那些掌握着经济行为的人来说不是一个好教训。所以，我认为还有一些工作要做，但这并不是一个困难的问题。只是我们把答案搞砸了，我们把沟通也搞砸了。查理？

原文

The stockholders of the future shouldn’t suffer. They didn’t do anything. It doesn’t teach anybody any lessons or anything, it teaches the lesson that if you run a bank and you screw it up, you’re still a rich guy and the clubs don’t drop you and the charity groups don’t quit asking you to their benefits.

And the world goes on. And that is not a good lesson to teach people who are holding the behavior of the economy in their hands. So, I think there’s some work to be done, but it’s not a difficult problem. It’s just we’ve screwed up the answer and we’ve screwed up the communication of it. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我这么守旧，以至于我有点喜欢银行不做投资银行业务的时候。这使我在现代世界里非常过时。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m so old fashioned that I kind of liked it that when banks didn’t do investment banking. That makes me very outmoded in the modern world.

沃伦·巴菲特：这个国家一度认为这违反公共利益，然后银行又想重新进入这个领域。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And the country decided it was contrary to public interest for a while, and then the banks wanted to get back into it.

查理·芒格：他们确实如此。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Did they ever.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。不，我的意思是——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I mean —

查理·芒格：而且我不认为让一群都想发财的银行家会带来好事。但（掌声）我认为银行家应该更像工程师。他更应该专注于避免麻烦，而不是发财。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think having a bunch of bankers, all of whom are trying to get rich, leads to good things. But I (APPLAUSE) think a banker should be more like an engineer. He’s more, like, into avoiding trouble than he is getting rich.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们可以做得很好。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and they could do fine.

查理·芒格：他们那样可以做得很好。而且我认为，当我们有一家银行，每个加入的人都计划发财时，我们就犯了一个大错误。这是价值观的矛盾。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: They can do fine that way. And I think that we’re making a big mistake when we get a bank where everybody who joins it plans to get rich. It’s a contradiction in values.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们得出了这个结论，我不知道《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》是何时通过的，但后来他们又想重新进入。你们中有多少人知道——也许我错了，我最近没看——美联储实际上被赋予了设定保证金要求的责任。他们经常改变保证金要求，因为众所周知，借太多钱的人如果数量过多，会对银行体系构成危险，诸如此类。结果怎么样？银行想出了一千种不同的方法，让你可以以100%的保证金借钱，你知道吗？我是说，通过衍生品和其他一切，他们完全扭曲了从1929年崩盘中吸取的所有教训——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And we came to that conclusion, I don’t know when Glass-Steagall was passed or anything, but then they want to get back in. How many of you know, and maybe I’m wrong on this, I haven’t looked lately, but the Federal Reserve actually was given the responsibility for setting margin requirements.

And they change margin requirements a lot of time because it was known that people that borrow a lot of money cause a danger to the banking system if you get too many in the picture and all of that sort of thing. And what’s happened? The banks figured out a thousand different ways to get so you could borrow on 100% margin, you know? I mean, through derivatives and everything, they just totally distorted all the lessons that were learned in the ‘29 crash and —

查理·芒格：想想银行涉足衍生品交易。哪个神志正常的人会允许那样做？

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine taking banking into derivatives trading. Who in his right mind would have allowed that?

沃伦·巴菲特：是啊。嗯，那里有更多钱可赚。而且——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s more money in it. And —

查理·芒格：嗯，这就是他们参与的原因。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s why they’re in on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And —

查理·芒格：但这对我们其他人来说不一定是一个伟大的社会结果。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: And

好的，这是根据您的要求，将2023年伯克希尔·哈撒韦年度股东大会第四部分（共五部分）的英文原文逐段翻译成简体中文，并以指定格式输出的内容。

嗯，人们基本上就是这样应对通胀的。他们用这样或那样的方式说，“在那方面我没问题”，然后就不去真正思考他们的行为可能带来的后果，尤其是严重后果。而且，如果你们有435个人，仅仅成为435人中的一员，而不是那个实际负责的人，那感觉可太棒了。

原文

Well, that’s what people have done basically on inflation. And they, one way or another, they say, “I’m all right on that,” and then they don’t really think about what the consequences of their actions could be, particularly. And it’s so much fun to, if there’s 435 of you, to just be one of 435 instead of being the person actually responsible.

总之，我仍然认为，仅次于两个超级大国的问题，并且当你真的要去毁灭一个星球、摧毁世界储备货币而实际上又无可替代时，忘掉所有那些玩具吧，我的意思是，想想任何代币或者那种疯狂都是个笑话。

原文

Anyway, I am still, next to the question of two superpowers and when you get in to really destroying a planet, destroying the reserve currency of the world when there’s really no substitute, and forget about all the toys, you know, I mean, it’s a joke to think of any tokens or (LAUGH) that sort of madness.

但是，持续印钞同样也是疯狂的，是的。我们知道怎么印，实际上我们在第二次世界大战期间就经历过印钞经济，那是必要的。我们遭受了严重的通胀，物价水平——我的意思是，有一百万种评判方法——但大概是当时的十倍左右吧。

原文

But it’s also madness to just keep printing money, yeah. And we know how to do it, and we actually came from a money-printing economy in World War II, which was required. And we suffered significant inflation, the price level — I mean, there’s a million ways to judge it — but it’s maybe ten times what it was then or something like that.

嗯，那就快接近你不愿再持有美元、想持有别的东西的边缘了。你想持有房地产；你想持有企业权益。有很多好的选择，而你最好的防御就是你自己的赚钱能力。

原文

Well, that’s getting close to the edge of where you don’t want to hold dollars anymore, you want to hold something else. You want to hold real estate; you want to hold interest in a business. There’s a lot of good, and your best defense is your own earning power.

如果你是城里最好的医生，最好的律师，最好的老师，甚至是第十好的，你都能过上不错的生活。你知道，经济是富有生产力的。凭借你的才华，你会成功。但靠囤积美元是不会成功的，你成功仅仅是因为你作为一个整体上富裕社区的一员，你的价值得以维持。所以，最好的投资永远是自己。这就是我能给你的答案。

原文

If you’re the best doctor in town, if you’re the best lawyer in town, if you’re the best teacher in town, or even if you’re the tenth best, you’re going to make a good living. You know, the economy is productive. And you will succeed with your talents. But you won’t succeed by hoarding dollars, you’ll just succeed by the fact that your value to the community, which is a rich community overall, is sustained. And so the best investment is always in yourself. That’s the answer I would give you.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们现在的情况是，我们学会了大量印钞，而我们一大部分年轻人直接进入了财富管理行业。（笑声）这——

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we have a situation where we’ve learned to print money in gobs, and a big chunk of our young people go right into wealth management. (LAUGHTER) This is —

沃伦·巴菲特：就像我们当年一样。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Like we did. (LAUGH)

查理·芒格：是的，像我们一样，像我们一样。是的，我们是坏榜样。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, like we did, like we did. Yes, we’re bad examples.

我想说，我进入财富管理行业时，并没有意识到它会变得如此庞大。我想为所发生的一切道歉。（笑声）

原文

And I want to say that I didn’t realize wealth management was going to get so big when I went into it. And I want to apologize for what’s happened. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：是啊，嗯。不管怎样，你做得很好。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. Anyway, you did well. (LAUGH)

5. 巴菲特本希望更早收购更多Pilot股份，但对方不卖

原文

5. Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn’t for sale

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自俄亥俄州帕尔马的加里·甘比诺，他说他从2004年起就是伯克希尔的股东。

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Gary Gambino in Parma, Ohio, who says he’s been a Berkshire shareholder since 2004.

他说：“今年为收购Pilot 41.4%的股份所支付的金额，使整个公司的估值约为190亿美元。这大约是BP收购Travel Centers of America价格（注：估值倍数）的六倍，而Pilot的市场份额仅为Travel Centers of America的三倍。”

原文

He says, “The amount paid this year for the 41.4% stake in Pilot values the entire company at around $19 billion. That’s about six times what BP is paying for Travel Centers of America, but Pilot’s market share is just three times Travel Centers of America’s.

“以2022年的收益（该年燃油利润率异常高）为基准确定最终价格，是否是一个重大错误？”

原文

“Was it a big mistake to base the final price in 2022 earnings, which has unusually high fuel margins?”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这是一个非常好的问题。答案是，我们安排分三个阶段收购，第三阶段由持有20%股权的所有者选择是否出售。第一阶段我们以一个后来被证明非常有吸引力的价格买入。第二阶段对柴油业务来说是非常好的一年，这意味着卖方得到了一个非常好的价格。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s a very good question. And the answer is that we arranged to buy it in three stages, with the third stage being at the option of the owner of 20%. The first stage we bought at what turned out to be a very attractive price. The second stage turned out to be a very good year for the diesel business, which means that the seller got a very good price.

我想说，总的来说，我们对自己以这个价格拥有80%的股份感到非常满意，但如果我们一开始就买下那80%，结果会更好。最后的20%由卖方选择是否出售，这种结构安排总是不明智的。

原文

And I would say that overall, we feel very good about the fact that we own the 80% at the price that we do, but we would’ve been better if we just bought the 80% to start with. And the last 20% the seller has the option, and that’s always an unintelligent way of structuring something.

我们和其他公司也有过这样的安排，嗯，比如我们和家具城。我们在1983年8月30日收购了（内布拉斯加）家具城80%的股份，差不多40年前了，结果非常完美。但是，当你给对方选择权时，他们就拥有了一些优势。

原文

We’ve had that arrangement with other, well, we had it with the Furniture Mart, we bought 80% of the [Nebraska] Furniture Mart on August 30th, 1983, almost 40 years ago, and it’s worked out perfectly. But when you give the other person the option, they’ve got some advantage.

我们现在拥有一个我们非常喜欢的业务80%的股份，和Travel America的比较其实站不住脚，因为Travel America不仅规模小得多，而且他们的所有物业都是租赁的。而我们在州际公路沿线拥有成百上千个地点，它们被划定为商业用途，可能占地15英亩左右，是独一无二的资产。

原文

We have 80% now of a business we like very much, and the comparison to Travel America is really spurious, because Travel America is not only much smaller, but they rent all their properties. And we have hundreds and hundreds of locations on the interstate that are zoned for what we, commercial, maybe 15 acres or, there’s nothing like it.

而且，州际公路不会向右移动两英里或其他什么的，对吧。所以，我们拥有的这个位置，BP可能做了一笔很好的交易，也可能没有。我读了招股说明书，我能理解。

原文

And they’re not going to move the interstate two miles to the right or something, you know, or anything of the sort. So, we’ve got a position that, you know, BP may or may not have made a fine deal. I’ve read the prospectus and I can understand.

我的意思是，这对BP来说是一个重要的产出来源。但我喜欢我们在Pilot拥有的管理层。我非常喜欢那位即将上任的新CEO。我得跟你们多介绍一下亚当·赖特，他将接任这份工作。他来自奥马哈。

原文

I mean, it’s a big source of output for BP. But I like the management we have had at Pilot. I like very much the fellow who’s coming in that’s the new CEO. I just have to tell you a little bit about Adam Wright, who’s taking that job on. He came from Omaha.

他入选不是因为来自奥马哈。他来自奥马哈。他毕业于北高中，那是一所公立学校，我妻子就是从那里毕业的。我有几个孙辈也从那里毕业。他去了内布拉斯加大学，几乎创造了橄榄球冲球码数纪录，这个纪录可能永远不会被打破，因为他们（似乎）放弃了橄榄球，但我记得他冲球大概有……（笑声）3600码。

原文

He wasn’t selected because he came from Omaha. He came from Omaha. He came from North High, a public school that my wife graduated from. I’ve got grandchildren that graduated from there. He went to the University of Nebraska and almost set the rushing record in football, which will never be beaten because they’ve given up football, but I think he rushed for maybe (LAUGHTER) 3,600 yards.

他在上学期间同时打了三份工。20年前，他在MidAmerican实习过，他的母亲工作供他上学。我的意思是，这简直就是霍雷肖·阿尔杰的平方。我们让他来管理Pilot。哈斯拉姆家族给了我们一个很棒的企业，“大吉姆”，现在他（听不清）优秀的人才。我们现在就是这样。

原文

He held three jobs while he went through there. He interned at MidAmerica 20 years ago, his mother worked to put him through school. I mean, it’s just, it’s Horatio Alger-squared. And we have him to manage Pilot. And the Haslams have given us a wonderful business, “Big Jim,” and now he (UNINTEL) great people. And here we are.

我很高兴我们拥有Pilot，我只是希望当初第一次做交易时就买了100%（笑声），但这并不是当时提供给我们的交易——

原文

And I’m very glad we own Pilot, I just wish we bought 100% (LAUGH) of it when I first made the deal, but that was not the deal that was offered to us —

查理·芒格：沃伦，它当时不卖。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, it wasn’t for sale.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，不卖。是的。家具城最后的20%在我们买的时候也不卖，所以我们只买了80%。结果也很好。我们用各种方式做了各种交易。最好的方式就是给人家开支票，拿到股票。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn’t for sale. Yeah. And the last 20% of the Furniture Mart wasn’t for sale when we bought it, so we bought 80% of it. And that’s worked out well. And we’ve done various deals various ways. The best way to do it is just write people the check and get the stock.

我们和TTI就是那样做的，但你不可能总能做成同样的交易。如果我们足够喜欢这个业务，足够喜欢这些人，我们会调整方式，但我们的偏好是开支票，拥有整个公司，并留住管理层。查理，还有什么要补充的吗？

原文

But we did that with TTI, but you can’t always make the same deal. If we like the business well enough and the people well enough, we will tailor it differently, but our preference is to write a check and own the whole place and keep the management in place. Charlie, anything to add on?

查理·芒格：没有。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: No.

沃伦·巴菲特：是啊。看着像亚当·赖特这样的人发展起来，真是太棒了。我的意思是，基本上，我不知道他母亲挣多少钱，但他上了北高中，离这里大概四五英里。公立学校毕业。然后一步一步努力上来。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s really wonderful to watch something like Adam Wright work out. I mean, basically, you know, I don’t know what his mother was earning, but he went to North High, which is probably four or five miles from here. Public school graduate. And worked his way up.

他在太平洋天然气和电力公司短暂工作过一段时间，然后我们把他带回了Pilot。Pilot，嗯，去年柴油价格大不相同。去年Pilot的销售额接近800亿美元，但今年价格更正常，收入大约是去年的一半或者差不多，可能多一点。

原文

Went through a short period at Pacific Gas and Electric, and we brought him home there on Pilot. And Pilot, well, Pilot, the prices on diesel were way different last year. Pilot was close to $80 billion of sales last year, but more normal prices this, it’s significant, you know, it’s half that or thereabouts, maybe a little more.

但他，我不知道亚当现在多大了，但他四十多岁。他是通过格雷格·阿贝尔参与过的组织成长起来的。现在，他在这里，经营着一家非常重要的企业。伯克希尔能做到这一点很好。而且，我不知道，可能其他人上过更负盛名的商学院，但我觉得那又怎样？你知道，我们已经看到了亚当的能力。

原文

But he is, I don’t know how old Adam would be, but he’s in his 40s. And he came up through the organization that Greg Abel was involved with. And now here he is, running a very major business. It’s good at Berkshire to be able to do that. And I don’t, you know, somebody else may have gone to more prestigious business schools, and I think so what? You know, we’ve seen what Adam can do.

6. “你应该写下你的讣告，然后努力去实现它”

原文

6. ‘You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it’

沃伦·巴菲特：好，四号位？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station four?

观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫J.C.，15岁，来自俄亥俄州。这是我第四次亲身参加伯克希尔股东大会。我非常热爱学习你们的演讲、采访和文章。感谢你们一直分享智慧。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is J.C. I am 15 years old and I’m from Ohio. This is my fourth in-person Berkshire meeting. I have a lot of passion learning from your speeches, interviews, and articles. Thank you for sharing your wisdom all the time.

巴菲特先生，在您今年的年度股东信中，您提到伯克希尔的旅程包含了“持续储蓄、复利的力量、美国顺风以及避免重大错误”。您过去曾谦虚地承认犯过很多错误。

原文

Mr. Buffett, in your annual shareholder letter this year, you said that Berkshire’s journey consisted of “continuous savings, the power of commanding, the American tailwind, and avoidance of major mistakes”. You have humbly admitted in the past that you have made many mistakes.

但这是我第一次特别注意到“重大错误”。您能否给我们一些建议，告诉我们无论是在投资还是生活中，应该避免哪些重大错误？我也很希望听到芒格先生的想法。非常感谢。

原文

But this is the first time that major mistakes stood out to me. Could you please advise us on what major mistakes we should avoid in both investing and in life? I would also like to have Mr. Munger’s thoughts too, please. Thank you very much.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，主要的……（掌声）查理说过你可能犯的主要错误是，如果你在美国，你很幸运。如果你环游世界，有些地方你没有太多选择。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the main, (APPLAUSE) Charlie said the major mistake you could make, you know, you’re lucky if you’re in the United States. If you go around the world you don’t have a lot of choices in some places.

但你应该写下你的讣告，然后努力去实现它。

原文

But you should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it.

你知道，随着时间推移，你会在这方面变得更明智。至于商业错误，你只想确保自己不会犯那种让你出局或几乎让你出局的错误。你永远不应该有一个因投资而失眠的夜晚，我的意思是，假设你有一些钱可以投资。

原文

And, you know, that’s something you get wiser on as you go along. The business mistakes, you just want to make sure you don’t make any mistakes that take you out of the game or come close to taking you out of your game. You should never have a night when you’re worried about investing, I mean, assuming you have any money to invest at all.

你应该做到支出略低于收入。如果你支出超过收入，你就会负债，而且很可能永远无法摆脱债务。我可能会为你的房屋抵押贷款破个例。

原文

And you should just spend a little bit less than you earn. And you can spend a little bit more than you earn, and then you’ve got debt, and the chances are you’ll never get out of debt. I’ll make an exception in terms of a mortgage on your house.

但信用卡债务，我们大量参与信用卡业务，也会继续做下去，但为什么要让自己陷入困境呢？如果你实际上要为信用卡支付12%或14%或任何利率，你就是在说，“我能赚到超过12%或14%的回报。”

原文

But credit card debt, and we’re in the credit card business big time, and we’ll stay in the credit card business, but why get behind the game? And if you’re effectively paying 12% or 14% or whatever percent you’re paying on a credit card, you know, you’re saying, “I’m going to earn more than 12% or 14% of my money.”

如果你能做到，那就来伯克希尔·哈撒韦吧。所以，这……我不想在查理在旁边的时候说这个，但这完全出自本·富兰克林。我的意思是，（笑声）道理没那么复杂。但我会给你几个建议。

原文

And if you can do that, come to Berkshire Hathaway. So, it’s, I hate to say this when Charlie’s around me, but it’s straight out of Ben Franklin. I mean, (LAUGH) and it’s not that complicated. But you, well, I’ll give you a couple lessons.

你知道，汤姆·墨菲，我第一次见他时，他对我说了两件事。他说，“你随时可以告诉别人‘明天再去死’。”在当时，这是个很好的建议。想想看，当你坐在电脑前，用30秒时间告诉某人“去死”或别的什么，就能永远搞砸自己的生活，这是多么好的建议。而且你无法抹去它。

原文

You know, Tom Murphy, the first time I met him, said two things to me. He said, “You can always tell someone to go to hell tomorrow.” Well, that was great advice then. And think of what great advice it is when you can sit down at a computer and screw your life up forever by telling somebody to go to hell, or something else, in 30 seconds. And you can’t erase it.

而且，你知道，你没有失去选择权。他还说，“赞美我的名字，批评我的类别。”还有什么比这更有道理？我的意思是，你喜欢那个总是批评你的人吗？在讨论事情时，你不需要诋毁任何人来表明你的观点。

原文

And, you know, haven’t lost the option. And he said, you know, “Praise my name, criticize my category.” Well, what makes more sense than that? I mean, who do you like that criticizes you all the time? And you don’t need to vilify anybody to make your point on subjects of discussion.

另一个普遍的建议是，我从未见过一个心地善良的人去世时没有朋友。我见过很多有钱人去世时没有朋友，包括他们的家人。但我从未见过，你懂的，我见过一些人，包括汤姆·墨菲老先生，可能还有小汤姆，他今天在场（笑声），但肯定是他父亲，我观察了他50年，从未见过他做出任何不友善的举动。

原文

And then the other general piece of advice, I’ve never known anybody that was basically kind that died without friends. And I’ve known plenty of people with money that have died without friends, including their family. But I’ve never known anybody, and you know, I’ve seen a few people, including Tom Murphy Sr. and maybe Jr., who’s here, (LAUGH) but certainly his dad, I never saw him, I watched him for 50 years, I never saw him do an unkind act.

我也没有见他做过很多蠢事。我的意思是，他并非没有辨别力，他只是觉得没有理由去做那些事。哇，这给生活带来了多大的不同。查理？

原文

I didn’t see him do very many stupid acts either. I mean, it wasn’t that he was non-discriminating, he just decided that there was no reason to do it. And wow, what a difference that makes in life. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，道理很简单：支出少于收入，精明投资，远离有毒的人和有毒的活动，努力终生学习，等等等等，并且为了延迟满足做很多事，因为你更喜欢那样的生活。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way.

如果你做了所有这些事情，你几乎可以肯定能成功。如果你不做，你就需要很多运气。而你不应该需要很多运气。你应该进入一个即使没有特殊运气也很可能获胜的游戏。

原文

And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. And if you don’t, you’re going to need a lot of luck. And you don’t want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you’re very likely to win without having any unusual luck.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还想补充一点，你需要知道人们如何操纵他人，你需要抵制自己这样做的诱惑。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d add one more thought too, you need to know how people can manipulate other people, and you need to resist the temptation to do it yourself.

查理·芒格：哦，是的，那些试图欺骗你、对你撒谎或不可靠地履行承诺的有毒之人。人生的一大教训就是让他们滚出你的生活。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes, the toxic people who are trying to fool you or lie to you or aren’t reliable in meeting their commitments. A great lesson of life is get them the hell out of your life.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

查理·芒格：而且要快。（掌声）要快。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: And do it fast. (APPLAUSE) Do it fast.

沃伦·巴菲特：我还想补充一点，查理会完全同意我的看法，如果可能的话，也要有策略地去做。（笑声）但一定要让他们离开你的生活。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would add, Charlie would totally agree with me, do it tactfully, if possible, too. (LAUGH) But do get them out of your life.

查理·芒格：是的。是的，我不介意一点策略。（笑声）甚至是一点点财务成本。但问题是要让他们滚出你的生活。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yeah, I don’t mind a little tact. (LAUGHTER) Or even a little financial cost. But the question is getting them the hell out of your life.

7. 当家庭成员是负面的人时，这是一个“棘手的问题”

原文

7. ‘Tough problem’ when family members are negative

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

贝基·奎克：好的，这个问题来自Roger Lee Tan。他说：“我叫Roger，来自香港，是伯克希尔的长期股东，也是巴菲特先生和芒格先生智慧与原则的崇拜者和追随者。你们两位都曾说过，生活中最困难的问题总是人的问题。”

原文

BECKY QUICK: All right, this comes from Roger Lee Tan. He says, “My name is Roger from Hong Kong, a long-term shareholder of Berkshire, admirer and follower of Mr. Buffett’s and Munger’s wisdom and principle. Both of you have said before that the most difficult problems in life are always people problems.

“而你们学到的一个关键教训，能够过上幸福和成功生活，就是远离消极的人。我的问题是，如果那些消极的人是你们的家人，是你们无法轻易远离的人，该怎么办？”（笑声）

原文

“And one of the key lessons you have learned to be able to live a happy life and a successful life is to stay away from negative people. My question is what to do if those negative people are your families, the people (LAUGHTER) whom you can’t simply stay away from?”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你尽量减少接触。但你不能，不，我的意思是，这毫无疑问。查理前几天给出了一个我觉得是巧妙外交辞令的回答，他说：“你总是应该和行为得体的人交往。”他说，“当然，你必须为你的家人破例。”

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You minimize it. But you can’t, no, I mean, there’s no question about it. And Charlie gave an answer I thought was master of tact the other day when he says, “You always ought to interact with people who behave well.” He says, “Of course, you have to make some exceptions for your family.”

但是（笑声）这是真的。你知道，你真的，我不知道有一个酗酒、蛮横的父亲，或者更普遍地说，父母是什么感觉。我的意思是，你是怎么处理的？非常有趣的是，麦克阿瑟家族，非常著名的约翰·麦克阿瑟，创立麦克阿瑟基金会的那个人，他有五个孩子。

原文

But (LAUGH) it’s true. And, you know, you really, I don’t know what it’s like to have, you know, a drunken, you know, bully-ish, probably father, but parent, just generally. I mean, you know, how do you handle it? It’s very interesting that the MacArthur family, the very famous John MacArthur, the man who set up the MacArthur Foundation, he had five kids.

其中四个后来成了这样或那样的超级明星，而他们有一个疯狂、漂泊、酗酒的父亲。但他们四个都决定，能做的事情就是赶快离开那个家。

原文

And four of them turned out to be superstars of one sort or another, and then they had this crazy, itinerant, drunken father. But they all decided that the thing to do was to get the hell out of the house.

所以，他，就是那个麦克阿瑟基金会的父亲，连同五个兄弟姐妹中的三个，都这么做了。

原文

And so, he had this, the father of the — of the MacArthur Foundation that did that along with three of the siblings out of five.

所以，你知道，我很幸运，我是说，查理也很幸运，你知道，如果你有……我的意思是，我们的父亲都看到过我们俩的很多缺点，但是，你知道，他们仍然会在那里支持我们。

原文

So, you know, I was lucky, I mean, and Charlie was lucky that, you know, if you have, I mean, our fathers saw plenty of shortcomings in both of us, but, you know, they would still be there for us.

如果你有一个不会支持你的父亲或母亲，你知道，那是一个非常棘手的问题。我认为如果我有那种情况，无论如何我可能也会挺过来，但我想我的生活会非常不同。查理？

原文

And if you have one that won’t be there for you, you know, it’s a very tough problem. And I think one way or another I probably would have gotten through with that, if I had that situation, but I think my life would’ve been a lot different. Charlie?

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的了。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

8. 为什么Garanimals只在沃尔玛销售？

原文

8. Why are Garanimals only sold at Walmart?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，五号位？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station five?

观众成员：嘿，沃伦和查理，下午好。我叫Sudakaredi Anapredi。我来自阿肯色州本顿维尔，沃尔玛的家乡。我从2019年开始是股东，我的女儿们从2020年开始是股东。我的问题是，这是我第一次来股东大会，我的问题是关于沃尔玛和伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们与BNSF、McLane以及像Fruit of the Loom和Garanimals等消费品有非常好的关系，等等。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey Warren and Charlie, good afternoon. My name is Sudakaredi Anapredi. I am from Bentonville, Arkansas, home of Walmart. I’m a shareholder since 2019, and my daughters are shareholders since 2020. My question is, this is my first time coming to shareholders, and my question is Walmart and Berkshire Hathaway has a very great relationship with BNSF, McLane, and consumer goods like Fruit of the Looms and Garanimals, and et cetera.

我的问题是，Garanimals是沃尔玛独家销售的，而Fruit of the Loom在许多其他零售商那里都有销售。伯克希尔·哈撒韦是如何决定某些产品在某家零售商独家销售，而其他产品则在多家零售商销售的呢？

原文

My question is Garanimals is exclusively sold at Walmart, and Fruit of the Loom is sold at many other retailers. How does Berkshire Hathaway decide some items are sold at some retailers exclusively, versus others are sold at many retailers?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是个好问题。但很显然，如果你有一个产品，你希望能控制分销。如果顾客点名要你的产品，你的毛利率可能会更高。我是说，刚刚有一篇关于伯纳德·阿诺特的文章，他建立了LVMH，你知道吗，他在蒂芙尼有一个蓝色的盒子。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. But obviously you’d love to control, if you have a product, you’d love to control the distribution. And you’re probably going to get better gross of margins if they ask for you by name. I mean, they just had an article about Bernard Arnault, who built LVMH, and you know, he’s got a blue box at Tiffany.

蓝色盒子本身就有意义。可口可乐的瓶子也有意义。在1920年代，我想，有一项研究，那种……瓶子和蒙眼测试，非常高比例的人口能认出那是可口可乐。

原文

And the blue box itself means something. And Coca-Cola, the bottle meant something. In the 1920s, I think, there was a study that kind of (UNINTEL) bottle and blindfolded, and a very high percentage of the population could recognize it was Coca-Cola.

当人们不仅能认出产品，还能认出包装时，你就能获得很好的毛利率。如果你只是另一种可乐，这样的可乐有成百上千种，即使你通过沃尔玛这样的渠道分销，比如他们有山姆可乐，那也不一样。

原文

When they can recognize not only the product, but the container, you know, you’re going to have good gross margins. And if you’re just another cola, and there have been hundreds of them, and even if you have distribution through something like Walmart, who has Sam’s Cola, it just doesn’t, it’s not the same.

我的意思是，你看看我，对吧？大约1886年，亚特兰大的约翰·彭伯顿创造了它，他们花了非常大量的钱做广告。另一方面，好时却不在广告上花一分钱。所以，我和查理都观察到很多产品，很多零售方法。

原文

I mean, here I am, you know? And 1886 or so, John Pemberton in Atlanta created it, and they spent a very significant amount of money advertising. And on the other hand, Hershey’s didn’t spend any money on advertising. So, we have observed, Charlie and I both, have observed so many products, so many methods of retail.

我们真的认为我们对它们了解不少，同时我们也知道我们对它有多么无知。这并不意味着我们自己想进入零售业，而是意味着我们在某种程度上学会了要避免什么。

原文

And we really think we know quite a bit about them, and we also know how much we don’t know about it at the same time. And it doesn’t mean that we want to go into retailing ourselves, but it does mean we’ve learned, to some extent, what to avoid.

我们学会了什么时候别人真的有好东西。Garanimals就有其独特之处。只是，你知道，沃尔玛为我们做了很好的分销工作。这对沃尔玛是个好产品，对我们也是个好产品。

原文

And we’ve learned when somebody really has something. And Garanimals has something. It’s just that there’s only been, you know, Walmart does a great job of distribution for us. And it’s a good product for Walmart, it’s a good product for us.

至于Fruit of the Loom，他们可以卖很多种类的内衣，销量可以很大，但我们赚的钱不会那么多，我相信无论是投入资本还是其他方面，当产品面对一大堆竞争对手时都是如此。

原文

And on Fruit of the Loom, they can sell lots of types of underwear, and they can do a big volume, but we’re not going to make as much money, as well as I believe the capital employed or anything, with a product that has a whole bunch of competitors.

如果孩子想要一件Garanimals的睡衣之类的，这不是那种会让人们特意开车20英里跑去买的产品，诸如此类。但是，如果你在沃尔玛，正在给孩子挑选睡衣之类的东西，而他或她想要某个特定的产品，价格合理，耐穿等等，我们很高兴能通过像沃尔玛这样有分销能力的渠道来分销。

原文

And if the kid wants a Garanimals, well, pajamas or something, it’s not the sort of product that causes people to drive 20 miles out of their way to buy it, or anything of the sort. But if you’re in the Walmart and you’re picking out pajamas or something for the kid, and he or she wants a particular product, and it’s reasonably priced and everything, and wears well and everything, you know, we’re happy to have it distributed through somebody with the distribution power of Walmart.

他们也很高兴拥有这个产品。总的来说，拥有喜诗糖果显然比拥有一个无名糖果公司要好。尤其是当人们每年一两次把它作为礼物购买时。我的意思是，他们知道，如果他们要送给女朋友、送给住院的人、在圣诞节或去赴宴时作为礼物，他们知道当他们把一盒糖果递给别人时，他们绝不会同时说，“给，这糖我买得很划算。”

原文

And they’re very happy to have the product. On balance it’s obviously better if you own See’s Candy than if you own the no-name candy company. You know, particularly when people buy it as gifts a couple times a year. I mean, they know that if they give their girlfriend, if they give somebody in the hospital, if they give a gift at Christmas or going to a dinner, they know if they hand the box of candy to somebody they don’t say at the same time, “Here, I got a wonderful deal on this candy.”

我的意思是，那会立刻破坏气氛，对吧？他们真正想看到的是对方在收到礼物时脸上露出笑容，他们做到了。所以，了解顾客，对于喜诗盒装巧克力，A，它的市场规模远不及软饮料。

原文

I mean, that just kills the moment, right? What they really want to see is a smile on the other person’s face that they’re receiving it, and they get it. So, knowing what customers, and See’s boxed chocolates, A, are not remotely the market that soft drinks are.

而且这种产品不太容易跨地区推广。好时巧克力也不行。我的意思是，如果你看看巧克力棒，在英国流行的在美国就不那么流行，诸如此类。可口可乐可以全球推广。大约有200个国家，可能其中180个国家它是主导产品。

原文

And the product does not travel particularly. Hershey’s chocolate didn’t travel. I mean, if you look at candy bars, what’s popular in the U.K. isn’t that popular in the U.S. and all kinds of things. Coca-Cola travels. There’s 200 countries, roughly, and probably 180 of them it’s the dominant product.

你是怎么做到的呢？嗯，如果你从1886年（笑声）就开始做，并且一直持续到现在，那会有帮助。所以，我们学到了很多。我们还有很多要学。但我们确实弄懂了一些东西，比如Garanimals。当它出现时，没人听说过它，结果我们以非常低的价格买下了它。

原文

And how do you do it? Well, it helps if you started in 1886 (LAUGH) and go from that point forward. So, we’ve learned a lot. We got lots to learn. But we did learn that something like Garanimals we understood. When it came around nobody had ever heard of it and we bought it for a very low price, as it turned out.

二十年前，到现在仍然没人知道这个品牌，或者知道是我们拥有它，那也没关系。但他们知道Garanimals是什么，而且它有生命力。它年复一年地持续发展。而有些东西就像宠物石一样。我们一直在学习。查理？（笑声）

原文

And 20 years ago, and still nobody knows it, or that we own it, and that’s fine. But they know what Garanimals are, and it has legs. It just keeps going year after year. And some things are like pet rocks. And we’re learning all the time. Charlie? (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：我没什么要补充的了。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have nothing to add.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。你可能从来没买过Garanimals。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. You probably have never bought any Garanimals.

查理·芒格：不，我从来没有。（笑声）我甚至都不穿它们。（笑声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I never have. (LAUGH) I don’t even wear them. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：你穿不上。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: You wouldn’t fit. (LAUGH)

9. 派拉蒙全球在流媒体领域面临激烈竞争

原文

9. Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自纽约市的巴里·拉弗。“根据上次公布的数据，伯克希尔持有大约9400万股派拉蒙全球的股票。这家资产丰富的公司在最近的季度财报中表现令人失望，就在本周还削减了80%的股息。”

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Barry Laffer in New York City. “Berkshire owns about 94 million shares of Paramount Global as of the last published data. This asset-rich company has disappointed on recent quarterly earnings reports, and just this week slashed its dividend by 80%.

“您如何看待流媒体战争的演变？您对自己的投资论点仍有信心吗？您的投资论点是基于该公司将成为收购目标，还是基于其基本面？”

原文

“How do you see the streaming wars evolving? And do you still have conviction in your investment thesis? Is your investment thesis based on the company being an acquisition target, or based on its fundamentals?”

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你们想免费帮我管钱吗？（笑声）他们，你知道，我们不是做给人股票建议生意的。那些对股票一无所知的人可以通过这样做赚很多钱，我们不认为这是我们应该免费提供的东西。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And how would you like to manage my money for nothing? (LAUGH) They, you know, we are not in the business of giving stock advice to people. And people who don’t know anything about stocks can make a lot of money doing that, and we don’t think it’s something we should give away.

但我得说，任何公司取消或大幅削减股息都不是好消息。

原文

And I will say this, it’s not good news when any company passes its dividend or cuts its dividend dramatically.

流媒体业务观察起来非常有趣，因为人们喜欢用他们的iPhone，看眼前屏幕上的娱乐节目，或者手机，或者其他什么。

原文

And the streaming business is extremely interesting to watch, because there’s, people love to use their iPhones, watching, being entertained on a screen in front of them, or a phone, or whatever it may be.

但是有太多公司在做这件事。要么需要更少的公司，要么需要更高的价格。嗯，你需要更高的价格，否则就行不通。当你的剧集播出时，你让人们加入流媒体服务，并不能锁定他们。

原文

But there’s a lot of companies doing it. And you need fewer companies, or you need higher prices. And, well, you need higher prices, or it doesn’t work. And you don’t lock in people when you get them to join up for the streaming period when your serial runs.

我的意思是，你可以让他们留一段时间，但你可能只让他们停留一个月。我们拭目以待。我21岁或22岁时经营过一个加油站，离这里大概三四英里，四五英里。我们只有一个竞争对手。

原文

I mean, you know, you keep them on for a while, but you get them for, like, a month. And we’ll see what happens. I mean, I had a gasoline station when I was 21 or 22, and it’s about three or four, four or five miles from here. And we had one competitor.

他决定了我们的利润，因为我们每天都看他的价格。如果我们降价，他就会跟进，而我们不能提价。他的油量是我们的两倍，所以他赢了。你在某些行业看到的基本商业问题，在其他行业是看不到的。

原文

And he determined our profit, because we looked at his price every day. And if we cut the price he’d match it, and we couldn’t raise the price. And he did twice the gallonage, so he won. And there’s just basic business problems that you see with certain industries that you don’t see with the other.

迪士尼在其动画领域是独一无二的——你知道它在上世纪三四十年代提供的内容。他们在首次放映时就摊销了成本，然后每隔七年重新推出《白雪公主》和其他影片，这很好。

原文

Disney was unique in its animated — what it offered, you know — in the ’30s and ’40s. And they wrote the stuff off at the first showing, and then they rejuvenated Snow White and all these other people every seven years, and that was fine.

但这是一个不同的世界。眼球数量不会大幅增加，人们花在上面的时间也不会大幅增加。而且你有一堆不想退出的公司。谁知道在这种情况下的定价会怎样。但任何人告诉你他知道未来的定价，都是在自欺欺人。

原文

But this is a different world. And the eyeballs aren’t going to increase dramatically in the time they can spend is not going to increase dramatically. And you’ve got a bunch of companies that don’t want to quit. And who knows what pricing does under that. But anybody who tells you that they know what pricing will do in the future is kidding themselves.

查理？顺便说一句，查理在好莱坞有很多经验。我是说，他以前，在我认识他之前……

原文

Charlie? Charlie’s had a lot of experience, incidentally, with Hollywood. I mean, he used to, before I even met him —

查理·芒格：我认为电影业是一个非常艰难的行业。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the movie business is one tough business.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

查理·芒格：这是我的看法。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s my view.

沃伦·巴菲特：人才会赚钱；经纪人会赚钱。如果你有一个影院，你知道，现在影院的业务量是疫情前的70%。大热的片子有巨大的票房。但你不能减少供应。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: The talent will make the money; the agents will make the money. And if you’ve got a theater, you know, the theaters are now doing 70% of the business that they did before the pandemic. And big hits, you know, have enormous grosses. But you can’t reduce the supply.

人们一天只有那么多小时。他们只有两只眼睛。他们拥有比以往更多的选择，而且有更便宜的东西提供相同的体验。他们中的一些人喜欢这种体验，尤其是去看大片。

原文

People have only got so many hours in the day. They’ve only got two eyeballs. And they’ve got more choice than ever before, and they’ve got stuff that’s cheaper that offers them the same experience. And some of them like the experience, you know, particularly with the big hits of going.

但这不像你可以让人口翻倍或者让眼球翻倍或者其他什么。而且有很多人。人才总是能拿到报酬。当你基本上在以这样或那样的方式包装这些人才，并且你需要提高价格，而且有很多强大的公司不想退出，那这就是一个有趣的方程式。

原文

But it isn’t like you can double the number of people or double the eyeballs or anything like that. And you’ve got a lot of people. The talent will always get paid. And when you essentially are packaging that talent one way or another, and you need to get higher prices, and you’ve got a lot of strong companies who don’t want to quit, that’s an interesting equation.

查理·芒格：如果你觉得电影业很艰难，试着投资一个传统舞台上的纽约演出吧。在那行，他们认为让出资人拿回任何钱都是一种背信弃义的行为。（笑声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if you think the movies are tough, try to invest in a New York show on a conventional stage. There they think it’s a breach of faith in that business to let the person who put up the money to ever get any money back. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，嗯，查理实际上看到很多这样的情况，当时……

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, well, Charlie saw a lot of that actually when —

查理·芒格：是的。我不喜欢那些生意。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I don’t like those businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们《埃及艳后》发生了什么，查理。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what happened on “Cleopatra, Charlie.” (LAUGHTER)

不，这是一个每个人都受到诱惑的行业。他们喜欢参与其中的想法，你知道吗，他们能获得一定的精神收入。但是——

原文

It, no, it’s a business that everybody’s tempted. They love the idea of going in it, you know, and they get a certain amount of psychic income. But —

查理·芒格：我也从未拥有过赛马。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I never owned any racehorses, either.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我和我岳父过去常谈论在AK-SAR-BEN马场认领一匹马，但我们始终没去做。我们俩一起去赛马场玩得很开心。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, my father-in-law and I used to talk about claiming a horse at AK-SAR-BEN, but we never quite got around to it. And we had a lot of fun going to the track together. (LAUGH)

10. “我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录没有哪家公用事业公司能超越”

原文

10. ‘Our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility’

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，六号区？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, section six?

观众成员：下午好。我叫汉娜·海耶斯，是来自爱荷华州的一名高中生。您今天早些时候说过，向可再生能源过渡有人员和资本支持。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon. My name is Hannah Hayes and I’m a high schooler from Iowa. You said earlier today that transitioning to renewable energy has the people and capital to support it.

那么，既然对可再生能源有足够的投资，储能技术很快就能满足爱荷华州的能源需求，并且通过《通胀削减法案》获得政府系统的支持，为什么伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司没有真正投资于未来，加快燃煤电厂的退役计划呢？这些电厂运营成本高，目前是爱荷华州最大的碳污染源，而且直到2049年才会最终退役，根据IPCC的说法，这对于抑制排放来说太晚了。

原文

So, with enough investment in renewables, the development of energy storage technology to soon meet Iowa’s energy needs, and support from the government system through Inflation Reduction Act funding, why hasn’t Berkshire Hathaway Energy truly invested in the future by accelerating retirement plans for the coal plants, which have high operating costs and are currently Iowa’s biggest carbon polluter, and will continue to be until they’re finally retired in 2049, which is too late to be curbing emissions, according to the IPCC?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这非常有趣。在爱荷华州，我们实际上生产的风能已经超过了我们客户使用的总能源量。但这不一定能24小时生产。所以存在一些问题。顺便说一句，在爱荷华州，当我们想去安装风力发电时，绝大多数县都欢迎我们。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s very interesting. In Iowa, we have actually produced more wind energy than is the total amount of energy used by our customers. But it’s not producible 24 hours a day necessarily. So, there’s problems. And incidentally, in Iowa, a significant majority of counties welcome us when we come around and want to put in wind.

有些地方不想要。我的意思是，有些地方有“别在我家后院”的心态。其他地方则喜欢他们从一小块土地上获得的收入。人们喜欢缴纳的税款。但我想说，如果美国有一个州在发展方面表现出色，那就是爱荷华州。但在爱荷华州还有一件有趣的事，就是我们还有另一家大公司。

原文

And some don’t want it. I mean, you know, there’s a not-in-my-backyard someplace. There’s other places where they love the money they get from a small plot of ground. And people like the taxes that are paid. But I would say that if there’s one state in the Union that stands out in the development, it’s Iowa. But what’s also interesting in Iowa is that we have one other major company.

总是有大量的小型合作社和各种各样销售电力的机构。但我们有一个主要竞争对手。我们的价格显著更低。事实上，我们现在（也在）奥马哈公共电力区（服务范围）。而在三或四英里之外，我们在爱荷华州销售电力。

原文

There’s always loads of little co-ops and all kinds of things that sell electricity. But we have one major competitor. And our prices are significantly lower. And, as a matter of fact, we are now in the Omaha Public Power District. And three miles or four miles away, we’re selling the electricity in Iowa.

我们卖得更便宜，尽管公共电力是内布拉斯加州发明的，而且已经——我认为还在继续——乔治·诺里斯在1930年代就创立了它。你知道，内布拉斯加州在某种程度上比爱荷华州更抵制风力发电。但就像我说的，我们的竞争对手——替代能源来源——并没有像我们这样真正去追求它。

原文

And we are selling it cheaper, even though public power was invented in Nebraska, and has been — I think it’s going on — George Norris did it back in the 1930s. And, you know, Nebraska’s resisted, to some extent wind power, more than Iowa. But like I said, our competitor — alternate source — hasn’t really pursued it the way we have.

但我想说，我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录，没有哪家美国公用事业公司能超越。当然，这得益于大多数公用事业公司将70%或80%的收益用于支付股息这一事实。而我们二十年来没有提取过普通股股息。我们 reinvested 我不知道多少亿美元。

原文

But I would say that our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility in the United States. And, of course, it’s been aided by the fact that most utilities pay out 70% or 80% of earnings and dividends. And we haven’t taken a common dividend, you know, for 20 years. We reinvested I don’t know how many billion.

这就是为什么收益从2亿美元增长到40亿美元，但我们的资本回报率并不比开始时高。我们只是在这个过程中不断投入更多资本，持续进行再投资。

原文

That’s the reason why the earnings have gone from $200,000,000 to $4 billion, but we’re not earning a higher rate of return on capital than we were when we started. We just put way more capital into the business as we went along, kept reinvesting the capital.

所以，我希望格雷格在这里能告诉你们更多细节。但我想说，我们真的可以用伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司的记录挑战美国任何一家公用事业公司。查理，你一直在观察。

原文

So, I wish Greg were here to tell you more details about it. But I would say that we’d really put up Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s record against any utility in the United States. Charlie, you’ve watched it.

查理·芒格：嗯，我观察了。我个人并不完全确定全球变暖会有多糟糕。我认为没有人确切知道海平面是会上升两英寸还是20英尺。所以，我认为在一个很多事情都不确定的领域里，有很多虚假的说法。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I have. And I’m not personally at all sure how bad the global warming is going to be. I don’t think anybody knows for sure whether the seas are going to rise two inches or 20 feet. And so, I think there’s a lot of false claims here in a world where much is not known.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）怀俄明州有很多风。我们正在建设向西延伸的输电线路。但那是第二次世界大战时他们让我们干的。当时华盛顿有个“沙皇”可以说，“就把它搞定”，就像他们对亨利·凯泽说建造船只那样。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (APPLAUSE) There is a lot of wind in Wyoming. And we are building transmission lines that extend out through the West. But it was World War II when they told us to do it. And we had a czar in Washington that could say, you know, “Just get it done,” like they said to said Henry Kaiser on building ships.

你无法相信如果那样我们现在会领先多少。但我们现在有钱，有技术。今年我们公用事业公司的折旧大约是40亿美元。我们可能在此基础上再花费大约30亿美元。所以，我们可能总共花费70亿美元。

原文

You can’t believe how ahead we would be down from where we are. But we’ve got the money. We’ve got the know-how. This year our depreciation in our utility company is on the order of $4 billion. And we spend maybe $3 billion additional to that. So, maybe we spend $7 billion.

公用事业行业很少有公司花费这么高比例的折旧资金。

原文

And there are very few companies in the utility industry that are spending, you know, that percentage of their depreciated money.

但我们乐意花更多，可是到处都有人不希望管道通过他们的地方，不希望有塔架，不管是什么。

原文

But we’d love to be spending more, but there are people all over that don’t want the pipeline to go through there. They don’t want the tower, whatever it may be.

这就是民主的问题。而且，正如我提到的，即使在爱荷华州，也有很多县——大多数，绝大多数县我认为会欢迎风力发电。

原文

And that is the problem of a democracy. And even, as I mentioned, within Iowa, you’ve got a great many counties that — majority, great majority of the counties I think would welcome the wind power.

有些县不喜欢。我们显然会与那些愿意与我们合作的地方合作。我们没有能力去告诉任何人该做什么。

原文

And you’ve got some counties that don’t like it. And we’re obviously going to work with the ones that want to work with us. We do not have the ability to go in and tell anybody what do on that.

每个州都有一个公用事业委员会，基本上管理我们的收益和我们的行为，这个行业就是这样发展起来的。这没什么不好，除非你卷入了那些实际上是全国性系统而非州级系统的事务。

原文

And there’s a public utility commission in every state that basically governs what we earn on it, what we do, and that’s the way the industry’s developed. And that’s not bad, unless you get into the things that in effect, you know, extend — they’re part of a country-wide system, rather than state-wide system.

查理·芒格：我还认为，即使我们不担心全球变暖，转向可再生能源来节省我们的碳氢化合物也是有意义的。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think also that even if we weren’t worried about global warming, it would make sense to —

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

查理·芒格：——转向可再生能源来节省我们的碳氢化合物。碳氢化合物能做某些其他东西做不到的事情。而且它们的数量是有限的。为什么不在节省它们方面保持谨慎呢？

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: — shift to renewables to conserve our hydrocarbons. There’re certain things hydrocarbons can do that nothing else can do. And there’s only so much of them there. Why not be cautious in conserving them?

沃伦·巴菲特：而且成本也大大降低了。我是说，风能。如果你看看我们现在做的，那些塔的效率高得多……

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And the cost, they’ve gotten so much more efficient, too. I mean, the wind. I mean, if you look at what we’re doing now, those towers are way more efficient than —

但是有很多人在谈论不可能做到的事情。还有——

原文

But there’s a lot of people that are talking about things that can’t be done. And then there’s —

查理·芒格：这个领域有很多胡说八道。如果你喜欢胡说八道，这个领域适合你。（笑声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a lot of nonsense in this field. If you like nonsense, this is the field for you. (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我们身在其中，所以……（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: But we’re in the field, so. (LAUGHTER)

查理·芒格：我知道。我知道。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I know. I know.

11. “我们不会提出收购西方石油公司的控制权”

原文

11. ‘We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental’

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, Becky.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自门罗·理查森。《华尔街日报》3月份报道称，石油生产商正在减少产量，可能已经达到了二叠纪盆地的峰值。

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Monroe Richardson (PH). The Wall Street Journal reported in March that oil producers are producing less oil and may have reached their peak in the Permian Basin.

鉴于西方石油公司和雪佛龙在二叠纪盆地都有重大持仓，您能否解释一下伯克希尔持有这两家公司大量股份的理由，特别是考虑到那里未来的石油前景？

原文

Given the major positions of both Occidental Petroleum and Chevron in the Permian, which you please explain the rationale for Berkshire’s significant holdings of both those companies, considering that future outlook for oil there?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，毫无疑问——石油真的很有趣，查理对石油的了解比我多得多，你是什么时候在贝克斯菲尔德或其他地方买下那个权益的？但那是在我认识你之前，对吧？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s no question — it’s really interesting about oil, and Charlie knows way more about oil than I do, when did you buy that royalty in Bakersfield, or wherever it is? But that was before I met you, right?

查理·芒格：是的——不，不是之前——是……是的，是在那之前。你说得对。那个该死的权益现在还每年付给我7万美元。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes — no, it wasn’t before — it was — yes, it was. It was just before. You’re right. And that goddamn royalty is still paying me $70,000 a year.

沃伦·巴菲特：你为那个权益付了多少钱？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: What’d you pay for the royalty?

查理·芒格：一千美元。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: A thousand dollars.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。那和二叠纪正相反。我父亲在1964年去世前买了1000或1500美元的权益。他把它们留给了我母亲。我母亲把它们留给了她的两个女儿。我姐姐去世了。我妹妹今天在这里。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Now that’s the opposite of the Permian. My dad bought $1,000 or $1,500 worth of royalties before he died in 1964. He left them to my mother. My mother left them to her two daughters. And my older sister died. And my younger sister is here today.

她每个月都会收到这些支票。她了解所有这些不同的油田，以及它们的产量。这就是美国大约一半石油产量的现实。另一半是页岩油。

原文

And she gets these checks every month. And she knows about all these different fields, and what they’re producing. And that’s the reality of half of the oil production, or something around that, in the United States. And then the other half is shale.

你知道，如果你去看过电影，看过石油，你永远不会看到那些在加州抽取查理权益油的东西。你会看到这些石油喷涌而出。嗯，在二叠纪，有一件事会让你印象深刻，那就是当你打出一口井的第一天，它可能日产12,000桶，或者15,000桶。

原文

And, you know, if you’ve gone to the movies, and ever watched oil, you’ve never watched the things that are pumping Charlie’s royalties in California. You’ll see these gushers of oil. Well, in the Permian, this should sink in on you, in the first day, the first day when you bring in a well, you know, it may be 12,000 barrels, or maybe 15,000 barrels.

而且很危险。西方石油公司有一口井，我记得第一天日产19,000桶左右。一年或一年半后，它就几乎变成一口枯井了。这实际上是一个不同的行业。在美国，这很有趣。我们每天可能使用1100多万桶——嗯，我们每天生产1100多万桶石油当量。

原文

And it’s dangerous. Occidental had one come in at I think at 19,000 barrels or something like that in one day. And in a year, year and a half, it becomes partly nothing. It’s a different business in effect. In the United States, it’s interesting. We use maybe 11 and a fraction — well, we produce 11 and a fraction million barrels of oil equivalent a day.

但如果页岩油停产，我的意思是，产量会很快下降到600万桶。想象一下，从全球产量中每天减少500万桶。然后我们还在减少战略石油储备。战略石油储备是终极油田。你不需要钻井。我们只是拥有它们。

原文

But if shale stopped, I mean, it would drop to six million very fast. Well, just imagine taking five million barrels a day out of production in the world. And then we’re also taking down our strategic petroleum reserve. Strategic petroleum reserve is the ultimate oilfield. You don’t have to drill. It’s just we’ve got them.

它本应是战略性的，但却卷入了政治。所以，当你谈论石油业务时，你实际上是在谈论不同种类的业务。我们喜欢西方石油公司在二叠纪的地位。我们不会喜欢那个地位——嗯，它曾一度跌到负值。曾跌到每桶负30美元。

原文

And it was supposed to be strategic, but it gets involved in politics. And so, there’s all — when you talk about the oil business, you’re talking about different kinds of businesses, basically. And we like Occidental’s position in the Permian. And we wouldn’t like that position — well, it got to minus one day. It got to minus $30 a barrel.

那当然很疯狂。但如果油价在X水平，你做得很好。如果油价在X的一半水平，你的成本是一样的，产量也不会改变。情况就不那么好了，但也会非常快地降低美国的石油产量。

原文

That was crazy, of course. But if oil sells at X, you know, you do very well. And if it sells at half of X, you know, your costs are the same, and it doesn’t change the production. And it doesn’t work as well, but it also brings down the oil production of the United States very fast.

所以，我们不知道油价会是多少。但我们非常喜欢西方石油公司拥有的地位。这就是为什么几年前，当

标题：2023年度股东大会

第5部分/共5部分

正如我所指出的，如果美国有一千家像伯克希尔这样纳税的公司，那么美国的其他任何人——无论是个人还是公司——都无需再缴纳任何所得税、社会保障税、赠与税、遗产税或其他税种。

原文

And as I pointed out, if there were a thousand corporations in the United States that paid what Berkshire has been paying, nobody else in the United States, no individual, no corporation, would ever pay any income tax, social security tax, gift tax, estate tax, anything else.

一千家像伯克希尔这样的公司就能产生美国现行税法下所有人缴纳的税收。我对此并不感到难过。我希望将这一数字降到五百分之一或类似水平。我愿意按这个税率纳税，我很高兴这样做。

原文

A thousand like Berkshire Hathaway would produce the revenue that’s being derived under the present tax code from everybody in the United States. And I don’t feel badly about that. And I love to get it to one five-hundreth, or something of the sort. But I’d like to do it — we can do it at this rate. I’m happy to do it.

我认为我们很荣幸生活在美国。但我们也必须控制支出。这是国会不太愿意做的事情。当我父亲在国会时，他们就不愿意这样做。但随着时间的推移，他们在这方面更加固执了。查理？

原文

I think we are privileged to live in the United States. But we also have to control spending. And that’s something that Congress doesn’t quite like to do. And they didn’t like to do it when my dad went to Congress. But they’ve dug in more, as the years have gone by. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我们之前已经讨论过这个话题了。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we covered this subject earlier.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)

16. 我们处在‘完美的游戏’中

原文

16. We are in ‘the perfect sort of game’

沃伦·巴菲特：九号台。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Station nine.

我说对了吗？好的。

原文

Am I right on this? Yeah.

股东：我叫阿夫隆·格罗斯（音译），来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。我是股东，这是我第四年来参加“资本主义的伍德斯托克”。（笑声）

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Avlon Gross (PH). And I am from Los Angeles, California. I am a shareholder. And it’s my fourth year coming to the “Woodstock of Capitalism.” (LAUGHTER)

沃伦·巴菲特：很高兴你来了。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad you came.

股东：非常感谢沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格所做的一切。你们之间从未讲过的最有趣的故事是什么？另外，你们业务中最困难的部分是什么？（掌声）

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you so much for everything Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.

What is the funniest story that you have never told about each other? And also, what is the hardest part of your business? (APPLAUSE)

沃伦·巴菲特：我来回答第二个问题。你问题的第二部分是，我们的业务并不困难。我们热爱自己的业务。每天早上起床时，我都感觉很好。我不知道那天会发生什么。也许什么都不会发生，但也许会有事情发生。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll answer the second. The second part of your question is that we don’t have a hard business. We love our business. Every morning, when I get up, I feel good. I don’t know what’s going to happen that day. Maybe nothing will happen. But maybe something will happen.

即使没有别的事，我也会滚动一些国库券或其他东西。但我与你能想象到的最棒的一群人共事。我们彼此喜欢，没有人觊觎别人的职位或类似的事情。这是理想的工作环境，而且离我家大约五分钟路程。所以，我一生中从未花时间通勤。我无法想象还有比这更好的事。

原文

And if nothing else, I’ll roll some T-bills or something. But I work with the greatest group of people you can imagine. I mean, we like each other. And nobody is after anybody else’s job, or anything of the sort. It’s ideal working conditions. And it’s five minutes from my home, or thereabouts. So, I haven’t spent my life commuting. I just can’t imagine having anything better.

查理有很多你没听过的有趣故事。我们看看他会讲哪一个。

原文

And Charlie’s got a lot of funny stories you haven’t heard. But we’ll see which one he comes up with.

查理·芒格：嗯，我认为沃伦和我天生就很滑稽，所以不需要很多有趣的故事。我们各自做的事情足够古怪，足以让对方感到有趣。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Warren and I are naturally so ridiculous that we don’t need very many funny stories. We each do things that are peculiar enough so that we can keep one another amused.

沃伦·巴菲特：告诉他们你当时在收购霍希尔德·科恩时对律师说的话。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what you told the lawyer when we were buying Hochschild Kohn.

查理·芒格：我不记得了。你告诉他们吧。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t remember. You tell them.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，你记得吗？（笑声）那是1966年，我们在巴尔的摩收购一家百货公司。我们需要一位律师，一位附近的、会完全按指示行事的律师。查理从威尔默·卡特勒律师事务所找了一位非常好的律师，我想是的。我不知道查理是否记得他给那位律师的指示。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you remember? (LAUGHTER) It was 1966, and we were down in Baltimore, buying a department store. And we needed a lawyer. And we needed a lawyer who was nearby and would do exactly as told. And Charlie came up with a very good lawyer from Wilmer Cutler’s, I believe. And I don’t know whether Charlie remembers the instructions he gave the lawyer or not.

查理·芒格：不，我不记得了。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，查理对那位我们以前从未见过的律师说：“对待沃伦要像……”我当时35或36岁。他说：“对待沃伦要像对待任何其他90岁的客户一样。”（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie told the lawyer, who we never met before. And he said, “Treat Warren like” — I was 36 at the time or 35. He said, “Treat Warren like any other 90-year-old client.” (LAUGHTER)

这家伙完全明白他的意思。我们很快就达成了交易。然后我们去了银行，我想是第一国家银行，实际上是马里兰国家银行。那里有一个叫卡米·斯拉克的人，不是吗，查理？

原文

This guy knew exactly what he meant. And we made the deal in a hurry. And then we went to the bank, First National Bank, I believe it was — or Maryland National Bank, actually. And there was a fellow named Cammy Slack there, wasn’t there, Charlie?

查理·芒格：是的。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们想借600万美元用于1200万美元的收购。卡米困惑地看着我们说：“你们想为这个小小的霍希尔德-科恩借600万美元？”查理和我说了类似这样的话：“嗯，马里兰国家银行是我们的第一选择。如果他们不想做，我们有另一家银行可以去。”

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: We wanted to borrow $6,000,000 bucks against a $12,000,000 purchase. And Cammy looked at us with bewilderment. And he says, “You want you borrow $6,000,000 for this little old Hochschild-Kohn?” And Charlie and I said something to the effect, “Well, the Maryland National was our first call. And if they didn’t want to do it, we had another bank we’d go to.”

不管怎样，他们还是借给了我们钱。但当他提到“小小的霍希尔德-科恩”时，我们立刻开始想：“也许这不是我们一生中见过的最好的交易。”从那时起，我们就一直在想办法卖掉它。当时桑迪·戈特斯曼也和我们一起。

原文

And, anyway, they lent us the money. But when he said little old Hochschild-Kohn, we immediately started thinking, “Maybe this isn’t the best deal we’ve ever seen in our lives.” And from that point on, we were trying to figure out how to sell it. Sandy Gottesman was involved with us then too.

在某种意义上，我们从那些不成功的交易中获得的乐趣，和从成功的交易中获得的乐趣一样多。我的意思是，如果你知道打高尔夫球时每一洞都能一杆进洞，你只要挥杆，球就会滚进300码或400码外的洞里，那就没人会打高尔夫了。

原文

And we had as much fun out of deals that didn’t work in a certain sense as the ones that did work. I mean, if you knew you were going to play golf and you were going to hit a hole in one on every hole, you just hit the ball, and it went in the hole that was 300 yards away, or 400 yards away, nobody would play golf.

我是说，这项运动的部分乐趣在于，你有时会把球打到树林里。有时你能解救出来，有时则不能。

原文

I mean, part of the fun of the game is the fact that you hit them to the woods. And sometimes you get them out, and sometimes you don’t.

所以，我们处在一种完美的游戏中。我们都很享受。我们一起有很多乐趣。我们不必做任何我们内心不认可的事情。

原文

So, we are in the perfect sort of game. And we both enjoy it. And we have a lot of fun together. And we don’t have to do anything we don’t really believe in doing.

我的意思是，我们不受任何团体的支配。所以我们可以塑造自己的命运。从某种意义上说，我们塑造了经营公司的原则。这是人生中一种巨大的奢侈。

原文

I mean, we are not dictated to by any group. And so, we get to forge our own destiny. And in a sense, forge the principle by which we can run the company. And that’s a huge luxury in life.

我们不想成为世界上任何其他公司的总裁、首席执行官或任何其他职位。因为那样我们就必须遵守一些我们并不真正想遵守的东西。

原文

And we don’t want to be president of any other company in the world, or CEO, or anything else. We’d have to conform to certain things that we really don’t want to conform to.

查理，这个描述公平吗？

原文

Is that a fair description, Charlie?

查理·芒格：是的，很公平。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it is.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.

17. 动视的套利赌注看起来不乐观

原文

17. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn’t looking good

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自大卫·卡斯，他是马里兰大学商学院的教授。

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Kass, who is a professor at the business school at University of Maryland.

他说：“在去年的年度股东大会上，沃伦提到伯克希尔持有了大量动视暴雪股票，作为一项合并套利交易。由于英国监管机构阻止了其被微软收购，伯克希尔是否减少或出售了其持股？”

原文

He says, “At last year’s annual meeting, Warren mentioned that Berkshire had taken a large stake in Activision Blizzard as a merger arbitrage play. Since the U.K. regulator has blocked its acquisition by Microsoft, has Berkshire reduced or sold its stake?”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，在股票交易方面，除非被要求披露（比如在13F文件或我们提交的其他文件中），我们不会提供信息。通过查看我们今早提交的10-Q报告，你可以计算出某些情况，但需要仔细查看。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in terms of what we do with stocks, we don’t give information except when required to, which is in the 13F, or whatever we file. And there’s certain things you can actually figure out by looking at our 10-Q, which we filed this morning.

但我要说的是，我认为微软表现得非常——该用什么词呢——愿意与监管机构合作。我的意思是，他们想完成这笔交易。在我看来，他们已做出了超出半数的让步。

原文

But I would say this. I think Microsoft has been remarkably, what’s the word, willing to cooperate with governing bodies. I mean, they want to do the deal. And they’ve met the opposition, it seems to me, more than halfway.

但这并不意味着交易一定能完成，如果某个国家（在这种情况下是英国）想阻止它。从世界运作的方式来看，他们比美国更有条件阻止这笔交易。而且这不是通过提供更多资金就能解决的问题。

原文

But that doesn’t mean that it gets done if a given country, in this case the U.K., wants to block it. They’re in a better position to block it than the United States, by just the way the world works. And that doesn’t get solved by offering more money.

所以，我不知道结果会如何。但即使交易没有完成，我认为也不是微软或动视的任何一方有过错。但并非所有应该发生的事情都会发生。18个月前，我们在与道明尼能源做交易时也遇到过类似情况。他们让我们买下了我们想买的大部分资产。

原文

So, I don’t know how it turns out. But if it doesn’t go through, I don’t think it’s through any shortcoming by either Microsoft or Activision. But not everything that should happen does happen. And, well, we ran into it when we made the deal with Dominion Energy 18 months ago. And they let us buy a good bit of what we wanted to buy.

然后政府实际上说：“你不能买别的东西了。”我认为在这件事上我们本可以做得比任何人都好，相关州没有反对，客户也没有反对。但你不能与美国政府对抗，你知道吗？

原文

And then the government in effect said, “You can’t buy something else,” which I think we would’ve done a better job with than anybody else did, and which the states involved did not object to it, which the customers didn’t object to it. But you don’t take on the United States government, you know?

你试图找出不会遇到麻烦的事情。我认为在那件事上，美国政府犯了一个错误。我认为英国政府在这件事上也犯了一个错误。

原文

And you try and figure out things that you won’t have a problem with. And I think in that case, the U.S. government made a mistake. I think the British government’s making a mistake in this case.

但这就是大城市里的生活，正如查理会说的那样。

原文

But that’s life in the big city, as Charlie would say.

我们会怎么做将取决于很多因素。查理？

原文

And what we do will depend on a lot of things. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我想——嗯，我们确实——是的——你漂亮地避开了这个问题。（笑声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think — well, we do — yeah — you kissed that one off beautifully. (LAUGHTER)

18. 如果你不能为自己工作，为伯克希尔工作几乎是同样好的选择

原文

18. If you can’t work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，十号台。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10. (Laughter)

股东：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫安德森·富勒（音译），来自加拿大新斯科舍省的埃文波特。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name’s Anderson Fuller (PH). And I’m from Avonport, Nova Scotia in Canada.

在提问之前，我只想感谢你们让我们得以深入了解你们作为投资者的思维。

原文

And before I ask my question, I just want to thank you for all you’ve done to give us insight into your minds as investors.

对我来说，从伯克希尔得到的最令人信服的收获是你们对合理激励机制的重视和成功运用。

原文

So, for me, the most compelling takeaway from Berkshire is your guys’ emphasis on and successful use of properly aligned incentives.

在我看来，拥有并领导一家企业有两个核心好处。首先，随着公司增长，你通过股权直接受益；其次，你拥有自主权。员工的激励机制比较容易理解，比如提供福利、公平薪酬和营造强大的文化。

原文

In my view, owning and leading a business has two central benefits. First, you directly benefit as the company grows, through your equity in it, and second, you have autonomy. Incentives for employees are a bit easier to understand, such as offering benefits, fair pay, and creating a strong culture.

但我一直难以理解最高层面的激励机制。尽管你们说伯克希尔给予旗下经理很大的灵活性，但这肯定比他们独立经营时要少。

原文

But I’ve always struggled to understand them at the highest level. Even though you say Berkshire gives its managers significant flexibility, it must be less than what they had when they were independent.

此外，你会认为热情和出售意愿应该是负相关的。那么，伯克希尔究竟如何弥补这一差距，并激励子公司的所有者将这些好处让渡给伯克希尔？谢谢。

原文

Additionally, you would think passion and a willingness to sell would be inversely correlated. So, how exactly does Berkshire bridge this gap and incentivize owners of its subsidiaries to give up these benefits to Berkshire? Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我们真正希望找到的是那些热爱自己业务，但不喜欢作为上市公司带来的许多附属事务的经理人。我的意思是，如果他们不得不花大量时间听别人告诉他们该做什么、不该做什么，而他们又不能得罪这些人，或者他们必须配合行业协会之类的东西，因为不想看起来像搭便车的人。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we really hope to find is managers who love their business, but don’t like a lot of what comes with it as a public company. I mean, if they have to spend a lot of time listening to people tell them what to do about this or that, and they can’t afford to irritate them, or they have to go along with their trade association, or whatever they may call it, because you don’t want to look like a free rider.

大多数工作中，人们都必须做出各种妥协。查理和我解决了这个问题。我一生中有过五个老板。我喜欢他们全部。其中两位对我的生活产生了巨大影响，让我过得更好。但我喜欢他们全部。

原文

There’s all kinds of things, compromises that people have to make in most jobs. And Charlie and I solved that problem. I had five bosses in my life. And I liked all five of them. And two of them were just huge factors in making my life better. But I liked all five of them.

其中几个，你知道，有人听说过JCPenney、Cooper Smith。我每小时赚75美分，我喜欢在彭尼工作。嗯，其实我并不喜欢在彭尼工作。但我喜欢为库珀·史密斯工作。每小时75美分。

原文

A couple of them were, you know, some people hear JCPenney, Cooper Smith, you know, I worked for 75 cents an hour and I loved working at Penny’s. Well, I didn’t love working at Penney’s. But I loved working for Cooper Smith. And, you know, it was 75 cents an hour.

但我必须按他们的吩咐做事，先是卖男式衬衫，然后是男装，然后是童装，等等。我喜欢为报社工作。在内布拉斯加大学时，我有一个很棒的经理。我还曾为本·格雷厄姆工作。我的意思是，一切都很顺利。

原文

But I had to do what they told me to do, which was to sell men’s shirts first, and then men’s clothing, and then children’s clothing, and so on. And I loved working for the newspaper. And I had a great manager when I was at the University of Nebraska. I got to work for Ben Graham. I mean, everything worked out.

但没有什么比为自己工作更好的了。如果你不能拥有一家大公司，那么为伯克希尔·哈撒韦工作——管理一家公司——就是你能得到的最接近的选择。你不必花时间讨好分析师，在很多情况下你可能都看不起他们。

原文

But there’s nothing like working for yourself. And if you can’t own a big company, working at Berkshire Hathaway, from running a company is the closest thing you will get. You don’t have to spend time courting analysts who you’ll probably have contempt for in many cases.

你不必花时间与银行打交道，尤其是在困难时期去筹集资金。

原文

You don’t have to spend time with banks, you know, getting money, and particularly in terrible times.

你会获得很多自由，我认为这对我有意义。如果你自己拥有整个公司，可能会更好。

原文

There’s all kinds of — you get a lot in the way of freedom that I would think would be meaningful to me. And it might be better if you own the whole place yourself.

但也许你有兄弟姐妹想退出。可能有一百万个理由让你无法实现这一点，除非你卖给伯克希尔。对于家族企业来说，当家人想往不同方向发展时，这比上市公司更容易一些。但仍有可能性。

原文

But maybe you’ve got siblings that want out. Maybe — there’s a million reasons why you may not be able to achieve that unless you sell to Berkshire. And that’s easier, probably, if you have a family business, where people want to go in different directions, than it is with a public company. But there’s still possibilities there.

所以，这就是为什么我认为如果我拥有一家上市公司，价值数十亿美元，而伯克希尔·哈撒韦想收购它，股东也愿意投票同意，我会考虑我对生活的感受。首先，我不想在65岁退休。我想继续工作。

原文

So, that’s why I think if I owned a public company, and it was worth a great many billions of dollars, and Berkshire Hathaway wanted to buy it, and the shareholders were willing to vote it, I would consider the way I would feel about life, for one thing, I wouldn’t want to retire at 65. I’d want to keep working.

卖给伯克希尔是有理由的，如果查理和我处于对方的位置，我们在某些情况下会接受这笔交易。但这并不适合所有人。查理？

原文

And there are reasons to sell to Berkshire, which Charlie and I, in certain positions, if we were on the other side, would take the deal. But it isn’t for everybody. Charlie?

查理·芒格：我认为我们做得相当不错。我们非常幸运。我不知道。在我看来，大多数最终像我们这样成功的人，他们几乎已经知道该怎么做。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we have a pretty good one. We’ve been very lucky. And I don’t know. It seems to me that most of the people who are going to end up the way we did, they almost already know how to do it.

沃伦·巴菲特：但回顾过去，我们可能做过的最重要的一笔收购是国家赔偿公司。不是因为它的具体业务，而是因为它带来的结果。杰克·林沃特控制着这家公司。我认识并喜欢他。他也认识我。每年一次，当内布拉斯加州保险局或其他机构来人时，他就会变得恼火。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: But the most important purchase, in retrospect, that we may have made was National Indemnity. Now because specifically what it did, but what it led to. And Jack Ringwalt controlled the company. And I knew him and liked him. And he knew me. And once a year, he’d get irritated when the Nebraska Department of Insurance, or somebody would come around.

他说他们总是在AK-SAR-BEN赛马场开放的时候来。我的意思是，他对为什么受监管是件麻烦事有一套理论。我告诉查理·海德尔，“下次杰克再有这种情绪，准备出售时，一定找到他。”

原文

And he said they always came around when the AK-SAR-BEN racetrack was open. I mean, he had all these theories about why it was a pain in the neck to be regulated. And I told Charlie Heider, “Next time Jack is in that mood, where he’s ready to sell, just because he’s tired of fooling around with all these guys, be sure and find him.”

所以，有一天查理打电话给我说：“杰克发作了。”我说：“带他过来。”我们达成了交易。这就是杰克出售的原因。交易完成后他很高兴。我也很高兴。所以，有一个人控制着一家企业，但一旦这些麻烦成为我的问题而不是他的问题，他就觉得那些人不那么烦人了。

原文

And so, Charlie called me one day. And he says, “Jack is in heat.” And I said, “Bring him over.” And we made a deal. But that’s why Jack sold. And he was happy after he made the deal. And I was happy after we made the deal. So, there’s a man that controlled a business, but just decided these people didn’t seem to bother him as much once they were my problem and not his.

你永远不知道好运何时会降临。那笔交易最初并没有为我们带来巨大的成果。但看看它带来了什么，你知道吗？

原文

And you just can’t tell when lightening will strike. And that didn’t do magnificent things for us initially. But just look at what it led to, you know?

所以，你永远不知道——如果你知道如何打完18个洞，那打高尔夫就没意思了。你甚至不会走上第一个发球台。我的意思是，正是这种不确定性、比赛的乐趣、对手以及各种让游戏变得有趣的因素。我认为查理和我正处在世界上最有趣的游戏之中。

原文

So, you never — you know, if you knew how you were going to shoot all 18 holes, it wouldn’t be any fun playing. You wouldn’t get out on the first tee. I mean, it’s the uncertainty, the fun of playing the game, the opponents, all kinds of things that make a game interesting. And I think Charlie and I are in the most interesting game in the world.

19. 喜诗糖果是一个‘不向外扩张的绝妙品牌’

原文

19. See’s Candies is a ‘wonderful brand that doesn’t travel’

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自西澳大利亚珀斯的西蒙·威瑟斯（音译）。

原文

BECKY QUICK: Here’s a question from Simon Withers (PH), in Perth, in Western Australia.

“我们很久没有听到喜诗糖果和NetJets的消息了。能否告诉我们喜诗的最新表现，以及你们预计它何时会在美国开完所有门店？

原文

“It’s been a long time since we’ve heard about See’s Candy and NetJets. Could you please give us an update on See’s performance, and when you project it will run out of places to open stores in the United States?

“另外，能否概述一下NetJets自收购以来的表现，以及它是否达到了你们收购时所看到的潜力？”

原文

“And could you also give us an overview of how NetJets has performed since its acquisition, and whether it’s achieved the potential you saw at the time of that acquisition?”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，对于喜诗，问题不在于开店。我们发现，我们拥有一个绝妙的品牌，但它不向外扩张。你知道吗？那种神秘感、实际产品以及人们对某些东西的情感，正如我们之前所说，它有时仅限于特定市场。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with See’s it hasn’t been a question of opening stores. We found out that we have this wonderful brand that doesn’t travel. You know? The mystique, the actual product, the feelings people have about some things, as we said before, I mean, it sometimes it’s limited to given markets.

Dr Pepper在达拉斯-沃斯堡的销量巨大，人均销量可能是底特律或波士顿的10倍。你会说：“嗯，一个已经存在了一个世纪的产品怎么会这样？”人们会旅行。你有全国性的广告。

原文

Dr. Pepper sells at a huge rate in Dallas-Fort Worth, and maybe at 10 times the percentage per capita, maybe that it has in Detroit, or Boston. And you say, “Well, how can that be with a product that’s been around for a century?” And people travel. You have national advertising.

我不确定。但随着观察不同的品牌，我不断学到更多。查理和我，我们在加州的经济效益非常好，以至于我们在许多情况下一次又一次地尝试同样的实验。实验成本不高。我们尝试了世界上所有方法来让一个品牌走出去。

原文

And I’m not sure. But I keep learning more, as I watch different brands. And Charlie and I, our economics were so good in California, that we tried in many cases the same experiment over and over again. It doesn’t cost much to experiment. And we’ve tried everything in the world to cause a brand to travel.

我们总是认为第一周是正确的。然后我们发现那种魔力——我们几乎可以打败任何其他糖果店。但随着世界的变化，现在几乎没什么糖果店了。所以，喜诗已经101年了。它拥有魔力。

原文

And we always think we were right for the first week. And then we find out that the magic — we can beat any other candy store, pretty much. But there aren’t any candy stores anymore to speak of, as the world has changed. So, See’s is 101 years now. It has magic.

它的魔力在一定程度上局限于相邻的西部地区。几乎是地心引力般的。然后你到了东部。顺便说一句，在东部，人们更喜欢黑巧克力而不是牛奶巧克力。在西部，人们更喜欢牛奶巧克力而不是黑巧克力。在东部，你可以卖小包装和黑巧克力——在西部——

原文

And it has limited magic in sort of the adjacent West. It’s gravitational, almost. And then you get to the East. And incidentally, in the East, people prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate. In the West, people prefer milk chocolate to dark. In the East, you can sell miniatures, and dark — in the West —

我的意思是，消费者的行为千奇百怪。但你想不断观察，因为你会学到一点东西。对于查理和我来说，尝试各种事情的诱惑很大，因为如果成功了，经济效益会很好。所以我们尝试了各种方法。当然，每个新来的经理都想尝试。

原文

I mean, there’s all kinds of crazy things in the world that consumers do. But you want to keep observing it, because you do learn a little. And with Charlie and I, the temptation to keep trying things, because the economics were so good if we succeeded, so we tried various things. And, of course, every manager wants to try that comes along.

因为他们知道这应该行得通。但就是不行。不过，这也正是它非常有趣的地方。

原文

Because they’ve learned that it should work. But it doesn’t work. So, but that’s what makes it very interesting.

20. NetJets是一家‘杰出的’公司

原文

20. NetJets is a ‘marvelous’ company

沃伦·巴菲特：至于NetJets，我们确实学会了如何区分——并且合理地——为那些非常富裕才能使用的人提供服务。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And NetJets, we have really learned how to distinguish, and justifiably distinguish a service to people that you have to be very well to do to use it.

但如果你非常富有，实际上你是在花你继承人的钱。我的意思是，就像我对我爱丽丝姑姑说的那样，她当老师后来变得非常富有。她来看我，从未结过婚。她说：“我能买得起这件皮大衣吗？”那是1968或1969年。我说：“爱丽丝，你不是在买它。你的侄女和侄子们是在买它，因为你是把钱留给他们的人。”

原文

But if you’re very well to do, in effect, you’re spending your heir’s money. I mean, it’s what I told my Aunt Alice after she went from teaching to be worth millions and millions of dollars. And she came to see me. She’d never been married. And she said, “Can I afford to buy this fur coat?” in 1968 or ‘69. And I said, “Alice, you aren’t buying it. Your nieces and nephews are buying it, because that’s who you’re leaving your money to.”

“代表你的侄女和侄子们，我想说我们希望你买下它。”同理。你的继承人希望你乘坐那架喷气机到处飞吗？还是希望你多留点钱给基金会或孩子们？解决这个问题的方法就是让你的孩子们自己也用上几个小时。

原文

“Speaking on behalf of your nieces and nephews I would say we want you to buy it.” And it’s the same way. Do your heirs want you to fly around in that jet? Or do they want you to leave a little more money to your foundation or your kids? And the way to solve that one is to offer your kids a few hours themselves.

然后他们的态度就会改变。所以，它是独一无二的。它在某种程度上做到了法拉利在汽车领域所做的事情。法拉利每年销售11,000辆汽车。也许12,000辆。它们闻名世界。我们在波士顿等地会有雪佛兰经销商。我们会卖出同样多的车。但我们不是法拉利。

原文

Then their attitude can change. So, it’s in a class by itself. It’s done what Ferrari has done in a different sort of way in cars. Ferrari sells 11,000 cars a year. I mean, maybe 12,000. And they’re known throughout the world. And we’ll have a Chevy dealership in Boston or something. We’ll sell as many cars. But we’re not Ferrari.

NetJets拥有600架——算上欧洲，大概650架，但今年我们将购买100架飞机。我们不会出售任何飞机，因为我们有积压订单。我们乘坐NetJets的航班去了东京。顺利抵达。在那里待了几天，然后飞回来。

原文

And NetJets has 600 — well, counting Europe, I mean, it’s maybe 650, but we’re going to buy 100 planes this year. And we won’t sell any, because we’ve got a backlog. And we took a NetJet flight over to Tokyo. And we arrived in good shape. And we spent a couple days there. And we flew back.

这没什么大不了。现在，你可能会说：“嗯，你老了，有点堕落之类的。”但钱会用于慈善事业。这些钱可能有一千亿或更多。我认为慈善机构希望我在自己身上花点钱。

原文

And there’s just nothing to it. Now, you can say, “Well, you’re getting sort of decadent and all that in your old age.” But the money will go to philanthropy. And the money will probably be a hundred billion or more. And I figured the philanthropies want me to spend a few bucks on myself.

它只需要比各个慈善机构花费的最后几美元更好——这些慈善机构在寻找有意义的事情上已经有很多困难。所以，NetJets没有竞争对手。我们前几天看了Wheels Up。

原文

All it has to do is be better than the last dollars that are spent by various philanthropies, which have plenty of problems finding things to do that make lots of sense. So, NetJets, there isn’t any competitor. We had looked the other day at Wheels Up.

股票在几年前以10美元发行。前几天它卖到了48美分。他们有12,600人预付了超过10亿美元的预付卡，他们给了钱，以后可以获得一定小时数的服务。

原文

Stock came out at $10 a couple years ago. It was selling at 48 cents the other day. And they’ve got 12,600 people that have given a billion dollars, a little over a billion dollars on prepaid cards where they’ve given them money, and they get a certain number of hours later on.

我不认为——我认为很有可能有些人以后会非常失望。

原文

And they don’t — I think there’s a good chance that some people are going to be very disappointed later on.

当他们有钱使用NetJets时，他们知道他们会乘坐和我以及我家人自我们收购公司之前就一直乘坐的飞机，由同样的飞行员驾驶。所以，这个决定并非出于商业目的。

原文

When they have money to do the NetJets, they know they’ll get on the same planes, with the same pilots as I and my family have flown on since before we bought the company. So, the decision wasn’t shaped by some commercial objective.

几年前，我从未听说过NetJets。弗兰克·鲁尼向我提起它。我立即买了股份。然后我们收购了这家公司。我的孩子们有时不得不乘坐商业航班。但有时他们也能用我们的。

原文

A couple years before, I’d never heard of NetJets. And Frank Rooney mentioned it to me. And I bought share immediately. And we bought the company. And, well, my kids have to fly commercial sometimes. But sometimes they get to use ours, too.

但我从未乘坐过其他公司的飞机。我为什么要呢？我的意思是，它是黄金标准。没有人能与我们的机队匹敌。如果你有600架飞机，你在美国更多地方拥有它们，比任何其他公司都多。我认为我们是第二大机队（听不清）商业航空公司。

原文

But I’ve never flown anything else. And why would I? I mean, it’s the gold standard. And nobody will match our fleet. I mean, if you got 600 planes, you’ve got them a lot more places in the United States than anybody else will have theirs. I think we’re the second largest fleet (UNINTEL) commercial airliners.

而且我们的机队正在增长，就像我说的，每年以100架的速度。所以，这是一家了不起的公司。

原文

And our fleet’s growing, like I said, at the rate of a hundred planes a year. So, it’s a marvelous company.

亚当·约翰逊表现得很好。你简直不敢相信他对公司做了什么。很长一段时间，这是一个艰难的商业模式。但他把它带到了现在的位置。我们应该永远拥有一家出色的公司。查理？

原文

And Adam Johnson has performed. You just can’t believe what he’s done with the business. It was a tough model for a long time. But he’s brought it where it is. And we should have a wonderful company forever. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，NetJets非常了不起。你可以说它现在价值不亚于任何一家航空公司。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, NetJets has been remarkable. You can argue that it’s worth as much as any airline now.

沃伦·巴菲特：它截然不同。查理——我们很难让查理购买NetJets的会员资格。然后我们想出了让他购买会员的办法：在机身里放一个经济舱座位。（笑声）

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s so different. And Charlie — we had a hard time selling Charlie a NetJets membership. And then we figured the way to get him to buy a membership was to put a coach seat in the fuselage. (LAUGHTER)

这真的让他动心了。我想他是我们唯一一个因此卖出的客户。

原文

And that really knocked him off. I think he’s the only one we sold on the basis of that.

查理·芒格：我以前从洛杉矶坐经济舱来参加伯克希尔年度股东大会。飞机上满是富有的股东。当我走进经济舱时，他们会鼓掌。我真的很喜欢那样。（笑声）（掌声）

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: I used to come to the Berkshire annual meetings on coach from Los Angeles. And it was full of rich stockholders. And they would clap when I came into the coach section. I really liked that. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE)

沃伦·巴菲特：但我得告诉你，我们让他半腐败了。他觉得他必须解释一下，但他仍然自己乘坐NetJets。不这样做才是疯了。你的继承人为此付钱。我的意思是，如果有任何人因为花在NetJets上的钱而让遗产变成负数，请告诉我。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: But I’ve got to tell you, we semi-corrupted him. He feels he kind of has to explain it, but he still flies in NetJet himself, so. And it’d be crazy not to. You know, your heirs are paying for it. I mean, find me anybody whose estate came in at less than zero because of what they spend on NetJets, threw them into that position, let me know.

但我还没见过这样的例子。巴菲特家族也不会是这样。是最后的剩余受益人支付了你的会员费。

原文

But I’ve never seen a case yet. And it won’t be the case for the Buffett family. And it’s the residual bottom beneficiary that’s paying for your membership.

不过，当你像查理和我一生中大部分时间那样生活时，要习惯花那么多钱有点困难。

原文

And it’s a little hard to get used to paying that much money though, when you’ve lived like Charlie and I have most of our lives.

21. 汽车行业令人着迷但难以预测

原文

21. Auto industry is fascinating but hard to predict

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。我们去11区。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We will go to section 11.

股东：你好。我叫刘汉弗莱，来自弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Humphrey Liu, I’m from Charlottesville, Virginia.

沃伦·巴菲特：啊！

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Ah!

股东：首先，我想对您、芒格先生、巴菲特先生以及所有伯克希尔人表示感谢，感谢你们每年举办这场盛大的活动。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First, I wanted to add my thanks to you and Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, and all of Berkshire, for throwing this grand event each year.

从全球趋势来看，零排放汽车似乎终于到了大规模普及的临界点。你们在这一领域是否看到了机会，无论是特定汽车制造商还是相关技术？

原文

Looking at the global trends, it increasingly does seem that zero-emission vehicles may have finally reached the cusp of mass adoption. Do you see any opportunities in this space, either in specific vehicle manufacturers or in related technologies?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我想说查理和我长期以来一直认为汽车行业太难了。你知道，福特汽车公司，亨利·福特，看起来他凭借T型车拥有了世界。他大幅降价，大幅提高工资。他可能有不同的个性或一些不同的观点，可能会当选美国总统。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that Charlie and I, we long have felt that the auto industry is just too tough. You know, the Ford Motor Company, I mean, Henry Ford, looked like he owned the world with the Model T. And he brought down the price dramatically, he took up wages dramatically. He might have been, with a different personality, or some different views, elected President of the United States.

最近有一本好书讲述了这段历史——也提到了内布拉斯加州——关于亨利·福特和托马斯·爱迪生联手的故事，可能是在一两年内。如果你对汽车感兴趣，应该读读那本书。

原文

I mean, there’s a good book that came out on that recently that told about the story — it tells a little about Nebraska in terms of it, but Henry Ford and Thomas Edison joining up, maybe a year or two it was. If you’re interested in autos, you ought to read that book.

但亨利·福特做到了，你知道，20年后他们却在亏损。另一个人，口袋里藏着枪，我想是哈里·贝内特，在管理福特汽车公司。当神童们加入时，它正走向破产。

原文

But Henry Ford did that, you know, and 20 years later they were losing money. And the other guy, with a gun in his pocket, I think Harry Bennett, you know, was running the Ford Motor Company. It was on its way to the junk heap when the whiz kids came in.

亨利·福特二世，他们称之为“汉克二世”，引进了泰克斯·桑顿和我的朋友RJ·米勒以及一些人。我前几天实际上在读1932年通用汽车的年度报告。这是我读过的最好的年度报告之一。它完全诚实地评估了他们的处境：当时他们有19,000家经销商，而我之前提到人口大约1.2亿。

原文

And Henry Ford II, “Hank the Deuce,” as they called him, brought in Tex Thornton, and my friend RJ Miller, and a few people. I was reading the other day, actually, the 1932 Annual Report of General Motors. And it’s one of the best annual reports I’ve read. It’s a totally honest, you know, assessment of exactly where they were: They had 19,000 dealers then, and the population, as I mentioned earlier, was about 120 million or so.

现在，美国有3.3亿人口，所有品牌加起来大约有18,000家经销商。这个行业有很多全球竞争对手，他们不会消失。在任何特定时期，似乎都有赢家，但这不会给你一个永久的位置。不过，正如我提到的，我认为法拉利处于特殊地位。

原文

And now, with 330 million people, all brands in the United States have, like, 18,000 dealers or something. It’s just a business where you’ve got a lot of worldwide competitors, they’re not going to go away. And it looks like there are winners in any given time, but it doesn’t get you a permanent place. Although, as I mentioned, I would say Ferrari is in a special place.

但他们每年只卖11,000或12,000辆车。去年美国，我想大概是1400多万辆。这不是一个让我们觉得着迷的行业。我们喜欢我们的经销商业务，但我不认为我能告诉你汽车行业五年或十年后会是什么样子。

原文

But they only sell 11,000 or 12,000 cars a year. In the U.S. last year, I think there were 14 million-something. And it’s not a business where we find it fascinating to be in. We like our dealership operation, but I don’t think I can tell you what the auto industry will look like five or ten years from now.

我确实认为你是对的，你会看到车辆的变革。但没有人会因为改变了车辆而拥有整个市场。查理？

原文

I do think that you’re right that, you know, you will see a change in the vehicles. But you won’t see anybody that owns the market because they changed the vehicle. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，电动汽车正在大行其道，这是一个非常有趣的发展。目前，它带来了巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。我不喜欢巨大的资本成本和巨大的风险。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the electric vehicle is coming big time, and that’s a very interesting development. At the moment, it’s imposing huge capital costs and huge risks. And I don’t like huge capital costs and huge risks.

沃伦·巴菲特：而且我们在美国补贴它，我们实际上也在尝试——试图加入亲劳工的——我的意思是，它也受到政治的巨大影响。但它会与我们共存，我们不会停止开车，美国公众对汽车有着深深的热爱。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And we’re subsidizing it in the United States, and we’re actually doing it — tried putting in a pro-labor-type — I mean, it is subject to politics like you can’t believe, too. But it’s going to be with us, we’re not going to quit driving cars, and — the American public has love affair with them.

但我认为我知道苹果五年或十年后会在哪里，而我不知道汽车公司五年或十年后会在哪里。我可能错了。但查理和我对汽车行业有着浓厚的兴趣。查理的公司在太平洋海岸证券交易所是通用汽车的专家，那是一个专营权，不是吗，查理？

原文

But I think I know where Apple’s going to be in five or ten years, and I don’t know where the car companies are going to be in five or ten years. And I may be wrong. But Charlie and I follow the auto business with intense interest. Charlie’s firm was the specialist at General Motors on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, and that was a franchise, wasn’t it, Charlie?

查理·芒格：是的。通过非常努力地工作，我们可以赚到一点钱。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. By working very hard, we could make a minor amount of money.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的。不过当时不是“一点”吧？得了吧——（笑）但是——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Wasn’t “minor” at the time, though. Come on — (LAUGH) but —

查理·芒格：是的，是的。即使是当时——

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it was. It was —

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Was it?

查理·芒格：——即使在当时也很少。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: — pretty minor at the time even.

沃伦·巴菲特：是吗？嗯，确实很少。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah? Well, it was pretty minor.

22. 巴菲特不担心美联储的资产负债表

原文

22. Buffett isn’t worried about the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自爱荷华州锡达拉皮兹的林赛·彼得·舒马赫。

原文

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Lindsay Peter Schumacher in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

“美联储资产负债表目前的规模是否让您担心？特别是量化宽松的结果——美联储凭空扩大了资产负债表。净效果本质上是一种单式记账，除了通过一系列分录之外，从无到有地创造价值。想知道芒格先生对此有何看法。”

原文

“Does the current size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet concern you? In particular, the result of quantitative easing — the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet out of nothing. The net effect in essence is a form of single-entry accounting creating something of value out of nothing other than a series of book entries. And wondering what Mr. Munger thinks about this as well.”

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我不认为美联储是问题所在，而且我认为他们无法解决财政问题。我不担心美联储。我认为它在履行其设立的职能。他们有两大目标，我可能不会支持将通胀目标从0改为每年2%。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think the Federal Reserve is the problem, and I think they can’t solve the fiscal problem. I do not worry about the Federal Reserve. I think it’s fulfilling the functions for which it was established. They have two objectives, and I would not have been one probably that would have changed the inflation objective: to 2% a year from 0.

你知道，我认为如果你告诉人们你的目标是每年让货币贬值2%，这会产生很多影响。虽然这对很多人来说感觉很好。很多人希望有点通胀，但除了那些背负大量债务的人，没有人希望高通胀。

原文

You know, I think that if you tell people that you’re shooting to depreciate your currency at 2% a year, that has a lot of implications. Although it feels good to a (LAUGH) lot of people. A lot of people want a little inflation, but nobody wants a lot of inflation except somebody’s that got a lot of debts.

我不担心美联储的资产负债表。我喜欢看它，数字很大——我一直喜欢大数字。但有趣的是：对我来说，最有趣的数字之一是流通中的货币。它已经——在2007年和2008年，人们说“现金是垃圾”，“所有这些现金都会消失”。

原文

And I do not worry about the Federal Reserve balance sheet. I enjoy looking at it, and the numbers are big — I always like big numbers. But it’s interesting: One of the most interesting figures, to me, is currency in circulation. I mean, it has gone — they were saying, “Cash is trash,” back in 2007 and ‘08, “and all that cash is going to disappear.”

嗯，如果你看看美联储的资产负债表，它已经从8000亿美元增加到2.2万亿美元，其中绝大多数是100美元钞票。我算了一下，在美国，包括婴儿在内，每人大约有50张100美元钞票。我真的很想知道所有这些钞票在哪里。

原文

Well, if you look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet, it’s gone from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion, and most of that’s in hundred-dollar bills, overwhelmingly. And I figured out I think there’s about 50 $100 bills per person — babies, everybody, in the United States, and I would really like to know where all of that is.

我的意思是，没人会在南美洲、非洲或其他地方囤积欧洲美元。现在对货币的需求——其中一些可能涉及微妙的毒品交易等活动。但任何认为“现金是垃圾”的人，都应该看看美联储的资产负债表。实际上，你可以看看有多少5美元、2美元和1美元钞票，而行动集中在100美元钞票上。

原文

I mean, nobody’s hoarding eurodollars, you know, in South America, or Africa, or wherever. And the demand for currency now — you know, some of it may be subtle drug dealers’ activities and of that. But anybody who thinks “cash is trash” ought to look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet. And, actually, you can look at how many $5 bills and $2 bills, and ones and all that, and the action has been in $100 bills.

100美元钞票的传播方式简直令人震惊。当然，我不知道它们在哪里，我认为美联储也无法确切知道，但他们可能会比我猜得更准。但我看到它发生了，你可以每周观察它，你会看到流通中的货币可能还会增长一点。相信我，“现金”不是垃圾。查理？

原文

I mean, it is just astounding the way that hundred-dollar bills have spread. And, of course, I don’t know where they are, and I don’t think the Fed can know exactly, but they’d probably make a lot better guess than I could. But I do it’s happened, and you can watch it every week, and you’ll watch currency in circulation probably grow a little bit. And, believe me, “cash” is not trash. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我不知道这一切会走向何方。情况已经非常极端。我认为你可以相当极端地对抗它：萧条等等，如果你事后回到一个有一定纪律的时期。但如果你只是——

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know where we’re headed with all of this. It’s been very extreme. I think you could be pretty extreme in fighting it: depressions and so forth, if you reverted afterwards to a period of some discipline. But if you just —

但如果你只是不断印钱并花掉它，我认为最终会导致严重的麻烦。你可以在拉丁美洲看到这一点。拉丁美洲总是让货币失控，当然，它在经济成就上远远落后于美国。所以，如果我们完全放弃旧的方式，进入一个只是试图印钱让日子好过点的新世界，我认为我们会付出代价。

原文

But if you’re going to just keep printing money and spending it, I think eventually it causes bad trouble. And you can see it Latin America. Latin America let its currency get out of control all the time, and, of course, it lagged the United States in economic achievement greatly. So, I think we pay a price if we ever give up our old ways entirely and go into a new world where we just try and print money, just make it easier to get through the year.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在二战中付出了代价，每个人——学童和其他人，包括我自己。我们购买了最初被称为“战争债券”、“国防债券”和“储蓄债券”等等。但从1942年到1944年或1945年，你支付18.75美元，拿回25美元。每个孩子都存了储蓄印花等等。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: We paid a price in World War II, I mean, everybody: school kids and everybody else, myself included. And we bought what were originally called “War Bonds,” and “Defense Bonds,” and “Savings Bonds,” and all that. But from 1942 to 1944 or ‘45, you paid out $18.75 and you got $25.00 back, and every kid saved savings stamps and all that.

但当一切结束时，国债占GDP的比例达到了120%，而不是30%或40%。随后我们经历了很多通货膨胀，很多。所以，那些真正购买债券支持战争的人，他们的部分购买力被夺走了。

原文

But when you got all through, you know, you had 120% of GDP in the national debt instead of 30% or 40%. And we had a lot of inflation subsequently, a lot. So, the people that really bought those bonds and supported the war had a portion of their purchasing power taken away from them.

嗯，这本身并没有什么错。但当国家养成这样做的习惯时，我认为很难找到与社会的崩溃点。但我认为你不应该想接近这个点。

原文

Well, there wasn’t anything wrong with that, particularly. But when the country gets in the habit of doing that, I think it’s tough to figure out where the breaking point is with society. But I don’t think you want to come anywhere close to it.

查理·芒格：是的，但让大量人口失业也很艰难。这就是矛盾所在。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but it’s also tough to have a mass of people unemployed. That’s the tension.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，这就是为什么美联储有两大目标，就业和通胀。但他们不是造成赤字的人。到目前为止，这个系统运作得还不错，尽管像我说的，它已经——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep. Well, that’s why the Fed has two objectives, in terms of employment and inflation. But they are not the ones that could create the deficits. And so far, the system has worked pretty well, although, like I say, it’s been —

查理·芒格：到目前为止，那个刚跳下高楼的家伙——

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: So, far, the man who just jumped off a tall building —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没错。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right.

查理·芒格：——在落地之前都还好。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: — is all right until he hits the ground.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）嗯，但我们可以现在停在第三层或第六层。我们不知道是哪一层，但我们知道还没有落地。但你知道，在政治上，投票批准拨款非常非常非常诱人，而投票支持增税则不好玩。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Well, but there could be ways we can stop now at the third floor, or the sixth floor. We don’t know what floor it is, but we know it hasn’t hit the ground. But, you know, politically it’s very, very, very tempting to vote appropriations, and it’s not fun to vote taxes.

拉塞尔·朗，参议院财政委员会主席，现在有一栋以他命名的建筑，他说：“你知道，不要向你征税，不要向我征税，向树后那个家伙征税。”（笑声）基本上，这就是态度——我的意思是，这是政治上有效的东西的现实。

原文

And Russell Long, head of the Senate Finance Committee, they’ve got a building named after him now, he said, “You know, don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that guy behind the tree.” And (LAUGH) basically that is the attitude — I mean, it’s the reality of what is useful in politics.

到目前为止，这个国家在处理许多理论上可能引起大问题的事情上运作得很好。但这并不能保证我们的未来，作为储备货币让我们可以做很多事情，但如果我们搞砸了，也会产生很多后果。查理？

原文

And so far, this country’s managed to work very well with lot of things that could theoretically cause a lot of problems. But it doesn’t guarantee us the future on it and being the reserve currency lets us do a lot of things, but it also creates a lot of consequences if we screw it up. Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，我们说得太多了，但这确实是个问题。我希望我们有解决办法。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’re beating a subject to death, but it is a problem. I wish we had a solution.

23. 我们需要照顾被资本主义取代的人

原文

23. We need to take care of people displaced by capitalism

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。现在我们去看一号台，看看是否能——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. With that we’ll go to station one and see if we —

股东：你好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫康纳，是诺丁汉大学的经济学学生。

原文

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name’s Connor, I’m an economics student at the University of Nottingham.

我今天的问题是，疫情期间我们经历了供应链短缺，尤其是来自亚洲的短缺。因此，公司出于政治意图选择将生产搬离。

原文

My question for you today is during the pandemic we witnessed supply chain shortages, especially from Asia. As a result, companies have chosen, with political intentions, to move production away.

公司应该做这些决定吗？政府应该支持它们吗？

原文

Should companies make these decisions? And should the government support them?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理？

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie?

查理·芒格：嗯，这是个好问题。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s a good question.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yep.

查理·芒格：显然，这是合乎逻辑的——如果你在经商，可以在墨西哥以更低成本制造产品，那么自然会在墨西哥开设工厂以获得更便宜的零件。许多汽车制造商正是这样做的。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Obviously, it’s logical — if you’re in business and you can make the thing in Mexico way cheaper, it’s natural to open a factory in Mexico and get your parts cheaper. And a lot of the auto manufacturers have done exactly that.

另一方面，没有人想掏空整个国家，所以所有的制造业工作都去了别处，而我们像一群农民一样生活：你知道，就像1820年的英国殖民地一样。这些想法当然存在巨大的矛盾。我们的海外生产没有那么多，对吧，沃伦？

原文

On the other hand, nobody wants to hollow out the whole country, so all the manufacturing jobs are elsewhere and we’re all living like a bunch of farmers: You know, like English colonies in 1820 or something. And these ideas are, of course, in big tension. We don’t have that much foreign production, right, Warren?

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。嗯，但我们损失了——最初，伯克希尔·哈撒韦作为一家纺织品制造商，因为南方变得比北方可行而失败。当然，最终——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, but we’ve lost — well, originally Berkshire Hathaway, as a textile manufacturer, lost because the South became feasible versus the North. And, of course, then eventually —

查理·芒格：南方变得昂贵——

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: The South got expensive —

沃伦·巴菲特：南方变得——

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: South got —

查理·芒格：——并搬到了中国。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: — and moved to China.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。社会受益，而一些人在这种情况下受到损害。一个富裕的社会应该以某种方式照顾那些在我们的鞋厂、纺织公司工作的人。我的意思是，如果你在我们的纺织厂工作，1964年我们接手时，一半的工人只说葡萄牙语。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure. And society benefits and some people get killed in that sort of a situation. And a rich society should take care, one way or another, of people that worked in our shoe factories, people who worked in our textile companies. I mean, if you worked in our textile operation, in 1964 when we took it over, half our workers only spoke Portuguese.

你知道，他们赚的钱并不很多。但现在可以在南方做这事，我们注定要关门。这绝不是工人的错。也不是我们的错：我们一直试图竞争。

原文

And, you know, they weren’t getting great wages at all. But now you could do it in the South, and we were doomed to go out of business. And it wasn’t the fault of the worker in any way, shape, or form. It wasn’t our fault: We kept trying to compete.

查理·芒格：嗯，田纳西河流域管理局在那里有廉价电力。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, TVA had cheap power down there.

沃伦·巴菲特：当然。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure.

查理·芒格：税收确实能产生电力。

原文

CHARLIE MUNGER: And tax dollars really can yield power.

沃伦·巴菲特：空调改变了一切，因为那些鬼地方太热了。还有很多其他因素。但随后它又在很多方面转移到海外，总体而言国家因此变得更好了。

原文

WARREN BUFFETT: And air conditioning changed everything because the heat in those damn places was impossible. And so, a lot of things. But then it moves offshore in many ways, and net the country is better off because of it.

但它取代了很多在生活中无法做其他事情的人。你不能对55或60岁、只会说葡萄牙语的人说“再培训”，告诉他们会在马萨诸塞州新贝德福德有“伟大的